The Is Ought Problem, Theistic Morality, and If Ought Moral Rationality

[Theftz22]

If I want this post to be as coherent as possible, then i ought begin with the Is Ought Problem. And indeed I do, so then it follows that the rational way to begin is like this:

The Is Ought Problem was first posed by David Hume in 1739. It essentially states that it is impossible to derive a prescriptive statement about what ought be the case, or what one ought do, from a descriptive, factual statement about what is the case. Morality is the study of what one ought to do, but if we cannot derive an Ought from an Is, that is a prescription from a fact, then that means that moral prescriptions cannot be based on objective facts, but rather subjective values, or as Hume put it "passions". Let me give an example of someone's first reaction to hearing this: "There is a wall in front of me, therefore I ought not walk forward." But no, I pointed out, it's not the fact that there is a wall in front of you that causes you to not walk forward, but the subjective desire to not smack into the wall. If you wanted to smack into the wall, then you ought walk forward. Even given multiple factual Is statements that would seem to lead towards an ought, it always takes a subjective desire to conclude what one ought do. One more example. "There is a report due tomorrow, he is going to need to stay up late to finish the report, drinking coffee is going to keep him awake." Now from these three objective, factual Is statements, could one conclude that he Ought drink coffee? No, it would take his subjective desire of wanting to finish the report in order to reach that conclusion. And in this way, the facts can only objectively tell us how to fulfill our subjective desires, Hume put it as "The reason is the slave of the passions." For a more detailed description watch: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bsbw4FqjuQ

(For the sake of the scope of this thread I will not go into secular attempts to solve the problem, as I have seen them all fail. However please bring them up if you think one can offer a solution.)

Theists will often use this to proclaim that only god provides an objective source of morality, but even with his omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, and transcendence, does god solve the Is Ought Problem? Well it would appear the answer is no, for if morality is truly only the realm of subjective feelings, how does a commandment by god change that? It's akin to saying that if god said that blueberry pie was the best type of pie, then it would objectively be true for all persons, regardless of their preferences. Digging deeper, we have the Euthyphro Dilemma. That is, are god's commandments moral by sheer virtue of the fact that he commands them, or does he command them because they are already moral? By the first it would seem morality becomes completely arbitrary; it is no particular quality of an action that makes it moral but simply the fact that god commanded it. There would be no reason for god making a commandment, because the commandment would only become moral after he commanded it. God's moral authority itself would only be circular; he would only be a moral authority after he had made commandments that he adhered to, and additionally, anything he could command would be moral. The second option, that is he commands them because they are already moral, gives no account of morality. God is ultimately a divine mailman, morals are outside and beyond his own power. He is completely irrelevant as to whether or not things are moral, and thus it presupposes morality at the onset. Now even if all of these objections were met, all the theist would establish is that god's commands are moral, but would it mean that the Is Ought Gap is solved? By the mere fact that God has commanded something and that something is moral, could we conclude that you ought follow that commandment? That has not been established. Why ought we follow god's commandments? Why ought we be moral? The theist has not yet shown why. Perhaps the theist would turn to hell, we ought be moral and we ought follow god's commandments because we will go to hell if we don't. But this would require the subjective desire of wanting to avoid hell. It appears god cannot solve the Is Ought Problem. Some of this video is good: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWNW-NXEudk#t=8m16s

Now, so far we have have established that you cannot derive an Ought from an Is, but there does appear to be a form in which you can derive an ought, that is an Ought from an If. That is, if you want a certain outcome, then it objectively follows that you ought to perform actions to actualize that outcome. The Ought is the objective method of satisfying a given subjective goal or desire, the If. These are statements I have already used throughout the post, such as "If I want this post to be as coherent as possible, then i ought begin with the Is Ought Problem." and "If I do not want to smack into the wall, then I ought not walk forward." This goal-based moral system I call Moral Rationality. Morality is the study of what one ought to do, and this system tells you what you ought to do based on what the rational action is based on your desires, hence Moral Rationality. So far this is very basic and does not seem particularly significant, but it is, because Moral Rationality can be used in place of traditional, unconditional, Is Ought forms of morality to form a working society much like we have today. This is for two main reasons: Almost everyone has the same fundamental interests, and the interest of the supermajority will take precedence over the minority. Considering the first maxim: Almost everyone has the same fundamental interests. Nearly everyone has an interest in not being killed and not having their stuff taken. So we all get together and agree to not steal and not take each other's stuff. What's more, we don't like to see others get killed or have their stuff taken. This is empathy, a basic product of evolution. We all like to see a world with more happiness and less suffering. So not only is respecting others in our own interest in a material sense, but also in an emotional sense. This is where we get the idea of individual freedoms and the modern moral idea that your rights end where another's begin. We see it fit that it is in our individual and collective interests to grant each other rights in order to secure our own rights and create a harmonious society. Now what of the second maxim: the interest of the supermajority will take precedence over the minority. Consider the psychopath who neither finds value in his own life nor the lives of others and enjoys killing. Some might point out at this point that it is morally rational for him to kill others, but this does not change the fact that it is still in society's collective interest to prevent him from doing so, and if necessary, put him in jail. So moral rationalism does not amount to a kind of individual relativism, that what is in one's own rational interest is right for you and others don't have the right to intrude on that. By sheer number and force alone, the collective interest of the majority will always outweigh that of the rare deviant individual. At this point, another objection might be raised; what if the majority could benefit immensely by say, enslaving a small percent of the population. This does not take into account human empathy. Modern society views all people as men, and the images of slavery shown to people today trigger revulsion. It is not in our interest to enslave part of the population because people would feel terrible about it and would not want the practice to continue. Here is a video which touches on some of these ideas: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uq2LqjQrNcw

So I hope I have coherently outlined why traditional moral absolutes fail, why theistic morality is no different, and why moral rationality is correct and still useful and applicable to the real world and society.

 

[ballin4life]

Each person has a moral code.

I define morally right interactions as ones that satisfy everyone's moral code.

Because each person has a moral code, it is morally right when everyone's moral code is satisfied.

 

[3mmanu3lrc]

I agree with ballin4life, but there's also a standard for morality.

 

[Theftz22]

Each person has a moral code.

I define morally right interactions as ones that satisfy everyone's moral code.

Because each person has a moral code, it is morally right when everyone's moral code is satisfied.

I appreciate you engaging in moral descriptions but the focus of the topic was on moral prescriptions (though I think I got off topic into descriptions when talking about theistic morality).

I see a problem with your definition though, because it is not true that everyone's moral code is mutually compatible. You define morally right interactions as ones that satisfy everyone's moral code, but actions cannot satisfy everyone's moral code if the content of the code is in competition. For instance one person believes it is right to abort a baby and the other believes it is wrong. Both of these moral codes cannot be satisfied, similarly, any area of contradiction between moral codes would lead to an unsolvable dilemma under this definition, and ample areas of contradiction exist in almost every facet of society. What if someone's moral code was only satisfied so long as no one else had their moral code satisfied?

And your last statement is a non-sequitur. It does not follow from the fact that each person has a moral code that it is morally right when each one of these codes is satisfied.

 

[asianaussie]

Firstly, learn to section off each of your ideas. No matter how interesting the subject matter (and this is very interesting, as a matter of fact), wall-of-text formatting can cause the reader to quickly lose interest, which isn't what you want in a debate. I actually think that formatting poorly is equivalent to poor presentation in an actual debate.

Second, this is a very intriguing issue, but are you aiming for a discussion or a debate?

