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Thought Experiment: Bridging the "Identity Gap" between Death and an 'Afterlife'

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Eyada

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Hi.

A simple thought experiment occurred to me earlier today and I wanted to share it to see if anyone can see any problems with it.

DISCLAIMER: This thought experiment is a simple yet fresh (I believe) take on a problem that has been Done to Death. As far as I am aware, I have never seen this exact formulation discussed before, and I think it has very important ramifications that other thought experiments of this ilk fail to illustrate.

It explores the idea of maintaining personal identity (i.e., continuing to survive as the same person) even after transferring your consciousness into a machine, leaving your biological body lifeless and inert, and it seems to dispel the fairly common claim that such a thing is not possible. (Indeed, in this thought experiment, it seems impossible to deny that identity has been maintained.)

Because I'm feeling narrative and it's 5:00 in the morning and I'm hoping it will make this less boring to read, I am presenting it as thus:


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Thought Experiment:]

You have cancer; it's terminal. They're sure: there's nothing they can do to help you.

Your body is going to die.

However, your brain is entirely unaffected. (So far, at least.) The cancer hasn't spread there yet. You are fully lucid and functional, and you're still your same old, happy-go-lucky self. (Other than the physical symptoms of the cancer, of course.)

That's why you're here at The Clinic today: you want to preserve that self.

You want to survive the inevitable death of your body.

So we begin the procedure:

You sit down in a comfortable chair.

Next to you is another chair and sitting in that chair is a perfect mechanical replica of your body. I'm not exaggerating: it is a literally perfect replica. Every single biological detail has been unfailingly, faithfully recreated. The replica is functionally identical to your current body (sans the cancer, of course); it is made from different materials than your human body, but it has been carefully engineered to be functionally indistinguishable from your biological form. From head to toe, from brain to bladder, it is functionally identical. However, it is dormant. It hasn't been "turned on" yet; once it is "turned on" though, it will behave in a fashion indistinguishable from and perfectly identical to the way your present human body behaves, in all respects.

It's a truly wondrous product of engineering.

The procedure today is going to be simple:

We are going to connect your brain to the Replica's brain. As you may or may not know, your brain is divided into various regions that are each responsible for performing certain mental tasks: for example, there is a section of your brain responsible for processing language, another for performing arithmetic, and various other regions responsible for processing each of your senses -hearing, sight, smell, taste, touch, etc. The Replica also has these exact same regions, and the Replica's regions have been engineered to be exact copies of those found in your current brain. The exactness of this copying is important: as you may or may not know, even tiny changes in brain structure can have profound influences on behavior and personality, so we have gone to excruciating lengths to ensure that this Replica is a perfectly faithful recreation of your current brain. (You've probably been wondering why all of those scanning devices are hooked to your head: this is what those are for. As we are talking, your brain is undergoing tiny structural changes in response to our conversation: these scanners pick up those changes and alter the Replica to ensure that it maintains its perfect likeness of your brain.)

We are going to hook every individual region of your biological brain to the corresponding region in the Replica's brain. So, for example, your region for sight will be hooked to the Replica's region for sight, and your region that handles language will be hooked to the Replica's region that handles language.

The nature of this connection is complicated (and proprietary), but it is such that it allows your brain and the Replica's brain to actually interface with one another: that is, your brain and the Replica's brain will be able to connect and smoothly operate as one unit.

In fact, that is the core of our procedure that we will be performing today: One region at a time, we are going to disable a region in your biological brain while simultaneously "turning on" the corresponding region in the Replica's brain and -this is the cool part- because your brain and the Replica's brain are connected together, the activity of the Replica brain's regions will seamlessly mesh with your biological brain's activity and smoothly take over handling the duties that the now-disabled biological region used to handle.

So, for example, we will turn off the part of your biological brain that performs arithmetic while simultaneously "turning on" the part of the Replica brain that performs arithmetic, and the Replica's "arithmetic region" will start performing all arithmetic calculations for you.

