God, Burritos, and Perfection

[rvkevin]

Would you agree with this statement?

Either Newtonian mechanics are false or our observations are incorrect.

I would agree. It’s just that when you talk about ontology, you are necessarily talking about epistemology. Any uncertainty in epistemology limits any confidence you can have about the ontology of something. This means that if our observations are not %100 certain, then our conclusions based on those observations cannot be %100 certain. I was merely pointing this fact out. Now, if you want to assume that our observations are %100 certain so that you can claim that we are %100 percent sure that Newtonian mechanics is false, that’s your prerogative, but I think that would be very arrogant.

What do you do when you have two hypotheses that both fit with the evidence? Let's try another example - suppose we lack the technology to perform an experiment to test Newtonian mechanics vs relativity. So for all intents and purposes, they give the same predictions. Would you choose to believe one over the other? For this example, they ONLY DIFFER in an untestable case.

Then they are indistinguishable. Remember, “fit” is very different from “successfully predict”. Before we recorded the movement of the planets, and were only able to test models of gravity on the surface of Earth, both relativity and Newtonian mechanics would be experimentally indistinguishable and judgment about their validity should be withheld until they can be further tested. Oceans of Ink could be spilled discussing how simple Newtonians mechanics is and how implausible time dilation is without making any progress or we could test them.

My theory can fail if a bowling ball fails to fall when you drop it.

No, you’re saying that’s an eventual prediction of it. You said that it predicts things will not fall in the future and then say that it can fail if things fail to fall. This kind of refutes the purpose of a prediction. I tried to get you to detail your hypothesis as to show the specific predictions and what conditions would satisfy a successful test or not, but I only got a “simplified” version of it. So, no, it wasn’t obvious that things falling includes things that don’t fall. If you can’t describe your hypothesis clearly, then don’t expect me to comment on it. You say that your hypothesis makes the same predictions except in one untested situation, but it’s unclear as to whether you understand what the predictions are. I think that pretty much sums up what is wrong with this discussion.

 

[Theftz22]

I think if I was an athiest, I'd sound exactly like Undersoggs. It's weird because he's Australian too.

No I'm not.

 

[ballin4life]

I would agree. It’s just that when you talk about ontology, you are necessarily talking about epistemology. Any uncertainty in epistemology limits any confidence you can have about the ontology of something. This means that if our observations are not %100 certain, then our conclusions based on those observations cannot be %100 certain. I was merely pointing this fact out. Now, if you want to assume that our observations are %100 certain so that you can claim that we are %100 percent sure that Newtonian mechanics is false, that’s your prerogative, but I think that would be very arrogant.

The statement that you agreed with is a statement of truth though. That's all I was getting at.

Then they are indistinguishable. Remember, “fit” is very different from “successfully predict”. Before we recorded the movement of the planets, and were only able to test models of gravity on the surface of Earth, both relativity and Newtonian mechanics would be experimentally indistinguishable and judgment about their validity should be withheld until they can be further tested. Oceans of Ink could be spilled discussing how simple Newtonians mechanics is and how implausible time dilation is without making any progress or we could test them.

Ok, so you say that you can't make a judgement between relativity and Newtonian mechanics without experimental evidence. Sure. But I think that I've created a situation (several actually) where you don't have experimental evidence to distinguish between two theories, but one of them seems likelier than the other for philosophical reasons.

What do you think about Russell's teapot? I'm sure you'll agree that it has a low prior probability. But priors by definition have nothing to do with evidence. Do you think that all theories have the same prior probability?

No, you’re saying that’s an eventual prediction of it. You said that it predicts things will not fall in the future and then say that it can fail if things fail to fall. This kind of refutes the purpose of a prediction. I tried to get you to detail your hypothesis as to show the specific predictions and what conditions would satisfy a successful test or not, but I only got a “simplified” version of it. So, no, it wasn’t obvious that things falling includes things that don’t fall. If you can’t describe your hypothesis clearly, then don’t expect me to comment on it. You say that your hypothesis makes the same predictions except in one untested situation, but it’s unclear as to whether you understand what the predictions are. I think that pretty much sums up what is wrong with this discussion.

My hypothesis was "Newtonian gravity will hold for the first 10 million times I drop an object (with density greater than the air), but not for the 10 million and 1st". Just trying to give an example of something that is the same as an established theory in all but an untestable case.