Tell me, when you say morals are above and beyond God's own power, what then, are morals? Morals are derived from our basic instincts and needs: the needs to survive, the need for comfort, the need for love, and the need for understanding. It is because we wish to survive that society condemns murder. It is because we wish for comfort that public exhibitionism is punishable. It is these conditions that lead to the 'ought' scenarios you describe. Because these instincts were (let's just assume for this that God does exist) 'programmed' by God (or otherwise evolved), would that not give God the original writer's credit to morals?

Each person has a moral code.

I define morally right interactions as ones that satisfy everyone's moral code.

Because each person has a moral code, it is morally right when everyone's moral code is satisfied.

Morals are a luxury. We only have morals so long as we have all the preceding requisites for living freely. Being able to say 'I don't wish to kill' may easily lead to one's death in more unstable, volatile areas of the world, and hence is detrimental to sustained life. You cannot assume everyone has a moral code, because the basic instinct for survival can easily overrule it.

This isn't even touching on all the problems that arise when someone with a deranged mindset requires his morals to be satisfied. The term 'socially acceptable' or 'majority' should be in there somewhere.

 

[Theftz22]

Second, this is a very intriguing issue, but are you aiming for a discussion or a debate?

Tell me, when you say morals are above and beyond God's own power, what then, are morals? Morals are derived from our basic instincts and needs: the needs to survive, the need for comfort, the need for love, and the need for understanding. It is because we wish to survive that society condemns murder. It is because we wish for comfort that public exhibitionism is punishable. It is these conditions that lead to the 'ought' scenarios you describe. Because these instincts were (let's just assume for this that God does exist) 'programmed' by God (or otherwise evolved), would that not give God the original writer's credit to morals?

Discussion or debate? The same thing, just in one people are afraid to say what they want for fear of offending anyone.

I don't believe I ever said "morals are above and beyond God's own power", rather I asked the theist to pin down whether or not he thought morals existed outside god, or if god's commandment created the moral itself. And of course the If desire to survive is very much a part of moral rationality that forms many of our oughts. The fundamental desire to survive I would put in the category of the desires shared by nearly everyone that we work together to guarantee as a society. But it remains wholly an If desire, if you want to survive, not an Is statement.

If the instinct to survive was programmed by God would it give him credit to morals? It would give him credit to the desire to survive in the sense that he was the programmer. But if you were to state that the desire to survive is moral because god programmed it, you could refer back to the problems I listed with that stance in the first post.

 

[ballin4life]

I appreciate you engaging in moral descriptions but the focus of the topic was on moral prescriptions (though I think I got off topic into descriptions when talking about theistic morality).

You ought to do things that satisfy your moral code as well as the moral code of others.

I see a problem with your definition though, because it is not true that everyone's moral code is mutually compatible. You define morally right interactions as ones that satisfy everyone's moral code, but actions cannot satisfy everyone's moral code if the content of the code is in competition. For instance one person believes it is right to abort a baby and the other believes it is wrong. Both of these moral codes cannot be satisfied, similarly, any area of contradiction between moral codes would lead to an unsolvable dilemma under this definition, and ample areas of contradiction exist in almost every facet of society. What if someone's moral code was only satisfied so long as no one else had their moral code satisfied?

It's possible that under my definition, no such objectively morally right actions exist. However, I do not think this is the case. Note that in your example, there is no objectively morally right thing to do, but there may be an objectively right moral action in, say, trading my money to a shopkeeper in exchange for a hat - because it makes us both better off, and everyone else in the world stays neutral, so the world as a whole is better off.

By the way, I use as an approximation this principle: if a decision doesn't directly involve you, then you are unlikely to have your moral code violated by the decision. Obviously this principle isn't perfect (see your abortion example), but it's a good approximation for both things.

One last principle that is somewhat implicit is that humans are morally equal to each other, meaning that each human can have a moral code. I would also say that in general, moral principles should apply to all humans equally.

And your last statement is a non-sequitur. It does not follow from the fact that each person has a moral code that it is morally right when each one of these codes is satisfied.

This is nitpicking, and perhaps is a problem of definitions. Who is going to complain in such a case? If everyone's moral code is satisfied and everyone is better off, then objectively, things have gotten better. I would define this as morally right.

 

[Theftz22]

You ought to do things that satisfy your moral code as well as the moral code of others.

I don't see exactly how that's been established. You've defined morally right according to your own terms but I don't see it established that we ought be morally right.

It's possible that under my definition, no such objectively morally right actions exist. However, I do not think this is the case. Note that in your example, there is no objectively morally right thing to do, but there may be an objectively right moral action in, say, trading my money to a shopkeeper in exchange for a hat - because it makes us both better off, and everyone else in the world stays neutral, so the world as a whole is better off.

By the way, I use as an approximation this principle: if a decision doesn't directly involve you, then you are unlikely to have your moral code violated by the decision. Obviously this principle isn't perfect (see your abortion example), but it's a good approximation for both things.

But what if someone objects to the wearing of hats? Or objects to idea of private ownership? Or objects to the monetary market system? Or the hat was made in sweatshop in China? Or the shopkeeper purposely undersells his goods?

Point is, it's almost impossible to find any action that satisfies everyone's moral code. And all you need is one person in the entire world whose moral code was only satisfied so long as no one else had their moral code satisfied for there to be no morally right actions at all. I think your definition has very little practical application.

One last principle that is somewhat implicit is that humans are morally equal to each other, meaning that each human can have a moral code. I would also say that in general, moral principles should apply to all humans equally.

Well that does stem from your definition because everyone's moral code must be satisfied in order for an action to be morally right. But you are alright with the implications of this principle? That the moral code of the murderer who finds it ok to kill people is equally important as the victim's who feels oppositely.

This is nitpicking, and perhaps is a problem of definitions. Who is going to complain in such a case? If everyone's moral code is satisfied and everyone is better off, then objectively, things have gotten better. I would define this as morally right.

I am aware of your definition, but I am pointing out that it is only through this definition that the statement is justified.

 

[ballin4life]

Well I'd say the point of the "equality" thing was to prevent people from saying "Well, it's morally right for me to do this, but only for me". So a murderer can't object to other people murdering him in kind.

Overall, I subscribe to the non-aggression principle (don't harm another unless that person harms someone else first - where harm is defined as damage to one's property) as an extension of the "things are right when they satisfy everyone's moral code" principle. Of course, the non-aggression principle goes much farther by calling certain things morally wrong. I think it's impossible to objectively deduce that certain actions are morally wrong (perhaps an action that goes against everyone's moral code ... but who would undertake such an action, as it would have to be against the actor's moral code as well. So it would basically amount to calling natural disasters "morally wrong" which makes no sense).

Anyway, yes, no one's moral code is objectively correct.

 

[TimeTemporal]

So, if you would clarify for me, you say that we cannot claim we ought to stop walking so as to not hit a wall unless we first give an if argument that we wish not to hit it. Then, we could claim we ought not hit the wall.
Am I correct in assuming that you're asking if no ought can be had unless an if exists first? And that morals therefore are dependent upon having an if so we can give reason to follow a moral?

I'm interested in the subject, I just want to make sure I'm reading the wall of text correctly.

 

[asianaussie]

He's saying that an objective moral system, and therefore the plausible existence of God, is dependant on there being an 'If' scenario and a 'proper' action, the 'Ought'.

I think. Walls of text are painful and I'm just as likely to be wrong as you are.

 

[Theftz22]

All moral Ought statements cannot come from factual Is statements but only If statements, the ought comes as the objective fulfillment of the if desire. Thus traditional objective moral systems that attempt to create unconditional moral statements applicable to everyone fail, and the only valid form to derive moral prescriptions is If______,Ought______.

