The Reality and Irreducibility of the Mental Life

[Theftz22]

The Failure of Eliminative Materialism

Mental states are things like thoughts, beliefs, sensations, desires, and intentions. The very existence of these things should not be particularly controversial. This is because we are directly acquainted with the reality of each of these mental states. We know that we think, have beliefs, sensations, desires, and intentions because we directly experience them into our everyday stream of consciousness. Still, the eliminative materialist claims that our direct perception of these mental states is merely an illusion. They do not deny that our experience of these things exists, they just try to explain it away as non-veridical. But, with regards to mental states, this position is self-defeating. If I have the illusion of the mental, then I have the sensation of that illusion. I would have the illusory belief in the mental. I would have illusory thoughts about the mental. But then ironically it would follow that I actually have those mental states, not just the illusion of them. As Descartes put it, cogito ergo sum, I cannot doubt that I have thought because my doubting is itself a thought! As "biological naturalist" John Searle says on the idea that our conscious experience may simply be illusory, "...where consciousness is concerned the illusion becomes the reality. If it consciously seems to me that I'm conscious, then I am conscious."

So I hope to have demonstrated the falsity of eliminative materialism. We directly perceive that mental states such as thoughts, beliefs, sensations, desires, and intentions exist, and not only do we have no reason to deny the veridicality of our experiences, but we have positive reason to believe that they are veridical because to say that they are illusory is self-defeating.

The Failure of Reductive Materialism

The mind may be defined as the source of our conscious experience of mental states. Now, having disproven eliminative materialism, the issue comes to rest on reductive materialism vs dualism. That is, is the mind ontologically reducible to physical states in the brain, or is it not. I wish to argue for a for a form of dualism. The argument begins at Leibniz's Law which states that if entity A and B are identical, then everything that is true of A is true of B. Leibniz's Law is merely analytical, it simply states what it means for two things to be identical. Leibniz's Law entails that if entities A and B are identical, then A and B have exactly the same properties, no more, no less. So if mental states are identical to physical states in the brain, mental states and physical states have exactly the same properties. But I believe that there are at least 9 properties that mental states and physical states do not share:

1. Propositional Content: Mental states always have propositional content. Like the belief, "we will win the game", the desire, "I want to win the game", or the thought, "we are down by 2 points". If you try to have thought, belief, or desire that has no propositional content in this way, you will find that it is impossible. But no physical states ever have propositional content. The chair in front of me has no propositional content. It can be involved in a proposition, such as "that chair is red", but it in and of itself has no propositional content. Thus, while mental states have propositional content, physical states do not.

2. Truth Values: My mental states can have truth values, they can be either true or false. For instance my belief, "we will win the game" is either true or false. But it doesn't even make sense to say that physical states can be true or false. Is my computer true? Is my chair false? To have a truth value, an entity must have propositional content. But as we've seen, physical states have no propositional content. Mental states have truth values while physical states do not.

3. Privileged Access: All physical states are equally observable to any competent observer. If you have properly functioning hearing, sight, taste, touch, smell, then you will be able to observe physical states just as well as any other competent observer. Any neuroscientist could cut open my head and observe my physical brain states just as well as any other, and you could as well, even if you couldn't interpret your observations as well as the neuroscientist. But you have a unique privileged access to your own mental states which you do not have with your physical brain states. You can immediately access your own mental states just by pure introspection. You cannot do the same with your own physical brain states. To put it another way, I'm eminently familiar with my own mental states, but I've never even seen my own physical brain states. If mental states were identical to physical brain states, that would not be possible. By careful observation of my behavior and physical brain states, you could piece together a general picture of my mental states. But I have no need of such a process because I have a unique privileged access to my mental states which I do not have with physical brain states. And if I choose to be guarded in my behavior, then you could never figure out my exact mental states. Therefore mental states have the property of privileged access while physical brain states do not.

4. Radical Event Dependence: Consider my mental states about my newborn baby cousin Zachary, such as my beliefs, thoughts, desires, intentions, and sensations about him. The existence of these mental states is radically dependent upon the contingent event of Zach being born in a way that my physical brain states are not. I could not have these mental states if Zach was not born. I could not have beliefs, intentions, desires, sensations, and thoughts about a non-existent entity. But the existence of my physical brain states is not radically dependent upon the occurrence of that contingent event in the same way. I would still have my physical brain states even if Zach was not born. There's nothing about the 3-pound hunk of meat in my head that would have changed if, by random genetic processes, my Aunt had a baby with one more X chromosome. Thus, my mental states are radically dependent on that event while my physical brain states are not.

5. Subjective Ontology: Conscious mental states have a subjective ontology. That is to say that they exist only when experienced. If I cease to consciously experience, then I am no longer conscious, and thus my conscious mental states no longer exist. Consciousness exists only when I am consciously experiencing it. But physical states have an objective ontology. They continue to exist even when no one experiences them. Rocks, trees, etc. don't pop out of existence when we turn our back on them and stop experiencing them. Similarly, even when I die, my physical brain states continue to exist even after I die and cease to be conscious. But I have ceased to be conscious. Thus conscious mental states have a subjective ontology while physical states an objective ontology.

6. Intentionality: Mental states have an "aboutness" to them that is not shared by physical states. Mental states are always about something, or of something. I think about things, I have beliefs about things, I have sensations of things, desires about things, and intentions about things. They always are referent towards a content. But how does it even make sense to say that my physical brain states are about something, any more than it makes sense to say that the moon, or my desk are about something. More pointedly, mental states can have intentionality towards non-existent things. Like my belief, "god does not exist". So my mental states stand in a intensional relationship to something that does not exist. But physical states never stand in relationship to things which do not exist, since they cannot physically effect that which is not physically present. Therefore mental states have intentionality while physical states do not.

7. Rational Relations: Mental states have the property of being involved in rational relations. For instance, my belief that all men are mortal, and my belief that Socrates is a man are involved in a rational relation with my third belief that Socrates is mortal. The rational relation is that the first two beliefs logically entail the third. But physical states do not enter into rational relations. This is because to be involved in a rational relation requires propositional content, but we've already seen that physical states have no propositional content. One physical state may cause another physical state, but it doesn't make sense to say that one physical state entails another physical state. Thus, mental states have the property of being involved in rational relations while physical states do not.

