über-venom
Smash Rookie
- Joined
- May 24, 2009
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This is a suitable topic for seasoned debators.
In philosophy, moral luck refers to the idea that a person's morality can change based on things entirely out of their control. For example, a person can be morally good, something outside of their control happens, and then the person commits terrible evils.
Now, the entire theory is going to require a bit of development, so bear with me, read everything as it applies to your stance. And if you like read the wiki!
First though, a bit of ground work. There a couple of positions that some people will have towards the topic that I want to address. If neither of these apply to you you can skip it.
Moral Eliminativism and Moral Relativity
Ok, so my message to this group: play devil's advocate here. Everyone should understand already that a truly sound moral eliminitivism or relativist argument will refute the moral luck argument and effectively all other moral arguments with it because it addresses the "meta-issues." If you'd like to talk about either one of these, I'd ask you to make another thread. If there's enough interest, I'll make one. I should also note that if you are one of these people, you'd be probably be inclined to argue for moral luck here anyway since it introduces serious problems with the nature of morality.
Legal vs. Moral distinction
Some people view these as the same thing. And it's pretty easy to show that they're not. For example, there is nothing legally wrong with trying to exploit the laws, in order to hurt other people. But most would agree that there is something morally wrong with that. Also, a king can be above the law, where no laws apply to him, and still commit atrocities. Similarly, people can make laws that are immoral in themselves, like the Jim Crow laws. Point is, when you are arguing whether a person is morally equivalent or different, do not use law.
Ok, so now that all that's out of the way it's time to get down to business.
For those who read/skimmed the wiki, you would have found that there were four types of moral luck. Resultant, circumstantial, constituitive, and causal. Personally I am more interested in the first two. But feel free to bring up either of the other two. Just know that both of them are intimately related with certain free will suppositions that should probably be developed elsewhere. Anyway, first up...
_____________________________________________
Resultant Luck - if you believe morality has anything to do with the results of your actions, this section is for you.
(This is just an example I came up with a long time ago, but the one on wiki is almost exactly analogous)
The question is, are they morally the same, or different? Most people will say they are morally the same. But feel free to disagree. If they are morally different they are victims of moral luck. If they are morally the same, they are not victims, and therefore this is not an adequate proof for the existence of moral luck. If you agree with that, you can say that there is no such thing as moral luck of the resultant species. But what about the circumstantial species?
Cicumstantial Luck - if you believe morality has anything to do with intentions read this too.
(This is just my twist on an already popular example.)
In these two examples, Friedrich, being the same person as himself, would have done the exact same thing under the exact same circumstances. And not only that, but he would have wanted the exact same things under the exact same circumstances as well. But different circumstances (beyond his control) inevitably drove him into different lifestyles. And this happened in such a way that in one, he was morally good, and in the other he was morally indifferent. Yet it's the same person. This species of moral luck is one I find to be significantly more difficult to deny. But I still think there are ways to say that the same person from each world is morally the same. And thus deny moral luck of the circumstantial species. Again, to affirm this kind of moral luck, you have to defend the position that these two Friedrich's are morally different. To deny it, you have to either show that the examples are relevantly problematic, or that both Friedrichs are morally the same.
Take a while to read this over and think about your responses. Note that the debate topics start below the line. You may comment on the stuff above the line, but otherwise I expect the participants to cooperate with all the things that were said there. Best of luck in formulating your responses**!
** Any that are half-***** will recieve a half-***** answer.
In philosophy, moral luck refers to the idea that a person's morality can change based on things entirely out of their control. For example, a person can be morally good, something outside of their control happens, and then the person commits terrible evils.
Now, the entire theory is going to require a bit of development, so bear with me, read everything as it applies to your stance. And if you like read the wiki!
First though, a bit of ground work. There a couple of positions that some people will have towards the topic that I want to address. If neither of these apply to you you can skip it.
Moral Eliminativism and Moral Relativity
- You are a moral eliminitivist if you believe that, when it comes down to it, there really is no such thing as morality.
- You're a moral relativist if you believe that morality truly is relative to each person. What's good is whatever's good to them, and what's evil is whatever's evil to them.
Ok, so my message to this group: play devil's advocate here. Everyone should understand already that a truly sound moral eliminitivism or relativist argument will refute the moral luck argument and effectively all other moral arguments with it because it addresses the "meta-issues." If you'd like to talk about either one of these, I'd ask you to make another thread. If there's enough interest, I'll make one. I should also note that if you are one of these people, you'd be probably be inclined to argue for moral luck here anyway since it introduces serious problems with the nature of morality.
Legal vs. Moral distinction
Some people view these as the same thing. And it's pretty easy to show that they're not. For example, there is nothing legally wrong with trying to exploit the laws, in order to hurt other people. But most would agree that there is something morally wrong with that. Also, a king can be above the law, where no laws apply to him, and still commit atrocities. Similarly, people can make laws that are immoral in themselves, like the Jim Crow laws. Point is, when you are arguing whether a person is morally equivalent or different, do not use law.