To test this, we will ask you to perform a simple arithmetic operation ("1+1 = ? ") prior to the "switch off-switch on" and then we will ask you to do that same arithmetic operation again afterwards. The first time you answer, you will have computed your response using your biological "arithmetic region"; the second time, you will compute your response using the Replica's "arithmetic region".

It will simply seamlessly merge with the activity of your still-living brain! You won't lose consciousness, feel disoriented, or suffer any sort of cognitive irregularity: the procedure is smooth and seamless. Most importantly, you will maintain a metacognitive awareness of the entire procedure: we will do a 3-2-1 countdown prior to performing the "switch", so you will be consciously aware of the moment when we transfer some of your mental processing over to the Replica. Furthermore, all of these fancy monitors and screens you see in front of you will display real-time scans of your brain activity (and the Replica's brain activity) so you can visually see when the "switch" happens.

You will be awake and aware the entire time. None of your mental functions will be compromised or interrupted. (This includes your memory.) Your consciousness will be maintained throughout the entire procedure.

This process works so smoothly because the Replica is such a perfectly engineered copy of your brain. The Replica will be monitoring your biological brain's activity in perfect detail, so it will be ready to exactly mimic and resume that exact activity the moment we perform the "switch" -Your brain literally won't miss a beat. The Replica region will seamlessly integrate with all of the regions of your biological brain that are still functioning and you won't even be able to feel the difference.

We will do this process repeatedly, one region at a time, until your entire biological brain is disabled and the entire Replica brain is "turned on". At that point, your consciousness will have been completely transferred to your new, cancer-free Replica body!

Here at The Clinic, disposal of your crappy old--erm, I mean, uh... burial and funeral services for your former body are included at no extra cost!

[/Thought Experiment]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So, some interesting questions arise from that:

(1.) Imagine the first "switch": let's say they are going to "switch" your arithmetic region first.

Prior to performing this very first "switch" they ask you: "What is '1 + 1 = ? " And you answer "2".

Question: At this point in time, are you still yourself?

The obvious answers seems to be yes, since they haven't even done anything to you yet.

Now, imagine that they perform that first "switch". They "turn off" the arithmetic region of your biological brain while simultaneously "turning on" the arithmetic region of the Replica brain. The Replica's arithmetic region smoothly and seamlessly accommodates itself into your mental activity. The net result is that there is no discernible difference in net brain activity. It's as if nothing changed, as far as brain activity is concerned. You are, of course, metacognitively aware that your brain has been meddled with: the monitors clearly showed the halting of activity in your biological "arithmetic region" and the simultaneous beginning of activity in the Replica's "arithmetic region". You waited with nervous anticipation as The Clinic operator counted down "3...2...1...switching", and you sat in anxious silence afterwards for what seemed like an eternity waiting for something to feel...different. (Although that feeling never came.) And through all of that, you were awake and aware and coherent.

They ask you again: "What is '1 + 1 = ? " And you answer "2".

Question: At this point in time, are you still yourself?

It is tempting to say no, because part of you has "died" and been replaced by a foreign "thing", but I think that answer is flawed.

When a person loses their leg and has it replaced with a prosthetic, would you say that they are no longer the same person?

I am assuming most people answer 'no' to that question (because some seriously absurd scenarios can occur if you answer 'yes'); If so, how is this "brain region prosthetic" any different than a prosthetic leg? I would contend that it is not any different at all.

If that argument isn't compelling for you, consider this: You were awake and aware the whole time this "switch" was happening. You felt anxiety as the countdown occurred; you clenched the handles of the chair tightly in fear as the machines around you made strange noises during the "switch", you watched as the colored regions on the monitors changed during the "switch", and you waited anxiously in fear afterwards to see if you felt any different.

It seems incoherent to say that it was a different person experiencing all of those things. And if it wasn't a different person, then you are forced to admit that you are still yourself, even after the "switch" has occurred.

