I was preparing to address the topic’s question by examining things through the lens of substance dualism versus monism (which I will certainly post eventually), but this response caught my eye. I know you were writing in response to another, but I’ll simply address the material as-is. Not that at the time of writing, I didn't read the post of your interlocutor, so forgive lapses in context beforehand.
1. It is necessary to explain the creation of the universe because causation demands that there be some first uncreated creator. You have already acknowledge the impossibility of an infinite series of causation. If the principle of causation is true, then, we must take the only other route available, that is there is a first creator which is itself uncreated. This does not violate the principle of causation because it is not contradictory to say that its reason for existence is sufficient within itself, but this is not to say that God created himself, as such would imply God be subject to temporal change, and thus not eternal, rather it is to say that God never was not. Occam's razor ostensibly makes the first uncaused cause the material universe, as you say, yet God is immaterial. Clearly, granting that there must be a first uncaused cause, which is God, it cannot be the universe, for the universe is substantially material, and God is that which is immaterial. Thus, pantheism is refuted.
I think we can all agree that there is (probably) a
metaphysical bedrock [1]. If you continue to ask “Why?”, your chain of inquiry, if left unabated, will ultimately lead to the answer of “Because it simply is”.
If there is an infinite multiverse, what grounds that infinity? If there is an eternally recurrent cycle of universal inflation and implosion (whether we have the same universe, or different ones at each iteration), then what grounds that cycle? If there is only our one universe, then what grounds it?
This bedrock must be “uncaused”; it must simply exist. I think that much can be said without contention. The question, then, is the
nature of this bedrock—which is to say, whether this bedrock is God (by any definition), or something else.
With that in mind, there are a few things that I’d like to underline, regarding your first point here:
-I take issue with your usage of the term “creation”, here. A
creation, by definition, has a
creator (who created the creation); if you characterize the universe as being “created”, then you necessarily invoke a “creator”. But is this a warranted assumption? Clearly the universe was
caused—something evidently “happened” for the apparent singularity state of origin to inflate and expand—but that doesn’t necessarily mean the universe was therefore
created. In what way was the universe not just caused, but created? How does the latter follow from the former?
-I don’t know what it means for something to be “immaterial”; in fact, I’m not exactly sure what it means for something to be strictly “material”. Whence comes this distinction? What is material, and what is immaterial? How can one tell the difference?
-Perhaps the biggest hang-up (for myself, anyway) is in the relationship between causation and time. Time is a requirement for causation; in fact, “time” can be defined as a succession of states (where this succession is what we call "causality"). “Time”, then, would simply be the term used to describe the discrete measurement (or observation, or experience) of that succession of states.
So time must “pass”, however incremental, for A to lead to B. If time, however, is a property of space-time, and if space-time “begins” at the causation of spatio-temporal inflation (i.e. the so-termed “Big Bang”), then there couldn’t be a “before” to that point. You can’t have time before time, or space outside of space, as that is a contradiction in definitions.
Space and time don’t exist beyond space and time, but God would (by virtue of Its nature). But if God is beyond “time”—a causal succession from one state to another—then God can’t be eternal, as
eternity (to my knowledge) is usually defined as an “infinity” of temporal states. Time without beginning or end, as it were. You could say that God, as the metaphysical bedrock, is unchanging, so every “state” of that eternity would the same state. But if so, then God cannot “cause” anything, because God is always in that one state—unless God’s singular state is always one of enacting causation. But that means that God could not freely have caused the universe.
The same problem arises if you hold that God is
timeless instead of
eternal (which is a more apt descriptor due to this extra-temporality clause). Instead of an infinite number of identical “states”, you would simply have a single state (which again must always be one in which God is in the act of creation). For God to have created space and time beyond space and time, then God would need the ability to change states. And this, by the definitions of time, space, and causality as we understand them [2].
If we grant that scenario, then “time” can’t be a specific property of space-time (because time transcends the apparent “boundary” of our observed space-time). In such a case, then wouldn’t the “boundary” that distinguishes space-time from what lies beyond be an arbitrary one? If this “meta-time” has different properties than the time we understand and experience, then what are the properties of that meta-time?
Clearly, there is much to unpack when it concerns God, time, and causation. And the above also applies to space (which we can broadly define as a volume in which things exist). If God exists beyond space, then what “contains” God? Is God the container of Itself, much as space is the container of the universe? How can a thing be said to “exist” if there is no “place” where that thing, or the idea of that thing, or whatever else resides, at a metaphysical level? A meta-
space, if you will?
A curious conundrum, to say the least.
[1] I use metaphysical in the philosophical sense (things pertaining to existence), not in the sense of “transcending” the physical (because I don’t currently know if the bedrock can or cannot be conceived in naturalistic terms).
[2] If an idea or a concept is unintelligible, or incoherent, or cannot otherwise be conceived or understood, then it cannot be meaningfully discussed. If meta-time cannot be meaningfully discussed or understood, then there’s not point, strictly speaking, in discussing it—not because it might actually be true, but because it would be as productive as speaking word salad, or gibberish.
