This post is long, so I'll collapse responses based on the correspondent.
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Well this is kind of where I said everything else being equal, but that was unclear in and of itself so lets say it another way.
Humans need water to live. They need clothing and shelter to survive in harsh climates. They need to procreate in order for the species to continue, etc. etc. These are all factual statements. However, we cannot say that these things are "good" things to do, because in each instance the facts are themselves not prescriptive. They only exist as statements, empty of true meaning. By saying "we want to live, so therefore we must do X or Y," that points to if-ought moral rationality as the OP suggested.
Indeed. If we want to live, we should work toward securing our survival.
We tend to want to live, so the above statement (if we want to live) tends to apply for most. Hence why most do work toward securing their survival.
What I'm proposing is that certain instincts are shared by all humans; common biological imperatives which evolved and that supersede conscious desire in terms of their origin, though they may influence our desires, and which therefore puts these "bio-morals" back in the realm of objectivity. And because of this, certain "moral truths" can be derived from properly identifying what these instincts are, and can therefore be prescriptively doled out and even taught to laymen who have not the time or inclination to identify within themselves these biological sources of social correctness, perhaps even at a young age, no different than learning about the body in school.
When I asked if this was a slippery slope, of course I meant, could this line of reasoning lead to trouble and if so, how? I asked because I'm only me, and I can only think of so much, but with enough people looking at it, maybe the flaws could be fleshed out.
I just want to know if it's possible, too. There's instinct, no doubt. And it plays a role in our decision-making, I've tested this theory IRL just to be sure. People can and will abandon all their platitudes when put to the sword, because at the end of the day, we're mostly cowards, bed wetters, we covet, we get jealous, we fear the unknown, on and on and on. We are what we detest to be in writing, in movies, in fiction. And instead of acknowledging this, we sit upon high horses and proclaim things like "oh, I'd NEVER do that!" So certain, yet no way of knowing.
How long did those soccer players go without eating until they FINALLY gave in and said, ya know what, F it, I'm hungry, this dude's already dead, let's eat him. And how horrible did they feel as their stomachs digested? "We're not human anymore." Seriously? Okay... maybe it -was- a moral conundrum, maybe some of them would rather have been unconscious than have to LIVE with the knowledge they'd become cannibals. Somewhere, deep in their brains, a signal was sent that said "forget what you're thinking, You. Need. To. Eat." and so they did.
So that means cannibalism is OKAY! Right?
How many other things are okay?
So basically, we can determine what is most optimal for the human being by quantifying the "bio-ethical" imperatives engraved in their programming. From these imperatives, we would derive an objective set of Bio-Morals.
One Bio-Moral could be "It is good to eat to survive". Therefore, cannibalism would be an acceptable course of action, since it satisfies that criteria.
I think I may have already touched on this earlier. We are capable of denying our "bio-ethical imperatives", since we are self-aware, and are thus capable of self-direction (to the degree that non-conscious factors permit conscious self-direction). Who cares if, as living things, we need to eat? The answer will be whether we collectively (or individually) decide to care about our programming or not.
If we all got together and decided cannibalism was "good", then it would be "good". Without an objective referent to bind our capacity to make choices, we could make such an accord. But it is an arbitrary one, because we could all just as easily collectively agree that cannibalism is "bad".
I'm getting the sense that this is at the heart of your concern. Any ethical model that is built from scratch from the ground up without any presupposed objective referents will be arbitrary, in that we're making subjective decisions that could just as easily turn out one way or another. That we decide that cannibalism is "good" is just as arbitrary as saying that it is "bad".
However, that we can acknowledge that any model we construct is arbitrary and subjective does not mean that such models are without meaning or pragmatic value. They can still mean something to us, much as life can mean something to us despite life have no substance of meaning (much as facts have no substance of morality).
And I believe that the majority of sound persons will choose a moral framework in which mutual collective fulfillment of desires is viewed as an objectively more efficient and advantageous way to fulfill individual desire, than everyone going at it on their own.
And we can see this in action; societies and civilizations require pro-social accords between people and communities. We would likely have not made it to the point we are now without having mutually agreed that cooperation was more advantageous in the long term than absolute individual autonomy.