So it seems that we must admit that doing this first "switch" does not compromise your identity.

Similarly, then, subsequent "switches" should not compromise your identity either.

But what about the final "switch": the one where they kill the last active region of your biological brain and "turn on" the final region of the Replica and thereby permanently and irrevocably separate your consciousness from your biological body?

You are just as aware and coherent for that "switch" as you were for all the others. The Clinic operator even warns you that: "This is the final switch. This will turn off the last bit of your biological brain and your consciousness will be completely transferred over to your new body." You experience the fear and apprehension as he says that, you experience the anxiety and doubt and conflicting emotions as you watch the last bit of your biological brain fade away on the monitor, and you experience the uncertainty afterwards and the confusion as to why you don't really feel any different.

It seems incoherent to deny that it is the same person experiencing all of those things. All of the memories and emotions and thoughts are perfectly interconnected, in a real, objectively verifiable, historically accurate way. How can it possibly be the case that my thoughts, feelings, hopes, memories, and fears one moment result in the creation of an entirely new person that is not in any way identical to myself the next moment? (And that this sudden creation of a new person is accompanied by my sudden and abrupt extinction.)

It seems, to me at least, that the only coherent conclusion is that identity is maintained throughout the procedure.

If that's the case, then it is true that it is entirely possible for an individual to survive the death of their body and to continue living. Right?

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Edit: Further reflection has convinced me that the section below that I originally included here is incorrect. I'll leave it to avoid any confusion regarding responses to it, but I have realized that while this thought experiment is indeed immune to the "copies problem", it is immune for different reasons.

Further, in thought experiments of this variety, people often address the idea of "copies": the idea that numerous Replicas are made instead of just one. The "copies" problem often results in bizarre scenarios and contradictions and is one of the main objections to the idea of maintaining identity past bodily death.

This thought experiment is immune to the "copies" problem. Because one of the premises of the procedure is that you do not suffer any cognitive irregularities, it is necessarily true that no "copies" could be made here. (An example that illustrates this clearly is imagining what would happen if you "switched" the vision region of the brain to a bunch of "copies" instead of just one Replica: suddenly, the person undergoing the procedure would find themselves seeing out of the eyes of numerous "copies" instead of just seeing out of one set of eyes. This is obviously a massive departure from regular cognition and would destroy the integrity of the procedure.)
 
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I don't really have much to say beyond that I agree completely with the results of the thought experiment. Well, beyond the fact that you stretched one paragraph into a few dozen... But I digress. What makes you "you" is really not that hard to grasp: it's the entirety of your experiences and your genetic structure. The contents of your brain plus the makeup of your genetics is, in general terms, who you are. Assuming that the replica is well-made, then you remain the same person. A case could be made to ignore the genetics part of that, I suppose, as they only help mold you into who you are...

One major thing I might want to mention: the "copies" problem you bring up wouldn't be one as such. You would not see through multiple eyes, but rather there would just be many different people who are identical to you at minute zero, but would very quickly differentiate themselves from you.
 

GwJ

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I don't have to the time to read all this, but is this another attempt to prove there's an afterlife or is this a genuine thought experiment?
 

Okuser

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Hi I'm new here,

The question of human identity (when do we seize to be human) was proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. The modern, egotistical interpretation of human identity lends to the idea that we have sole authority and ownership of our bodies. But, in the crux of our elbow alone there exists over 30 types of bacteria, which operate homogeneously with the human body to regulate temperature and perform other functions as well. The concept of "I" (or the ego) is an illusion because it is impossible to define at exactly what point are we no longer human when we remove parts of our body.

The human body is a collection of carbon and water inseparable from the surrounding environment, and the OP's experiment is nothing more than a rearrangement of that matter.
 

Eyada

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I don't really have much to say beyond that I agree completely with the results of the thought experiment. Well, beyond the fact that you stretched one paragraph into a few dozen... But I digress.
Hmm. That wasn't my intention; I meant only to be thorough to avoid any misunderstandings. It appears I failed and instead just made it annoying to read.