 

[rvkevin]

Ok, so you say that you can't make a judgment between relativity and Newtonian mechanics without experimental evidence. Sure. But I think that I've created a situation (several actually) where you don't have experimental evidence to distinguish between two theories, but one of them seems likelier than the other for philosophical reasons.

What are those philosophical reasons?

What do you think about Russell's teapot? I'm sure you'll agree that it has a low prior probability. But priors by definition have nothing to do with evidence. Do you think that all theories have the same prior probability?

Russell’s teapot has a low prior probability and no corresponding evidence to increase that low prior probability. All theories have a low prior probability. It’s just that some theories have the corresponding evidence to raise their priors to a point where we are comfortable with claiming that they correspond with facts of nature. The implication that time slows down when someone moves has a low prior, yet has evidence to support it. The implication that light is both a particle and a wave has a low prior, yet has evidence to support it. The implication that light can be bent has a low prior, yet has evidence to support it. Low priors + evidence = believable. Not all theories have the same priors. If one hypothesis is a subset of another, then that is less likely than the more general hypothesis. This is based on the conjunction rule from set theory.

My hypothesis was "Newtonian gravity will hold for the first 10 million times I drop an object (with density greater than the air), but not for the 10 million and 1st". Just trying to give an example of something that is the same as an established theory in all but an untestable case.

If you were to mathematically model this claim, it would look something like this:

Newton’s inverse square law = {t | Start of universe <t< 10,000,000 AD}
Not Newton’s inverse square law = {t | 10,000,000AD <t<10,000,001 AD}
Newton’s inverse square law = {t | 10,000,001AD < t}

This hypothesis has an untested claim nestled into it. So, no, it does not have the same Baye’s factor as Newtonian mechanics and therefore does not have the same amount of evidence as Newtonian mechanics. Let’s try an easy example. I have some claim A&B. Based on the evidence, A has high probability of being true and B has a low probability of being true. Let’s make A be “I saw Inception in theater” and B be “I summited Mt. Everest last year.” If I give you very good evidence for claim A, how much does it increase the probability of A&B? Hardly nil. This is because the weight of the heavy lifting falls under claim B which has zero evidence. This is what you are proposing, A (Newtonian mechanics) and B (some untested claim with no evidence). Now, if the claim was simply A, that I had seen Inception in theater and had given you my ticket stub, a picture of me in the seat with a scene of the film playing, and citing you information about the film, this would drastically increase the probability that A is true meaning it would have a high Baye’s factor. The Baye’s factor for A&B is much lower than simply A alone.

 

[ballin4life]

You know what else is an untested claim? That Newton's inverse square law will hold for 10,000,001AD. As I said before, the only difference between my theory and the usual is an untested case. If evidence is all that matters, then you cannot distinguish between the two. But YOU CAN because philosophically we assume that there are laws of the universe that do not change.


More importantly - let's say we have no evidence at all - we're starting over. Are my theory and Newton's inverse square law equally likely - i.e. do they have the same prior? Note that they are mutually exclusive (NOT a conjunction as you claim above). I would say no, Newton's law is much more likely even before we have evidence.

 

[rvkevin]

But YOU CAN because philosophically we assume that there are laws of the universe that do not change.

This doesn’t make sense to me. Assuming what is true is not a reliable method to knowledge; otherwise, I would be going to religion for answers. Now, if you mean that the uniformity of past events is evidence that gravity doesn’t have a time variable to it since having a random sequence conforming to the inverse square law would be remarkably improbable, then you would be using a Bayesian analysis, not a philosophical one. Is that what philosophy is all about, assuming things to be the case? How is this supposed to be a way of figuring things out about nature? Please explain.

More importantly - let's say we have no evidence at all - we're starting over. Are my theory and Newton's inverse square law equally likely - i.e. do they have the same prior? Note that they are mutually exclusive (NOT a conjunction as you claim above). I would say no, Newton's law is much more likely even before we have evidence.

I would agree with you for probably different reasons. If you were to say Newtonian mechanics relies on things in the universe following a pattern (P). This pattern could either be dependent (D) on time or independent (I) of time. Then you propose a theory that makes the same predictions as Newtonian mechanics with exception of one event. If the behavior of things is dependent on time, and each pattern is equally likely, then Newtonian mechanics is as likely as your hypothesis. However, if the pattern is independent of time, then only Newtonian mechanics is viable. So, Newtonian mechanics necessitates P, whereas your hypothesis necessitates P&D. Your hypothesis requires a specific subset of conditions to be true, whereas Newtonian mechanics does not.

