Long post incoming. Sorry not sorry.
While this may be an explanation, the major point was that man is not naturally atheist. The natural state of man is theism. Gather some children together, throw them in isolation with no contact, they'll still come out believing there's a life after death. We know this from history.
[…]
When it comes to personal accounts, sure.
[collapse=ON THE CAUSALITY OF BELIEF]
Yes. I’m not contesting this. My point is (or was) this:
There is something innate in humans that leads to the tendency for theism. That is, the emergence of beliefs in spirits, afterlives, deities, and so on. On this, we can agree, as it is the most that can be said with accuracy and certainty.
But what is the
cause of these beliefs? This is the question of interest.
You propose that it’s because humans have a connection to these “theistic forces” of spirits and afterlives and deities.
I proposed that there are alternative explanations, such as neurological and physiological factors that cause these beliefs to arise naturally in humans. I raise this motion of alternative accounts because it means that we can’t accept your proposal outright.
That there is more than one potential account means that we have to examine these alternatives, to see which of them might be more probable, or warranted, or so on. For the latter account, we have the capacity to observe these neurological and psychological quirks in action.
For the former, there is certainly testimony of
experiences of theistic forces. Is there any other way to corroborate such testimonies (beyond, say, suicide, so that one can peek beyond the proverbial veil)?
Lacking such corroboration, it’s harder to assess the probability and plausibility of the theistic account. And what’s more, we do know that testimony can be inaccurate, flawed, or misremembered due to cognitive biases and the like—factors that do figure in the naturalistic account of the theism effect.[/collapse]
That's not really a problem at all unless you're a muslim and believe everyone is naturally muslim. The idea that humanity comprehends that there is more then the material world does not require humanity to have actual knowledge of it.
Side note: I wasn't very focused with my previous post and sort of threw a bunch of stuff at the wall. The argument I'm going to be trying to make here is that the world is not just materialistic.
[collapse=ON MATERIALISM AND DUALISM]
I don’t know what it means for something to be “material”.
It’s a pretty strange category, mostly due to the baggage the historical term brings. By saying the universe (or our experience) is “material”, there’s the tacit suggestion that there is, or can be, the “immaterial”.
But on what grounds do we suppose there exists such a distinction? If there is no distinction, the term “material” doesn’t have much explanatory use. Neither would “immaterial”. You could call the universe immaterial if you wanted, or material, or frumptious. Labels become arbitrary.
Could you perhaps clarify on what it means for a thing to be “material”? Is it anything that is the expression of particles and waves and fields (matter, energy, quantum hullaballoo, etc.)? If this is the case—and I imagine it might, since that’s the formulation I’ve seen the most—what “else” might there be, and how might we determine there is such a “something else”?
By addressing this, you would also address how humans can interact or detect such immaterial elements (and such, go some way in supporting, or at least clarifying, your claims). Our sense organs and bodies are attuned for the material. What mechanism do we have to detect the immaterial? Is it the spirit or soul? What is that? How does that interact with our bodies? How does the material interact with the immaterial?
Theism usually always invokes dualism of substance. But how these substances interact is the central issue. If that cannot be explained or accounted for, then you can’t account for why people can connect to the immaterial (which the basis of your position). So I would suggest that you make your case for substance dualism, since if you can make a case for that, most of your other claims will likely follow.[/collapse]
I don't see how the fact that it can have a natural explanation removes it from the equation? Why have it at all?
[collapse=ON COMPETING HYPOTHESES]
The natural account doesn’t remove the theistic account from the discussion. It just increases the margin of doubt for the latter, and means there is more work that one has to do.
If the theistic account stood uncontested, then it would be a far more warranted account to accept. Because it does not stand uncontested, it is less warranted to accept. That’s all there is to it.
You presented your claims straight and bold without any elaboration, so your statements had an absolutist tone (especially with the assertions of “self-evidence”). My response aimed to question the assertions of self-evidence—that is, that your claims are not self-evident at all. At best, they serve as one hypothesis among others.
