@font-face { font-family: "Cambria"; }p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; }div.Section1 { page: Section1; } This first paragraph will briefly outline Beall and Restall’s theory on logical pluralism. They write that pluralism has three tenants. The first tenant is that “the pretheoretic notion of consequence is given in (V)” (476) where (V) is validity. The second is “A logic is given by the specification of the cases to appear in (V). Such a specification of cases can be seen as a way of spelling out truth conditions of the claims expressible in the language in question.” The third is “There are at least two different specifications of cases which may appear in (V)” (477). In order to specify or spell out a case, you need a logic. This can be done in a multitude of ways, such as possible worlds or using a model theory. Thus, there are different ways specifying cases that appear in (V). The center of the theory is that there is no singular correct way of accounting for a case. There are different, but equally good logics. There is no point in debating which account is considered logic, for they are both logic. They both analyze the same case differently, and they both follow a path that is deductive. Debating which is better is moot, as they are both equally valid.