Determinism vs Free Will

[Holder of the Heel]

I understand all of this, but a question remains.

Even if I blatantly state I believe in determinism and say I cannot explain how I could possibly have free will, I can never live my life and be successful (as in living very long at all). I MUST live my life assuming free will exists, because I have no other choice (if I want to live). So you could say that our perception of free will is just evolutionary to living things so we don't die off, but why would we evolve such a trait... How could such a trait even come into existence? Did any animals ever live in a deterministic way. How could you even live in a deterministic way? It really doesn't make sense does it. How true is determinism if every living thing doesn't follow it as a way of living? We can say it's true, but what good is it to say it's true when we all know we're going to be deciding what we want to eat within the next 24 hours?

I don't think it's necessary for me to find this force of will, when it is impossible to live without it.

You're not getting what determinism means, we come across decisions, and yes it feels like it isn't determined, but what determinism implies is not a lack of thought, or even some sort of unshakable fate, but the decisions we make were made because we had to. The previous sentence when I have first heard of this debate, like mentioned at the original post, made me think it is pointless to discuss, but there are huge implications and things to understand.

We have basically decided, like I mentioned before, that determinism, in a causality existence, that when we go step by step we reach the next step because that was the next one. Our steps are altered all the time with sense-datum, bombarded like meteors on the moon leaving their constant impressions, and our thoughts traveling, but it is irrefutable that there is a slight predetermination of the next step, since everything is physical, as is our thoughts and imagination, and therefore such things as dualism are brought up because to justify free will there needs to be something non-physical about the mind that adds this "free will", which is incredibly difficult to prove, and has not been.

 

[Alphicans]

I tried to talk about free will, but no one responded to meee

Just because what choice I'd make is essentially what would happen every time, if all the scenarios were the same, doesn't mean that I don't feel anything.

There are sooo many variables in our world, that if the world is deterministic, in effect, we DO still have free choice, although this is a bit disingenuous, because I think free choice in this instance means something different to me than it does to you.

I think for free choice to exist on a fundamental level, there must be a trait that events can have, that replaces randomness, and determinism

I'll give a short analogy to say what I mean, but I might say it badly, so bare with me lol.

So I think we can both agree that pain objectively exists, right? And for most of us, it's an objectively bad thing, right (by this, I mean you'd agree that we both really don't like pain, and that it's not a good thing for us to feel it?)?

Alright say I'm in front of a button, and if I press it, I don't feel pain. If I don't press it, I'll get shocked and it'll be very painful.

I wouldn't throw up my hands and say "It doesn't matter what decision I pick, I'll either feel pain, or not feel pain either way, no matter what," I'd make the "choice" to press the button so that I don't feel any pain. Given the exact same circumstances, I'd do it every time, though. If I'd had identical experiences, and if I had the exact same genes, and the exact same brain, if literally all the things were the same, I would react the same way, and come to the same choice the same way. Atleast as best as I understand a general determinist mindset.

idk whether I'm a determinist or not, I'm not sure what I believe quite yet, but under determinism, I don't think that what you mentioned is much of an issue.

For the first part: determinism is the idea that everything we do we have no choice about. Determinism cannot include freewill. Freewill is the idea that we have a choice in what we do at least some of the time. It sounds like you want to be a compatabilist, but their mystery is that they violate a seemingly obvious principle. If you want to talk about that we can.

You're not getting what determinism means, we come across decisions, and yes it feels like it isn't determined, but what determinism implies is not a lack of thought, or even some sort of unshakable fate, but the decisions we make were made because we had to. The previous sentence when I have first heard of this debate, like mentioned at the original post, made me think it is pointless to discuss, but there are huge implications and things to understand.

We have basically decided, like I mentioned before, that determinism, in a causality existence, that when we go step by step we reach the next step because that was the next one. Our steps are altered all the time with sense-datum, bombarded like meteors on the moon leaving their constant impressions, and our thoughts traveling, but it is irrefutable that there is a slight predetermination of the next step, since everything is physical, as is our thoughts and imagination, and therefore such things as dualism are brought up because to justify free will there needs to be something non-physical about the mind that adds this "free will", which is incredibly difficult to prove, and has not been.