 

[ballin4life]

This doesn’t make sense to me. Assuming what is true is not a reliable method to knowledge; otherwise, I would be going to religion for answers. Now, if you mean that the uniformity of past events is evidence that gravity doesn’t have a time variable to it since having a random sequence conforming to the inverse square law would be remarkably improbable, then you would be using a Bayesian analysis, not a philosophical one. Is that what philosophy is all about, assuming things to be the case? How is this supposed to be a way of figuring things out about nature? Please explain.

You're still making this assumption in disguise, because you assume that all those past results have something to do with future results. (Just like we assume that the laws of physics hold on the other side of the universe just as well as they do here.)

Let G2 be "gravity holds tomorrow" and let G1 be "gravity holds now"

If the past and future are independent, then P(G2|G1) = P(G2) and you can't gain any knowledge based on past observations.

Now, based on our observations in the past, it would appear that past and future aren't independent ... but it would be circular to say that this makes past and future less likely to be independent, because we would be using past observations to predict the future.

I would agree with you for probably different reasons. If you were to say Newtonian mechanics relies on things in the universe following a pattern (P). This pattern could either be dependent (D) on time or independent (I) of time. Then you propose a theory that makes the same predictions as Newtonian mechanics with exception of one event. If the behavior of things is dependent on time, and each pattern is equally likely, then Newtonian mechanics is as likely as your hypothesis. However, if the pattern is independent of time, then only Newtonian mechanics is viable. So, Newtonian mechanics necessitates P, whereas your hypothesis necessitates P&D. Your hypothesis requires a specific subset of conditions to be true, whereas Newtonian mechanics does not.

HEY! Philosophy!

 

[rvkevin]

Now, based on our observations in the past, it would appear that past and future aren't independent ... but it would be circular to say that this makes past and future less likely to be independent, because we would be using past observations to predict the future.

We would be using past events as evidence for how the universe works. If you think that this is an invalid step, then you must think that every scientific (descriptive) model is circular…I don’t follow how they are circular.

HEY! Philosophy!

Where? I basically described set theory. And I’ll taboo philosophy while I’m at it.

 

[ballin4life]

We would be using past events as evidence for how the universe works. If you think that this is an invalid step, then you must think that every scientific (descriptive) model is circular…I don’t follow how they are circular.

Why is it a valid step? How do you know that there is one way the universe works?

And yes, the idea that the past affects the future is a part of pretty much all scientific models ...

Let F be the proposition that the past affects the future (so ~F would mean the past is independent from the future). We might observe that in the past F seemed to be true. But this is NOT evidence for F, because in order to use this as evidence, we have to assume F - we have to assume those past observations matter.

Where? I basically described set theory. And I’ll taboo philosophy while I’m at it.

The idea that there are two sets of propositions - those that are dependent and independent on time, and that the proposition that was dependent on time had a lower prior - all that is philosophical reasoning.

 

[rvkevin]

Let F be the proposition that the past affects the future (so ~F would mean the past is independent from the future). We might observe that in the past F seemed to be true. But this is NOT evidence for F, because in order to use this as evidence, we have to assume F - we have to assume those past observations matter.

I still don't follow. The only relevant factor when evaluating the evidence is the likelihood the result would happen under F in relation to the likelihood it would happen under ~F. What does it mean that we have to assume that those past observations matter? If they don't matter, then they would not be evidence but that would only happen if the probability that the result would happen under F and ~F are the same, but that is not the case for the hypothesis under consideration.

Why is it a valid step? How do you know that there is one way the universe works?

In what sense are you using the term" know"? There is evidence that raises the probability of the proposition, but whether we can "know" based on your definition is uncertain. It might be that nothing can ever reach what it takes to be considered knowledge to you, but that would missing the point of science.

The idea that there are two sets of propositions - those that are dependent and independent on time, and that the proposition that was dependent on time had a lower prior - all that is philosophical reasoning.