That’s generally been my angle so far.
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The argument is that almost every single human to have ever existed has experienced somethings spiritual. The ones who say they never have and don't are the small, tiniest minorities of humanity, both to exist now and to ever have existed. If 40 million people from all different parts of the world say they're feeling a connection to something higher, that is pretty good evidence that something higher has to exist, even if not any of the specifics. If 99.9% of every human to have existed feels the same, that's even better evidence.
[collapse=ON STATISTICS AND INFERENCES]
It’s evidence toward a hypothesis—namely, the hypothesis that these experiences point to theistic forces.
What if 99.9% of humans have a flawed or biased understanding of these experiences on account of neurological quirks? We know that humans do possess these quirks, which can colour their thinking and interpretation of their experiences.
99.9% percent of humans are humans, so 99.9% of them would express such quirks and biases and effects. Ergo, 99.9% of humans believe in immaterial things because of a combination of genetics, neurology, behaviour, lack of knowledge, and cultural reinforcement?
You seem to be proposing “people have theistic experiences, ergo theism is true”. But that doesn’t necessarily follow—
even if 99.9% of people have such experiences. Because there’s the prospect of all of those people being wrong in part or in whole.
You might find such a proposition incredulous—how can
virtually all humans be so off the mark about their collective experiences?—and I agree that it’s quite a bit to chew, but the truth doesn’t care about your (or my) incredulity (or credulity, for that matter).
My stance is “people have theistic experiences, so let’s investigate the cause”. I invoke natural factors because we can observe and measure such factors, and their effect on the interpretation of experience. So that seems to be a viable avenue of investigation.
If you have a proposal for how one might go about investigating the theistic account, please do share. In so doing, you might demonstrate that like the natural account, the theistic account is also a viable avenue for investigation. For we are investigators, you see; we are skeptical and inquisitive, and don’t want to accept claims at face value.
[/collapse]
How can you experience what doesn't exist?
[collapse=ON EXPERIENCE AND AGENCY]
This question is phrased strangely. What are you responding to?
I claim that it is the case that
we have the incorrigible experience of agency. Do you agree with that much?
The question is whether this experience applies beyond our experience. What if our every thought and emotion and experience was predestined, such that
we are predestined to feel as though we have agency? What if, in spatial dimensions greater than the third, that all points in our timeline exist simultaneously (which would include all actions we ever have done or will do)?
This is the issue central to the question of free-will VS determinism. How can we authenticate our experiences without appealing our experiences? This is circular, which means there exists no corroboration.
Do note that I am NOT making a claim that determinism is true, or that I do indeed believe free-will to be false. What I AM claiming is that your assertion is tenuous. “We feel like we have free-will, ergo free-will is the case”. My argument is that this does not follow, since there is doubt as to the validity of that experience as it relates to reality beyond ourselves.
[/collapse]
Even when science had no understanding of disease or how it was spread we still understood that disease exist because we can experience it. We can notice that we make choices.
[collapse=ON EMPIRICISM AND TESTIMONY]
Yes. As per my above response, I do not contest that we
experience agency. I also don’t contest that there may be free-will. But I
do contest that experience
alone is sufficient as evidence or proof, since we know that experience
can be misleading or incorrectly processed/interpreted. How do we remove or minimize doubt? By corroboration.
It’s why, in courts of law, it’s preferable to have something more than mere witness testimony. Artifacts from the crime scene(s), records with relevant data, video or audio documentation. Witness testimony is not invalid, of course, but it can be unreliable, and having something more
in addition to testimony invariably strengthens one’s case. And so too, I propose, does it go with addressing the theism effect, authenticating agency, and so on—cases for which, so far, you only offer experience, or witness testimony, as exhibits.
We understood that disease existed, because we could experience it. And eventually, we investigated and discovered the cause (namely, bacterial and/or viral infection).