Out of curiosity, how would you condense it down to a single paragraph?

What makes you "you" is really not that hard to grasp: it's the entirety of your experiences and your genetic structure. The contents of your brain plus the makeup of your genetics is, in general terms, who you are. Assuming that the replica is well-made, then you remain the same person. A case could be made to ignore the genetics part of that, I suppose, as they only help mold you into who you are...
Interesting. It seems to me that the thought experiment shows that "identity" consists entirely in the concept of a unique, properly connected stream of consciousness. This stream of consciousness is "properly connected" through causal relations (i.e., the activity of my consciousness causes the states of my consciousness the next moment) and/or, in the case of humans at least, it is also "properly connected" by its persistent and reliable association with a single brain.

Basically, the current state of your consciousness can be reliably and validly traced backwards through time to any previous state of your consciousness either by (1) direct causal relationships (states of consciousness directly lead into or flow from one another) or (2) indirect causal relationships (they're all caused by the activity of the same brain, for example, or, in the case of this experiment, they're caused by the activity of the same pair of interconnected brains.)

Either way, your consciousness (which I believe defines your identity) is basically a unique, interconnected "series of conscious events" that has been consistently occurring since your birth. It is entirely unique: it started at a particular time, in a particular place, in association with a particular brain, and progressed in the unique way it did according to your history. No other consciousness can ever copy that. It is infallibly and unquestionably unique, if only as a result of the history portion of that.

In other words, your identity is more like a unique event than a unique thing. (It is an ongoing series of events, of course, presumably up until you die.)

Even if this thought experiment was changed to exclude genetics, it seems to me that it would still maintain identity, as there is never a time during the procedure where "the person" undergoing the procedure ever actually ceases to be conscious. Furthermore, all of the experiences and states of consciousness are "properly connected" by one of the two criteria I listed above. (i.e., Either directly or indirectly.)

One major thing I might want to mention: the "copies" problem you bring up wouldn't be one as such. You would not see through multiple eyes, but rather there would just be many different people who are identical to you at minute zero, but would very quickly differentiate themselves from you.
Imagine that the first "switch" they perform is on your visual processing region.

Suddenly, you would cease to see things through the eyes of your biological body and you would instead begin seeing things through the eyes of the Replica. (As the optic nerves in your original body would be disabled, you would no longer receive input from the your original eyes; instead, the Replica's eyes and optical nerves would be "turned on" and, hence, the optical region of your brain would be receiving input from the Replica's eyes. Thus, your sense of sight would originate from the Replica's eyes, rather than your original biological eyes.)

That would certainly be a fairly odd moment, but your overall consciousness would never be compromised: you would remain entirely coherent and metacognitively aware of why that was happening. You could even watch the transition on the monitors and perfectly anticipate the exact moment your vision would suddenly transfer over to the Replica's eyes. The Clinic operator would give you the usual countdown, and you would have a few seconds to sit there and anticipate what it was going to be like to see through the eyes of the Replica body sitting next to you. Then, after the "switch", you would be able to see if you anticipated correctly. You could even look over and see your biological body sitting there, all the while being fully aware that (at the moment) most of your mental processing was still happening in that biological body. Since none of your other senses had been "switched" yet you would be experiencing the very odd sensation of seeing through the eyes of one body while feeling, smelling, hearing, etc, through the sense organs of your original biological body. Granted, that is a slight departure from regular cognition (we aren't used to our vision being "disconnected", spatially, from our other senses) but compare that to the instance where "copies" are made and you will see that it isn't really too problematic:

If there were 20 Replicas instead of 1, you would suddenly find yourself deluged by 20 separate streams of visual input. Your mind is not designed to handle that; it wouldn't know how to organize and make sense out of 20 different and conflicting streams of optical input. It would be impossibly incoherent. It would compromise the proper functioning of your consciousness.