2. Allow me, sir, to introduce another common godly attribute: infinite. Allowing God be infinite, God cannot be material, for matter implies spacial limitation, and therefore finiteness.
-What does it mean for God to be infinite? What properties of God are infinite?
If God transcends the “space” of our universe, then does this mean that God is “spatially” infinite? Would this not mean then mean that there is space beyond space?
-I again see this “material”-”immaterial” distinction. Are you saying that a thing is “material” if it “exists” within the apparent boundary of our space and time? And that, by definition, all things beyond our space and time are “immaterial” (God included)?
If we suppose a multiverse, is each universe material, and the shared meta-space in which they coexist being immaterial? Also, what is the
substance of immaterial things? I realize this may seem a daft question, if immaterial things are simply non-material things. But I am once more wondering as to what a non-material thing might be.
If you invoke things like “ideas”, “thoughts”, “minds”, “consciousness”, or “spirit” as being immaterial, then this is a matter of substance dualism (which I will be addressing in a forthcoming post to this thread). You can discuss such a tangent if you like, though I’m only going to respond in full after I post that aforementioned musing (which is furthermore tied to the thread topic of God and evidence).
4. This implies a temporal progression. Since we have already established God is eternal, it makes sense to claim that, to God, all times are now, since he is substantially unaffected by the passage of time.
-If we follow my own deliberations on the subject, then God, by virtue of interfacing with our space-time, would interface with all causal states (or “frames”) of the universe (due to omnipresent transcendence and immanence). God “encompasses” the entirety of our universe’s timeline (the sum of all states arranged in causal sequence).
-By virtue of “residing” [3] beyond time, then God naturally can’t be “affected” by the “time” of our universe. God isn’t part of the causal system (though can interact with it, as is usually held as a capacity of God). So in this, I suppose we’re in agreement.
The point of contention would lie in how God, who is unaffected by time, can
affect time (or interface with it).
[3] Residing in meta-space, where things that are beyond space can be “found”. I’m using spatial terms (residing, found, beyond, etc.) to describe meta-space, so these terms are breaking down. You might therefore say that there is no use in conceiving things in those terms. But you invoke such terms the moment you begin to speak of things “beyond” time and “outside” of space.
5. I do not understand. To be all-powerful implies one has sufficient potentiality in itself to bring to actuality all things which are not intrinsically impossible, such as a square circle. This does not require infinite complexity.
-Hmm. If omnipotence is defined as the capacity to enact all possibilities which are not intrinsically impossible—that is, all things that are logically coherent and consistent—then what would omnipresence be?
The capacity to be in all spaces and times simultaneously? If so, God would also exist in all meta-spaces and meta-times at once. But how “big” is meta-space”, and how “long” is meta-time? Are they finite or infinite? If God is infinite, then I suppose the latter must apply.
Still, the concepts of
infinity and
spacelessness/
timelessness seem at odds with one another.
6. Causation is not a fundamentally materialistic notion. If it were, then God would have to be material, which, as we showed above, is not possible. Determinism cannot be understood as the only method of causation because determinism is exclusively material, and having demonstrated that God causes that which is immaterial, with himself for example as being immaterial, it is no contradiction to say that God can cause that which is free will.
-How does causation, or the act of causal influence, pertain to the material, or not pertain to the immaterial? Are all things that are immaterial beyond causation by definition? If so, then they cannot change, be changed, or enact change.
But if God, an immaterial entity, is something that cannot change or be changed, but can
enact change, then must we invoke a concept of “meta-causation” to reconcile causation with changeless-ness [4]? Or is God necessarily intertwined with our space and time, so that the causation of our universe is not something God
chooses to do, but is a innate
property of his (meta-)temporal state?
-As per my deliberations, determinism wouldn’t strictly be a property of that which is material, but that which is
causal. If determinism is the model in which events are the inexorable outcome of conditions that existed prior, then we necessarily need causation, or a causal system, for such conditions and their outcomes to be expressed and manifest.
That which is immaterial isn’t non-deterministic because it is
non-material, then; that which is immaterial is non-deterministic because it is
non-causal. Which poses the problems touched on throughout this response (mainly, how something that is non-causal can enact change, which is itself causal).
Basically, all this boils down to is questions about where you get your definitions from. Space, time, causation, material, immaterial, eternal, infinite, finite; you use these terms, but I don’t know the definitions you use for them. With the conventional definitions I've been applying, many contradictions and irreconcilable ideas emerge. Perhaps your definitions are more suitable, then.
In any case, feel free to respond to all this. Again, I don’t think I will respond again in turn until I have completed my aforementioned post concerning the thread’s topic proper. Still, hope I’ve given you something to think about (because you’ve evidently done so for me).
[4] If we define causation as "that which perpetuates change", then we clearly are working with irreconcilable terms. Which would thus require something to allow for reconciliation, whether that be revised definitions or something else.