We have not yet such explanatory strides for agency. The key, in my view, will be to confirm the nature of time, if that’s possible. Is there a “present”? Is our timeline stretched out before us, or do we build our timeline one frame at a time? Can we influence this progression? Do our actions cause divergent outcomes (parallel timelines and the like)? Are such divergences in themselves (pre)determined?
Because it is certainly the case that we are influenced by factors beyond ourselves. We exist in space and time, so the rules of space and time would invariably dictate how much agency we truly have.
But this is beside the point. I suggest that you seek to find material, if any, that supports the case for free-will
in addition to witness testimony (i.e. the testimony of the experience of agency). Because I do agree that such testimony
can and does serve as supporting evidence for the free-will hypothesis. I just wonder if it's enough to make that belief justifiable.
[/collapse]
This is false, as you can easily use the exact same argument to disprove anything humanity has ever discovered. We use common sense to tell us about the universe, but how do we know our common sense works? By the use of our common sense. We see fire, we think it's hot. We touch it, it is hot. Fire is hot. The initial assessment, the experiment, the data, the conclusion, all determined by our common senses. If your argument is correct then we can no longer claim to know a single thing, not even if we exist.
(Note: sorry didn't watch the podcasts)
[collapse=ON SKEPTICISM]
No worries on the podcasts. They are upwards of an hour long each, so they are a commitment. I nonetheless leave the links there for yourself or anyone else to view, should they wish to.
First, could you define “common sense”? Appeals to common sense are frequent, so the actual definition of the term has, in my experience, become clouded. I would appreciate if you could forward a definition to which we could hold to.
Science paints a provisional picture of the universe. For all we know, our experience could be illusory—a program, or brains in a vat. It remains that whatever “this” is, it has consistent rules that govern all interactions. And we can observe, detect, measure, and even predict them (with sufficient data). This is the foundation of methodological naturalism—the idea that our experience, whatever it may ultimately be, can be explained and explored using scientific methodology. Science only works if it assumes methodological naturalism as an axiom.
Perhaps, then, it was misguided, or inaccurate of me to lean on the term “experience”. I think my judicial analogy sketched up above is a better fit for what I’m trying to convey.
What I’m skeptical about is the claim that our interpretation of experience
alone is sufficient to warrant the acceptance of a claim. In this thing we call "reality", experience and science have cross-examined the fact that testimony alone can be unreliable or misinterpreted. To have testimony
and something else is better than testimony alone.
We currently only have the testimony of agency to support the idea that space and time are decidedly agency-ish (unless, again, you have something more to share). In other words,
if there was no life whatsoever to speak of in the universe at all anywhere, that the universe would
still be rooted in free-will. Free-will, therefore, becomes a principle that would exist
independent of
human experience, yet a principle that we are all utterly subjected to.
Is this at all clearer? To be skeptical is to not accept anything at face-value, or not without consideration. Even the notion that we “know”, or
can know, anything at all is not exempt from skeptical inquiry (and such questions are the domain of epistemology, the branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge). The notion that “we” exist at all is similarly not exempt (and becomes the subject of philosophy of mind and ontology and metaphysics).
But this doesn’t mean we should or need to reject that we do know anything; it only means that we must acknowledge that everything we know is provisional, and
can be subject to change the moment new information comes to light.
So hopefully, that clarifies my position. With all that said, I would now like to start a new line of inquiry, seeking to clarify your position.
Could you define “free-will”, and/or “agency”? In what way, and to what extent, do I, Sehnsucht, have free-will? How much agency do I have, if at all? To what extent do the laws and rules of my reality inhibit, or allow, the expression agency on my part?
And in what way would the presence of free-will/agency serve as support for the theistic hypothesis? How does the latter follow from the former? It occurs to me writing this that in your opening dialogue, you kind of just said “free-will exists, so this supports theism”. At least it's clear how your other points pertain to theism, but I don’t think you touched on why free-will was relevant. So if you could expand on all of this, it would be great. 8)
[/collapse]
That's not historically true. The question of Jesus was more then open to criticism since the 18th century, and in fact most of the American founding fathers did not believe in Jesus historically. The fact that you just linked to a podcast shows that debate about Jesus's existence are more then allowed in our country.