Hi I'm new here,

The question of human identity (when do we seize to be human) was proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. The modern, egotistical interpretation of human identity lends to the idea that we have sole authority and ownership of our bodies. But, in the crux of our elbow alone there exists over 30 types of bacteria, which operate homogeneously with the human body to regulate temperature and perform other functions as well. The concept of "I" (or the ego) is an illusion because it is impossible to define at exactly what point are we no longer human when we remove parts of our body.

The human body is a collection of carbon and water inseparable from the surrounding environment, and the OP's experiment is nothing more than a rearrangement of that matter.
This thought experiment is more about demonstrating the persistence of consciousness across bodies.

Consciousness, which is a sort of emergent result of the activities of our biological brain, is not really a physical part of our bodies: it's more like an abstract result of our body's activities.

This thought experiment is meant to show that the transfer of consciousness is possible, and, thus, that identity can be transferred.

Your position rests on the claim that "bodily identity" is the same as "personal identity"; i.e., that "I" am simply equal to my body (or perhaps one of many shareholders in my body, according to your bacteria comment?). This thought experiment disproves the Bodily Identity theory, as my original body is not maintained in any way (it is destroyed, actually) yet it seems incoherent to deny that "I" continue to exist after the procedure.
 

Dre89

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One of the problems of claiming it's still the same person is that you could simply imagine a scenario where the replica functions whilst the regular brain/body is still working unattached to the replica. They're clearly not the same person, one is simply a clone of the other.

The only difference between this example and the OP is that in the OP the regaular brain isn't functioning and has to be attached to the replica, but this still doesn't change the fact that it's a clone.

The law of identity basically shows the replica can never become the same person as the regular person. For the two things to be identical, all their properties need to be exactly the same, but in this case they're not. The replica only replicates its functionality, it doesn't replicate all of its properties. For example it doesn't replicate the historical property of coming out of the original body's mother, or it doesn't have the exact same spacial locations, or the exact history of occupied spacial locations, to name a couple of examples.

That's why the only two things in a proposition than can ever be truly identical are the same thing, eg. "A is A" because no two things in reality can have the exact same properties.

To give an example of the problem of saying two things with different properties are same, imagine objects 1 and 2, which you are trying to say are both the object 1. Suppose 1 has the properties ABCD, and 2 has the properties ABEF. Now if you say these things are identical, you have a problem because you could have object 3 which has properties ABCH, which is obviously more similar to 1 than 2 is, but you would have to say they're all equally identical. It's similar to saying something is infinite in length, and that there is another object that is longer than it.
 

GofG

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Dre, you can perform experiments in your own house using half-mirrors where you start with two photons and end with two photons and it is not only unknowable which photon ended up where, but there exists no matter-of-fact as to which photon is which. That is, all subatomic particles are exactly identical and have the exact same attributes such that an omniscient being would be unable to discern between them. Might be a nit-pick but there is no reason why there can't be two exactly identical objects with exactly the same attributes.
 

kataklysm336

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Dre, you can perform experiments in your own house using half-mirrors where you start with two photons and end with two photons and it is not only unknowable which photon ended up where, but there exists no matter-of-fact as to which photon is which. That is, all subatomic particles are exactly identical and have the exact same attributes such that an omniscient being would be unable to discern between them. Might be a nit-pick but there is no reason why there can't be two exactly identical objects with exactly the same attributes.
The fact that they occupy different spatial locations is a different attribute.
 

Dre89

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The fact that they occupy different spatial locations is a different attribute.
Took the the words from my fingers.

Gofg is committing the same fallacy as the OP by assuming that having the same appearance and functionality= having all the same properties. Their histories of occupied spacial locations is just one example of a distinction between the two.

By your logic, two identical twins who have exactly the same physical features would be the same thing if they were both stillborns, as they don't have different mental activity to differentiate themselves, they would simply become objects with the exact same properties by your logic.
 