The section on theistic morality was put in to show that even assuming the existence of a theistic god, the Is Ought gap is not bridged and no Is Ought statement is justified.

 

[DanteFox]

stuff

A very well thought-out post, and I've been thinking about this kind of stuff recently too. A few problems:

-It seems to me that the is-ought problem is merely a statement of correct syntax and logic that doesn't really undermine theistic morality. In my understanding of the theistic morality, God is the perfect standard of all things. By His perfect nature, morality flows directly from people being in accordance with his divine nature. In this way, God is different from people in that He doesn't whimsically change His nature. It's not moral because he says so, it's moral because he is so. Now, what if he were different? Then morality would be different. I suppose in this way, morality is like a law of nature, it's not something that is circular, it simply is or isn't.

Now even if all of these objections were met, all the theist would establish is that god's commands are moral, but would it mean that the Is Ought Gap is solved? By the mere fact that God has commanded something and that something is moral, could we conclude that you ought follow that commandment? That has not been established. Why ought we follow god's commandments? Why ought we be moral? Now even if all of these objections were met, all the theist would establish is that god's commands are moral, but would it mean that the Is Ought Gap is solved? By the mere fact that God has commanded something and that something is moral, could we conclude that you ought follow that commandment? That has not been established.

Of course it depends on the subjective desire of the person. Nobody has to be moral. Like I said before, the Is Ought problem is merely a statement of syntax, not really a law of morality. Part of morality is the ability to choose between right and wrong actions. Without that choice, morality is gone.

Why ought we follow god's commandments? Why ought we be moral?

- That's up to the individual to decide. Some might decide to be moral because of hell, others might simply to be in accordance with God, others might do it just to feel good, others might simply reject moral conduct altogether. I don't see how the individual, subjective whims of each person nullifies morality. At best it nullifies a model of morality that is independent of minds or wills, which is only a problem for naturalists.

-On your moral rationalism: it seems to me that it only amounts to an attempt to rationalize our pre-existing moral convictions within a secular, relativistic framework of common interest. This is made quite apparent by your attempt to exclude slavery as a moral option simply by saying that most people find it repulsive, but of course, a mere 200 years ago, this was not the case, and so in that time, going by your standard, it was moral, and so it boils down to moral relativism.

I mean, it's logically consistent, but do you actually believe that's morality? I don't.

 

[Theftz22]

-It seems to me that the is-ought problem is merely a statement of correct syntax and logic that doesn't really undermine theistic morality.

The Is Ought problem is a statement about the impossibility of moving from descriptions to prescriptions, statements about what is the case to statements about what ought be the case.

In my understanding of the theistic morality, God is the perfect standard of all things. By His perfect nature, morality flows directly from people being in accordance with his divine nature. In this way, God is different from people in that He doesn't whimsically change His nature. It's not moral because he says so, it's moral because he is so. Now, what if he were different? Then morality would be different. I suppose in this way, morality is like a law of nature, it's not something that is circular, it simply is or isn't.

So how then does god attain his nature? Does he create it himself? Then you fall to the first prong of the dilemma, it is moral simply because he says so, or wills himself so. If he gets his nature not from himself, then first of all not only have you not given an account of where he gets his nature, but you fall to the second prong of the dilemma, god says it because it is already moral. His nature was moral from a standard external to himself. Appealing to go'd nature only re-phrases the dilemma, is something moral because it is in god's nature, or is it in god's nature because it is moral?

Of course it depends on the subjective desire of the person. Nobody has to be moral. Like I said before, the Is Ought problem is merely a statement of syntax, not really a law of morality. Part of morality is the ability to choose between right and wrong actions. Without that choice, morality is gone.

I'm not claiming anything about people being forced to make the moral decision, the decision will always remain. What you have to justify is why we ought to make the moral decision. You must have an objectively binding justification, otherwise prescriptive morality becomes subjective, which is not at all what the theist wants.

- That's up to the individual to decide. Some might decide to be moral because of hell, others might simply to be in accordance with God, others might do it just to feel good, others might simply reject moral conduct altogether.

Subjective desire, subjective desire, subjective desire, subjective desire.

I don't see how the individual, subjective whims of each person nullifies morality. At best it nullifies a model of morality that is independent of minds or wills, which is only a problem for naturalists.

It nullifies objective prescriptive morality. If you can't give any objectively binding reason why we ought do something from a theistic worldview, you've forfeited god's commandments as objective prescriptions, and I thought you were trying to argue that theism can support objective morality. But moral descriptions are just one half of morality.

-On your moral rationalism: it seems to me that it only amounts to an attempt to rationalize our pre-existing moral convictions within a secular, relativistic framework of common interest. This is made quite apparent by your attempt to exclude slavery as a moral option simply by saying that most people find it repulsive, but of course, a mere 200 years ago, this was not the case, and so in that time, going by your standard, it was moral, and so it boils down to moral relativism.

Well, yeah. Slavery was morally rational for those people, but not for modern society. But there's nothing to prevent us from looking at it and saying, "that's horrifying and we won't allow that anymore". Moral relativism has an unwarranted prescription that we can't enforce our morals on others, but that's simply not the case in moral rationalism.

I mean, it's logically consistent, but do you actually believe that's morality? I don't.

It's prescriptive morality, in that it tells us what we ought do.

 

[DanteFox]

The Is Ought problem is a statement about the impossibility of moving from descriptions to prescriptions, statements about what is the case to statements about what ought be the case.



So how then does god attain his nature? Does he create it himself? Then you fall to the first prong of the dilemma, it is moral simply because he says so, or wills himself so. If he gets his nature not from himself, then first of all not only have you not given an account of where he gets his nature, but you fall to the second prong of the dilemma, god says it because it is already moral. His nature was moral from a standard external to himself. Appealing to go'd nature only re-phrases the dilemma, is something moral because it is in god's nature, or is it in god's nature because it is moral?

Something is moral because it is God's nature. In the theistic view, God was not created, so he didn't "get" his nature from anywhere. It's basically just the way he is. Things don't become moral after the fact because God said them. God couldn't say anything else. It's like gravity. He's fixed and unchanging.

I'm not claiming anything about people being forced to make the moral decision, the decision will always remain. What you have to justify is why we ought to make the moral decision. You must have an objectively binding justification, otherwise prescriptive morality becomes subjective, which is not at all what the theist wants.

Why do I have to have an objectively binding justification? The theistic view of morality has always been linked to choice. Some things are moral --> you should do these things because they are the best way to live life --> which assumes that's what you want. I see no problem there. I think you're confusing moral ought with prudential ought, which are two different things. The fact that prudential ought is always subject to differing tastes in no way invalidates the objectivity of a moral ought.

Subjective desire, subjective desire, subjective desire, subjective desire.



It nullifies objective prescriptive morality. If you can't give any objectively binding reason why we ought do something from a theistic worldview, you've forfeited god's commandments as objective prescriptions, and I thought you were trying to argue that theism can support objective morality. But moral descriptions are just one half of morality.

I am arguing objective theistic morality in the sense that in theistic morality things are objectively good or evil. That is to say, on theistic morality, certain things would be good or bad regardless of whether or not people regarded them as such, but that wouldn't mean that prudentially everyone would regard them as the choice that they want to make.

Well, yeah. Slavery was morally rational for those people, but not for modern society. But there's nothing to prevent us from looking at it and saying, "that's horrifying and we won't allow that anymore". Moral relativism has an unwarranted prescription that we can't enforce our morals on others, but that's simply not the case in moral rationalism.



