I'm not sure what exactly you're trying to say here. From a purely set theoretic standpoint, a set is entirely described by it elements.
Then the distinction between improper and proper subsets is void. It ties into what I said about Hume's proposition that "whole" things don't exist, only their parts; the "apple" doesn't exist physically; only its properties do. The distinction between an improper and proper subset reflects that.
Let me rephrase this to see if I understand your argument correctly:
We can conceive of AC as valid; hence there is a realm in which we can conceive of it, and since AC contradicts physical laws, this realm must be non-physical.
Does this accurately reflect your position? If so, I think I can buy this as an answer to my specific objection (although I think there's still hope for the physicalist position - I'll need to reread more closely before I get into that, though).
80% of it or so, yeah.
I don't know what you're getting at, I'm not entirely sure how the unicorn point that was made by John is refuted.
You're not understanding how physicalities work. In order for something to be <represented> as he said is in and of itself a metaphysical concept. How can it represent it, yet not be it? How can it represent it without being it, in a physical world? "Sense-datum" can't explain the abstract representation of the unicorn if the unicorn doesn't physically exist.
Here: Existence is the state of something when it is physical and logical. Without both criterion being met, it simply does not exist. All things must have sense to it, and all things need to be actually there, and therefore must be physical as well. Those two criterion are existence isolated to its exact criterion, nothing else is needed.
Says who? You've got to realize how loaded the terms "logical" and "physical" are. You're defining something by your own personal definitions, which have no apparent rigor behind them. What does it mean to be in a state of "logical equanimity" and "physicality"? What qualifies something as "actually being there"? This is degenerating from technical qualifications, to existential qualifications and now to random definitions being haphazardly used. How much experience do you have with formal logical systems? The intuitive, colloquial version of "logic" doesn't cut it in these contexts, as is evidenced by your repeated fallacies and habitually conflicting positions.
We can conceive of many things if we'd like, and yet that doesn't entail existence, or else all sorts of absurd things could exist, an immense amount of things if not infinite.
If we're thinking of something that does not physically exist, but still referring to it and being able to conceive of it, e.g. counterfactuals ("if" statements), unicorns and even the subjunctive mood in language, then from where does the thought come?
Does is generate from the void?
If all things are strictly physical, then how can we conceive of unreal scenarios, and statements expressing irreality?
What about potentiality? Isn't potentiality an illusion in a deterministic universe?
Then how is it conceived? It doesn't exist, yet here we are referring to it; that necessarily entails its existence, but on a plane not necessarily physical. This should be self-evident.
And no, you cannot talk about a metaphysical mind, you have yet to make any sense of what you talk about, you don't know what it is like, how it is there, etc. Nothing can exist without the ability of people imagining it, because that means you cannot sense it in any way imaginable, and therefore there is nothing to even imagine.
This is exceptionally fallacious contention. You're discrediting my argument on a basis that you've neither succeeded in, nor attempted to prove. It's circular reasoning; you're basing your premise on an informally invalid conclusion that if something cannot be sensed, it does not exist.
Also, numbers are not metaphysical, they are ideas that can measure, you can't even isolate one of anything in existence, let alone one itself. They aren't non-physical either, they just don't exist in any form. There are no such things as metaphysical either, they just merely describe physical things. A "type of description of being" mind doesn't make sense. If you are going to use the "beyond physical" metaphysics mentioned earlier, may I remind you that you beat into the discussion you do not mean non-physical. It feels like you are cherry-picking with this non-physical and metaphysical stuff. So either you are proposing something non-physical, which you admitted to having no explanation for, or you are saying something nonsensical with metaphysics.
I never said I lacked an explanation for the metaphysical; I said I lacked a way to force you to understand the concepts at hand. And again, all of this, in its lacking of analogies, anecdotes or rhetorical questioning of any kind, is a paragraph essentially telling me that my propositions are incorrect just because.
You've still yet to satisfactorily answer my questions regarding the Banach-Tarksi paradox, touching an idea, or if numbers exist in nature, and if they don't, how come? Why do humans need to be present?
I can mention a lot of things we both would agree don't exist.