Alphicans

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I think if you accompany this with a 4-D physicalist mindset, then you can claim one is able to survive the destruction of your body. However, that's a pretty obvious point, and a detailed description like the one you just gave seems rather pointless.

Dre: and by your logic, if someone cuts off your arm, you are no longer the same "Dre." Extended further, this means you would have to admit you were never 3 years old. Most people don't want to bite that bullet, and seems completely absurd.
 

Dre89

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No, it simply means my functionality has changed. Some of my properties would have simply been altered. That's not a loss of identity.

:phone:
 

Alphicans

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If you haven't contradicted yourself, then your previous post has no point to it all, and you accept this thought experiment as a success.

You said that replica cannot be the same person due to having different properties. As you know, when you were three you had many different properties including being made out of completely different physical bits, so therefore you must also conclude that you and your three year old self were not the same person.
 

Dre89

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We're the same being, just with different properties. My three year old self and current self have the exact same pre three year old history for example.

The alterations to the properties are occuring to the same being.

:phone:
 

Alphicans

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Then why isn't the replica the same being? It's clear they have the same psychological history, meaning they should have the same pre three-year old history as well.
 

Dre89

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They don't have the same history. They don't occupy the same space, or have a history of occupying the exact same spaces. Space is just one example of differentiating properties.

They simply have the same functionality.

:phone:
 

Alphicans

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How don't they have the history of occupying the space? If their psychological history is the exact same they should remember they same physical spaces they took up.
 

Dre89

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That's properties of memory. Again, that's functionality. They haven't actually both occupied the same spaces.

You're still only considering functionality.
 

Alphicans

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How is that at all different from yourself right now and your three year old self?

Nothing in your body right now is the same as your three year old self. Every cell is made up of different individual elements, meaning the only thing that has remained the same is your functionality. You're drawing an unwarranted arbitrary line.
 

Eyada

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The law of identity basically shows the replica can never become the same person as the regular person. For the two things to be identical, all their properties need to be exactly the same, but in this case they're not. The replica only replicates its functionality, it doesn't replicate all of its properties. For example it doesn't replicate the historical property of coming out of the original body's mother, or it doesn't have the exact same spacial locations, or the exact history of occupied spacial locations, to name a couple of examples.
I think if you imagine the following slight alteration to the thought experiment, it may be easier to see the difficulty in your assertion:

I, Eyada, am going into The Clinic to have the procedure done to me. You, Dre, are accompanying me.

You assert that the replica cannot ever be "me" (Eyada); thus, at some point during the procedure "Eyada" must cease to be. (Assuming that complete brain death, and the bodily death that accompanies it, is equivalent to ceasing to be; we'll leave Soul Theory and such out of this for the time being.)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1.) At the beginning of the procedure, they hook my body up to all of the machines and they hook my still-fully-functional biological brain to the replica's brain.

Eyada: Hey Dre: Thank you for coming with me today.

Dre: You're welcome.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am going to assume that the answer here is "yes" as any other answer makes no sense. (They haven't even done anything to me yet, how could it not be me?)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2.) Now imagine that they perform the first "switch": they kill the part of my biological brain that performs arithmetic and activate the arithmetic portion of the replica's brain, seamlessly integrating it into my consciousness as described in the thought experiment.

Eyada: Ask me a math problem.

Dre: What is 2 times 2 equal to?

Eyada: 2 times 2 is equal to 4.

Dre: That's correct.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?

Bear in mind that I calculated my answer to that question using the replica's brain matter, not my biological brain matter.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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(3.) Now imagine that they perform the second "switch": they kill the part of my biological brain that produces speech and activate the equivalent region in the replica's brain, seamlessly integrating it into my consciousness as described in the thought experiment.

Eyada: Hello? Can I still talk? I'm scared.

Dre: Yes; I hear you.

Eyada: I..I...don't actually feel any different. I'm not scared anymore.

Dre: That's odd.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?