8. Indubitability: This is a property of only mental states that I discussed earlier when discussing eliminative materialism. The existence of mental states is indubitable, because to doubt is itself a mental state. Cogito ergo sum. Thus, it is flatly contradictory to doubt the existence of mental states. But physical states are not indubitable in that way. There is no contradiction in doubting that the physical states I observe are real. There is no logical contradiction in brain-in-a-vat or Descartes' Demon style scenarios. Thus, while mental states have the property of indubitability, physical states do not.

9. Modal Properties: This particular contention has become particularly controversial in the DH as of late. The fact is though that at least if it is the case that it is even logically possible that mental states could exist without physical brain states, it would follow that that mental states have different modal properties than physical brain states, and that therefore they are not the same thing at all. And by the same line of argument, if my physical brain states could exist without my mental states existing, that too would show that they are not identical. Therefore the whole issue comes to rest on two questions: Are zombies (bodies that look and act in exactly the same way as real people but have no mental states) logically possible? And is the body-swap (my mental states somehow switch bodies with another person) logically possible? If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then mental states are not identical to brain states. The issue is, how do we show that either of these things is logically possible? One thing to consider is that both of these situations are depictable. Now, conceding for the sake of argument the strict depictability-to-possibility thesis, we may say that something being depictable counts as evidence for its possibility. Even Alt admits that there are correlations between depictability and possibility. Consider the following argument for depictability constituting evidence for possibility:

1) If you depict something, then a depiction of that thing exists.
2) A depiction has features that clearly resemble the thing being depicted.
3) For most impossibilities, features that clearly resemble that impossibility cannot exist.
4) Therefore, for most impossibilities, a depiction of that impossibility cannot exist. (2 and 3)
5) Therefore you cannot depict most impossibilities. (1 and 4)
6) Therefore if you can depict something, then it is probably not impossible. (5)

Premise 1 is obviously true. The act of depicting something means making a physical image of it, but then since a depiction is just defined as the actual physical image itself, premise 1 is true. Premise 2 also seems fairly unobjectionable. If a depiction of something did not have features that clearly resemble the thing being depicted, then we would not be able to recognize that what the thing being depicted is. But we are able to recognize what the being depicted is (at least if it is a good depiction). What follows then is premise 2, a depiction does in fact have features that clearly resemble the thing being depicted. Premise 3, by restricting its scope to only the majority of impossibilities, is perfectly compatible with admitting that things like time travel and zeno machines are depictable and yet impossible. But still the majority of impossible things like square-circles and married bachelors are so dissimilar from things that are actual that they have features of which clear resemblances are impossible. The rest of the argument follows by logical necessity. Thus we can see that depictability counts as evidence for possibility. Therefore, since zombies and the body-swap are depictable, we are justified in thinking that they are possible unless we are presented overriding evidence of their impossibility. Therefore what follows is that mental states are not identical to physical brain states, because they have different modal properties.

The Success of Dualism

Therefore I conclude that mental states are real and irreducible entities. Moreover, we have seen that they are irreducible in light of their being not identical to physical states. Therefore I conclude that mental states must be viewed as real and irreducible non-physical states. I do not intend to defend why I believe property dualism succeeds while substance dualism also fails at this particular time, but only to rediscover the reality of the mental life which we all knew about all along.

 

[AltF4]

Showing that mental states and brain states are not logically identical only proves that it's logically possible for dualism to be correct. (IE: There's nothing internally contradictory about dualism) It does not show that dualism is actually true. Merely being free of internal contradiction is not cause to call something true in the real universe.

 

[Theftz22]

To the contrary, I've shown that mental states and physical states are actually not the same thing, as in the actual universe. I've shown that they're not logically identical with different modal properties, but I've also shown them to be actually not identical with other properties. My argument is much more than for internal coherence.

 

[AltF4]

Then you're being quite confusing in your original post. You say:

The argument begins at Leibniz's Law which states that if entity A and B are identical, then everything that is true of A is true of B. Leibniz's Law is merely analytical, it simply states what it means for two things to be identical. Leibniz's Law entails that if entities A and B are identical, then A and B have exactly the same properties, no more, no less. So if mental states are identical to physical states in the brain, mental states and physical states have exactly the same properties. But I believe that there are at least 9 properties that mental states and physical states do not share:

You are quite specifically saying here that you are arguing against the logical identity of minds and brains. Leibniz's Law only applies to logical identity. Not actual sameness.

Even all of your individual points only describe logical differences between minds and brains. To prove that minds and brains are not actually the same thing in the real world you would have to show an example of a task that the mind can perform but the brain cannot. Proven instances of out-of-body experiences would be a good example.

But alas, the exact opposite is true. Despite our looking long and hard, every single instance of mental experiences and capacities have been mapped to brain function. There are no instances of unsolved mental ability that cannot be explained by brain activity. The conclusion from this is pretty obvious.

EDIT: Which isn't to say that we have a perfect and unerring account of all brain activity. But there's nothing fundamentally missing from the current models, just details. This is the same with our understanding of sound. While we may not be able to predict with unerring accuracy all the intricate details of sound resonance and reflection, there is nothing fundamentally mysterious about it. Sound is just a bunch of pressure waves moving through a medium. And the brain is just a bunch of synapses, neurons, and chemical processes. Their interactions are complex, but there's nothing fundamentally mysterious or missing about it

 

[Dre89]

But what he's saying is that the mind posseses properties which we know exist (most of the numbered stuff) that the brain does not. This is not just being conceivably different, it explains truths of the world (the numbered stuff).

And your demand that we demonstrate an activity not mapped to the brain isn't reasonable. A mind-body dualist isn't saying that the mind can function independently from the brain, not every mb dualist believes the mind will function perfectly after death and rise to Heaven. All the dualist has to demonstrate as that they are distinct properties, and that the combination of both is necessary to explain certain truths (again, the numbered stuff).