It's prescriptive morality, in that it tells us what we ought do.

There's also nothing to prevent us from looking at it and saying, "those seemed like pretty good times, let's go back to that system," at least not on moral rationalism, since by what you posted, it's the majority that can enforce morality that's what makes things right or wrong. That's not objective in any sense of the word.

as a side note, I understand your argument, I just don't see how not being able to derive and ought from an is undermines theistic morality. By your own admission, one cannot derive an ought from an is, so prescriptive statements of morality are justified by if statements. You then go on to propose a system of morality based on if statements, right after you say that theistic morality fails because you'd need to if statements to justify them. Seems like a double standard to me.

 

[Theftz22]

Something is moral because it is God's nature. In the theistic view, God was not created, so he didn't "get" his nature from anywhere. It's basically just the way he is. Things don't become moral after the fact because God said them. God couldn't say anything else. It's like gravity. He's fixed and unchanging.

If god has a nature, it must be attained either from himself, or something external to himself. That encompasses all possible options. "It's just the way he is", well yeah, that's what nature means, now how did he get it? I'll put it in a little syllogism just for you.

1. That which has a nature attains it from either itself, or something external to itself.
2. God has a nature.
3. God's nature is attained from either himself, or something external to himself.

If you want to say that something is moral simply because it is God's nature, I submit that that makes morality completely arbitrary and falls prey to all the problems of that prong of the dilemma. These were "...morality becomes completely arbitrary; it is no particular quality of an action that makes it moral but simply the fact that god commanded it. There would be no reason for god making a commandment, because the commandment would only become moral after he commanded it. God's moral authority itself would only be circular; he would only be a moral authority after he had made commandments that he adhered to, and additionally, anything he could command would be moral."

On a side note, I guess the fact that you say "God couldn't say anything else" means you don't believe he is omnipotent?

Why do I have to have an objectively binding justification? The theistic view of morality has always been linked to choice. Some things are moral --> you should do these things because they are the best way to live life --> which assumes that's what you want. I see no problem there. I think you're confusing moral ought with prudential ought, which are two different things. The fact that prudential ought is always subject to differing tastes in no way invalidates the objectivity of a moral ought.

A moral ought is still an ought, which seeks to say that you should or should not do something, in this case with a moral justification. If the only reason you have to say that anyone should or should not do something is because you have defined it to be moral or immoral, then you have to justify why we ought be moral or ought not be immoral, which cannot be done objectively. The "best" way to live is subjective and so is the desire to live that way.

I am arguing objective theistic morality in the sense that in theistic morality things are objectively good or evil. That is to say, on theistic morality, certain things would be good or bad regardless of whether or not people regarded them as such, but that wouldn't mean that prudentially everyone would regard them as the choice that they want to make.

If you're arguing solely for an objective descriptive theistic morality, then that's fine (I kind of got side-tracked into descriptions in my OP anyway). It's just that you're an atypical theist, most I know very strongly try to avoid god's commandments not being objective and binding. Like I said"...what use does morality have if we only engage in describing behavior? We ultimately must make prescriptions about what one should or should not do for morality to have any purpose." We can sit around all day defining certain actions as "good" and others as "evil", but what use does any of it have if we can't even tell people not to be evil?

There's also nothing to prevent us from looking at it and saying, "those seemed like pretty good times, let's go back to that system," at least not on moral rationalism, since by what you posted, it's the majority that can enforce morality that's what makes things right or wrong. That's not objective in any sense of the word.

We could, but we won't. As we have learned more about each other, we've come to understand how similar we all are and have developed quite a sense of empathy as a species. To think that modern people would tolerate slavery is simply untenable. Furthermore, modern weaponry is so lethal that a very small group of people can do massive damage. It would be near impossible to enslave any significant amount of people when some explosives and chemical and biological weapons could be used to create mass havoc as a defensive tactic. Even if the enslavement was successful, a single slip up in allowing slaves to become armed would result in massive casualties. Even if people were not disgusted by slavery, it's questionable as to whether it would be in the majority's best interest.

as a side note, I understand your argument, I just don't see how not being able to derive and ought from an is undermines theistic morality. By your own admission, one cannot derive an ought from an is, so prescriptive statements of morality are justified by if statements. You then go on to propose a system of morality based on if statements, right after you say that theistic morality fails because you'd need to if statements to justify them. Seems like a double standard to me.

Like I said, most theists want to maintain that theism allows for god's laws and commandments to be objective prescriptions. Objective theistic prescriptions are undermined, and it was the original intent of my OP to show that there are no objective moral prescriptions, and that a system based on Ifs and not Is is the valid method. If you want to ground theistic prescriptions in Ifs, then this problem simply doesn't apply to you, it's just atypical.

 

[DanteFox]

If god has a nature, it must be attained either from himself, or something external to himself. That encompasses all possible options. "It's just the way he is", well yeah, that's what nature means, now how did he get it? I'll put it in a little syllogism just for you.

1. That which has a nature attains it from either itself, or something external to itself.
2. God has a nature.
3. God's nature is attained from either himself, or something external to himself.

I reject the first premise. That's akin to either saying that a) God created himself, which is causally impossible, or that b) God was created, which is not the theist position.

If you want to say that something is moral simply because it is God's nature, I submit that that makes morality completely arbitrary and falls prey to all the problems of that prong of the dilemma. These were "...morality becomes completely arbitrary; it is no particular quality of an action that makes it moral but simply the fact that god commanded it. There would be no reason for god making a commandment, because the commandment would only become moral after he commanded it. God's moral authority itself would only be circular; he would only be a moral authority after he had made commandments that he adhered to, and additionally, anything he could command would be moral."

like I said, it wouldn't be God's commands that make them moral, it would be his nature as God, the perfect standard and creator that makes them moral. The commands would simply be his communication of those standards.

On a side note, I guess the fact that you say "God couldn't say anything else" means you don't believe he is omnipotent?

I believe he is omnipotent in that he is all powerful. I believe he is also perfect and sinless, so he can't sin. He wouldn't command us to do immoral things because it is against his nature to do so.

A moral ought is still an ought, which seeks to say that you should or should not do something, in this case with a moral justification. If the only reason you have to say that anyone should or should not do something is because you have defined it to be moral or immoral, then you have to justify why we ought be moral or ought not be immoral, which cannot be done objectively.

why?

The "best" way to live is subjective and so is the desire to live that way.

"best" in this case is simply means "filled with the most good." And remember, since we're assuming theistic objective morality, such a thing would be objective and presumably quantifiable. But yes, the desire to live the best life would be subjective. Doesn't undermine that morality's objectivity.

If you're arguing solely for an objective descriptive theistic morality, then that's fine (I kind of got side-tracked into descriptions in my OP anyway). It's just that you're an atypical theist, most I know very strongly try to avoid god's commandments not being objective and binding. Like I said"...what use does morality have if we only engage in describing behavior? We ultimately must make prescriptions about what one should or should not do for morality to have any purpose." We can sit around all day defining certain actions as "good" and others as "evil", but what use does any of it have if we can't even tell people not to be evil?

You're linking a morality's utility with its objectivity for some reason that I fail to see. The two are quite different and utility is indeed subjective.