Firstly, I know exactly what determinism is. Secondly, I don't see how dualism accounts for freewill any better than physicalism. If it does I'd like to hear it. If dualism can account for it, then that is a huge thing for dualism to have. For you to say that dualism can do this gives dualists a huge leg to stand on, perhaps one big enough to persuade many people.

I am also not arguing that freewill doesn't have a mystery, and infact I've already outlined exactly what I take the mystery to be. What I am doing, though is showing that determinism takes what every living organism lives by and says it's a deception. I am sorry if I implied that I was talking about determinism as a lack of thought, but that is not at all how I understand it. Determinism is like you're on a road, and there are many forks on that road, but when examined very closely, these forks aren't actually connected to the road you are on. These forks are physically possible choices that you somehow cannot choose. The "mystery" I am putting forth is simply "it seems very strange that I can act as if I have choices, live life like I have choices yet have no choices. I can conceive of many alternative physically possible lives if I had made different choices at times x, y and z, yet I am to believe this is false?" Your objection to this as a mystery is that as a physical being, my actions must be predetermined. But what predetermines them? Is there an outside source that acts on me that forces me to do things? Surely you would say no, so if that is the case then it must be my body making these choices. If it is my body then I am obviously making the choices. This is where the consciousness debate comes into play I guess, but is it 100% necessary to go there?

Also, for the record I am not a libertarian. I think determinism probably has the most going for it, but I am not willing to let defenders of free will die off, because if they can somehow show free will is possible then I'd definitely like to be on board with them.

 

[theunabletable]

For the first part: determinism is the idea that everything we do we have no choice about. Determinism cannot include freewill. Freewill is the idea that we have a choice in what we do at least some of the time. It sounds like you want to be a compatabilist, but their mystery is that they violate a seemingly obvious principle. If you want to talk about that we can.

No I'm definitely talking about determinism, I wasn't advocating literal, fundamental free choice.

I'd like a different word for what I want, because I want a word that's like "free choice", but it doesn't mean the kind of free choice you're talking about lol

so idk, I'll cut and paste my analogy again.

"So I think we can both agree that pain objectively exists, right? And for most of us, it's an objectively bad thing, right (by this, I mean you'd agree that we both really don't like pain, and that it's not a good thing for us to feel it?)?

Alright say I'm in front of a button, and if I press it, I don't feel pain. If I don't press it, I'll get shocked and it'll be very painful.

I wouldn't throw up my hands and say "It doesn't matter what decision I pick, I'll either feel pain, or not feel pain either way, no matter what," I'd make the "choice" to press the button so that I don't feel any pain. Given the exact same circumstances, I'd do it every time, though. If I'd had identical experiences, and if I had the exact same genes, and the exact same brain, if literally all the things were the same, I would react the same way, and come to the same choice the same way. Atleast as best as I understand a general determinist mindset."

If the world is deterministic, we have choices in a sense, but the choices we make would be based on all of the world around us, and our reactions to everything and such. In a deterministic world, I think all of our "choices" would happen given the same situation every time.

So not just are the environments around us determined, but the "choices", or actions we performed are also determined, and we'd make those same actions given the exact same circumstances every time.


I believe in "free choice" in a... practical sense, not in a more literal one. By that I mean... if the world is deterministic, we'll always make the same choices no matter what. However the world has such an uncountable amount of variables, and our thought processes are sooo complex, that we, as far as actually living and being happy and **** goes, basically have all the things that literal free choice would give us.

It makes the term "free choice", in my mind, a little redundant, atleast if literal free choice is impossible. If we had literal free choice, what would be different about us? Our thought processes are so complex, and the environment and experiences we get are so complex, that we might as well have free choice. Our abilities would be pretty much the same either way, wouldn't it?

I guess it depends on what free choice actually means. If we don't have free choice, then what plus what we currently have would equal literal free choice?

 

[Dre89]

If you can find any evidence for this, then you should present it.

Robots.

Robots are probably the better example. Robots act based on calculating a number of factors eg. external stimulus, their programming etc.

If humans were determined, we'd simply be like this, just more complex.

Self-awareness isn't necessary for this purpose, otherwise robots would need to be deceived into think they're free in order to function.

 

[GofG]

Robots.

Robots are probably the better example. Robots act based on calculating a number of factors eg. external stimulus, their programming etc.

If humans were determined, we'd simply be like this, just more complex.