The mind and brain are clearly not identical in that we can hypothetically imagine a created functioning brain that produces no consciousness.

Conscious thoughts may be mapped back to neuroscience but consciousness itself can't, in the sense that if you view the anatomy of the nerve system you won't actually see the conscious thoughts that the subject can.

 

[AltF4]

I'll gladly concede that the mind and body are not logically identical. Since calling two things logically identical is an extremely strong statement, calling two things NOT logically identical is an extremely weak statement. It says almost nothing. It says only that it is possible (barring other arguments) that minds and bodies to be different. Sure. It has never been my position that it's logically impossible for non-physical minds to exist. It is my position that they don't exist, and that there is no reason to believe that they do.

All these numbered "different properties" are meaningless word play like "Propositional Content" (it doesn't matter how we use English to describe the phenomenon), or missing the point of the consequences of purely physical minds. Ridiculous things like:

I'm eminently familiar with my own mental states, but I've never even seen my own physical brain states. If mental states were identical to physical brain states, that would not be possible.

That's like saying "I have seen light, but I have never seen a photon. Therefore light and photons are not identical". Yes you HAVE seen a photon. Because that's what light is! And yes you HAVE seen brain states, because that's what mental states are. To just declare that you haven't seen brain states is to beg the question.

The mind and brain are clearly not identical in that we can hypothetically imagine a created functioning brain that produces no consciousness.

I disagree that being able to imagine something in any way indicates what's possible. As per my other thread about that exact topic.

Conscious thoughts may be mapped back to neuroscience but consciousness itself can't, in the sense that if you view the anatomy of the nerve system you won't actually see the conscious thoughts that the subject can.

Bold unsubstantiated claims. What makes you think that consciousness cannot be explained by neuroscience? To the contrary, we understand it pretty well. We understand it enough to be able to administer drugs to shut it down but not damage anything for instance. (Anesthesia)

 

[Theftz22]

You are quite specifically saying here that you are arguing against the logical identity of minds and brains. Leibniz's Law only applies to logical identity. Not actual sameness.

Even all of your individual points only describe logical differences between minds and brains. To prove that minds and brains are not actually the same thing in the real world you would have to show an example of a task that the mind can perform but the brain cannot. Proven instances of out-of-body experiences would be a good example.

But alas, the exact opposite is true. Despite our looking long and hard, every single instance of mental experiences and capacities have been mapped to brain function. There are no instances of unsolved mental ability that cannot be explained by brain activity. The conclusion from this is pretty obvious.

Identity is identity is identity. Identity is a necessary property, meaning that there's no difference between "logical identity" and "actual sameness". Besides, the properties of mental states that I listed are different in the actual world. I only appealed to modal properties in my very last point. Therefore, even though there's no difference between your "types" of identity, I've satisfied even your flawed requirement of having to show non-identity through actual properties.

EDIT: Which isn't to say that we have a perfect and unerring account of all brain activity. But there's nothing fundamentally missing from the current models, just details. This is the same with our understanding of sound. While we may not be able to predict with unerring accuracy all the intricate details of sound resonance and reflection, there is nothing fundamentally mysterious about it. Sound is just a bunch of pressure waves moving through a medium. And the brain is just a bunch of synapses, neurons, and chemical processes. Their interactions are complex, but there's nothing fundamentally mysterious or missing about it

If my arguments are correct, then no amount of neuroscience is going to show that mental states are identical to physical brain states, since my arguments aren't founded on complex neuroscientific facts about the brain.

I'll gladly concede that the mind and body are not logically identical. Since calling two things logically identical is an extremely strong statement, calling two things NOT logically identical is an extremely weak statement. It says almost nothing. It says only that it is possible (barring other arguments) that minds and bodies to be different. Sure. It has never been my position that it's logically impossible for non-physical minds to exist. It is my position that they don't exist, and that there is no reason to believe that they do.

No, to show that two things are not "logically identical" would be to show that they are actually different. I'm not going to bother going over that because I'm sure I've explained that to you multiple times in the past.

All these numbered "different properties" are meaningless word play like "Propositional Content" (it doesn't matter how we use English to describe the phenomenon), or missing the point of the consequences of purely physical minds. Ridiculous things like:

Propositional content means that they express propositions, I don't see what you have against that term.

That's like saying "I have seen light, but I have never seen a photon. Therefore light and photons are not identical". Yes you HAVE seen a photon. Because that's what light is! And yes you HAVE seen brain states, because that's what mental states are. To just declare that you haven't seen brain states is to beg the question.

If you simply patently assert that I have seen brain states without any reasoning then you are the one who is in fact begging the question. I thought it was pretty self-evident that I haven't seen my own brain states. Why? Well, I know what brain states look like, I've seen pictures of them. But I've never gotten my own brain scanned, or anything of the like. My brain states are physically located inside my head, and I've never yet looked, directly or indirectly, anything located inside my head. I know what the physical organ of the brain looks like, and I've never seen my own. I don't see how you could deny that basic empirical fact.

 

[Dre89]

Bold unsubstantiated claims. What makes you think that consciousness cannot be explained by neuroscience? To the contrary, we understand it pretty well. We understand it enough to be able to administer drugs to shut it down but not damage anything for instance. (Anesthesia)

I didn't say it can't be explained by neuroscience. I'm saying it can't be experienced by neuroscience.

There is a distinction between the chemicals in the nerve system, and the consciousness it creates. The actual experience of the subject's consciousness (as in directly witnessing or experiencing their thoughts) is not accessible via neuroscience, nor is it accessible through any other physical means.

These non-physical states exist but aren't acccessible by any physical means, and in most cases are visual imagery, with all three dimensions, yet have no material location.

 

[AltF4]

When i say "Actually different" I'm not referring to logical identity. I thought that was pretty clear. two things can be not logically identical, and yet in reality be actually the same. Or "contingently equal" might be the term you choose. "Light" and "Photons" are an example. It's logically possible that they're different, therefore they are not identical. But in reality, they map to the same thing. Same with "Earth" and "3rd planet from the sun".

No, to show that two things are not "logically identical" would be to show that they are actually different. I'm not going to bother going over that because I'm sure I've explained that to you multiple times in the past.