When you make a hypothesis, you need to have a set of results in which the hypothesis passes the test and a set of results where the hypothesis fails. Otherwise there would be no point to running the experiment if you don't know how the result will effect the hypothesis. If one has a wider range of successful passing conditions, then, given set theory, it is more likely. Again, this is science and mathematics. Please explain how philosophy does with the word philosophy tabooed.

 

[ballin4life]

I still don't follow. The only relevant factor when evaluating the evidence is the likelihood the result would happen under F in relation to the likelihood it would happen under ~F. What does it mean that we have to assume that those past observations matter? If they don't matter, then they would not be evidence but that would only happen if the probability that the result would happen under F and ~F are the same, but that is not the case for the hypothesis under consideration.

F has nothing to do with the past though. F is whether something will happen in the future. Assuming that those past results matter is using F already.

In what sense are you using the term" know"? There is evidence that raises the probability of the proposition, but whether we can "know" based on your definition is uncertain. It might be that nothing can ever reach what it takes to be considered knowledge to you, but that would missing the point of science.

But you are making an assumption that your process results in something meaningful. You assume that past events matter - that they will predict future events.

When you make a hypothesis, you need to have a set of results in which the hypothesis passes the test and a set of results where the hypothesis fails. Otherwise there would be no point to running the experiment if you don't know how the result will effect the hypothesis. If one has a wider range of successful passing conditions, then, given set theory, it is more likely. Again, this is science and mathematics. Please explain how philosophy does with the word philosophy tabooed.

It's not self evident that a time dependent theory has a narrower range of passing conditions.


One other issue - how do you get numbers for your prior probabilities? Given that there are infinite possible mutually exclusive outcomes to any given thing, the prior must be 0 for each if we assume that they are all equally likely.

 

[rvkevin]

F has nothing to do with the past though.

This is what we are trying to figure out. You can't just assume your conclusion.

But you are making an assumption that your process results in something meaningful. You assume that past events matter - that they will predict future events.

No. I would be perfectly content had the evidence pointed the other way. This means that this is not an assumption I have, but a conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence.

Given that there are infinite possible mutually exclusive outcomes to any given thing, the prior must be 0 for each if we assume that they are all equally likely.

This hypothesis would make very poor predictions.

 

[ballin4life]

This is what we are trying to figure out. You can't just assume your conclusion.

What? That's exactly what I said in the two sentences right after the one you quoted...

It's using F when you assume past results matter.

No. I would be perfectly content had the evidence pointed the other way. This means that this is not an assumption I have, but a conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence.

What evidence do you have that the past is not independent from the future?

If you're going to say "well in the past it seemed that the past affects the future", then you are assuming your conclusion. You are assuming that those past results (which seemed to show the past affecting the future) are not independent from the future.

Another way to think about it is that you can't ever directly access the future; you can only access the past. It's not something you can gain evidence for or against.

This hypothesis would make very poor predictions.

It's not a hypothesis ... it's a question about priors.

So how do you determine priors then?

 

[rvkevin]

Do you understand what evidence is?

 

[ballin4life]

No, why don't you explain what you mean? What is evidence? It seemed before that you defined evidence as "successful predictions", but then I think you disagreed with that later when I presented my gravity theory.

Please also elaborate on how you determine priors when evidence cannot be a factor in priors.

 

[rvkevin]

It seemed before that you defined evidence as "successful predictions", but then I think you disagreed with that later when I presented my gravity theory.

You never actually presented a theory of gravity. You only gave me a conclusion and I had to guess at the premises. I was unable to think of any premises that gave the same predictions as the inverse square law and when I asked for details, I was not given any further information. This led me to believe that this is not the case that they give the same predictions for the gathered data and that you simply asserted that they did. Until you can demonstrate this and not simply assert it, I can't take this point seriously.

Regarding priors, I don't know the answer at the moment, we would need to test different hypotheses in order to find out. It might be that specifying a uniform distribution for unknown variables makes the most accurate predictions. Perhaps you could come up with a better method, but at the end of the day, it is the empirical results and not philosophy that will decide who is right.

 

[ballin4life]

Ok, but what's the prior probability that uniform distribution gives the most accurate predictions?

Seriously though, priors are obviously pretty important in your scheme, and yet you can't use evidence to determine priors by definition. So you are restricted to using purely philosophical reasoning for thinking about what priors to use.