This pro-social ethical framework may be arbitrary. But I suspect that it appeals to your basic existing desires as a human being (life, liberty, security, etc.), and it appeals to my basic desires, so we can both agree to call it "good".
(NOTE: We can use factual "bio-ethical imperatives" to derive an ethical model, but that such a model happens to parallel our existing pro-social wiring doesn't necessarily mean that our model is an
objective morality
rooted in "Bio-Morals" (nor that "Bio-Morals" even exist). That we have "Bio-Morals" only matters insofar as we agree that they do, for otherwise, they don't).
I do, but I seem to still be thinking the same question, so maybe I need more clarification.
A young person should be a *insert moral theory* and an old person should be a *insert alternate moral theory*.
Yes or no?
To me, it seems plausible that Yes would be the answer, because of the fact that young people value things so differently, but I suppose it could be that moral frameworks need to be less specific, so that it -can- apply to all age groups. Or genders, or races, or ethnicities, etc etc etc.
If I might chime in, I'd say that a consequential framework would apply universally across all ages. It is simply that different age demographics may have different desires/goals (due to life experience disparities, etc.), and may thus consider current and future variables for a given situation in a different light.
It's what i take after read this ****.
Sorry I couldn't resist
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[collapse=LARSINTJ HAS MUCH THINGS TO SAY]
Yes.
In order to happily co-exist with other virtuous people.
Virtuous: To be guided by a universally consistent decision-making methodology. Both capable of supporting one's own needs as well as the needs of others you have committed to.
Traits like honesty, courage, compassion and respect all inevitably follow if a virtuous person is to live their values.
If someone is to be objectively virtuous, then they must follow an objective ethical framework. An objective ethical framework can only define evil actions, not good ones. Specific definitions of good behavior will always be subjective due to conflicting circumstances and interests. An action not immediately classified as evil is inherently neutral - it could either be something nice like a surprise gift or something cruel like ignoring someone in need of assistance.
Got it. 8)
The Non-Aggression Principle
1. Do not initiate murder
2. Do not initiate theft
3. Do not initiate misinformation
All three are permissible in the case of self-defense against an external initiator, but only to match the force imposed upon you. A greater retaliation is not acceptable.
The NAP applies to everyone.
Does it apply to everyone
by virtue of the NAP's definition (which says it applies to everyone)? Or is there a logical proof (or series of proofs) that support that claim (i.e. A, B, C, therefore the NAP applies to everyone)?
It might be useful for the record to distinguish whether the NAP's universality is an axiom that your proposing, or if it's the product of syllogistic deduction.
The NAP is based on the axiom of self-ownership. If we own our bodies we must also own the consequences of our actions.
If I plant a seed and a tree grows, that tree belongs to me because it would not exist without my input.
Money represents productivity and energy expenditure, a consequence of human effort.
Let's say the new tree I planted bears fruit, someone else may wish to trade their effort (money) for a piece of my effort (fruit).
If we own our bodies, then we own the consequences of our actions, and the output of our efforts.
A sensible definition. Though as I relate below, I wonder about Is-Oughtisms.
Why is consent important? Disregarding the NAP for now, imagine a typical thief who makes a living off stealing the consensual productivity of others. How successful do you think this thief would be if everyone else in the world was also a thief?
"It is universally preferable to violate property rights"
vs.
"It is universally preferable to respect property rights"
The former is not universally consistent for the three reasons I gave in my initial post.
- Simultaneous denial and affirmation of property rights. A thief expects to keep what they have stolen.
- The total acceptance of property right violation flips to become consensual. If everyone in the world is a r.apist then it is no longer r.ape.
- It morally condemns inaction despite a lack of choice, the foundation of ethics.
There are no contradictions raised by the latter, so it is worthy of consideration.
If everyone in the world was a thief, consistently and mutually stealing from one another, then global success (if we define
success as maximal retention of one's goods) would be low.
Yet what does it matter that people are on the whole successful or not? That everyone is a consent-violating thief or not?
I don't want to have my stuff stolen, and I imagine that you don't want to have your stuff stolen, either. But what do our desires matter?
They would only matter if we all agree that they do. And universal consistency in one's ethical approach similarly only matters if we all decide that universality matters. Because you could show up at my door and extol the virtues of being virtuous, only for my to flip you the bird and kick you in the crotch.