I think it's pretty clear that how I am (and have been all along) using these terms, this is not true. Above are two counter-examples. And of course there are countless of them.

If you simply patently assert that I have seen brain states without any reasoning then you are the one who is in fact begging the question.

Precisely! You can't just blindly assert that you have or haven't observed brain states. Since that conclusion depends on whether mind states and brain states are equal. If they are equal, then you HAVE been observing brain states all along, and just didn't know it.

I mean... maybe I'll get to all of these numbered "points"... but they're all so silly. Look at "Radical Event Dependence". Ridiculous claims like:

I could not have beliefs, intentions, desires, sensations, and thoughts about a non-existent entity

Sure you can. People do it all the time. You don't think people have imaginary friends? (Not even referring to religion) They sometimes don't even know they're not real. Your emotions and mental activity is in no way dependent on anything but what's in your brain. Except insofar as your brain is affected by the environment. I literally cannot comprehend what would make you say the contrary.

 

[AltF4]

I didn't say it can't be explained by neuroscience. I'm saying it can't be experienced by neuroscience.

There is a distinction between the chemicals in the nerve system, and the consciousness it creates. The actual experience of the subject's consciousness (as in directly witnessing or experiencing their thoughts) is not accessible via neuroscience, nor is it accessible through any other physical means.

These non-physical states exist but aren't acccessible by any physical means, and in most cases are visual imagery, with all three dimensions, yet have no material location.

All unsubstantiated claims!

It's perfectly possible for neuroscience to get to the point where you can stick your head into a machine and it reads your consciousness, which can then be visually displayed onto a screen or directly transmitted (via biological implants) to someone else's brain.

To say that this is impossible is a strong claim. One you at least have to try to back up. And if your answer is "because the mind is non-physical" then this is begging the question. Since you used this argument as evidence for why minds aren't purely physical.

 

[Dre89]

Except that will just be creating an imitation of conscious thought.

Creating a replica of conscious thought doesn't change the fact that the original doesn't have a physical location.

If anything, it further confirms the distinction between the chemical processes in the nerve system and the consciousness created by them.

 

[AltF4]

You're just continuing to beg the question. This whole thread is about trying to prove that non-physical minds exist. You can't go calling that a fact.

 

[Theftz22]

When i say "Actually different" I'm not referring to logical identity. I thought that was pretty clear. two things can be not logically identical, and yet in reality be actually the same. Or "contingently equal" might be the term you choose.

There is no such thing as contingent identity, so I have no idea what you're talking about. If two things are possibly different, then that means that they have different modal properties in the actual world. Therefore they have different properties in the actual world. Therefore they are not the same in the actual world. That's why identity is a necessary property. Either something is identical in every possible world, or in no possible worlds. Besides, my argument doesn't depend on modal properties.

"Light" and "Photons" are an example. It's logically possible that they're different, therefore they are not identical. But in reality, they map to the same thing.

To my understanding, light is only emitted and absorbed by photons, but not the same thing. Anyway, if light and photons are the same thing, then it is possible that they are different.

Same with "Earth" and "3rd planet from the sun".

I've only refuted this example three times already, you can stop bringing it up.

Precisely! You can't just blindly assert that you have or haven't observed brain states. Since that conclusion depends on whether mind states and brain states are equal. If they are equal, then you HAVE been observing brain states all along, and just didn't know it.

But I'm not just asserting it, there's good empirical evidence that I haven't observed my own brain states. We would both agree that my brain states are located inside my skull. But I've never physically observed the inside of my skull, nor have I had a brain scan, nor have I had bits of my brain removed. Therefore I've never physically observed my own brain states.

I mean... maybe I'll get to all of these numbered "points"... but they're all so silly. Look at "Radical Event Dependence". Ridiculous claims like:



Sure you can. People do it all the time. You don't think people have imaginary friends? (Not even referring to religion) They sometimes don't even know they're not real.

But then you face the problem of explaining how mental states could be involved in an intensional relationship with non-existent things, when physical states never are, which was another of my points.

Your emotions and mental activity is in no way dependent on anything but what's in your brain. Except insofar as your brain is affected by the environment.

As I've said in the past, mental states could be entirely causally reducible to brain states, but it would not follow from that that they are ontologically reducible to brain states. Smoke is causally reducible to fire, but smoke is not the same thing as fire.

I literally cannot comprehend what would make you say the contrary.

Good arguments.

 

[AltF4]

As I've said in the past, mental states could be entirely causally reducible to brain states, but it would not follow from that that they are ontologically reducible to brain states. Smoke is causally reducible to fire, but smoke is not the same thing as fire.

Who here is arguing that mental activities are ontologically reducible to brain states? (IE: Who is arguing that the mind and the brain are logically identical?) If that's all you're arguing against, then have it. You have in no way proved that non-physical minds exist, though.

But I'm not just asserting it, there's good empirical evidence that I haven't observed my own brain states. We would both agree that my brain states are located inside my skull. But I've never physically observed the inside of my skull, nor have I had a brain scan, nor have I had bits of my brain removed. Therefore I've never physically observed my own brain states.

This is begging the question. If brain states ARE mental states, then you have in fact been observing brain states all along and just didn't know it. To say definitively that you haven't observed brain states is to assume that mental states and brain states are completely different. Which is to assume your conclusion.

I guess I'm going to have to go point-by-point...


1. Propositional Content:

Silly word play, in no way indicative of anything. I could just as easily say "Spoken speech has content in a way that pressure waves through air does not. Speech has meaning and context and a listener, but pressure waves just are". How we use English to describe the thing doesn't reveal any truth about the thing. This is like in the determinsm thread, when I was told that non-physical minds exist because it's common speech to say "my brain". Absurd.

Furthermore, even the premise is false. It's perfectly possible, indeed common, to just "be mad". But not "at something".


