Says who? You've got to realize how loaded the terms "logical" and "physical" are. You're defining something by your own personal definitions, which have no apparent rigor behind them. What does it mean to be in a state of "logical equanimity" and "physicality"? What qualifies something as "actually being there"? This is degenerating from technical qualifications, to existential qualifications and now to random definitions being haphazardly used. How much experience do you have with formal logical systems? The intuitive, colloquial version of "logic" doesn't cut it in these contexts, as is evidenced by your repeated fallacies and habitually conflicting positions.
Logical and physical aren't loaded terms, they have set definitions, considering there are sciences devoted to them both that describe their laws objectively, and I am merely using them in the context of how they are used as such in their respective studies. Physical is defined by things that follow the laws of physics, and "logical equanimity" are merely the logical prerequisites that all things must possess in order to exist, such as the Four Laws that are self evident and etc. Nothing can exist if in doing so it betrays the laws of logic, and it simply doesn't exist if it doesn't follow the rules of physics as well, so we are bound by both, that is not only conventional wisdom but professional wisdom. What physicist is going to say things are not as I speak of them? Unfortunately, mathematics does not have any logic to it, it isn't a logical system, it is a bunch of equations and measurements that contain things that are not even conceivable. No, I do not believe that one can conceive of a line, being able to simply give a definition of something isn't the equivalent of conceiving it, I can describe an assortment of fairy tale things, and no I do not mean "imagine". The word defined, like dragons, doesn't make it exist in any sense, got it isn't existent, and it either "is" or "is not", there is no middle ground. Just like with the apples you spoke of before, the name is simply a convenient designator, "apples" do not exist, nor do they exist because I choose to describe what we call apples with one world and not a list of all the properties and dimensions of apples in general or of any specific apple.
If we're thinking of something that does not physically exist, but still referring to it and being able to conceive of it, e.g. counterfactuals ("if" statements), unicorns and even the subjunctive mood in language, then from where does the thought come?
I've answered this, it is a combination of senses that we have acquired. Unicorns do not exist in
any sense, they've only been imagined and drawn.
This is exceptionally fallacious contention. You're discrediting my argument on a basis that you've neither succeeded in, nor attempted to prove. It's circular reasoning; you're basing your premise on an informally invalid conclusion that if something cannot be sensed, it does not exist.
Okay then, explain to me this one time what it is that you mean by a metaphysical mind? If metaphysics either describes something beyond the physical or simply describes physical aspects, where does "metaphysical mind" come in?
This is a head-scratcher, and honestly affirms my belief that you do not understand the principle of my argument or follow what I've been saying. Were you following my positions accurately, you'd know that my position is that if it can be conceived or even mentioned, then it exists, if not physically, metaphysically. So by mentioning something, I will automatically qualify it as at least metaphysically existent. So this statement is vacuous.
So describe what kind of metaphysical thing a conceived thing is and why it is as such.
Then from where comes the idea of pure numbers? How is algebra possible? You obviously don't understand numbers if you believe it only involves natural numbers, as implied by your "sensing more than one thing" clause. What about imaginary numbers; the square root of one? We can't sense negative numbers; we can't sense imaginary or complex numbers, yet they yield physically meaningful results; how do you explain this?
I was answering as to how the concept of numbers originated, although it is self-evident that the rest were developed by messing around with such concepts in new ways, in the same way Isaac Newton came up with Calculus, he simply had an obsession with math and tried doing all sorts of things with it. That is why it is dangerous to get wrapped up in it, it has practical usages, but only insofar as they measure actual things, but this does not entail any sort of existence.
How is the concept of imaginary numbers possible if we can't visualize them? It's very evident that they are logically sound. You've ensnared yourself in yet another tall order of profound explanations. You're faced with the burden of justifying the notion that we can only conceive what we sense and what is physical, yet imaginary and negative numbers can't physically exist and cannot be attached to physical objects, much like the Banach-Tarski paradox. I want every question in this body of text answered.
An apple is one thing, right? If not, you concede that an apple as a whole is an abstract, synthetic categorization that does not naturally or physically exist, after all, how can something exist as both a singular thing and multiple things? Clearly you just referred to the universe as one thing by invoking it in a single word, but then maintain it's not one thing; how can it be defined as having two quantities? That's a physical impossibility. For the universe to not be one thing, and an apple to be one thing, you hold a principally contradictory stance. Both are just an arrangement of atoms, correct? You've tangled yourself in yet another web of conflicting stances borne of only an intuitive approach. Either way you go, you either contradict your stance that the universe being singular is absurd if you insist categories are nonexistent but still invoke an apple as a singular object, or you force yourself to reject the notion that an apple is singular, but therefore possesses a dual quality of plurality and conceptual singularity (since an apple is invoked as a singular object, but is contrasted to the notion that the universe being singular is absurd despite both just being a collection of atoms) which is physically impossible; physical objects cannot maintain plurality and singularity concomitantly.
Saying that I am a person does not entail that I am one thing, in fact, I am most certainly not, but it is a convenient designator that we use in order to prevent have to know and describe everything that we are in order to describe ourselves. The idea is singular, yes, but that is all semantics, I'm surprised you wouldn't catch that. An apple isn't a singular object, the idea simply entails the description of one thing, but that thing is a plurality of things. In fact, I didn't even say anything that you are describing up above, I am confused as to where you got all of that.
That's not even close to the point. You were making an appeal to authority by saying Parmenides' subjugating Socrates' argument disproved the theory of Forms instead of just Socrates' particular argument for it.
No, I am saying that no one has EVER proven the existence of "forms". Socrates failed, Plato failed, Parmenides couldn't do so, he just simply "believed" it because he didn't know what else to say on the matter. Conclusion: They don't exist, or they do, they haven't been proven by you.
They're only negating qualities under your self-validated premises and definitions of existence, which you've yet to proffer a valid argument for. I never said anything about existing without existence; that's how you perceive it under your premises. I speak of two different kinds of existence; not two antipodes.
I'd rather enjoy watching you try to prove something that is impossible to be possible. Although, the very sentence blatantly says it can't be done. You said forms didn't have physical value and therefore didn't exist, which seems valid and true to me and is aligned with everything I've been saying thus far, but if that is the case, they are thus impossible to provide evidence for, and therefore impossible to prove.
And <why> does thinking entail existence? Because it is acknowledgment, and is therefore existent. You do not understand the invocation of cogito ergo sum if you think it solely applies to metacognition and solipsistic contexts. The thinking of oneself isn't magically different from thinking about an apple; they both affirm existence for the same reason. The reference and mention of the thought or idea alone implies existence, otherwise you're faced with the explanation of how something nonexistent can be mentioned.
You have no understanding of cogito ergo sum, or else you'd know that proof of our existence is from our wondering about it, it isn't done because we wondered about ourselves, or else whatever we wondered ourselves to be would be what it is, our thoughts can't cause ontological changes which has been expressed before. Even after researching the topic again, and it in no way says of anything that you're talking about, I am thoroughly confused. Descartes makes specific mention of a premise such as "Whatever has the property of thinking, exists." Let us disregard all of the criticisms of the theory itself, for you don't even make it that far, it isn't a part of this discussion in any way. As a result, it is even harder to envision your basis that thinking of things creates them.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum#Criticisms