We are exactly like this. It's just that you don't believe it could be true because, while you have an intuitive understanding of how complex it is possible for something to be, you do not have a technical understanding of how far the universe has stretched the limits of complexity when it comes to humans. It stretched it pretty ****ing far. It made objects (our brains) which are actually aware of their own existence!

Self-awareness isn't necessary for this purpose, otherwise robots would need to be deceived into think they're free in order to function.

What? I know I'm not free and I can still function.

 

[Dre89]

We are exactly like this. It's just that you don't believe it could be true because, while you have an intuitive understanding of how complex it is possible for something to be, you do not have a technical understanding of how far the universe has stretched the limits of complexity when it comes to humans. It stretched it pretty ****ing far. It made objects (our brains) which are actually aware of their own existence!



What? I know I'm not free and I can still function.

The argument I was addressing claimed that self- awareness was necessary for humans to have this level of complexity whilst being determined.

I'm saying the SA is only necessary if we have free will, because without free will we could act just as complex as we do now with SA, as I demontrated with the robot example.

 

[ElvenKing]

Because we can look at the patterns of electricity in the brain which give rise to consciousness and see that there are no patterns isomorphic to this pattern in a rock.

If it could be shown that there are patterns in the erosion of a rock which are the same as (or at least of a very similar nature to) the patterns of neuron activity in the human brain which give rise to consciousness, then yes, the erosion of a rock by water would be a conscious and self-aware function, just like humans.

The chance of this is so low in my mind that I do not even have any ethical problems with possibly creating a conscious life every time I pour water onto a rock. On the other hand, I would have huge ethical problems with possibly creating a conscious mind via whole-brain emulation, which I believe actually would contain those same physical patterns.

How to you know that electricity patterns in brain are indicative of there being a consciousness? How do you determine that the patterns seen in human brain are the ones that produce consciousness while the ones in an electricity grid do not?

You still haven't the answered the question. You have just repeated that we know brain system causes consciousness. I am asking how you know it is the brain system which does this.

The argument I was addressing claimed that self- awareness was necessary for humans to have this level of complexity whilst being determined.

I'm saying the SA is only necessary if we have free will, because without free will we could act just as complex as we do now with SA, as I demontrated with the robot example.

It is required though, else we couldn't be having this discussion.

I answered this point in a previous post. Feeling self-awareness is apart of that complexity.

 

[Dre89]

But I could in turn ask you how you know that the chemical processes involved in baking a cake don't catalyse conciousness in the cake.

If robots don't have conciousness, then my point still stands. If materialist determinism requires you to believe that robots do have thoughts and feelings, then free will is definitely the more rational belief.

 

[Dre89]

It is required though, else we couldn't be having this discussion.

I answered this point in a previous post. Feeling self-awareness is apart of that complexity.

If SA is necessary for this level of compelxity in a determinist agent, then you must believe that if robots will ever achieve our level of complexity, they will have to gain thoughts and feelings.

I don't see how that's the case. Humans under the determinist framework would just be more complex, organic versions of robots. I don't see how having more reactions to external stimulus, or having more external stimulus to react to, and having more complex programming and more factors influencing a decision somehow requires SA.

If it does, at what level of complexity does it become required?

 

[ElvenKing]

But I could in turn ask you how you know that the chemical processes involved in baking a cake don't catalyse conciousness in the cake.

If robots don't have conciousness, then my point still stands. If materialist determinism requires you to believe that robots do have thoughts and feelings, then free will is definitely the more rational belief.

Through the suggestion of where consciousness occurs we get from taking that our own consciousness is attached to our bodies. Once I assume that my consciousness attached to what I feel as my body, I have reason to expect consciousness in body that are similar to mine and behave like me.


No, free will has nothing to do with it. The same problem present in that situation as well. How do you know whether or not a rock has consciousness and free will? In a situation of free will, to have any suggestion of what has free will and consciousness, you have to use the reasoning in the first paragraph.

If SA is necessary for this level of compelxity in a determinist agent, then you must believe that if robots will ever achieve our level of complexity, they will have to gain thoughts and feelings.

I don't see how that's the case. Humans under the determinist framework would just be more complex, organic versions of robots. I don't see how having more reactions to external stimulus, or having more external stimulus to react to, and having more complex programming and more factors influencing a decision somehow requires SA.