2. Truth Values:

To the contrary, a mental state absolutely can not have truth values. The statement "we will win the game" can be true or false. But not the mental state depicting that statement. Only statements can have truth values. That's what defines a statement! The ability to be true or false. States of being of any kind are neither true nor false, they just are. The best you can say is "I have a mental state depicting a false statement"

3. Privileged Access:

Begs the question. If mental states are reducible to brain states, then we can most certainly "read your mind". To just state blindly that nobody can access your thoughts is to say that they are not represented in physical states, which is to beg the question.

4. Radical Event Dependence:

I have a hard time wrapping my head around the premises of this one. is it saying that mental states change without physical stimulus? That's a bold claim. Certainly one worthy of a bit more evidence than a mere assertion. If not... then isn't that exactly what we should expect to see in a world where the mind and brain are reducible to one another?

5. Subjective Ontology

Begs the question. To say that mental states are subjectively experienced "by you" is to assume that "you" are not your brain. You're saying that "you" are somewhere else, experiencing your brain from afar. Which is to assume what you want to prove.


6. Intentionality:

Repeat of "Propositional Content". Silly word play.

7. Rational Relations

Repeat of "Truth Values". Mental states don't have truth values, nor do they participate in anything. Statements do. Mental states can describe a statement, but they themselves don't participate in anything.

8. Indubitability

Even if you are a "brain in a vat" you still have a physical brain. (The one in the vat) The body in front of you right now may be an illusion, but there must be some hard reality behind the illusion. "Reality" and "physical" are synonyms.

9. Modal Properties

Here is where you again explicitly state that your argument is merely about logical identity. A point that nobody is contending. But then confusingly try to expand on it by saying: "therefore they are not the same thing at all"

A clever play of words that might lead some to think you've concluded that non-physical minds exist. But you have done no such thing. Proving that bumps in the night and Bigfoot are not logically identical does not mean that Bigfoot exists.

 

[Dre89]

You're just continuing to beg the question. This whole thread is about trying to prove that non-physical minds exist. You can't go calling that a fact.

When do I imply that it is a self-evident fact?

The thing is if we were determined there wouldn't be any need for conciousness. We'd be just like robots, acting based on chemical processes.

Conciousness isn't necessary for what you propose, but it exists, yet your whole reason for rejecting the mind is that it's an unnecessary addition.

So unless you can show how conciousness is somehow necessary for brain activity, I don't see how your argument works. In fact the brain still works when we're not concious anyway, further adding to my point.

 

[AltF4]

When do I imply that it is a self-evident fact?

Right here:

Creating a replica of conscious thought doesn't change the fact that the original doesn't have a physical location.

And in this thread, at least, I'm not proposing anything. I'm just refuting claims of proof for non-physical minds. I don't need to provide positive evidence for theory B to refute theory A.

 

[Dre89]

Concious thoughts don't have a physical location.

When I imagine an apple, are you saying there is some thought bank somewhere in the universe that stores physical manifestations of people's thoughts?

Of course you're not

 

[AltF4]

Yes, it's called your brain. A thought is nothing more than a series of biochemical reactions, fully physically present. Declaring it non-physical is to beg the question, since this thread is trying to establish exactly that.

 

[Dre89]

The chemical processes create the image, they're not the same thing. Otherwise the chemicals themselves would colour and arrange themselves to form the image of an apple, and we would be able to see this apple inside someone's skull.

We've been through this before. If you're a physicalist, you must believe anything with the dimensions of length width and depth, or anything that is visually perceivable must have a physical location.

Thoughts don't have a physical location. The actual image itself doesn't physically exist within the brain.

Also, if you believe mental states are all a result of chemical processes, how do you explain mental states originating from hearing words?

I can understand mental states being a result of chemical processes for things like food intake, sexual frustration, drug abuse etc. This is because the stimulant is purely chemical or hormonal.

The difference with words is that it requires an understanding of their meaning. An insult or revelation or bad news won't catalyse negative mental states in a baby because a baby won't understand what they mean.

The problem is that the chemical states in the body won't know what the words mean. Something else has to decipher the meaning before the body knows what chemical processes are needed to enact the relevant mental states. That's why we don't react when someone says something to us when we're asleep.

Robots are a different story. Robots can react to words, but they're just programmed to react to that specific sound, they don't know what it means. If you conveyed the message in a non-verbal way (assuming it isn't programmed to understand non-verbal communication) it won't react.

I'm having a hard time getting the point out but I hope you understand what I'm trying to say.

 

[AltF4]

No, I disagree. The chemical reactions ARE the image. Forget the human brain, and consider a computer network for a moment.

If I send an image file out over the network, and while it is in route stop and think "where is the image"? What kind of answer does one expect to get?

I can tell you that there's a series of electrons flowing across ethernet cables. And that these electrons are in a sequence such that when received at one end of a modem are interpreted as an array of bits. And that these bits are in a pattern such that they can be again interpreted and displayed on a screen as an image.

"But where is the image?" you might say.

You can either say:
a) "The Image" is just a shorthand expression for the complex underlying reality, which is the stream of electrons in a particular pattern. Interpreted differently, the same bits could be a video. Or music.
b) "The image" refers to some nebulous concept of the image, and not any instantiation of it. In which case no such image can be said to exist.

The same is precisely true about brains, instead of computers. An image in your head IS the series of biochemical reactions.

Also, if you believe mental states are all a result of chemical processes, how do you explain mental states originating from hearing words?

Your ear produces electro-chemical signals interpreted by the brain. Isn't that obvious?

 

[Dre89]

The difference with a computer is that during that process nothing is visually perceiving the image. That's just the data for the image.

The difference with a human idea is that it's actually being perceived. And the chemicals aren't the image because if they were you'd be able to see an
image of an apple inside someone's skull.

The ears only interpret the sound, not the meaning. My point is that chemicals in the body can't interpret meaning because they're not structured to do that.

 

[AltF4]

What is perception and why can't chemicals do it? Why can't electricity do it? This is like the Chinese room thought experiment. You are implicitly defining intelligence (or "perception") to be something magical. Something which no physical entity is capable of. If you define it that way, then you necessarily exclude any natural explanation. It becomes magic.

 

[Dre89]

I didn't say perception can't be done by chemicals. Sounds are interpretted by chemical processes, but the meaning can't be interpretted by chemicals because chemicals in the body aren't wired to understand the arbitrary meanings of human sounds.