We could, but we won't. As we have learned more about each other, we've come to understand how similar we all are and have developed quite a sense of empathy as a species. To think that modern people would tolerate slavery is simply untenable. Furthermore, modern weaponry is so lethal that a very small group of people can do massive damage. It would be near impossible to enslave any significant amount of people when some explosives and chemical and biological weapons could be used to create mass havoc as a defensive tactic. Even if the enslavement was successful, a single slip up in allowing slaves to become armed would result in massive casualties. Even if people were not disgusted by slavery, it's questionable as to whether it would be in the majority's best interest.

There are many people in the present day in parts of the world that DO tolerate slavery and actively participate in it's practice. On your proposed morality, since such communities are able to enforce such a practice, they are morally justified in doing so.

Like I said, most theists want to maintain that theism allows for god's laws and commandments to be objective prescriptions. Objective theistic prescriptions are undermined, and it was the original intent of my OP to show that there are no objective moral prescriptions, and that a system based on Ifs and not Is is the valid method. If you want to ground theistic prescriptions in Ifs, then this problem simply doesn't apply to you, it's just atypical.

So then you admit that theistic morality is a valid model for having objective rights and wrongs?

 

[MuraRengan]

Two in regards to the first post.

1.

Nearly everyone has an interest in not being killed and not having their stuff taken. So we all get together and agree to not steal and not take each other's stuff. What's more, we don't like to see others get killed or have their stuff taken. This is empathy, a basic product of evolution. We all like to see a world with more happiness and less suffering.

I have doubts about the validity of the bold. Empathy is an emotion, not a physical or biological trait. It deals directly with concepts, which is relevant only to the intellect. To say that humans have "evolved" empathy is to imply that empathy is a basic result of an evolved intelligence; however, the evidence does not necessarily show this. Empathy is surely a device used by humans, but it is not a given trait of intelligence. A human is perfectly capable of functioning without empathy for fellow humans. For example, one man's possessions are stolen, is his neighbor obligated by his intelligence to feel empathy? If yes, is this consistent with the way people are today? The answer is no. For this reason I disagree with the red quoted statement. Empathy (nor any other emotion) is not a product of evolution.

With that said, where then does empathy (and other emotions) come from? I do not claim to know, but I will assert that the answer is not evolution, nor is it intelligence. In a more biological sense, emotions are caused by chemicals in the brain, but what causes the brain's chemical/emotional response to react consistently and similarly to different circumstances? For example, why does the (common) brain say that a man should feel the emotion of sadness when a family member dies? These questions are most often answered with explanations of relative morality and feeling, such as "We feel sad because we loved him and he is now gone," however "love" is yet another feeling invoked by the brain, for which there needs further explanations of its cause. Eventually, we are reduced to the same question quoted blue, because emotions are always explained with emotions or relative morals (I am open to a counter-example here.) However, evolution does not function on emotions and other relative concepts. Evolution is strictly objective in its method; therefore, I assert that evolution would never result in emotions in a being. My conclusion on this matter is that emotions will never be fully explained through natural means.

Here I will pose my counter-explanation (also for the sake of time, I will be intentionally vague in some areas hoping that the ideas are mutually understood, because if I explained every position I had to it's fullest, I'd be essentially writing a book, I will elaborate if necessary). We have observed how emotions function. They cause humans to feel a sensation which is relative to their own experiences. By examining emotions, it can be argued that they have a pre-established purpose, this is seen by the fact that the brain decides emotions consistently [For example, the brain will likely not tell a person to be happy if he is assaulted, nor will it tell them to be angry when they win a prize. (these, of course, are subject to change with human experience, which, in even these circumstances, will still be consistent with that person's mental workings.)] Therefore, since evolution cannot be posited as the cause of emotions, we must look to either another natural cause or a non-natural cause. I know not of any other natural forces which affect human mental biology; therefore, it is reasonable to argue that a non-natural force is the reason why man has emotions.

2.

Theists will often use this to proclaim that only god provides an objective source of morality, but even with his omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, and transcendence, does god solve the Is Ought Problem? Well it would appear the answer is no, for if morality is truly only the realm of subjective feelings, how does a commandment by god change that? It's akin to saying that if god said that blueberry pie was the best type of pie, then it would objectively be true for all persons, regardless of their preferences. Digging deeper, we have the Euthyphro Dilemma. That is, are god's commandments moral by sheer virtue of the fact that he commands them, or does he command them because they are already moral?

You seem to have a misunderstanding of what God's attributes. In a wholly (Catholic, for I cannot speak for other religions) theistic viewpoint, God is morality, that is, what is good is what is God. This means that God would never verbalize to humans something which is not identified in his morality. So the moment you speak of God in terms of a (Catholic) theistic viewpoint, you must reference the belief that God's morality is the utmost morality. I say utmost, because it is obvious that not all man follows God's morality; however, this does not make God's morality irrelevant. If anything, it puts human morality at odds with what is accepted as the ultimate morality. If you understood what theists believed about God, you'd understand that in the contexts of a theistic God, your argument is futile because you question the validity of God's morality. For a theist, the validity of God's morality is a given, and is undebatable, which is a device of faith. Your entire argument concerning God's morality is futile from the start because you don't agree to the basic premise that God's morality is absolute because morality is part of God's being. Therefore your final conclusion cannot be right if the traditional theistic God exists, regardless of whether or not you believe in it.

 

[ballin4life]

2.

You seem to have a misunderstanding of what God's attributes. In a wholly (Catholic, for I cannot speak for other religions) theistic viewpoint, God is morality, that is, what is good is what is God. This means that God would never verbalize to humans something which is not identified in his morality. So the moment you speak of God in terms of a (Catholic) theistic viewpoint, you must reference the belief that God's morality is the utmost morality. I say utmost, because it is obvious that not all man follows God's morality; however, this does not make God's morality irrelevant. If anything, it puts human morality at odds with what is accepted as the ultimate morality. If you understood what theists believed about God, you'd understand that in the contexts of a theistic God, your argument is futile because you question the validity of God's morality. For a theist, the validity of God's morality is a given, and is undebatable, which is a device of faith. Your entire argument concerning God's morality is futile from the start because you don't agree to the basic premise that God's morality is absolute because morality is part of God's being. Therefore your final conclusion cannot be right if the traditional theistic God exists, regardless of whether or not you believe in it.

If the traditional theistic God exists, that still will not solve the is ought problem. Just because some being has some moral beliefs, that does not make them objectively correct.

Now, certain followers of a being may assert that its morality is objectively correct (or even define morality as this particular set of morals), but there is no justification behind this assertion.

 

[Theftz22]

I reject the first premise. That's akin to either saying that a) God created himself, which is causally impossible, or that b) God was created, which is not the theist position.

I'm not asking you to give an account of god's existence, just his nature. Either, he created it himself, or he obtained from something other than himself, that encompasses all options. You recognize nothing as greater than god so you can't accept the first option. You recognize that the second would leave you at mercy of the full force of the problems with that prong of the dilemma. Therefore you refuse to give an account of god's nature.

like I said, it wouldn't be God's commands that make them moral, it would be his nature as God, the perfect standard and creator that makes them moral. The commands would simply be his communication of those standards.
I believe he is omnipotent in that he is all powerful. I believe he is also perfect and sinless, so he can't sin. He wouldn't command us to do immoral things because it is against his nature to do so.

I still submit that that makes morality completely arbitrary, the only factor of whether or not something is moral is whether or not it conforms to god's nature, regardless of any consequences, intention, etc. And you need to explain how god's nature comes to be, ultimately once you do that the rest of the problems with that prong will fall into place.

Also I pointed out a contradiction, there is nothing logically contradictory about sinning.

why?