If it does, at what level of complexity does it become required?

When there is the human consciousness present. Consider this, what is the difference between hitting a human with a stick and hitting a robot that is not complex enough to have consciousness? If you hit the human, it feels pain. If you hit the robot, it does not. The only difference between being conscious and not having it is the presence or absence of the consciousness.

 

[GofG]

The argument I was addressing claimed that self- awareness was necessary for humans to have this level of complexity whilst being determined.

I'm saying the SA is only necessary if we have free will, because without free will we could act just as complex as we do now with SA, as I demontrated with the robot example.

No, being self-aware has significant advantages even if you don't have free will. Like, being able to evaluate your decision making process using intelligence, instead of just executing your adaptations blindly.

How to you know that electricity patterns in brain are indicative of there being a consciousness? How do you determine that the patterns seen in human brain are the ones that produce consciousness while the ones in an electricity grid do not?

You still haven't the answered the question. You have just repeated that we know brain system causes consciousness. I am asking how you know it is the brain system which does this.

I know this because I've read many papers by many neurologists, all of which have pointed in the direction of a very specific pattern of neuron activity being the sole cause of consciousness. It is this pattern which we would look for in an electricity grid to determine if it were conscious or not. Why is this so unbelievable?

 

[ElvenKing]

I know this because I've read many papers by many neurologists, all of which have pointed in the direction of a very specific pattern of neuron activity being the sole cause of consciousness.

You have just repeated that we know consciousness occurs in the brain again. This doesn't give any explanation as to how we know to think that patterns of neuron activity cause consciousness(as opposed to any other process observed in the physical world or that consciousness is not attached to objects at all). Your current argument is like me saying: "I know that apples cause pimples," then when asked to support that it is actually so, simply repeating: "I know that apples cause pimples."

 

[GofG]

If there had been peer reviewed papers published in publications like Science and Nature which said that apples caused pimples, would your example be any less of a strawman?

We are much closer to technically solving the consciousness problem than you think.

 

[Dre89]

Gofg- You don't need self awareness to be able to evaluate decisions with intelligence. Intelligence would simply be another factor that goes into a desicion making process.

 

[GofG]

To evaluate decisions about your own decision making process absolutely requires selfawareness.

Otherwise evaluations of the decision making process of a species have to be done very slowly using natural selection, as opposed to using intelligence.

 

[Dre89]

To evaluate decisions about your own decision making process absolutely requires selfawareness.

But if free will isn't doing this, then what is doing this is just neurons, just like the original decisions being made. It's just another physical process in the body.

Also, do you guys randomness plays a part in the actions of determined agents? There was a thought experiment in which a donkey a thirsty. There are two watering holes both an equal distance away from the donkey. The donkey is on a flat plain, so basically there is no difference between chosing one water hole over the other, all the factors are completely the same.

Some people think that if the donkey didn't have free will, it would never move to one and die of thirst. They say this because there is no reason to favour one over the other, so under a determinist framework, which says actions are the result of certain factors, the donkey could never choose and thus would never move.

I guess you could just say it favours one out of randomness though.

 

[ElvenKing]

If there had been peer reviewed papers published in publications like Science and Nature which said that apples caused pimples, would your example be any less of a strawman?

We are much closer to technically solving the consciousness problem than you think.

This isn't actually an issue with any of the science(that example referring to that you are restating without actually explaining anything). It is an issue of how we know the evidence we have is actually reflecting what we claim it is, as a feeling of consciousness is not something can be seen directly in the empirical word(seeing someone eat does not give access to the feeling experience of what they smell and taste).

You will probably complain: "But we can see it in those processes" but then there is no distinction between the position concluded and the supposed evidence, meaning you are simply assuming that it must be those physical process that result in consciousness while other do not(and there is no reason to favour one physical process over another).

 

[GofG]

...I don't understand your complaint very well.

When I run ps aux, the linux version of the task manager, and look at my running processes, I can see 'firefox' and i can see 'rtorrent'. I know that the physical process in my computer which is the electrical pattern for 'rtorrent' is rtorrent, because it can be traced throughout my computer as being the exact process I define as 'rtorrent', and it is separate from 'firefox' because 'firefox' is the process which can be traced throughout my computer consistently as being defined as 'firefox'.

