Determinism vs Free Will

[AltF4]

Dre, all you just did was completely disregard the thing you quoted from me, and then repeat yourself. As if I hasn't just responded to the thing you said. This is debate hall 101 stuff, here.

You're abusing terminology that doesn't apply in a materialist world. "imitate the activity of a concious being, without being concious themselves" is total nonsense. There is no difference between immitating feelings and having feelings. When you reveal that consciousness is entirely a physical process, then there's nothing unnecessary about it. It just is. It would only be unnecessary if it were non-physical.

 

[Dre89]

You're using materialism as a premise in your argument for materialism.

Humans have conciousness, in that they have thoughts and feelings. We could create something that acts like humans, but that doesn't mean it has thoughts and feelings.

 

[AltF4]

Twice in a row, now. Completely disregard what I say, continue to repeat yourself. You know, Dre, you'll never get into the debate hall like this. oh wait....

And I am in no way "using materialism as a premise in your argument for materialism". I am showing that a materialist viewpoint is consistent and does not imply stupid things like rocks having feelings. I am saying "If materialism is true, then we get a whole bunch of perfectly reasonable and consistent things". NOT "If materialism is true, then that means materialism is true".

 

[Dre89]

Twice in a row, now. Completely disregard what I say, continue to repeat yourself. You know, Dre, you'll never get into the debate hall like this. oh wait....

And I am in no way "using materialism as a premise in your argument for materialism". I am showing that a materialist viewpoint is consistent and does not imply stupid things like rocks having feelings. I am saying "If materialism is true, then we get a whole bunch of perfectly reasonable and consistent things". NOT "If materialism is true, then that means materialism is true".

If you're saying that there's no difference between imitating conciousness and actually having conciousness, then that would mean that anything that acts like humans must have thoughts and feelings.

Now that doesn't mean rocks have it, because they don't act like humans. But saying that a robot which imitates human activity has thoughts and feelings does have problematic implications.

 

[AltF4]

If you're saying that there's no difference between imitating conciousness and actually having conciousness, then that would mean that anything that acts like humans must have thoughts and feelings.

Why, it's almost as if I've said this before...

There is no difference between immitating feelings and having feelings.

In a materialist world "a perfect simulation" is a synonym for "actually having" anything. And that's the whole point. If there's no physical difference, and all that exists is physical, then there is no difference.

Now that doesn't mean rocks have it, because they don't act like humans.

Hey, some progress.

But saying that a robot which imitates human activity has thoughts and feelings does have problematic implications.

Such as ...

You know, leaving out the conclusion in an argument sure is an easy way to imply it without while still maintaining plausible deniability. I have nothing to actually refute here. No point was ever made here. Yet there's a clear implication. It's an unfair and dishonest way of having a debate.

PG'ers, take note. Do not do this.

 

[Dre89]

Actually, I pointed out the implications a million times before.

For example, I pointed out the lower level animals problem. You're saying that having conciousness in robots is simply a matter of complexity. However, there are robots already existing that are probably already more complex than low intellect animals, so do you think that current robots have conciousness? So it isn't an issue of complexity in robots, yet that's what you were saying it was down to.

Even so, it becomes incredibly arbitrary to determine when a robot all of a sudden has conciousness or not.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

As for simulations and emulating, he is simply using words poorly, but he actually means a precise copy, though it is hard to imagine.

There is a difference between complexity and ability to contain and use data, which is a simpler concept that we simply keep enhancing. Complexity refers to capturing the effect that incidentally creates the consciousness effect that seems to allow for imagination and emotion.

And consciousness isn't arbitrary to me, at least I think so. I think I've said before, but I believe it is just when something has that perception of the moment, which really only happens when someone can remember and imagine the future (again, to me the imagination allows for emotion incidentally).

I'll concede as for the state of this debate and say this: I'll grant that if we can somehow can artificially create a copy of a human brain with no biological elements, and that it no longer maintains the probability, program-like nature that makes me hesitate, then okay, that robot has consciousness. But even so, I find myself hard to bend to make the final step and say that something like that even makes sense like I've been mentioning.