If you're talking about the image of the apple, I never said chemical processes can't create the image, they just aren't the image.

And are you saying that when a computer has an image that has not yet been projected on the screen, it somehow envisions the image without it having any physical location at the time?

If you are you're saying the computer has a conscience. This means we'd have to give it the same rights we give animals, which is absurd.

But even so you have no reason yo believe a computer perceives the image before it's on the screen. The process of the computer can be explained without this perception, so you're just adding an unnecessary proposition.

Also, the only reason why you would believe this is because you don't don't believe in a np mind, and therefore believe an electronic system must operate the same way we do, therefore having consciousness. That's assuming your conclusion before the premise.

 

[AltF4]

For the sake of this thread, I'm not making any assertions at all about materialism. You just asked me to explain something, and I did out of courtesy. This thread is supposing to provide proof of a non physical mind, and I'm trying to refute that. One doesn't have to replace a theory with another in order to refute one. I do happen to have an opinion on the matter, but it's irrelevant here.

I'm at a bit of a loss of what precisely you mean by "the image of the apple". Try to be as exact and verbose as you can in what you mean. What does it mean for physical processes to "create" the image but not itself "be" the image? Where then is the image? Do you mean to suggest that it "exists" in the same sense that a mathematical equation "exists". (Which is to say, not at all.)

 

[Dre89]

It doesn't exist in the same sense because the equation isn't visually perceived.

A mathematical equation doesn't have spatial dimensions and other properties of visually perceivable objects do.

My point is that if you're a materialist you must believe anything visually perceivable has a physical location, but thoughts don't.

An actual image of the apple doesn't physically exist in your head, in the sense that you wouldn't see an apple inside their head.

 

[AltF4]

I still honestly don't know what you mean by "the actual image". You're saying it has spatial dimensions but doesn't exist in the physical world? Try to tell me exactly and precisely what it is that you mean.

Are you trying to say that "the actual image" refers to some non-physical mirror incarnation of the atoms in the real world? Like some silly platonic world of forms? Then that's begging the question for this thread. Since the existence of non physical minds (and any other object) is what you're trying to prove.

 

[Theftz22]

Who here is arguing that mental activities are ontologically reducible to brain states? (IE: Who is arguing that the mind and the brain are logically identical?) If that's all you're arguing against, then have it. You have in no way proved that non-physical minds exist, though.

I actually cba to go over this point again for the umpteen-billionth time. Logical identity = identity = sameness = actual sameness

This is begging the question. If brain states ARE mental states, then you have in fact been observing brain states all along and just didn't know it. To say definitively that you haven't observed brain states is to assume that mental states and brain states are completely different. Which is to assume your conclusion.

But I'm not just assuming it, there's good evidence that I haven't physically observed my brain states. I haven't heard them because they don't make sounds audible to our own ears. I haven't touched them because I haven't cut my head open. I haven't tasted them because, well, that would be weird (trust me I haven't). I haven't smelt them because my nostrils point outwards and only smell things external to me. I haven't seen them because my eyes, like my nostrils, observe outwards, and I haven't cut my head open or had my brain scanned. But that's all of our physical senses. So I can't have been physically observing my brain states.

1. Propositional Content:

Silly word play, in no way indicative of anything. I could just as easily say "Spoken speech has content in a way that pressure waves through air does not. Speech has meaning and context and a listener, but pressure waves just are". How we use English to describe the thing doesn't reveal any truth about the thing. This is like in the determinsm thread, when I was told that non-physical minds exist because it's common speech to say "my brain". Absurd.

The speech only has content once a mind is able to here and understand the words. We wouldn't say that some certain combination of soundwaves has propositional content if no one existed to even hear it. Wittgenstein made that argument quite nicely. So the speech only has propositional content insofar as it is related to mental states. That seems to me to give further support to the idea that only mental states have propositional content.

Furthermore, even the premise is false. It's perfectly possible, indeed common, to just "be mad". But not "at something".

I'd argue that that's false. Even if people say that they are just "mad", if you probed deeper you'd find what they are mad at, even if they are just mad at the general state of things.

2. Truth Values:

To the contrary, a mental state absolutely can not have truth values. The statement "we will win the game" can be true or false. But not the mental state depicting that statement. Only statements can have truth values. That's what defines a statement! The ability to be true or false. States of being of any kind are neither true nor false, they just are. The best you can say is "I have a mental state depicting a false statement"

That seems false. I can have true or false beliefs and true or false thoughts. Here's how that works. I have a belief that X. Then it turns out that not-X. Therefore I had a false belief. Mental states don't "depict" things btw.

3. Privileged Access:

Begs the question. If mental states are reducible to brain states, then we can most certainly "read your mind". To just state blindly that nobody can access your thoughts is to say that they are not represented in physical states, which is to beg the question.

Once again, I'm not just asserting it, there's good evidence that people can't access my thoughts as well as I can. I can ask someone sitting right next to me what I'm thinking and the vast majority of times they won't know, even though I will. We can immediately access our own mental states purely by introspection, but physical states are not accessible by introspection. So your conditional statement is right of course. If reductive materialism is true, then we should be able to read minds. That sets up the second premise in the modus tollens argument: we can't read minds.

4. Radical Event Dependence:

I have a hard time wrapping my head around the premises of this one. is it saying that mental states change without physical stimulus? That's a bold claim. Certainly one worthy of a bit more evidence than a mere assertion. If not... then isn't that exactly what we should expect to see in a world where the mind and brain are reducible to one another?

That's not the argument. The argument is that some of my mental states would not exist if some events had not happened, while the same is not true for my brain states.

5. Subjective Ontology

Begs the question. To say that mental states are subjectively experienced "by you" is to assume that "you" are not your brain. You're saying that "you" are somewhere else, experiencing your brain from afar. Which is to assume what you want to prove.

I don't see how that's relevant to the argument at all. What does "experiencing my brain from afar" have to do with this argument? If you deny that we have conscious experience of our own mental states, then you are an eliminative materialist, and I already showed that to be patently false.