A number of reasons, firstly because to stop there would be arbitrary and unjustified. If I ask, why shouldn't I kill? You might reply, because it causes pain and suffering. But why not cause pain and suffering? Because it is immoral? And why not be immoral? If at this point you offered no explanation, it wouldn't be sensible. You owe me some kind of reason as to why you don't have to explain why I shouldn't be immoral. I am still left wondering. It has been pointed out that this commits the "taxi cab" fallacy, of simply stopping a principle at your desired destination. If you just arbitrarily said that this certain thing needs no explanation, why does anything need an explanation? You would have to recognize atheist systems as objective too, because they could simply stop after defining moral and immoral, or at any point even.

Furthermore, it seems unclear why, given no reason, a certain 5-letter combination of letters, "moral", is something we ought do, as opposed to anything else. Why not just stop at evil? Do I owe you an explanation of why we ought be evil if that's the combination of letters I choose to stop at? Given no reason why we ought do one over the other, I can't see you have any justification in maintaining I ought be moral and ought not be evil.

"best" in this case is simply means "filled with the most good." And remember, since we're assuming theistic objective morality, such a thing would be objective and presumably quantifiable. But yes, the desire to live the best life would be subjective. Doesn't undermine that morality's objectivity.

It does undermine that morality's ability to make objective prescriptions.

You're linking a morality's utility with its objectivity for some reason that I fail to see. The two are quite different and utility is indeed subjective.

Utility means something's practical usefulness. I am not at all referring to utility, just why we ought do something on a given moral system.

I fail to see why you're denying prescriptive morality. This is just a universally accepted aspect of what morality is. Any reputable ethicist or reference on morality points to two aspects, normative and descriptive, or prescriptive and descriptive. Have a look at the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy

In the normative sense, morality should never be overridden, that is, no one should ever violate a moral prohibition or requirement for non-moral considerations. All of those who use “morality” normatively also hold that, under plausible specified conditions, all rational persons would endorse that code.

But if you give no objective reason why all rational people ought follow your moral system, then it is not objectively normative. And in order to objectively justify it you would have to justify why we ought be moral under your definition of moral, which cannot be objectively done.

It seems that the only reason to deny prescriptive morality is to avoid an apparent shortcoming in your ethical system. But if you only want to discuss descriptive ethics, you would have to accept that there is non-theistic objective morality.

There are many people in the present day in parts of the world that DO tolerate slavery and actively participate in it's practice. On your proposed morality, since such communities are able to enforce such a practice, they are morally justified in doing so.

Yes, the moral system without god relies on human power of enforcement. It is one of the theistic advantages to have a divine ***-kicker.

So then you admit that theistic morality is a valid model for having objective rights and wrongs?

Actually I think it's quite hilarious that theistic morality runs into so many problems with descriptive morality. It's not even hard to define an objective descriptive morality, almost anything could suffice, which is why descriptive morality is so useless, it's just a bias towards a combination of 5 letters that makes it even a blip on the radar. Even definitions like "eating burritos is moral and anything else is immoral" work perfectly fine unlike theistic morality, because it invokes a middle-man to determine morality instead of going straight to it, which raises all these issues.

 

[DanteFox]

I'm not asking you to give an account of god's existence, just his nature. Either, he created it himself, or he obtained from something other than himself, that encompasses all options. You recognize nothing as greater than god so you can't accept the first option. You recognize that the second would leave you at mercy of the full force of the problems with that prong of the dilemma. Therefore you refuse to give an account of god's nature.

No it doesn't. That's a false dichotomy. God, being eternal, does not need to have been created, so you have to show me why God's nature either has to have been acquired, or created.

I still submit that that makes morality completely arbitrary, the only factor of whether or not something is moral is whether or not it conforms to god's nature, regardless of any consequences, intention, etc.

It's only arbitrary if his nature is arbitrary. This may or may not be the case. Let's say God's nature were arbitrary. That wouldn't make that morality any less real. It would still be objective, and it would still be true.

Also I pointed out a contradiction, there is nothing logically contradictory about sinning.

There is something logically contradictory about a sinless being sinning.

A number of reasons, firstly because to stop there would be arbitrary and unjustified. If I ask, why shouldn't I kill? You might reply, because it causes pain and suffering. But why not cause pain and suffering? Because it is immoral? And why not be immoral? If at this point you offered no explanation, it wouldn't be sensible. You owe me some kind of reason as to why you don't have to explain why I shouldn't be immoral. I am still left wondering. It has been pointed out that this commits the "taxi cab" fallacy, of simply stopping a principle at your desired destination. If you just arbitrarily said that this certain thing needs no explanation, why does anything need an explanation? You would have to recognize atheist systems as objective too, because they could simply stop after defining moral and immoral, or at any point even.

Furthermore, it seems unclear why, given no reason, a certain 5-letter combination of letters, "moral", is something we ought do, as opposed to anything else. Why not just stop at evil? Do I owe you an explanation of why we ought be evil if that's the combination of letters I choose to stop at? Given no reason why we ought do one over the other, I can't see you have any justification in maintaining I ought be moral and ought not be evil.



It does undermine that morality's ability to make objective prescriptions.



Utility means something's practical usefulness. I am not at all referring to utility, just why we ought do something on a given moral system.

I fail to see why you're denying prescriptive morality. This is just a universally accepted aspect of what morality is. Any reputable ethicist or reference on morality points to two aspects, normative and descriptive, or prescriptive and descriptive. Have a look at the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy



But if you give no objective reason why all rational people ought follow your moral system, then it is not objectively normative. And in order to objectively justify it you would have to justify why we ought be moral under your definition of moral, which cannot be objectively done.

It seems that the only reason to deny prescriptive morality is to avoid an apparent shortcoming in your ethical system. But if you only want to discuss descriptive ethics, you would have to accept that there is non-theistic objective morality.

so based on that link you gave me, what would "plausible specified conditions" entail? What would being "rational" entail?

Yes, the moral system without god relies on human power of enforcement. It is one of the theistic advantages to have a divine ***-kicker.

So... you criticized theistic absolute morality for being arbitrary, yet your system depends on the whims of people. If my system is arbitrary, yours definitely is.

If I understand you correctly, whatever the majority deems moral is objectively moral, so I guess it is objective. Not that this has any bearing on this exchange, but as a side note, the problem I see with atheistic absolute moral systems is that there is no reason to believe such moral duties are true. They might be, but I don't see any reason to believe that they are.

Actually I think it's quite hilarious that theistic morality runs into so many problems with descriptive morality. It's not even hard to define an objective descriptive morality, almost anything could suffice, which is why descriptive morality is so useless, it's just a bias towards a combination of 5 letters that makes it even a blip on the radar. Even definitions like "eating burritos is moral and anything else is immoral" work perfectly fine unlike theistic morality, because it invokes a middle-man to determine morality instead of going straight to it, which raises all these issues.

I don't think you're using descriptive morality in the sense as how it's normally used. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descriptive_ethics

 

[_Keno_]

No it doesn't. That's a false dichotomy. God, being eternal, does not need to have been created, so you have to show me why God's nature either has to have been acquired, or created.

So God can be eternal, eh? Well, if you are giving the concept of "eternal" validity, why can I not say matter/energy have always existed? As you put it, "show me why matter/energy has to be created."

It's only arbitrary if his nature is arbitrary. This may or may not be the case. Let's say God's nature were arbitrary. That wouldn't make that morality any less real. It would still be objective, and it would still be true.

So you're saying that if God did not recieve his morality from outside himself (aka it's not his morality), then God's subjective opinion (no matter what it may be) is objectively true for humans? (just wondering, not trying to make a point)

There is something logically contradictory about a sinless being sinning.