P.S. Dre, I find me and you hardly agree, but I respect that you don't retaliate to some of Alt's characteristic offensive obiter dictum.

 

[rvkevin]

However, there are robots already existing that are probably already more complex than low intellect animals, so do you think that current robots have consciousness?

I would beg to differ. Simply think of how many sensory inputs an animal can receive. Basically, every inch of their body is filled with hundreds to thousands of nerves that can receive a signal that is then imputed into the brain. This doesn't even begin to describe how many sensory inputs the eye can handle, or the tongue, or ear can deliver. So we have all these senses capable of delivering millions of signals to the brain to interpret and it does a mighty fine job of handling said information. I don't think we have anywhere close to this sort of complex system operating on an artificial level. We are merely beginning at creating software that is able to analyze images and voice analyzing software is a recent phenomena. However, both of these functions are used by "lower" order animals on a daily basis in order to survive, so would be warranted to justify said claim that our computers are more "complex".

 

[Dre89]

Thanks Holder.

Rv- But that's simply complexity in terms of receiving stimulus. There's also complexity in terms of actions, in which current robots certainly surpass lower animals.

So how do you define at what point a robot attains thoughts and feelings? What's the criterion?

 

[GofG]

It has to have the mechanical constructions in its brain which give it thoughts and feelings.

We have those mechanical constructions in our neurons. Robots do not have them in their transistors, but the only thing keeping that from happening is that we have yet to put those mechanical constructions in place in our robots. Our robots have, up to this point, been designed for very specific purposes, as opposed to general purposes, so we haven't needed to include those mechanical constructions. (We lack the technological ability to do so at this point, but it is theoretically proven that we could, assuming materialism.)

 

[Orboknown]

You still haven't proven that emulating feelings means actually having feelings without saying "its assumed among materialists that perfect simulation equates to actual possession of".

 

[rvkevin]

There's also complexity in terms of actions, in which current robots certainly surpass lower animals.

I don't know what you mean here. Are you talking about what functions each can perform? For example, a calculator is superior at calculating than most people. Does this mean that the circuitry of the calculator is more complex than the circuitry in the human brain? Certainly not. We know how to design a calculator, but we are nowhere close to mapping the human brain or even mimicking the functions that it performs on an artificial platform; it is simply too complex at the moment for our state of computing. We need to develop the software algorithms needed for these functions, it is not simply a matter of computing power. A calculator simply performs a simple function better than humans, it simply does it much faster. However, to analyze movement, a picture's content, etc., it requires a much more complex algorithm.

So how do you define at what point a robot attains thoughts and feelings? What's the criterion?

Feeling seem to be a class of chemicals within the individual's system that influence their decision making. This would mean that robot's would not attain feelings unless we specifically design them in, which would probably be counterproductive to their purpose. The reason why we make robots is to perform a specific function, and having a robot respond "I don't want to do that" would be counterproductive to their designed purpose. We could put in an algorithm that makes them emulate feelings, which would basically make them comparable to sociopaths who fake emotions to manipulate others. How do you define someone who has "real" emotions and someone who simply feigns emotions? It can't be their exterior actions, since they would be identical. Is it a certain chemical that is present in the brain? If so, what role does that chemical have in their "circuitry"? I suppose when a robot states their preferences, without them being specifically coded in (which would be emulation), then we could call those feelings. However, I would think that most robots would have a specific algorithm for when it is appropriate to feign emotions and when it is not, since it would make their responses more predictable.

 

[GofG]

You still haven't proven that emulating feelings means actually having feelings without saying "its assumed among materialists that perfect simulation equates to actual possession of".

You are correct. I am assuming materialism.

 

[Orboknown]

Well you cannot use an assumption of what you are trying to prove to prove to another person that said case is true when that other person does not believe in the viewpoint yku are arguing from.
I apologize if that wording doesn't make sense.

 

[GofG]

There are two people in this thread with yellow text. Both think that robots can't be conscious. One of them is a materialist and one of them is a dualist. I'm sorry that I got you two confused.

