Someone explain something to me. How was this a prisoner's dilemma?
Let's say your mafia partner outright states he is going to Compete.
If you Cooperate:
-If you get targetted, you lose.
-If your partner gets targetted, you need to win solo, but you don't lose right away.
If you Compete:
-If you get targetted, you lose.
-If your partner gets targetted, you lose.
So if you know your partner is going to Compete, it's actually strictly better to Cooperate, since you would still have a chance to win if he is targetted, whereas you wouldn't have that chance if you also choose to Compete. And if you are targetted, you lose in both cases. That's assuming that losing to your partner is equivalent to losing to dying as lovers, which it seems is the case here, according to the rules.
If I rolled mafia, I would have stated right away that I was going to Compete, and then explained this in the QT. Then a rational player (ie- one who continued to try to play the game and not just say "well that's dumb, i'm just gonna compete and take us both out then") would choose to Cooperate.
Am I missing something?
Interesting mechanic nonetheless... I guess the game then becomes who will make the more believable threat. Because I can threaten to be committed to Compete, but if the other player also claims to be choosing Compete, then the rational course of action for me as well is to Cooperate. Without a way to make a credible threat, the Nash equilibrium might still end up on (Compete, Compete), but definitely not in the same way the traditional prisoner's dilemma does.