Bear in mind that my words were generated by the replica's brain matter, not my biological brain; however, the thoughts and feelings behind those words are clearly still coming from my original, biological brain.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Iterate ad nauseam, until:

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(4.) Now imagine that they perform the final "switch": they kill the last part of my biological brain, the visual processing region, and activate the visual portion of the replica's brain, seamlessly integrating it into my consciousness as described in the thought experiment.

Eyada: That really was an odd sensation; one moment, I was seeing through the eyes of my original body, and now I am seeing through the eyes of this replica body. How odd, but not too confusing: they warned me before doing it. Ask me something that would require vision, Dre.

Dre: How many fingers am I holding up? (Holds up two fingers.)

Eyada: You're holding up two fingers.

Dre: Correct.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?

Bear in mind that all of my mental activity is the result of the replica brain, as my original, biological brain is now entirely dead and inert.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you answer "no" to the final scenario, it begs the question:

At what point did it cease to be "Eyada" that you were speaking to?
 

ElvenKing

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I think if you imagine the following slight alteration to the thought experiment, it may be easier to see the difficulty in your assertion:

I, Eyada, am going into The Clinic to have the procedure done to me. You, Dre, are accompanying me.

You assert that the replica cannot ever be "me" (Eyada); thus, at some point during the procedure "Eyada" must cease to be. (Assuming that complete brain death, and the bodily death that accompanies it, is equivalent to ceasing to be; we'll leave Soul Theory and such out of this for the time being.)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1.) At the beginning of the procedure, they hook my body up to all of the machines and they hook my still-fully-functional biological brain to the replica's brain.

Eyada: Hey Dre: Thank you for coming with me today.

Dre: You're welcome.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?
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I am going to assume that the answer here is "yes" as any other answer makes no sense. (They haven't even done anything to me yet, how could it not be me?)

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(2.) Now imagine that they perform the first "switch": they kill the part of my biological brain that performs arithmetic and activate the arithmetic portion of the replica's brain, seamlessly integrating it into my consciousness as described in the thought experiment.

Eyada: Ask me a math problem.

Dre: What is 2 times 2 equal to?

Eyada: 2 times 2 is equal to 4.

Dre: That's correct.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?

Bear in mind that I calculated my answer to that question using the replica's brain matter, not my biological brain matter.
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(3.) Now imagine that they perform the second "switch": they kill the part of my biological brain that produces speech and activate the equivalent region in the replica's brain, seamlessly integrating it into my consciousness as described in the thought experiment.

Eyada: Hello? Can I still talk? I'm scared.

Dre: Yes; I hear you.

Eyada: I..I...don't actually feel any different. I'm not scared anymore.

Dre: That's odd.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?

Bear in mind that my words were generated by the replica's brain matter, not my biological brain; however, the thoughts and feelings behind those words are clearly still coming from my original, biological brain.
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Iterate ad nauseam, until:

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(4.) Now imagine that they perform the final "switch": they kill the last part of my biological brain, the visual processing region, and activate the visual portion of the replica's brain, seamlessly integrating it into my consciousness as described in the thought experiment.

Eyada: That really was an odd sensation; one moment, I was seeing through the eyes of my original body, and now I am seeing through the eyes of this replica body. How odd, but not too confusing: they warned me before doing it. Ask me something that would require vision, Dre.

Dre: How many fingers am I holding up? (Holds up two fingers.)

Eyada: You're holding up two fingers.

Dre: Correct.

Question: Were you (Dre) talking to "me" (Eyada) in that exchange?

Bear in mind that all of my mental activity is the result of the replica brain, as my original, biological brain is now entirely dead and inert.
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If you answer "no" to the final scenario, it begs the question:

At what point did it cease to be "Eyada" that you were speaking to?
That is a strawman because it the moving of a single consciousness to different hardware. There are never two people in the way Dre describes in this instance. One consciousness briefly loses certain experiences and that consciousness is integrated with a replacement replica brain, renewing the presence of the lost experiences.
 