Ok, so now that all that's out of the way it's time to get down to business.
For those who read/skimmed the wiki, you would have found that there were four types of moral luck. Resultant, circumstantial, constituitive, and causal. Personally I am more interested in the first two. But feel free to bring up either of the other two. Just know that both of them are intimately related with certain free will suppositions that should probably be developed elsewhere. Anyway, first up...
_____________________________________________
Resultant Luck - if you believe morality has anything to do with the results of your actions, this section is for you.
(This is just an example I came up with a long time ago, but the one on wiki is almost exactly analogous)
It's late at night, about 10 o'clock. This lady is walking down the street (for whatever reason) and assume she is innocent. On either side of her are two tall buildings. Unbeknownst to this woman there is an assassin in each building, each with the same brand of .50 cal. sniper rifle aimed at her head. Neither assassin is aware of eachother's presence. But each are dead set on murdering the woman. Now, here's the rub. Assassin #1, unknowingly had his gun replaced with an exact replica of his own, only it doesn't shoot. This is not the case for assassin #2. So, both of them pull the trigger at the exact same time. Assassin #2's bullet comes from five stories up careening through the air and landing dead on target (no pun intended). The woman is killed instantly. Assassin #1, though he planned to do the same exact thing, was incapable of firing a bullet in the first place.
The question is, are they morally the same, or different? Most people will say they are morally the same. But feel free to disagree. If they are morally different they are victims of moral luck. If they are morally the same, they are not victims, and therefore this is not an adequate proof for the existence of moral luck. If you agree with that, you can say that there is no such thing as moral luck of the resultant species. But what about the circumstantial species?
Cicumstantial Luck - if you believe morality has anything to do with intentions read this too.
(This is just my twist on an already popular example.)
Consider two possible worlds with the same person.
World A:
Friedrich is a native born German. All his life he had been considered a good person by his peers, someone who'd never harm anybody. But one day all that changed, when the nazi regime took over in Germany he was forced in the war, as a soldier. Those recruiting him gave him little option to join, as he was threatened with torture if he chose any other course. But of course, as a nazi soldier, he wasn't merely ordered to do battle with enemies, he was also responsible for turning in any Jews he found as prisoners to be killed. At first, he was violently distraught by all the merciless killing he was involved in. But eventually he decided to accept his fate as a nazi soldier and his eyes became cold. It wasn't that he liked killing. It was just that there wasn't a whole lot he could do about it. If he tried he could possibly turn on his team and perhaps save one family of Jews, but that would almost certainly bring his death. So he remained passive. He did what he was told, and he did nothing when nothing was required of him.
World B:
1925 - Hitler is killed by a flying golf ball to the cranium.
Friedrich again is exactly the same as he was. Only since there was no Nazi regime, he ends up getting a well paying job, and a family with three wonderful children. And he lived a moderately peaceful life thereafter.
World A:
Friedrich is a native born German. All his life he had been considered a good person by his peers, someone who'd never harm anybody. But one day all that changed, when the nazi regime took over in Germany he was forced in the war, as a soldier. Those recruiting him gave him little option to join, as he was threatened with torture if he chose any other course. But of course, as a nazi soldier, he wasn't merely ordered to do battle with enemies, he was also responsible for turning in any Jews he found as prisoners to be killed. At first, he was violently distraught by all the merciless killing he was involved in. But eventually he decided to accept his fate as a nazi soldier and his eyes became cold. It wasn't that he liked killing. It was just that there wasn't a whole lot he could do about it. If he tried he could possibly turn on his team and perhaps save one family of Jews, but that would almost certainly bring his death. So he remained passive. He did what he was told, and he did nothing when nothing was required of him.
World B:
1925 - Hitler is killed by a flying golf ball to the cranium.
Friedrich again is exactly the same as he was. Only since there was no Nazi regime, he ends up getting a well paying job, and a family with three wonderful children. And he lived a moderately peaceful life thereafter.
In these two examples, Friedrich, being the same person as himself, would have done the exact same thing under the exact same circumstances. And not only that, but he would have wanted the exact same things under the exact same circumstances as well. But different circumstances (beyond his control) inevitably drove him into different lifestyles. And this happened in such a way that in one, he was morally good, and in the other he was morally indifferent. Yet it's the same person. This species of moral luck is one I find to be significantly more difficult to deny. But I still think there are ways to say that the same person from each world is morally the same. And thus deny moral luck of the circumstantial species. Again, to affirm this kind of moral luck, you have to defend the position that these two Friedrich's are morally different. To deny it, you have to either show that the examples are relevantly problematic, or that both Friedrichs are morally the same.
Take a while to read this over and think about your responses. Note that the debate topics start below the line. You may comment on the stuff above the line, but otherwise I expect the participants to cooperate with all the things that were said there. Best of luck in formulating your responses**!
** Any that are half-***** will recieve a half-***** answer.