6. Intentionality:

Repeat of "Propositional Content". Silly word play.

I don't think that it's silly word play at all, it's one of the biggest issues in all of the philosophy of mind. Maybe if you had a better explanation you'd think differently: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

7. Rational Relations

Repeat of "Truth Values". Mental states don't have truth values, nor do they participate in anything. Statements do. Mental states can describe a statement, but they themselves don't participate in anything.

Mental states do participate in things. My mental state of intending to vote may cause my hand to go up. There a mental state is involved in a causal relationship. To deny that you'd have to say that nobody ever ate because they were hungry. Another thing that they participate in is rational relations. Surely some of my beliefs entail other. My belief that if p, then q, and my second belief that p, surely entail my third belief that q. You can't hold to the first two beliefs and rationally not believe the third. But that's just what entailment means.

8. Indubitability

Even if you are a "brain in a vat" you still have a physical brain. (The one in the vat) The body in front of you right now may be an illusion, but there must be some hard reality behind the illusion. "Reality" and "physical" are synonyms.

But I'm saying that all physical states are dubitable. There's nothing contradictory about the act of entertaining Descartes' evil demon scenarios, or doubting the impossibility of having our same exact brain states, but different mental states. This sounds as though it collapses into different modal properties, but it does not. Whereas for that argument, I need to positively assert that such scenarios are possible, for this argument all I need is that there is no logical contradiction in the very act of doubting there impossibility, whether or not they actually turn out to be possible.

9. Modal Properties

Here is where you again explicitly state that your argument is merely about logical identity. A point that nobody is contending. But then confusingly try to expand on it by saying: "therefore they are not the same thing at all"

For umpteen-billionth and second time, identity is identity is identity is identity. There all the same thing, it's a necessary property.

A clever play of words that might lead some to think you've concluded that non-physical minds exist. But you have done no such thing. Proving that bumps in the night and Bigfoot are not logically identical does not mean that Bigfoot exists.

I don't even know what that's supposed to mean. The argument first starts by showing that mental states exist, and then shows that they are non-physical. What does that have to do with bigfoot?

 

[Dre89]

I still honestly don't know what you mean by "the actual image". You're saying it has spatial dimensions but doesn't exist in the physical world? Try to tell me exactly and precisely what it is that you mean.

Are you trying to say that "the actual image" refers to some non-physical mirror incarnation of the atoms in the real world? Like some silly platonic world of forms? Then that's begging the question for this thread. Since the existence of non physical minds (and any other object) is what you're trying to prove.

I obviously don't believe it exists in the physical world because I believe in a np component of the mind.

I'm saying that the materialists believes anything that is visually perceivable (such as the thought of an apple) must have a physical location.

So a materialist must maintain that the image must exist within the physical world, but it clearly doens't. This is what I'm saying is wrong with the rejection of the np mind.

 

[Bob Jane T-Mart]

Even if mental states can do all the things you say that they can, what is to say that all physical states can't?

You haven't yet proven it to us. If you just assert that it's not possible for physical states to do these things, then aren't you committing a hasty generalisation fallacy?

 

[Dre89]

Are you talking to me or Doggs?

If you're talking to me, you're completely misunderstanding what I'm saying.

 

[AltF4]

I actually cba to go over this point again for the umpteen-billionth time. Logical identity = identity = sameness = actual sameness

So, you're saying that all you have to do is show that minds and brains are not logically identical then *poof*, that proves the existence of a magical dimension of non-physical minds? Do you really think it's that easy? Why would anyone doubt that, if it were the case. Come on, now, don't be silly.

"Pressure waves through air" is not logically identical to sound. But sound is in reality just pressure waves through air. Photons and light are not logically identical. But light is in reality nothing more than photons. Wind is not logically identical with moving air, but wind is in reality nothing more than moving air.

The brain and mind are not logically identical, but in reality the mind is nothing more than the brain.

Saying that two things are logically identical means that they could not possibly be different in reality. Saying that two things are not logically identical means that they could possibly be different in reality. It does not say that they must be.

But I'm not just assuming it, there's good evidence that I haven't physically observed my brain states. I haven't heard them because they don't make sounds audible to our own ears. I haven't touched them because I haven't cut my head open. I haven't tasted them because, well, that would be weird (trust me I haven't). I haven't smelt them because my nostrils point outwards and only smell things external to me. I haven't seen them because my eyes, like my nostrils, observe outwards, and I haven't cut my head open or had my brain scanned. But that's all of our physical senses. So I can't have been physically observing my brain states.

Have you ever seen serotonin? Have you smelt it? Tasted it? Heard it? No. So can we then conclude that you've never observed it? NO!

Serotonin is the chemical responsible (primarily) for any feeling of happiness you've ever had. Any time you have had any feeling of joy, what you're experiencing is the serotonin. (Despite what your grade school teachers told you, the body has way more than just senses)

A "brain state" is just a complex combination of chemicals like serotonin. It is not fair to say you haven't observed them. To the contrary, you have intimately observed them your whole life.

The speech only has content once a mind is able to here and understand the words. We wouldn't say that some certain combination of soundwaves has propositional content if no one existed to even hear it. Wittgenstein made that argument quite nicely. So the speech only has propositional content insofar as it is related to mental states. That seems to me to give further support to the idea that only mental states have propositional content.

Of course speech only has content to a mind. That's what defines "content". It's a vacuous thing to say. This in no way helps you determine what the "mind" is. The mind could still be the brain at that point.

That seems false. I can have true or false beliefs and true or false thoughts. Here's how that works. I have a belief that X. Then it turns out that not-X. Therefore I had a false belief. Mental states don't "depict" things btw.

You're playing games with words, even after I specifically called out that trick. In common speech, we tend to use phrases such as "I had a thought that was false". But this is impropper in a strict context. Your thought can't be right or wrong. It doesn't make sense to speak of ANY state of being as right or wrong. Even mental states.

Only statements can have truth values. If you can claim that mental states of being can be right, then I can claim that physical states of being can have truth values. But neither make any sense. It's a state of being. It just is. It can neither be correct nor incorrect.