I don't know how you could test which assumptions to use for priors without making some huge generalizations. For example, experiments with dice would lead me to believe that I should generally assume uniform distribution of priors over all possible outcomes. But it's a big leap to generalize this to say that I should initially assume a uniform distribution of priors for the gravitational constant.


Also I don't understand your point about my theory of gravity. My theory of gravity was simple - the inverse square law will hold except in the untestable case where you drop a tennis ball 10,000,000,001 times - it will fail on the last one (or insert whatever else you want here for an untestable case, it really doesn't matter). I don't know what you mean by "premises" vs "conclusions" here, or what exactly is unclear about this theory.

By construction though my theory gives the same predictions as Newtonian gravity in all testable cases.

 

[Theftz22]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nDOxLh6AbQ

lol

 

[BOB SAGET!]

http://www2.crossroads.ca/itsyourcall/discussions?id=145

can some you debaters destroy these people whether on the show or on the page?

 

[Dre89]

Honestly Bob, people as uneducated as them will never learn anything from what we say, so there's really no point . All they'll do is frustrate us with their ignorance.

 

[Theftz22]

http://atheologic.blogspot.com/2011/08/kalam-cosmological-argument-premise-1.html

Here is my comprehensive rebuttal of the first premise of Kalam.

 

[Theftz22]

^^Same but for the moral argument.

http://atheologic.blogspot.com/2011/08/moral-argument.html

 

[Sucumbio]

Good read...

The moral argument definitely has trouble when faced with the statement "Objective moral values and duties exist." There's just no way to prove that statement true (or false).

 

[Theftz22]

Well I'd say that there's no way to affirm the first premise and prove the second premise without question-begging. But I wouldn't say that, independently of the moral argument, that its impossible to come to conclusions either way on that issue.

 

[Dre89]

Good read...

The moral argument definitely has trouble when faced with the statement "Objective moral values and duties exist." There's just no way to prove that statement true (or false).

It is a provable statement (potentially).

To do it though, you need to venture into meta-ethics and ontology.

The reason why everyone thinks you can't prove it is because people uneducated in moral philosophy usually don't have ethical systems beyond applied ethics and very basic normative ethics. So they believe in objective morality or subjective morality for nature or nurture reasons, but because they haven't addressed it meta-ethically they don't have a rational justification for it.

Think of it like an uneducated religious person who believed the Bible is the word of God simpyl because they were raised that way. That person won't provide a rational justification for that belief, and put it down to faith, but someone like a biblical scholar would have a much more rational argument (whether you believe it or not).

For example, I have reasoning behind why I believe objective morals exist that doesn't resort to appeals to emotion or my upbrining.

 

[ciaza]

Care to share that reasoning with the class, Dre.? =P

Unless you already have somewhere else and I haven't read it, in which case my bad.

 

[Dre89]

I've shared my normative ethics (which to sum up is pretty much natural= good, but that's obviously not doing it any justification), but I'm not sure if I've shared my meta-ethics (why I think natural=good, and why I think objective good exists in the first place).

My lecturer said people who haven't studied philosophy probably won't understand my argument, but I'll throw it out there anyway. Basically, I have an ontological notion of good/morality. We know being exists. We know being is good, and non-being is not good, because if non-being was not "ungood", then there'd be no problem with all of existence being obliterated. But there is a problem with that, because otherwise being wouldn't exist in the first place.

Now I know people will misunderstand what I'm saying here. No moral premise has been invoked yet. I'm not saying "it's morally wrong to obliterate all being". It is a purely ontological point. I'm saying "given that being exists, it is ontologically wrong for being in its entirety to not exist/cease to exist".

So that's how I get good=being. The next step is how I get being= natural. All beings have certain inclincations which move them towards things which are good for the preservation and flourishment of their being. We naturally move towards food, shelter, sex etc. because they are good for the preservation of our being. Humans are artistic, and we naturally move towards that as well, because that is how we flourish as beings (I'm using "artistic" in an incredibly broad sense here). These are natural inclinations, it is natural for us to move towards those.

So in effect, what is natural is what allows us to fulfill our being the most, and so the reason why I think natural=good, is because I reasoned that natural= being, and before that in my meta-ethics I reasoned that being= good. So ultimately, I reasoned that natural= being= good.

 

[rvkevin]

We know being is good, and non-being is not good, because if non-being was not "ungood", then there'd be no problem with all of existence being obliterated.