Eyada

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That is a strawman because it the moving of a single consciousness to different hardware. There are never two people in the way Dre describes in this instance. One consciousness briefly loses certain experiences and that consciousness is integrated with a replacement replica brain, renewing the presence of the lost experiences.
That is my point: there are never two people. That's the whole point of this thread and the thought experiment in the opening post.

Dre rejected the validity of the thought experiment, stating that the transfer failed to maintain identity. Unless he didn't and I'm just misunderstanding what he said.
 

Dre89

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The original and the replica still aren't the same thing though, they still have different properties. They just have similar functionality.

The modified hought experiment doesn't really change anything. What you fail to realise is that it doesn't actually matter if parts of the original brain shut down or not. You could simply connect foreign objects to the brain even if the original brain was still entirely functional.

The fact that parts of the original shut down and the replica mimmicks theme isn't relevant. The replica could still mimmick a function that the original has intact, and they would clearly appear to be distinct. The only difference between the scenario in the last sentence and your one is the functionality of the original. They're not the same when the original functions, but to say that they automatically become one once the oriignal stops functioning seems pretty silly when you look at it from this perspective.

As for who or what I'm talking to in the scenario. That's a different problem. That's basically just a question of when it's no longer you and when it becomes the replica (and it can be a combination of both until the original completely shuts down). It's a process of transferring your identity over to a replica, it's simply just transferring your functionality.
 

Eyada

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The original and the replica still aren't the same thing though, they still have different properties. They just have similar functionality.
Yes, my original body and the replica body are obviously not the same things (for example, in the original thought experiment one of them has cancer and the other doesn't.)

The two bodies unquestionably have different properties, but similar functionality.

My question: What about the consciousness involved? It has the same properties and, thus, is maintained, yes?

That is to say, the consciousness of "Eyada" is maintained even after the death of the biological brain from which it was originally produced.
 

Dre89

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No the two conciousnesses simply have the same functionality, not the same the properties.

The original is simply being mimicked by a replica. The original doesn't even need to be dead for the replica to mimmick it, yet if they were both functioning, you wouldn't say they were united. But to then say that as soon as the original conscious dies the two become united is absurd.
 

Eyada

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No the two conciousnesses simply have the same functionality, not the same the properties.
I am confused; there is only one consciousness in this thought experiment. There are portions of that consciousness emerging from both the biological brain and the replica brain, but those portions are being seamlessly merged into one, single, unified consciousness. That consciousness starts off being produced by only a single brain, goes through a time where it is being produced by two separate brains, and then finally ends up being produced by only one brain again.

It seems, to me at least, that there is never a point during the procedure where that consciousness is ever lost, destroyed, or negated: it is the same consciousness from beginning to end. (Or, to borrow one of your words, it is the same "being" from beginning to end.)

The original is simply being mimicked by a replica. The original doesn't even need to be dead for the replica to mimmick it, yet if they were both functioning, you wouldn't say they were united. But to then say that as soon as the original conscious dies the two become united is absurd.
The brains aren't united by the fact that the original brain is dead; they are united because the thought experiment explicitly dictates that they are networked together as one cohesive, integrated, seamless unit. (They are being united by the imaginary, futuristic technology of The Clinic.) Essentially, the two brains are networked together, so they literally are united. Obviously, if that networking were removed they would cease to be unified.
 

GwJ

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Eyada, think harder about what Dre is really claiming. I feel like you are misunderstanding what he's saying

:phone:
 

ElvenKing

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Eyada, think harder about what Dre is really claiming. I feel like you are misunderstanding what he's saying

:phone:
I think they misunderstood each other because Eyada thought Dre's argument about space was referring to when there was only one consciousness, but Dre was actually only ever speaking of a situation where there are two consciousnesses. Now Dre thinks Eyada is making an argument addressing when there are two consciousnesses when this is not actually the case.

I might be wrong though.
 
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