The moment the sinless being sins, that sinful action is no longer a sin. As of that moment, that sin never was and never will be a sin. It is not logically contradictory because the sinless being can never sin, no matter what it does.

Also, try to disable sigs

 

[Nicholas1024]

So God can be eternal, eh? Well, if you are giving the concept of "eternal" validity, why can I not say matter/energy have always existed? As you put it, "show me why matter/energy has to be created."

The second law of thermodynamics teaches that entropy will always increase. Since we exist in a finite (although very large) universe, there is currently a finite amount of entropy, and due to the existence of elementary particles, entropy can only increase in finite steps. Therefore, if matter/energy existed eternally, then we'd only exist in a state of "maximum entropy". That is, the universe would be exactly the same regardless of where one was, just a small scattering of particles a few degrees above absolute zero. That obviously isn't the case.

 

[ballin4life]

That assumes that the second law of thermodynamics is always true. This so-called "law" is just something we have observed in the past. It may not be true pre Big Bang for example.

 

[rvkevin]

I'm curious as to how the "Is-Ought problem" is proposed. What does it mean? So you can't derive and ought without using an individual's preference. So, some systems or notions of morality (i.e. universal oughts) are incoherent. What exactly is the problem? Could you imagine someone asking about your opinion on the speed of light problem? What does that mean? Well, objects can't move faster than the speed of light. So, some notions of science fiction are incoherent. What exactly is the problem?

It's only a problem for those who have a preconceived notion about what morality is and since every system does not satisfy their definition of morality, then they say that its not an accurate moral framework, when in actuality their preconceived notion is incoherent so they will never be satisfied with any moral framework (unless it takes those on as unfounded assumptions). Those who want to accurately model morality must come to reality's terms, not search for what they think those terms should be.

The 'problem' is that some people want to justify their preconceived notions and are unable to do so. Want universal oughts? Well then you have the Is-Ought problem. Those who don't think morality needs to have universal oughts would probably find the is-ought problem to be irrelevant to the issue of morality and consequentially not a problem at all.

 

[Dre89]

You also have the problem of people blindly accepting proposed principles such as this one, or Ockham's razor as axioms.

 

[rvkevin]

You also have the problem of people blindly accepting proposed principles such as this one, or Ockham's razor as axioms.

Its not a principle, its an observation based on the kickback from Harris's most recent book. Most of the criticism was based not on what Harris said but based on what others thought morality should be. If you want to actually respond to what I said, then do so, but don't attempt to make some witty remark that barely makes sense.

 

[Dre89]

My point is it gets annoying when people use the naturalistic fallacy argument, or the razor, as if just stating it automatically wins the argument. The principle itself needs to be justified.

 

[rvkevin]

My point is it gets annoying when people use the naturalistic fallacy argument, or the razor, as if just stating it automatically wins the argument. The principle itself needs to be justified.

OK, how does that relate to anything I just said? Do you think I just committed the naturalistic fallacy? If so, in what way?

 

[Dre89]

I didn't say you committed it.

You were complaining about it, and I made a complaint as well about peoples debating styles. It wasn't aimed at you specifically.

 

[ballin4life]

The naturalistic fallacy is obvious in any mildly reasonable morality. If you disagree morally with killing others, then just notice that in nature people kill others all the time.

NOTE also that the use is not necessarily to say "you're wrong", it's to say "you haven't convinced me". Arguments from nature being good are not convincing to me at all. Occam's razor is a similar guideline. Yes, it is entirely possible that we are all in the Matrix right now, but I have no reason to hold this belief without additional evidence separating that possibility from others.

 

[Dre89]

See Ballin that's the fallacy you always make.

You did it with the burito, and you're doing it with this. You assume that descriptive and prescriptive are synonomous. Just because people have different notions, doesn't mean they're invalidated.

 

[ballin4life]

Burrito wasn't me lol.

How am I assuming descriptive and prescriptive are the same? That's what the naturalistic fallacy is doing though.

 

[Dre89]

No it does the opposite.

People who commit the NF are saying that despite the fact many people do X, we should do Y.

 

[ballin4life]

Please explain how I was equating descriptive and prescriptive.

Also Naturalistic Fallacy is "it happens in nature, therefore it is good". First part descriptive second part prescriptive.

 

[Theftz22]

No it doesn't. That's a false dichotomy. God, being eternal, does not need to have been created, so you have to show me why God's nature either has to have been acquired, or created.

I'm not asking you to admit god was created, when I speak about god's nature, I mean his moral nature. There is no reason why his moral nature needs to be just, loving, good, etc. Theistic morality simply assumes it as such in order to make those things moral. You need to give an account of why god's moral nature is that way, rather than say, like he's actually depicted in the old testament (). As I have argued, there are only two possible sources of his moral nature, himself, or something external to himself.

It's only arbitrary if his nature is arbitrary. This may or may not be the case. Let's say God's nature were arbitrary. That wouldn't make that morality any less real. It would still be objective, and it would still be true.

The point about the arbitrary nature of theistic morality is to show that what is moral becomes subjective on account of god's arbitrarily choosing what is moral. If god makes moral values arbitrarily, they are dependent upon the subjective whims of an appraiser. Thus the theist recourses to say that they are not arbitrarily chosen, but chosen on account of his loving nature. So to prove that god chooses his nature arbitrarily would be to prove that morality again becomes not objective, but subjectively and arbitrarily chosen.

There is something logically contradictory about a sinless being sinning.

To show that god cannot be both unable to sin, and able to do anything logically contradictory (omnipotence), you would have to show that if you accept both, there arises a contradiction. Which is true, because sinning is not by itself logically contradictory, but only is when you also accept that god is sinless. So this is indeed a completely internal contradiction that arises when you give god both properties.

so based on that link you gave me, what would "plausible specified conditions" entail? What would being "rational" entail?

Those plausible specified conditions refer to the situation in which the moral principle could be applied. I take rational persons to mean persons who base their positions on rational thinking, that is thinking that follows the rules, laws, and cannons of logic.

Asking your opponent to define every difficult term is an insincere and dishonest debate tactic. We're debating under the assumption that certain terms are mutually understood. I have not asked you to go into defining terms that you could write a doctoral dissertation on. If your only objection is that I have not defined common, but intricate terms in my argument I would not debate at all.

So... you criticized theistic absolute morality for being arbitrary, yet your system depends on the whims of people. If my system is arbitrary, yours definitely is.

Firstly it's not arbitrary because it's based on the goals of survival and happiness, which are evolutionary values, and evolution is not arbitrarily chosen by anything, because it's simply not chosen at all by anything (unless you advance god using evolution, but that's a separate debate).

But, I never said that the values of moral rationality are objective, so it doesn't matter. In fact, moral rationality doesn't even address descriptions, just conditional prescriptions.

If I understand you correctly, whatever the majority deems moral is objectively moral, so I guess it is objective. Not that this has any bearing on this exchange, but as a side note, the problem I see with atheistic absolute moral systems is that there is no reason to believe such moral duties are true. They might be, but I don't see any reason to believe that they are.

Moral rationality doesn't deem anything moral or immoral, just morally rational or irrational given certain subjective desires that the vast majority of people have. But I have never claimed any of my prescriptions to be objective, just applicable and useful in creating a society to our liking without needing to do the impossible of making objective prescriptions.

I don't think you're using descriptive morality in the sense as how it's normally used. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descriptive_ethics

Not at all. Did you read? Let me quote.