If we knew that being is good, then I would against euthanasia, except I am not. This doesn't mean that it needs to be practiced on everyone, only in certain circumstances. Your implication assumes that morality is not conditional, which seems to be an unnecessary and probably false assumption. There are some circumstances where non-being is preferable to being, and these need to be considered. You have given no reason for me to change my position other than asserting that we know it is the case, when I in fact don't. Is there any reason or evidence for this line of reasoning?

 

[Sucumbio]

Argument from Personal Incredulity

Naturalistic fallacy

"Objective moral values and duties exist." True, false or unprovable?

We know being exists. We know being is good, and non-being is not good, because if non-being was not "ungood", then there'd be no problem with all of existence being obliterated. But there is a problem with that, because otherwise being wouldn't exist in the first place.

This is a poor leap in logic that fails, and also commits to circular reasoning. All of existence could absolutely cease to exist and this would not change the fact that before the event of existence ending, that existence existed.

No moral premise has been invoked yet. I'm not saying "it's morally wrong to obliterate all being". It is a purely ontological point. I'm saying "given that being exists, it is ontologically wrong for being in its entirety to not exist/cease to exist".

So that's how I get good=being.

??? This makes no sense. You clearly state that you aren't making any moral premises, and then you... do it anyway? You go from saying it's "purely ontological" to "good=being." Why don't you try that part again, this time without skipping the in between steps. Clearly state in logical form how you get from [being exists so it's ontologically wrong for being to not exist] to [being = good]. (but remember to shore up your [first] statement because as I pointed out, it's not even true, being isn't automatically good just because not-being means being couldn't exist in the first place.

Moving along...

I'm willing to accept that Natural = Being. It makes perfect sense to think of the natural world around us as evidence of existence, and I'd rather not suppose that existence is an illusion because it leads to a pointless dead end.

But I see no evidence in anything in the Natural world that suggests there is a moral fiber ingrained within. In fact I'd go so far as to say that morality itself is a product of only a human intellect's interpretation of an emotional response. True, biology is required for these things to take place, so one can argue that Nature has proliferated Morality, but it no way suggests that Nature itself is moral.

For instance, a tornado striking a community and obliterating it. It is a sad event, leaving many devastated. Does this event mean that they deserved it? Did Mother Earth decide that it was time for them to perish? Of course not. It's a tornado, there's only scientific evidence that can be gathered, which will point to the low/high pressure convergence that led to the weather event.

There's no morality in Nature -except- for humans (that we know of, I won't discount the possibility of other species on other planets in the Universe).

So, I cannot agree that Nature = Good because I see no reason to accept that Being = Good even though I do agree that Nature = Being.

And because of this I cannot see the original question as answerable. As far as we know, there's no proof that moral values and duties (duties technically stem from values, so it's unnecessary to state them separately) - morals - exist objectively.

 

[Theftz22]

My lecturer said people who haven't studied philosophy probably won't understand my argument, but I'll throw it out there anyway. Basically, I have an ontological notion of good/morality. We know being exists. We know being is good, and non-being is not good, because if non-being was not "ungood", then there'd be no problem with all of existence being obliterated. But there is a problem with that, because otherwise being wouldn't exist in the first place.

If A is good then not-A is evil, obviously. So if being is good then destroying being is evil, you're just stating a tautology here. What we are lacking here is any reason for why destroying being is evil. You suggest that destroying being is evil because if it were not evil then "being would not be here in the first place". This seems to presuppose the truth of theism though obviously. Maybe on the theistic view god creates being because being is good, but on the atheistic view obviously the reasons being exist in the first place have nothing to do with being being good.

However it seems to me that if you just talking about "good" descriptively here you need to define what you mean by good. Otherwise it makes no sense to argue that being is good if good is just an empty term that has no meaning, like "jshbdfjbaj". For instance your argument that being only exists in the first place because it is good seems to presuppose a definition of "good" something like "in accordance with god's nature" since that would be why god creates being on the theistic view. And why even make life harder for yourself? If you are just going for descriptions then just define good as being.

Now I know people will misunderstand what I'm saying here. No moral premise has been invoked yet. I'm not saying "it's morally wrong to obliterate all being". It is a purely ontological point. I'm saying "given that being exists, it is ontologically wrong for being in its entirety to not exist/cease to exist".

