Here you call me obtuse, and criticise my argument. That suggests you took the argument seriously. You wouldn't call someone obtuse for an argument you haven't heard yet....
I apologize for misleading you.
Firstly, you need to separate God and religion. I'm a theist, but I don't believe in any religion, do not believe in young Earth creationism (although many religions don't either) and I don't believe the universe was made for us. I also believe atheism is more logical than pretty much every other God theory apart from my own.
I am talking purely about origin stories. The explanation of why the universe came to be the way that it is. The only way to get evidence which backs one origin story over another is if the two hypotheses predict different results to the same experiment, and then that experiment is ran.
Religion is an empirical thing in the world, therefore it possibly is subject to Bayes theorem. Metaphysical arguments for God aren't though.
Why aren't they? There are two possibilities:
a: Your theory, whatever its metaphysical nature, predicts in advance some experiential difference from the predictions of other theories. These predictions can be tested and either lend weight to or take weight from your theory.
b: Your theory, whatever its metaphysical nature, does not predict in advance some experiential difference from the predictions of other theories, in which case your theory is
indistinguishable from those other theories. Unfortunately at this point our best bet is occam's razor, which somehow if your theory requires 30,000 words to describe, I doubt it'll make the cut.
The problem is metaphysical arguments (at least the one I use) are rather long and complex, because they need to address the complete picture. For example, my honours thesis is basically my metaphysical argument for God, and it will be 30 000 words.
You should begin describing it to me so that I might be able to actually argue against you, instead of having an unapproachable blackbox as my opponent.
The reason why other theists' arguments don't need to be as long as because they have a probabilistic approach. They basically throw multiple arguments for God's existence, so that the probability of God's existence cumulates. They won't acknowledge it, but this is in fact what they are doing.
My initial understanding is that your argument somehow
proves, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses, itself true through some fundamental logical induction. Such an argument might have validity, i'd like to see it.
My argument, however, isn't probalistic. My argument is a single, complex and thourough argument that covers every assumption. For example, many Christians will try to show that God exists, but won't account for why/how the Trinity exists. Or they'll claim that God is metaphysically necessary, but then use a physical argument (like intelligent design), which may prove God's existence, but doesn't prove his metaphysical necessity at all.
What is the difference between being metaphysically necessary and being physically necessary? My knee-jerk response might be that a metaphysical necessity probably isn't very necessary. Feynman: "Philosophers often make vague statements about what
has to be true. They forget that the only
truth is the observational evidence, and all truth must come from that truth", or something to that effect.
The basic idea behind my argument is that I first show that there must be a metaphysical first cause (as opposed to a mp infinite regress). I then show that this first cause must be self-necessary (meaning it is self-sufficient has no reason for it's existence, has no purpose etc.)
Basically, from here I try to show that there is a very specific criteria for self-necessity.
I say that self-necessity entails that it can't be finite, contingent, can't have a specific etc. basically it can only have properties which we attribute to what is commonly referred to as God.
Even properties such as the will are explained. I explain that the will is necessary because the act of causation must be contingent, and it is contingent because if it has a will it freely chooses to create. The reason why the causation must be contingent is because if it was a necessary mechanic, then you'd be ascribing a form an objective to the most ontologically prior being, which I demonstrate can't have those.
The jump from a being either governed by newtonian determinism or quantum probability to a being with the ability to make conscious decisions is one I would like to hear.
That's not even the tip of the iceberg. The last paragraph is just one isolated example of my reasoning. The concept behind the argument is quite simple and sensible, it's just that the justification of every premise is rather technical and complex.
The question is, what new predictions can we make with your theory?
I hate to bring Carl Sagan's dragon into this, because you might be offended, but I can think of no clearer example as to the utility of occam's razor.
There is no difference between the theory "there is an invisible, inaudible, and otherwise undetectable dragon in my garage" and the theory "there is no dragon in my garage". They both make the same predictions, both predict the same outcome to experimental verification, and therefore are identical in content. The structure, however, is quite different. A simple Solomonoff induction shows that the structure of the 'no dragon' argument is much, much simpler than the structure of the 'undetectable dragon' argument. Since both theories predict the same results indefinitely, and there is no experiment which can distinguish between them, we use Solomonoff induction to decide which one we want to believe in.
This doesn't give us a 'right' answer. It very well be that there is an undetectable dragon in the garage, but we might as well cache a simpler theory in our minds.
Without knowing hardly anything about your theory, it sounds to me to be overly complicated and probably hard to distinguish from simpler theories. Prove me wrong.
e: sig