 

[Orboknown]

Its fine.
But its not safe to just go on "this person seems to agree with me"
I'll go switch post color to make this easier.

 

[GofG]

Yo holder, you should get back in here, my arguments can't be made against a dualist.

(unless we want this thread to become why dualism doesn't make sense)

 

[Holder of the Heel]

Well, dualism is kind of being talked about in a user blog about atheism haha, though we can speak touch upon on it here if you people would like.

I suppose materialism does indeed imply it as GofG does, the only difference would be metaphysical properties, which is what hung me up. Metaphysically the consciousness would not be equivalent, I think, but physically it would be consciousness, to me.

 

[Dre89]

Rv- I wouldn't say a calculator has more complex actions, because it simply performs one action with great quality. I was referring to machines which perform a large number of actions.

So do you think there's a difference between a robot who simulates feelings, and a robot who actually has them? What would be the programming difference?

 

[rvkevin]

Rv- I wouldn't say a calculator has more complex actions, because it simply performs one action with great quality. I was referring to machines which perform a large number of actions.

Such as? A machine that computes a large number of equations? Does Mathematica have more complex actions than a human? What machine currently has the most complex actions? What qualifies as an action here? A specific output? Does stimulating each muscle in the human body count as a specific output? If so, then surely we should consider the permutations involved; talk about complex. What about stimulating distinct bundles of neurons (i.e. our thoughts)? I would think that there are a lot of complex actions that occur for that.

So do you think there's a difference between a robot who simulates feelings, and a robot who actually has them? What would be the programming difference?

I was making a distinction between programming action X and programming preference Y which leads to action X. It's the same difference between a compassionate person and a sociopath. They may help someone in a given scenario, but they have entirely different motives behind it. The compassionate person genuinely cares about the person's well-being, but the sociopath is only interested in potential rewards. One has feelings towards the particular person, one does not; but the actions are the same. You can program a robot to help someone in a given situation, or you can program the robot to prefer that humans are happy, and then give them the necessary A.I. so that they can learn that helping humans is a means to achieve this outcome. The latter is much more difficult since it would basically need to emulate the brain and our technology is nowhere near that phase.

 

[theunabletable]

I don't understand how free will could exist at all, atleast in a fundamental, literal world.

idk I guess a little thought experiment of mine on the subject (I'm sure other people have thought of it, maybe others in this very thread haha) is try and think of a sequence of events, that is neither determined, nor random in any aspects.

Is there one possible? An event that occurred, that wasn't determined, and wasn't in anyway random? I can't think of a third possible trait for an event to have, in place of being determined, or random (and not a mix of both, I mean an event that has neither of these things), and as such, I have trouble understanding the idea of free choice.

If everything is determined, then not having free choice seems rather clear, if there are random elements, followed by cause and effect (or the elements are simply completely random, I don't think it effects this much at all), then, if your choice comes down to something truly random, how could you call that free choice in the first place?

I guess what this comes down to is... what even is free choice?

I haven't been able to comprehend it in any way it's ever been explained to me, as the idea of free choice, atleast in every definition I've recieved, or has been explained to me, seems self contradictory. So enlighten me c:

So do you think there's a difference between a robot who simulates feelings, and a robot who actually has them? What would be the programming difference?

Well what does it mean to "actually have them [feelings]"?

For example, I pointed out the lower level animals problem. You're saying that having conciousness in robots is simply a matter of complexity. However, there are robots already existing that are probably already more complex than low intellect animals, so do you think that current robots have conciousness? So it isn't an issue of complexity in robots, yet that's what you were saying it was down to.

I don't think complexity is such a... well simple thing lol.

Like the way you're saying this, it's almost as if you're implying there is just one kind of complexity, and it exists on a 1 dimensional number line. There's 0 complexity, a complexity of 1, a complexity of 2, a complexity of 3, etc.

But really, complexity is such a... well complex, depthy thing, if you wanted to rate it, it's probably not possible to just do it on a number line. You might need a 2 dimensional grid, or a 3 dimensional representation, or more.