Saying that something is wrong just is invoking a moral premise. It doesn't really matter if you want to label it "ontologically wrong" or not its still making a moral statement about something being wrong, metaphysically.

So that's how I get good=being. The next step is how I get being= natural. All beings have certain inclincations which move them towards things which are good for the preservation and flourishment of their being. We naturally move towards food, shelter, sex etc. because they are good for the preservation of our being. Humans are artistic, and we naturally move towards that as well, because that is how we flourish as beings (I'm using "artistic" in an incredibly broad sense here). These are natural inclinations, it is natural for us to move towards those.

I think that you should specify that you are talking about sentient beings here. Now sure, most sentient beings naturally attempt to maintain themselves in being, but how does that imply the identity claim that literally being = natural. That seems to me to simply be a non-sequitur. When we say that being is natural, or that the grass is green, we mean that being has the property of being natural, or that the grass has the property of being green. We do not mean to say that being is the same thing as natural, or that grass is the same thing as green, that would just be an equivocation on the word is. These things cannot be identical for one is an adjective and the other is a noun.

 

[Dre89]

I can't answer everything now but I'll try to address some main points.

Ontologically wrong is not the same is morally wrong. A fish ontologically is meant to live in the sea. Having it live on land is ontologically wrong, but there's not necessarily any moral wrong here.

The problem is, I wanted to say the fact that being exists as opposed to not existing means being has purpose, but I didn't want to say that because all the scientists will misinterpret it and say "evolution has no purpose" bla bla, assuming I'm talking about purpose ascribed by a mind.

And no, this assumes no theism. My morality wouldn't change if I stopped believing in God.

 

[rvkevin]

Dre, it would benefit everyone, including yourself, if you took a little more time constructing your posts. Rather than stating an idea ambiguously and having everyone not understand what you mean and causing more posts for you to respond to, it would make the conversation much more efficient if you initially stated your case with more detail and clarity.

As it stands, it looks like you're equating being with "ontologically good" (originally stated as just "good"), and then trying to equate "ontologically good" with "natural". So far, being seems to be synonymous with existing, "ontologically good" with capable of/conditions for existing, and "natural" is whatever leads to "being" or "ontologically good". As of yet, I see no moral or ethical component to this system; "being" and "ontologically good" merely describes the weak anthropic principle and "natural" describes adaptive behavior. Do you think that your framework is prescriptive? If so, how?

 

[Theftz22]

Ontologically wrong is not the same is morally wrong. A fish ontologically is meant to live in the sea. Having it live on land is ontologically wrong, but there's not necessarily any moral wrong here.

It seems to me that "wrong" is just an inherently moral word. The only way I could see this not being the case is if by "wrong" you mean something like "incorrect" in a factual sense. As if I were to say "it is ontologically wrong that god exists" (though this would be an unusual and jack-***** way of speaking). But the problem is that this is not how you are using the term. For their is nothing factually incorrect about destroying being, or having a fish as a pet, it seems to me that you are trying to disguise moral terms as amoral ones here.

But even if your argument here was purely amoral, why then are you saying that you are defending a meta-ethical system?

The problem is, I wanted to say the fact that being exists as opposed to not existing means being has purpose, but I didn't want to say that because all the scientists will misinterpret it and say "evolution has no purpose" bla bla, assuming I'm talking about purpose ascribed by a mind.
And no, this assumes no theism. My morality wouldn't change if I stopped believing in God.

I'll ignore the issue of anthropomorphising evolution here because it is irrelevant. Your argument for why destroying being is bad depends on the claim that the purpose for being existing in the first place is that being is good. Even if you think evolution or abiogenesis has "purpose" its purpose is not to produce good. Only god would have that purpose. This does clearly presuppose theism.

 

[Dre89]

Evolution has nothing to do with my argument, I just anticipated that the scientists would bring it up.

And no, factual correctness, or a factual wrong, is an empirical wrong. If a fish is in fact living out of the sea, it is empirically, or factually correct that the fish is living out of the sea, but still ontologically wrong.

The reason why I'm labelling it as an meta-ethical system is because I'm deducing that morality is ontological.

Again you're assuming moral good. The fact that there is being rather than non-being means that being is ontologically good.

There is no "ought" in this process. Morality is simply doing what is ontologically good. There is no motivation other than ontology being an end in itself, there's no notion of a reward or punishment or anything like that that you see in theological morality.