Why can't consciousness be the same?

 

[GofG]

e: accidental double post

 

[ElvenKing]

...I don't understand your complaint very well.

When I run ps aux, the linux version of the task manager, and look at my running processes, I can see 'firefox' and i can see 'rtorrent'. I know that the physical process in my computer which is the electrical pattern for 'rtorrent' is rtorrent, because it can be traced throughout my computer as being the exact process I define as 'rtorrent', and it is separate from 'firefox' because 'firefox' is the process which can be traced throughout my computer consistently as being defined as 'firefox'.

Why can't consciousness be the same?

But then you are positing an argument that considered whether there is consciousness to be present or not to be up to whether you define it is produced by a particular physical system. This would mean, for example, that if you were to define that rocks falling to the ground produced consciousness, it would be so, which I suspect is not a position you would agree with.

The example doesn't really work anyway, as you are talking about a connection between two things, that one produces another, as opposed to simply the mere definition of two things. Your position is that X physical system(electricity in the brain) causes Y effect(consciousness), but how do you know that Z physical system(an atom in a gold ingot) does not cause Y as well(or even instead)? You know that there is consciousness(through your own experience) and you know there many objects and process in the world through your experience of perception. The question here is: how do you know which of these(if any) your consciousness is attached to?

 

[GofG]

Alright. I think we can end this argument with my conceding that I actually define consciousness to be the pattern in the brain that I'm talking about. This isn't circular logic from the universe's perspective, so I think it's okay to do this.

I see your point now and I apologize.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

Firstly, I know exactly what determinism is. Secondly, I don't see how dualism accounts for freewill any better than physicalism. If it does I'd like to hear it. If dualism can account for it, then that is a huge thing for dualism to have. For you to say that dualism can do this gives dualists a huge leg to stand on, perhaps one big enough to persuade many people.

Our brain, assumed it being just as it appears, leaves no room for free will. There are only processes, there is no thing that somehow lies within the brain that can work without the brain's interference. That is where the non-physical mind would come in for some, and they say we have a non-physical will.

I am also not arguing that freewill doesn't have a mystery, and infact I've already outlined exactly what I take the mystery to be. What I am doing, though is showing that determinism takes what every living organism lives by and says it's a deception.

It isn't much of a mystery as to why you "feel" free. If you're taken along the mental process, which you are, wouldn't it feel like you are choosing them? You even think of things and imagine them, are cognizant of it, and it is all a part of the process. And just because it feels that way is no logical proof, that is like the proof religious people make because they think they feel God within them at moments because they believe in him. That is essentially meaningless.

I am sorry if I implied that I was talking about determinism as a lack of thought, but that is not at all how I understand it. Determinism is like you're on a road, and there are many forks on that road, but when examined very closely, these forks aren't actually connected to the road you are on. These forks are physically possible choices that you somehow cannot choose. The "mystery" I am putting forth is simply "it seems very strange that I can act as if I have choices, live life like I have choices yet have no choices. I can conceive of many alternative physically possible lives if I had made different choices at times x, y and z, yet I am to believe this is false?" Your objection to this as a mystery is that as a physical being, my actions must be predetermined. But what predetermines them? Is there an outside source that acts on me that forces me to do things? Surely you would say no, so if that is the case then it must be my body making these choices. If it is my body then I am obviously making the choices. This is where the consciousness debate comes into play I guess, but is it 100% necessary to go there?

If your body does it, that does NOT mean you are making choices. In fact, the body does what it does because of physics and NEVER asks for our consent. We do not =/= our body. The only thing we "possess" that could be truly defined as ourselves is our cognizance. If someone took your best friend's body, you wouldn't consider them your best friend by virtue of their body, nor would you consider him/her your best friend if he/she completely lost consciousness. So, our consciousness is a particular part of our body, so our body essentially binds us to how we work, anything our body can't do our consciousness cannot transcend, anything wrong without our brain causes our "consciousness" to suffer, and we cannot overrule it. This is why a lot of moral paradoxes arise such as "moral luck" and causes belief systems like Absurdism, but I digress.

Also, for the record I am not a libertarian. I think determinism probably has the most going for it, but I am not willing to let defenders of free will die off, because if they can somehow show free will is possible then I'd definitely like to be on board with them.[/QUOTE]

 

[Alphicans]

If there are only processes, why can't there be decision making processes? I am not sure how this can't be the case. This came up in my phil class today actually, he gave a good answer, it had that part in it, but I forget the rest :/ (although I think that's what it boiled down to).