It seems to me that because we have agency (or the subjective experience thereof), there is no imperative to abide by any objective moral standard, because I can abide or reject it for whatever reason(s) I care to offer (and abide/reject on a consistent or inconsistent basis, as per my prerogative).
Your model is internally consistent, and everything follows from the base axioms, and so I'd say that it's a strong and valid ethical theory. But if I don't care about axioms and definitions and syllogistic deduction and inference, then the model doesn't amount to much, pragmatically speaking.
I'll cover below the route I've taken in trying to construct my own working moral hypothesis. Because I'm not saying you're wrong; I'm just concerned about the objective-subjective distinction (and the Is-Ought distinction as well, since that's the thread topic). So bear with me for a little longer.
One cannot argue against self-ownership without demonstrating and accepting it. Whose mouth is speaking? Whose fingers are typing? Whose mind are they trying to change?
My mouth speaks the words I speak, and my fingers type the words typed here. And it is my mind that would be trying to change another's mind (though do note that in this case, I'm not trying to change your mind of anything, nor have I yet engaged in any real defense of any of my proposed models).
Does the fact that I have typed this sentence mean that I own it? Does the fact that I engraved a message on the wall mean that I own it? Does the fact that my heart is currently pumping means that it deserves to not be shanked by a knife?
This seems tied to the Is-Ought distinction. If we define "self-ownership" as "those things which pertain to an agent", then yes, I "own" myself and my words and deeds. Yet how might you derive an Ought ("You Shall Not Violate Self-Ownership") from an Is ("All Agents Possess Self-Ownership")?
So I agree that you can't argue against the fact of self-ownership. This is a matter of definitions, so it's axiomatically true that we all have self-ownership. The concerns arise when you attempt to derive prescriptive moral edicts from this axiom.
The complete rejection of human predators is crucial IF the future is to be happy and sustainable for those who are virtuous. Relativism enables evil through an irrational denial of absolutes, it creates a befuddling ideological fog of moral insanity.
Would this not be relative? This is a conditional statement; it could easily be otherwise. Rejecting human predators only matters if we all desire (and thereby, agree to pursue) a future that is happy and sustainable (which, we can further come to agree, requires us to hold to a standard of virtuous living).
What if none of us want a future that is happy and sustainable? Would we still have any incentive to eschew Evil?
If you were to ask people, most will likely say that they
do in fact desire a happy and sustainable future for themselves. I certainly find such a future appealing. But that only speaks to the primacy of desire as the impetus of human action.
There is no necessary reason that the human species should or should not be overall happy. Or whether it should or should not flourish. Or even whether it should or should not exist in this universe (or any other). We all want to be happy and flourish, but who cares about what we want? Are we owed what we want simply by the fact of having wants?
I again come to suspect that there is a more fundamental axiom at play here than the NAP or Self-Ownership or the Virtue of Universality -- the axiom in which in order for any of this to matter, we must first agree, mutually and collectively, that any of this
does matter.
This method of assessing any ethical proposition to determine evil from neutral is empirical at its core. Logic is derived from the consistency of external matter.
Mm, yes. I was just trying to make a distinction between the way these ideas seem to have come about. You've used axioms, definitions, and derivations thereof (by reason alone), whereas I've been toying with factoring variables and constants of human experience, as molded and directed by biological and cultural evolution, self-awareness, and so on.
Naturally, logic parallels reality, since the former is modelled after the latter, and the latter appears to be causal and consistent (thus making logic causal and consistent).
Well, I'm simply relaying what I understand about an ethical theory called UPB (universally preferable behavior) by
Stefan Molyneux. Check him out if you're interested.
Whereas the NAP is quite old because it is intuitive, it's just that society has a bad habit of creating exceptions for whatever self-centered justification masquerading as a vague "greater good".
So that site has free materials on tons of philosophical matters? And the page itself has a bunch of stuff pertaining to Molyneux? Neat. I see there are PDF files aplenty, so it would make for convenient reading. I'll put the page in my Bookmarks for later use.
Anyway, I said above that I'd outline what I have thus far by way of moral speculation, so here it is for the record:
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My current working model was derived from a matter of investigation. You first have to try to define the concept of morality (it concerns choices, and which we should make), then determine the foundation of choice (it is the agent that makes choices), then determine the impetus of choice (desires and values are what drive human action).