Once again, I'm not just asserting it, there's good evidence that people can't access my thoughts as well as I can. I can ask someone sitting right next to me what I'm thinking and the vast majority of times they won't know, even though I will. We can immediately access our own mental states purely by introspection, but physical states are not accessible by introspection. So your conditional statement is right of course. If reductive materialism is true, then we should be able to read minds. That sets up the second premise in the modus tollens argument: we can't read minds.

Finally, a falsifiable statement! So you would agree that if we are able in our lifetimes to build a mind reading machine, then that clearly demonstrates that the mind is purely physical?

Then what would be your response to the fact that neuroscience been able to identify what specific parts and functionality of the brain are respinsible for what mental activity? IE: We're already well underway into the process of discovering exactly what chemicals are responsible for what mental functions, what electric signals represent what mental functions, and everything else.

After doing that, it's just a matter of engineering a machine to measure the levels of serotonin, activities in specific areas, etc... and you've got yourself a brain reading machine.

If non-physical minds exist, then you should be able to tell me a mental function that the brain is incapable of or otherwise not responsible for. IE: Tell me exactly what the brain scanning machine will never be able to detect.

That's not the argument. The argument is that some of my mental states would not exist if some events had not happened, while the same is not true for my brain states.

So... you're telling me that physical states just happen without cause?

Mental states do participate in things. My mental state of intending to vote may cause my hand to go up. There a mental state is involved in a causal relationship. To deny that you'd have to say that nobody ever ate because they were hungry. Another thing that they participate in is rational relations. Surely some of my beliefs entail other. My belief that if p, then q, and my second belief that p, surely entail my third belief that q. You can't hold to the first two beliefs and rationally not believe the third. But that's just what entailment means.

And you're telling me that the physical world doesn't behave according to causal relationships? Of course they do.

 

[AltF4]

I obviously don't believe it exists in the physical world because I believe in a np component of the mind.

I'm saying that the materialists believes anything that is visually perceivable (such as the thought of an apple) must have a physical location.

So a materialist must maintain that the image must exist within the physical world, but it clearly doens't. This is what I'm saying is wrong with the rejection of the np mind.

Dre, this is twice in a row in this thread that you completely disregarded a direct and simple request to further explain what you're talking about. I haven't a clue what "the actual image" is, in your vocabulary, and what exactly you mean by saying it exists.

Do you mean to say it "exists" in the same way that we say "love exists". Which is just shorthand for "people exist who exhibit the feeling of love". Try to be verbose.

 

[Dre89]

Dre, this is twice in a row in this thread that you completely disregarded a direct and simple request to further explain what you're talking about. I haven't a clue what "the actual image" is, in your vocabulary, and what exactly you mean by saying it exists.

Do you mean to say it "exists" in the same way that we say "love exists". Which is just shorthand for "people exist who exhibit the feeling of love". Try to be verbose.

I mean a thought exists simply by the fact that you conceive of it. There isn't really anything more to it.

Whether I believe thoughts exist in some platonic world of ideas isn't relevant at all.

When you think of an apple, you can picture it visually. It has colour, texture and spacial dimensions, all properties of a physical object.

The type of existence doesn't matter, just it's something that's visually perceivable.

It doesn't exist in the same sense as love because love isn't visually perceivable.

I don't really know how to make it clearer. Just imagine an apple in your head. The thought exists, or existed because you just conceived of it. That's all there is to it.

 

[Bob Jane T-Mart]

Are you talking to me or Doggs?

If you're talking to me, you're completely misunderstanding what I'm saying.

To Doggs. Specifically referring to his opening post.

 

[Dre89]

Oh ok, that was kind of confusing seeing as it was right after my post and you didn't quote anything.

 

[AltF4]

I mean a thought exists simply by the fact that you conceive of it. There isn't really anything more to it.

Whether I believe thoughts exist in some platonic world of ideas isn't relevant at all.

When you think of an apple, you can picture it visually. It has colour, texture and spacial dimensions, all properties of a physical object.

The type of existence doesn't matter, just it's something that's visually perceivable.

It doesn't exist in the same sense as love because love isn't visually perceivable.

I don't really know how to make it clearer. Just imagine an apple in your head. The thought exists, or existed because you just conceived of it. That's all there is to it.

It's "the thought" that exists, then. So the question comes down to "what is the thought"? I would contend that the thought itself is nothing more than a series of electrochemical processes. You're saying it's a non-physical entity in a nebulous and ill-defined world of other non-physical things.

Without any actual evidence to support your side of the story, why should I take it seriously? It's just begging the question to assert that your version of what a thought is, is correct and then use that as evidence for the existence of non-physical minds.

 

[Dre89]

I didn't say the thought exists in the np world.

The chemicals create the image, they're not the same thing.

The chemicals are a physical process in the brain. The idea isn't. They're not the same thing, otherwise I'd expect to see chemicals in the shape of an apple in your brain.

 

[AltF4]

If they don't exist in the physical world and don't exist in the non-physical world, then what on Earth are you trying to say?! It's like playing 20 question with you, Dre. I don't see why you can't just say clearly what you mean.

I'm left completely baffled at what you think an "image" is. I'm not going to bother entertaining this silly line of questioning if you can't be clearer.

 

[Dre89]

I've been saying this the whole time, if you're a materialist you must believe it exists in the physical world because anything visually perceivable must have a physical location in materialism.

But clearly thoughts don't exist in the physical world, which is my problem with materialism.

 

[AltF4]

No, materialism merely says that anything which exists is physical. It's right there front and center of the Wikipedia page. And that's exactly how the term was taught to me in my philosophy courses. It also follows from the obvious literal meaning of the word itself, that all things which exist are material. (As opposed to immaterial)

Ghosts are not a problem for materialism since they don't exist. (Even though you can picture them)
Gods are not a problem for materialism if they don't exist.
etc...

I don't know where you're concocting this bit about "everything that is visually perceivable must be physical". That's just silly. There are many things that are visually perceivable that just don't exist. Physical or otherwise. Talking frogs, for instance. Do you seriously think that every well educated person who calls theirself a materialist believes that talking frogs exist, simply because one can imagine it?