So I modify my second part to my consciousness is going through processes that happen to be equal to making choices, just as they can be equal to a belief, desire, concept, intention etc.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

Yeah that is what I was saying, there is a decision making process that has several processes conducive to it, and the fact that they are processes only assimilates to what I have said before about how it only makes us feel like we're driving when we are only in the passenger's seat.

 

[Alphicans]

How does that mean we're in the passengers seat? You're kind of implying dualism with that statement. Unless I am missing something here.

 

[ElvenKing]

How does that mean we're in the passengers seat? You're kind of implying dualism with that statement. Unless I am missing something here.

That, in our experience, we are simply watching a series or events occurring, rather than ever making a decision to take an action with will. All the "choices" that we supposedly make are triggered by a mix of processes and events that we have no defining control over at all. Instead of working how they might appear in the moment(e.g. I decide to pick cereal over toast), they are all triggered by how the physiology of the body interacts with what is happening in the world. My "decision" to pick toast is instead caused by a combination process of my body and experience. For example, it might be that made the choice of cereal because I find it have a better taste, and so I ate the cereal because my body is "programmed" to seek out the most pleasurable taste. However, having an awareness of what is going on is that it can change such "programming." If, the next day, I hear a report on the news talking about how cereal eaters are prone to horrible health problems while toast eater or not, the way my body reacts to avoid dangers to itself could cause me to no longer eat cereal and have toast instead.

The really tricky thing is that the notion of free will, if held, may act a determining factor in what action someone takes. An idea that someone is "free to choose" what happens next could act to determine that other influences lose their grip and they may be determined to behave in a manner than, if they lacked their believe in their ability to choose, they otherwise would.

This does seem posit a sort of body-mind dualism. A difference between what is causing you to behave in a particular manner(interaction physical world processes causing all your action) and how you experience the world in action(you have the choice of what to do), but it this isn't the case. The conceptual understanding of experience, assuming that consciousness is attached to the body, and so the events of the world, acts as a determining factor in how the body relates to the world(e.g if someone tells you some food is poisoned, the conceptual threat poised by poison can act to determine that you won't eat the food).

 

[Alphicans]

All you did was essentially repeat holder of the heel, and didn't actually answer my question. You're not answering why it isn't possible for my consciousness to make choices independently, and are instead assuming determinism is true.

Take your cereal/toast example. I see that report, but instead I say "you know what I enjoy the taste of cereal so much, I am gonna risk it," which is incredibly plausible, and your statement is essentially saying this is impossible. Why can't I make that choice?

"The really tricky thing is that the notion of free will, if held, may act a determining factor in what action someone takes. An idea that someone is "free to choose" what happens next could act to determine that other influences lose their grip and they may be determined to behave in a manner than, if they lacked their believe in their ability to choose, they otherwise would."

Not at all an issue for free will. Free will states you have choice AT LEAST SOME OF THE TIME, so there it's not a problem if sometimes, even most of the time we are (or someone else is) completely determined/fated to do something. After all we all must die and I don't think libertarians are going to say we have the choice at that point.

 

[GofG]

...I've lost track again. Can we get a list of the dualists vs materialists? I began typing a long response to Alphican's post and then realized he might be a dualist.

 

[Alphicans]

I really take no stance when it comes to dualism vs physicalism, but it seems to me physicalism has a better argument. For all purposes I am a physicalist.

 

[GofG]

...Do you not see the incongruities between accepting free will and accepting materialism?

 

[Alphicans]

I do, but I also see it in dualism. The question is why does dualism avoid these problems and physicalism doesn't? If dualism can avoid them then I might be a dualist.

 

[GofG]

Dualism might say that there is a non-corporeal entity which might be your soul which can influence the potential energy in the neurotransmitters in your brain, pushing certain points past thresholds which they otherwise would not have passed, making you perform actions which a soulless version of you would not have performed.

e: a secular version of dualism might say that your soul is a physical entity which existed in the beginning of our universe, and was able to see every choice you had to make, while you existed, billions of years from now, and changed the starting variables of the universe in such a slight way such that it changed the decisions you made from being the ones that a soulless version of you would have selected. (Just to give you a better example of what I'm saying)

Materialism implies that we select all of the decisions that a soulless version of us would select, because the soulless version of us and us are indistinguishable and therefore identical.