This is a head-scratcher, and honestly affirms my belief that you do not understand the principle of my argument or follow what I've been saying. Were you following my positions accurately, you'd know that my position is that if it can be conceived or even mentioned, then it exists, if not physically, metaphysically. So by mentioning something, I will automatically qualify it as at least metaphysically existent. So this statement is vacuous.
Numbers are learned from us sensing more than one thing. Numbers don't even exist unless it is relative to objects for it to signify, so again they are purely symbols, and those do not exist
Then from where comes the idea of pure numbers? How is algebra possible? You obviously don't understand numbers if you believe it only involves natural numbers, as implied by your "sensing more than one thing" clause. What about imaginary numbers; the square root of one? We can't sense negative numbers; we can't sense imaginary or complex numbers, yet they yield physically meaningful results; how do you explain this?
How is the concept of imaginary numbers possible if we can't visualize them? It's very evident that they are logically sound. You've ensnared yourself in yet another tall order of profound explanations. You're faced with the burden of justifying the notion that we can only conceive what we sense and what is physical, yet imaginary and negative numbers can't physically exist and cannot be attached to physical objects, much like the Banach-Tarski paradox. I want every question in this body of text answered.
if existence was all one thing, the conception of plurality wouldn't come across to us (although the universe being one thing is absurd, but it demonstrates my point). It is like how we made human time, by labeling a measurement with a symbol such as a second or a day. The idea of numbers only came to light because of other ideas. Again, trying to coincide mathematical sense to physical sense is going to confuse you, just as you are and are thus forced to put forth something you don't even understand to answer it, is not a good idea.
Oh? How is the universe not one thing? Conversely, how is it single thing? How is one definition more valid than the other? That dual conception of wholeness and plurality is a <quintessential> facet of metaphysics.
An apple is one thing, right? If not, you concede that an apple as a whole is an abstract, synthetic categorization that does not naturally or physically exist, after all, how can something exist as both a singular thing and multiple things? Clearly you just referred to the universe as one thing by invoking it in a single word, but then maintain it's not one thing; how can it be defined as having two quantities? That's a physical impossibility. For the universe to not be one thing, and an apple to be one thing, you hold a principally contradictory stance. Both are just an arrangement of atoms, correct? You've tangled yourself in yet another web of conflicting stances borne of only an intuitive approach. Either way you go, you either contradict your stance that the universe being singular is absurd if you insist categories are nonexistent but still invoke an apple as a singular object, or you force yourself to reject the notion that an apple is singular, but therefore possesses a dual quality of plurality and conceptual singularity (since an apple is invoked as a singular object, but is contrasted to the notion that the universe being singular is absurd despite both just being a collection of atoms) which is physically impossible; physical objects cannot maintain plurality and singularity concomitantly.
It isn't a puzzle, but I myself am willing to explain things luckily for you using the method just explained. If I understand math well, better than most people, logically I should be able to explain how to people that don't know it, and that I should also be well aware of smaller things such as 1+1=2, and so on.
See above paragraph regarding my questioning of your understanding of math.
Yeah, just because he believed in them doesn't change the fact that he couldn't make sense of it either or prove anything. If I believe I am right in this conversation... does that make me right? Surely not, you believe you're right too! And interestingly, no one has been able to make sense of forms since. It is unlikely we will ever be insufficient to prove it since it doesn't exist.
That's not even close to the point. You were making an appeal to authority by saying Parmenides' subjugating Socrates' argument disproved the theory of Forms instead of just Socrates' particular argument for it.
If you think something doesn't exist it becomes impossible to prove on the assumption you are correct. Of course, you believe in things can exist without existence, but I'm still waiting for some explanation as to how something can bear both negating qualities at once.
They're only negating qualities under your self-validated premises and definitions of existence, which you've yet to proffer a valid argument for. I never said anything about existing without existence; that's how you perceive it under your premises. I speak of two different kinds of existence; not two antipodes.
Thinking entails existence. Thinking of something doesn't entail the existence of that something, only that which is thinking is proven to exist.
And <why> does thinking entail existence? Because it is acknowledgment, and is therefore existent. You do not understand the invocation of cogito ergo sum if you think it solely applies to metacognition and solipsistic contexts. The thinking of oneself isn't magically different from thinking about an apple; they both affirm existence for the same reason. The reference and mention of the thought or idea alone implies existence, otherwise you're faced with the explanation of how something nonexistent can be mentioned.