And I didn't watch the podcasts, I'll get back to it later since that sidetracks it. I will, however, point out again the support among historians for Jesus' existence is in the same category as biologist support for evolution.
[collapse=ON HISTORICITY]
Our country? I’m Canadian, my good sir. 8P
I do not deny that there is a school of thought among biblical historians that proposes Jesus to have been a historical figure—that whether or nor he was messiah, Jesus was a man like any other who lived roughly two millennia ago, or thereabouts.
What I am doing is bringing to the discussion the notion of Jesus not only not being messiah, but never having existed at all—that he is a character formed as a pastiche of historical and/or mythical characters.
I bring this up in the same way I bring up the naturalist account for the theism effect. In your opening post to this discussion, you made strong assertions of self-evidence and/or overwhelming evidence. This included the assertion that Jesus was, at minimum, a man who did indeed exist in Judea of old,
and who spread the word of God,
and was crucified by the Romans,
and that the testimony of disciples seeing Jesus after his death are all legitimate.
This is one hypothesis, which, as you note, is taken seriously among many historians in the field of biblical study (and is not necessarily unwarranted). Another hypothesis that also has some basis for it is that the historical Jesus is a fiction.
So we have multiple competing hypotheses. Can we determine which of them is correct? If not, which seems most probable, given all available evidence?
This is the work presented before us. My claim is not strictly that Jesus never existed (though I am inclined to think it is a valid hypothesis), but that the
strength of your assertion is not warranted. You can’t say “many biblical scholars think Jesus existed historically, ergo he existed historically”; at most, you could say “in my view, the existence of the historical Jesus is the most plausible hypothesis”.
And then you would go on to explain why you think as much (through the presentation of supporting materials and the refutation of detracting materials).
Though I will once more note that I am less in a position to do said work unless I recuse myself to do extensive research on the subject of biblical historicity, which could take awhile. Because currently, I feel my knowledge is not sufficient to aptly debate the matter. As a result, I don’t intend to press the point of the non-historicity of Jesus; I’m only questioning all of your claims of self-evidence and strong assertions.
[/collapse]
I don't get this. You claim there is no need for a moral lawmaker, but in your example you proposed an example of a moral lawmaker (although a ridiculous one), but then seemed to be arguing on the idea that you didn't.
[collapse=ON LOGIC AND ETHICS]
Perhaps I didn’t explain myself adequately, then.
You claimed there could be
no logical formulation of a moral system without a moral lawmaker (in your case, God). As I responded, this is not the case.
A logical system is logical so long as it obeys the rules of logic (consistency, causal progression, etc.). At the foundation of logic are axioms, statements that are otherwise arbitrary, but that we agree to deem them as being true (or that they are the case).
Hence why I said you could have a “logical formulation” of a moral system without God, since all you’d have to do is propose one or more axioms that don’t include God that serve as the basis of your moral philosophy.
I used the puppy example to demonstrate the arbitrary quality of axioms. Sure, it was absurd, but it illustrates the concept just as well.
Try this less absurd, and very basic formulation of a possible moral philosophy:
-”Good” is defined as that which maximizes happiness for as many as possible;
-We do tend to desire happiness more than non-happiness;
-Therefore, we generally desire happiness;
-Therefore, if we want to acquire happiness, then we should pursue the good;-We generally do want to acquire happiness;
-Therefore, we should pursue the good, and all actions that enact the good.
This is a basic syllogistic formulation. My axiom is that “good” = ”maximal happiness”, and every premise that follows stems from that axiom.
But I don’t
have to define “good” in the way I did. You could propose a different definition of “good” and come up with a different formulation, so long as your following premises hold your axiom to be the case (and that there are no internal contradictions between premises).