 

[Alphicans]

It seems that is essentially agent-causation. How does that non-physical entity become the agent to make the decisions? As stated, physical events are indeterministic, they either happen one way or the other, and if this is the case, how can you, the dualisticy agent, make the physical event undetermined?

Unless I am mistaken, it sounds like your example is just your soul changing the universe in such a way that it creates another, determined pathway. The only choice it has made is a single choice that affects every other choice you will make during your life time. I supposed it's free will given it had one choice, but obviously a believer in free will won't settle for that.

Continuing on agent-causation, it doesn't evade the mystery of becoming an agent. If free-will is real, then the world is undetermined, and if becoming the agent of your actions is an undetermined event, then the choice is not really in your control is it?

 

[GofG]

It is assumed that this soul has some mechanic which violates known physical laws which allow it to actually truly make a decision one way or the other, in such a way that repeated experiments with the exact same variables might have different outcomes. That is how dualism evades the argument.

 

[Alphicans]

Ok, then why wouldn't you be a dualist? It accounts for consciousness perfectly, and allows for our intuitions of the world to be absolutely correct. I can't really argue this debate much more since I have a very little understanding about free will in general. Overall it doesn't seem to me that dualism in any sense evades the issue of it being impossible to be free in an indeterministic universe, but that could just be cause I am confused as **** in terms of this issue.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

Not at all an issue for free will. Free will states you have choice AT LEAST SOME OF THE TIME, so there it's not a problem if sometimes, even most of the time we are (or someone else is) completely determined/fated to do something. After all we all must die and I don't think libertarians are going to say we have the choice at that point.

It isn't fate, or even if you believed in fate it would be not be fate pushing you, that's more of a divine plan that will happen regardless. As for Free Will, it means you have a choice all the time, it just means physical drives simply tempt you (Free Will is the more religious originated choice, and that is why Christianity speaks of avoiding temptation, at least I think so). Free Will partially would be a compatibalist position, which I'm not 100% how those work off hand.

How does that mean we're in the passengers seat? You're kind of implying dualism with that statement. Unless I am missing something here.

No, ElvenKing did indeed answer your question here, it is because we are conscious and we are experiencing and being controlled by said processes, so we are "taken along the ride" if you will, which makes you think you are guiding it as opposed to not being conscious of it or being pushed by some determining force. Dualism is certainly not implied, in fact nothing implies dualism, which is why I don't believe in it.

 

[Alphicans]

I think I am done with this discussion cause I don't have much more to add, but you are definitely wrong about what free will is. It simply means you have choice some of the time. That is how I always understood it, that's what I read and what I've been taught. I think saying free will = choice all the time is way too big of a claim and would never be backed by anyone.

I guess I should elaborate just a tiny bit. Say you're strapped by all fours to a chair. No matter what position you take (determinism or free will or compatabalism), it's obvious you don't have the choice to leave the chair. You might have the choice to think about leaving the chair, but you cannot actually leave it. If you say free will = choice all the time, then free will is defeated with that example right there, which is ridiculous. No person believing in free will would submit to that example.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

...Free Will doesn't mean you do what you want, that is something outside of your very existence preventing you. Free Will vs. Determinism only involves decision making, you can WANT to get out of the chair, the debate is whether you decided to want to or not. It doesn't give you super powers to break out of a chair if you, that is absolutely ridiculous, why would you think that? Choice all the time means you want to make the decisions and you are making them mentally, that doesn't mean your body is always capable of making your decisions. Outside forces are not even close to being a part of the discussion, not even your experiences building who you are, that is called moral luck, and is entirely outside of how the consciousness works, simply a question of how morality is constructed.

 

[Alphicans]

You're describing compatabalism. They believe you can be free in a determined world for exactly that reason.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

It isn't about whether you can accomplish what you want, it is about how you got to what you want. Compatibalism may be like that, but philosopher's have already addressed how they don't define Free Will sufficiently, it isn't about enacting what you want, it is beyond obvious we can't fulfill our desires at a whim, or else we'd all by common sense say we are compatiblists.