This alone tells you nothing about what you should or should not do; it merely establishes the mechanism of action and consequence. People do things because they want something, and so act in such a way so as to fulfill their desire(s). It is factual that people have desires, and tend to be aware of them, and tend to act upon them. We can use these facts to derive a standard of moral prescriptions.
If everyone tends to want the same thing, then it is objectively the case that cooperation will increase the probability that you and I will satisfy our individual desires, than if we sought to satisfy them on our own (or even at the expense of one or both of us). If I:
>Want what I want;
>Tend to want to get what I want;
>Recognize that others want what they want, and tend to want to get what they want;
>Acknowledge that pro-social approaches are more efficient, advantageous, and sustainable in the long-term for the fulfillment of what I want;
>THEN we should engage in a pro-social approach of mutual cooperation, wherein the fulfillment of our collective wants are maximized, and factors that impede those collective wants are minimized.
We can label that which maximizes global fulfillment as that which is "good", or what we "should" do, and that which minimizes or impedes global fulfillment as that which is "bad", or what we "should not" do.
It doesn't have to be this way. No one has any obligation to adhere to such a model of living. But I believe that most people want to maximize the likelihood of fulfilling their desires, and will thus band together in a pro-social manner, whereas those that don't care to follow this model will be in the minority. What will invariably happen is that this minority, in trying to impede the desires of this pro-social majority, will be met with resistance. Which is the case in the collective arrangements we call "societies".
If we all want the same things (e.g. life, liberty, security, etc.), then it is in our interest to eschew, minimize, and discourage actions, behaviours, and views that impede those things -- which will include dealing with individuals who exhibit such traits.
This model neither prescribes how we might go about fulfilling life/liberty/security, nor which of these possibilities are "good" or "bad" -- because it is we who define "good" and "bad", for better or worse.
You may say that this whole line of reasoning is relativistic. And it is. It is arbitrary, because it could just as easily be any other way.
But human existence itself is arbitrary, since we could well not exist. Yet we do exist, and we do have desires, and these desires do drive our actions. What we choose to do with these facts is up to us.
The problem, if there is one, is that people don't tend to sit down and actually talk these issues out. Or perhaps, don't tend to investigate and scrutinize both their own convictions/beliefs/views, and the subject of ethics and morality in themselves. So we have a mishmash of conflicting ideals, in which pro-sociality is not necessarily the dominant or most desired approach to conducting ourselves.
This is neither a good or a bad thing. And will continue to be until we all decide it is a good or a bad thing.
And I could certainly try to extol "Desire-Impetus Pro-Social Consequentialism" as the optimal ethical model.
But only if I desire to do so.
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So that's what I've been mulling over these past few months, ever since I tried to put some actual thought in determining where I might stand in terms of Ethics. It all rests on the primacy of human desire as the driver of action -- because if we didn't truly want anything, we wouldn't have the incentive to do anything. And if morality concerns actions, and no actions are taking place, then morality becomes void and irrelevant (much as how an objective standard of morality, divorced from the human experience, would amount to nothing if no humans, or even agents in general, existed).
I find it appealing, since it has pragmatic value and is relevant (and rooted in) human experience. If morality concerns the human being, then it would be necessary to account for the variables that influence human action. Better, then, to work along the grain of the human being, and not against it, I say.
Do note that I'm terming this a "working" model, since I haven't formalized it to sufficient degree (in my estimation). I've come some way, but I'm not sure I've reached the end of my contemplations, so to speak. Do feel free to comment on the principles of this model, ask questions, underscore flaws or issues or raise objections, etc.
In the end, though, it seems both of our models yield generally the same result. That is, we'll for the most apart agree on what is ethical conduct and unethical conduct. Which, I would propose in my pragmatism-fetishist way, matters more than which model is technically correct (or barring that, more optimal). 8DDDDD
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Geez, what an unwieldy and misbegotten post.
You guys bring out the worst in me.
AfungusAmongus
would appreciate this thread i wish I'd read it sooner. The op's explanation of the is ought problem is not only well put but it completely explains why facts cannot lead to should-dos. My water example is perhaps null and i see why. We do drink water, fact, but it's from a subjective desire to not die of thirst.