A moral philosophy is only useful inasmuch as it can be applied. If you had a moral philosophy, but never applied, it might as well exist in a vacuum. As such, you can devise a moral philosophy and apply it in the real world. And in so doing, you can test your moral philosophy and the soundness of your axioms by seeing if the results of applying this philosophy are congruent with what your axioms predict.
So, if I were to apply my example formulation above in the real world, and found that the philosophy failed to yield the expected results—people don’t want happiness, pursuing the maximizing of happiness fails to maximize happiness, etc.—then I would then know that my philosophy is flawed, or unsound.
But if that same philosophy does work in the actual world, then I have in my hands a valid and sound moral philosophy that I can practice. And all thanks to the power of axioms and logical relations.
You might say such a philosophy is insufficient because there is no basis for me to say that “good” is what I say it is. And I completely agree; that is precisely why axioms are said to be
arbitrary. But even if they
are arbitrary, what difference does it make if I nonetheless formulate a moral philosophy that is consistent and works in the actual world?
[/collapse]
Yet there's multiple religious concepts that go against evolutionary nature. **** is a prime example. In evolutionary terms, **** is good, it allows for more reproduction, more gene spreading. Yet almost every religion has laws against ****.
[collapse=ON EVOLUTION AND COERCION]
To prevent copious asterisks, I will us the term
coercion as shorthand for
non-consensual or forced mating (or ****).
Coercion is one reproductive strategy. Evidently, if every male went about impregnating whichever female(s) they fancied, then reproduction rates would be consistent, or be higher.
Yet humans are self-aware. Not only that, but we have an innate pro-social, cooperative inclination.
With that comes an aversion to violations of autonomy. We don’t like it when people attack us, or maim us, or try to kill us, or obstruct our way, or steal our stuff, or do such things to our kin and kith. It’s only to be expected, then, that we would also be averse to having our sexual autonomy violated through coercion. And those who do perpetuate such acts do so because they are the aggressors, and not the victims. Few ever like or want to be the victim.
And that is why, I propose, that people don’t like being coerced. That, and the fact that in self-awareness, we can process the full psychological nuances of violations of our autonomy. You need only look to the psychological repercussions of coercion in its victims to see that this is the case.
Being self-aware, we have an added measure of cognitive and social factors that can influence, if not supersede, what we’d otherwise be evolutionary inclined to do. So even if we, as humans, had the innate inclination for coercion, we can channel and direct those impulses in other ways. But I do believe that it is not the case that most humans have a predilection for coercion. Transgression of autonomy are counter to the ethos of pro-sociality, in which the wellbeing of the whole maximizes the success of the whole.
Sure, we could survive through a primarily coercive strategy. We’d probably end up with a lot of psychologically skewed women, though, and even if such a paradigm were normalized, I suspect there would be cognitive dissonance (”This is the way things are” VS “In my bones, I have an aversion to transgressions of my autonomy).
The fact that most religions disavow **** is concordant with the picture I describe above. If we innately are averse to transgressions of autonomy,
then it is to be expected that we would call things that violate autonomy as being “bad” or “wrong”, and things that prevent or don’t result in transgressions as being “good” or “right”.
Do note that the above is armchair speculation based on my layman’s understanding of human evolutionary trajectory. I have no sources at hand to support the above claims, and any countering sources would be welcomed. Though I suspect that I’m somewhere in the ballpark with all of this; at the very least, it’s a reasonable scenario to consider.
[/collapse]
Anyway, Maven, I will leave the rest of your responses to those they pertain to.
@
Sehnsucht
You know there is a thread on free will, you could just, link to it to explain it. And talk about it there,
http://smashboards.com/threads/does-free-will-exist.361811/
I've made contributions to that thread already. I suppose if anyone wants to discuss agency and determinism with me further, they can tag me there.
For the moment, we can carry on the discussion here, since the claim being proposed is that free-will is evidence in support of the theistic hypothesis (which is this thread's topic).