This doesn't derive ought from is, it does it the other way. Humans ontologically move towards certain things- food, sex, shelter etc. ontologically, they ought to move towards these things. These things are what is/are good.

You can't contest that ontologically we move towards certain things. The only contentious point I'm making is that morality is ontological.

 

[Theftz22]

And no, factual correctness, or a factual wrong, is an empirical wrong. If a fish is in fact living out of the sea, it is empirically, or factually correct that the fish is living out of the sea, but still ontologically wrong.

Please define what you mean by "ontologically wrong". You've stated that it is not moral at all and that it is not a factual term either, what is it? It seems that you're simply using it to mean "something that is not the normal state state of affairs". If this is what you mean, then just say so and admit that this argument is purely definitional, and clarify if you mean it to be moral or not.

The reason why I'm labelling it as an meta-ethical system is because I'm deducing that morality is ontological.

Wait a minute, I thought that something being ontologically wrong is not invoking any moral premise at all?

Again you're assuming moral good. The fact that there is being rather than non-being means that being is ontologically good.

Define ontologically good.

There is no "ought" in this process. Morality is simply doing what is ontologically good. There is no motivation other than ontology being an end in itself, there's no notion of a reward or punishment or anything like that that you see in theological morality.

You contradict yourself again. Is ontologically good somehow also morally good or not? You've changed your position like four times on this issue in this post alone.

This doesn't derive ought from is, it does it the other way. Humans ontologically move towards certain things- food, sex, shelter etc. ontologically, they ought to move towards these things. These things are what is/are good.

Humans do move toward these things, but the conclusion that they ought to move towards these things comes out of left field. How does the fact that people do certain things mean that they ought do those things?

You can't contest that ontologically we move towards certain things. The only contentious point I'm making is that morality is ontological.

I can't even tell if you are making that point or not.

You desperately need clarification on two points:

What the hell do you mean by ontologically good / evil?

Is ontological good and evil also morally good and evil or not?

 

[Dre89]

Ok let me clarify. Moral wrong is encompassed under ontological wrong. Moral wrong only applies to humans, or whatever you deem a rational agent. So a moral wrong is when a rational agent willfully commits an ontologically incorrect action.

So the notion of ontological wrong and right in the world is not a moral premise, because if there were no rational agents, there'd be no moral right or wrong. An ontological wrong would be a fish living out of water. It would also be a moral wrong if the fish was a rational agent like a human.

And it doesn't commit the NF. Is-ought says something is good, so we ought to pursue it. This system says we pursue X, therefore it is good.

 

[Reaver197]

Sounds like to me a better way to say it would be that it is ontologically satisfactory, in that the being is fulfilling the requirements to continue/uphold its life and/or existence. Saying it in terms of "right" and "wrong" might be a little too confusing, and seems to add an unintended moral implication to it.

 

[AltF4]

So it's morally wrong to do something abnormal. Am I getting this right?

 

[blazedaces]

Evolution is morally wrong according to Dre. Great...

-blazed

 

[Theftz22]

Ok let me clarify. Moral wrong is encompassed under ontological wrong. Moral wrong only applies to humans, or whatever you deem a rational agent. So a moral wrong is when a rational agent willfully commits an ontologically incorrect action.

So the notion of ontological wrong and right in the world is not a moral premise, because if there were no rational agents, there'd be no moral right or wrong. An ontological wrong would be a fish living out of water. It would also be a moral wrong if the fish was a rational agent like a human.

Ok so you define moral wrong as willfully committing an ontological evil act. This is all fine and well but I'm still left wondering what exactly you mean by ontological good and evil. Sure you can give an example but what's the principle behind the example? Once you give a definition of ontological good and evil it will become clear that your descriptive argument is just definitional.

And it doesn't commit the NF. Is-ought says something is good, so we ought to pursue it. This system says we pursue X, therefore it is good.

Ok so this isn't a prescriptive ethics at all then I take it?

And is this now your definition for ontological good, "that which is pursued"? In which case your argument for why destroying being is evil just falls apart.

Overall I'm left wondering on the following issues:

1. What do you mean by ontologically good and evil?
2. How is being ontologically good (may be answered by question 1)?
3. Is this in any way prescriptive?
4. Any response to my objections on your point that "being = natural?