Descriptive ethics, also known as comparative ethics, is the study of people's beliefs about morality. It contrasts with prescriptive or normative ethics, which is the study of ethical theories that prescribe how people ought to act

Descriptive ethics: What do people think is right?
Normative (prescriptive) ethics: How should people act?

Those working on descriptive ethics aim to uncover people's beliefs about such things as values, which actions are right and wrong

Clearly descriptive refers to descriptions about the way certain actions are, like right and wrong, moral and immoral. Contrast this with prescriptive which refers to how things ought to be, how people ought to act.

 

[DanteFox]

I'm not asking you to admit god was created, when I speak about god's nature, I mean his moral nature. There is no reason why his moral nature needs to be just, loving, good, etc. Theistic morality simply assumes it as such in order to make those things moral. You need to give an account of why god's moral nature is that way, rather than say, like he's actually depicted in the old testament (). As I have argued, there are only two possible sources of his moral nature, himself, or something external to himself.

If you're not trying to get me to say god was created, you're granting that he would be eternal. I don't see why his nature would have to "come from somewhere" when he himself didn't "come from anywere." It just doesn't make sense.

The point about the arbitrary nature of theistic morality is to show that what is moral becomes subjective on account of god's arbitrarily choosing what is moral. If god makes moral values arbitrarily, they are dependent upon the subjective whims of an appraiser. Thus the theist recourses to say that they are not arbitrarily chosen, but chosen on account of his loving nature. So to prove that god chooses his nature arbitrarily would be to prove that morality again becomes not objective, but subjectively and arbitrarily chosen.

God doesn't choose his nature, thus he doesn't choose what is moral.

To show that god cannot be both unable to sin, and able to do anything logically contradictory (omnipotence), you would have to show that if you accept both, there arises a contradiction. Which is true, because sinning is not by itself logically contradictory, but only is when you also accept that god is sinless. So this is indeed a completely internal contradiction that arises when you give god both properties.

I never said he could do the logically contradictory. I don't view omnipotence that way.

Those plausible specified conditions refer to the situation in which the moral principle could be applied. I take rational persons to mean persons who base their positions on rational thinking, that is thinking that follows the rules, laws, and cannons of logic.

Asking your opponent to define every difficult term is an insincere and dishonest debate tactic. We're debating under the assumption that certain terms are mutually understood. I have not asked you to go into defining terms that you could write a doctoral dissertation on. If your only objection is that I have not defined common, but intricate terms in my argument I would not debate at all.

I didn't ask those questions in order to score any "debate points" as you might have imagined. I just thought it was a little vague.

Firstly it's not arbitrary because it's based on the goals of survival and happiness, which are evolutionary values, and evolution is not arbitrarily chosen by anything, because it's simply not chosen at all by anything (unless you advance god using evolution, but that's a separate debate).

But, I never said that the values of moral rationality are objective, so it doesn't matter. In fact, moral rationality doesn't even address descriptions, just conditional prescriptions.

Fair enough. So moral statements would depend on the goal of the subject. Useful, but not necessarily true. Also could lead to some morally appalling outcomes.

Not at all. Did you read? Let me quote.







Clearly descriptive refers to descriptions about the way certain actions are, like right and wrong, moral and immoral. Contrast this with prescriptive which refers to how things ought to be, how people ought to act.

Not quite. Read it again. Descriptive ethics refers to what people think is right, not what actually is right.

 

[Excellence]

There are so many sides to morality that it seems useless to debate at all to me but I'll do it anyway.

I think the best place to start is to ask the question: How can we hold people accountable to anything? And to that question, I say that we can only so long as individuals are free to choose which desires they have.

Here is how I see it.

Desire A -> Belief A -> Action A
Desire B -> Belief B -> Action B
Desire C -> Belief C -> Action C

In this scenario, actions, beliefs and desires can be anything you'd like. If a person is randomly assigned any of these things, do they have a choice? No. If you're landed with Desire A, then your subsequent action, Action A, will always be the result and because of that you do not have a choice. Let's look at a practical example so you guys can see where I'm going with this.

Michelle desires to become a pediatric physician. As a result, Michelle believes that she must work hard in her studies. As a result, Michelle studies hard. Because of her desire, Michelle works hard in her studies. In this instance, there is no choice and so Michelle cannot be held accountable for her actions.

Desire A1 ->Desire A -> Belief A -> Action A
Desire A1-> Desire B -> Belief B -> Action B
Desire A1 -> Desire C -> Belief C -> Action C

In this instance, we will have freedom of choice. Even though Michelle doesn't have the ability to change her desire A prime, A1, (the desire to have a good life) she does have the ability to control which sub-desire she follows Desire A, Desire B, or Desire C (to become a doctor, to win the lottery, to steal the world's largest diamond) and likewise with her beliefs and actions. As a result, she makes the choice of which actions she takes and this is what I believe all individuals do and which is why I believe we have morality.

Because we have the ability to choose which subsequent actions we have, people will generally gravitate toward a central cluster of beliefs and desires since choosing those is up to choice, environmental factors and immeasurable things.

 

[ballin4life]

I don't think beliefs necessarily come from desires. For example, I might want to rule the world, but I obviously don't believe that will actually happen. They seem pretty separate to me.

I think that desires are strongly linked to morality though, in pretty much the way you said.

 

[Theftz22]

I kind of forgot about this.

If you're not trying to get me to say god was created, you're granting that he would be eternal. I don't see why his nature would have to "come from somewhere" when he himself didn't "come from anywere." It just doesn't make sense.

Essentially, when we speak of some being's "moral nature", we are referring to the moral traits of that being. For example, "John is greedy, selfish, and unkind". Or "Jason is kind, caring, and altruistic". Now people come to have such traits in three ways, one is by their genetic makeup. Another by their formative experiences. And the third is by active volition to decide to act and be that way. Now in the case of god, he has no genetic makeup and is in fact created by nothing, so the first option cannot apply to him. The second option is equally implausible because god exists alone before his creation of the universe and he does not age or mature so thus he has no formative experiences. Additionally he is omniscient so it would be impossible for him to learn from any experience. Thus the only way I can see god having the moral trait of say, justness, is for him to freely choose to act and be just. But then the rest of the problems with voluntarism immediately fall into place.

God doesn't choose his nature, thus he doesn't choose what is moral.

I find it implausible that god could have any moral nature if he does not freely choose it, as explained above.

I never said he could do the logically contradictory. I don't view omnipotence that way.

I may have initially mistyped that first sentence of my argument. What I meant to say was "To show that god cannot be both unable to sin, and able to do anything other than the logically contradictory (omnipotence), you would have to show that if you accept both, there arises a contradiction." Perhaps that should clarify what I meant to show, which is that since sinning is not logically contradictory in and of itself there only arises an internal logical contradiction when you accept both moral perfection and omnipotence.

Fair enough. So moral statements would depend on the goal of the subject. Useful, but not necessarily true. Also could lead to some morally appalling outcomes.

The idea is that moral prescriptions depend on the goal of the agent. I agree that it is useful but I don't know what you mean by "not necessarily true". It would seem to me since the Is-Ought Problem is valid, it is true. And the whole point was to show that it could almost never lead to appalling outcomes because, in a nutshell, "Almost everyone has the same fundamental interests, and the interest of the supermajority will take precedence over the minority."

Not quite. Read it again. Descriptive ethics refers to what people think is right, not what actually is right.

I think it's clear that descriptive ethics is exactly what it means, namely describing the nature of an action, such as right and wrong, while normative ethics concerns prescriptions.