Even so, it becomes incredibly arbitrary to determine when a robot all of a sudden has conciousness or not.

This seems like a continuum fallacy. Take one piece of straw. Is it a heap of straw? No. Take one more piece of straw. Is it a heap of straw? No. Take 1,000 pieces of straw. Is it a heap of straw? Probably, but at what point did it become a heap?

or for a good picture that kind of shows a similar concept (the picture is about evolution, and is unrelated, but I think you'll understand why I linked it here based on the context):

And further, I'd say take what you've said even further. Shouldn't it be equally arbitrary to decide when it is that a life form all of a sudden doesn't have consciousness?

So how do you define at what point a robot attains thoughts and feelings? What's the criterion?

What's the criterion for when an animal attains thoughts and feelings? What's the criterion for when ANYTHING at all attains thoughts and feelings? What's the criterion for when a life form could produce actions, but not have thoughts and feelings?

But I suppose even more important than any of the above would be the question, what ARE thoughts and feelings, and what makes them independent of experiences?

 

[ElvenKing]

Thanks Holder.

Rv- But that's simply complexity in terms of receiving stimulus. There's also complexity in terms of actions, in which current robots certainly surpass lower animals.

So how do you define at what point a robot attains thoughts and feelings? What's the criterion?

The criterion is that the robot has thoughts and feelings. There being the presence of conscious experience is something that comes out of nothing. Any experience begins in the fact that the experience exists. Your objection has been working backwards throughout this entire discussion; it is consciousness where awareness is located and it if by definition must exist if there are thoughts, emotions, feelings, etc., etc. Consciousness is necessary is a first principle for anyone, as else there could not be the experience of inquiring if consciousness. One does not show that consciousness must be, it is the point where one must begin.

Of course, it is true that the only consciousness you must assume is present is your own experience. Since feeling of a consciousness cannot be experienced itself without being part of that consciousness, one might well ask the question: how do I know any perceived object(be it what I feel is "my body," that other human body, that robot, or a rock) in the world actually had a consciousness attached to it? I might have a consciousness experience that makes it feel like my consciousness owns a body, that that human body over there has a consciousness within it, or that the rock sitting on the ground is currently thinking about lemon pies; however, the is not sufficient to show that there is necessarily a consciousness attached to any of those objects(my feelings of experience could be wrong).

This where your attack on materialism makes it mistake. You accused that if materialism was to assume consciousness in one result of the physical world, it would have to assume that everything did or nothing did, which is absurd because not only might it be that different physical process produce different things(this would be an assumption that is just as much supported as taking that everything must be conscious or that there was no consciousness but your own) but also because assuming consciousness's attachment to objects in the world is equally a problem for anyone else. If you are to reject materialism and all conscious experience is a result of objects in the physical world, you actually still have the problem of being unable to tell what has consciousness and what does not.

Let us assume that consciousness experience is not always a result of physical process, now you see a rock in front of you, how do you know that it doesn't, like you, possess a consciousness that is attached to a physical body(the rock) but does not stem in origin from that rock body? You can't. You have to make just as make of an assumption to say that it possess consciousness or does not consciousness as any materialist. The presence of a consciousness attached to an object is, since one cannot observe a consciousness experience and show how it is necessarily attached to an object, is always an assumption no matter who it is.

So how then do we consider that is is reasonable to reject that some objects have consciousness attached to them and others not? The answer, whether materialist or otherwise, is that we have, in the former paragraphs, ignored that something important happens when we take the assumption that an individual's body is attached to their consciousness experience: it suggests to an individual the nature of where the presence of another consciousness might occur. Once I take the assumption that my body is actually my body and that the changes in my conscious experience are trigged by events that happen to my body, I build a series of connections about what events in the world are attached to a conscious experience(for example, when my hand touches the table, I feel a texture), so when I see that there is a body, a body that looks very like mine, on the other side of the room touch a table with its hand, it becomes reasonable to suggest that there is a consciousness experiencing the texture of the table. On the other hand, a rock displays non of these behaviours and is of a completely different nature to me body, so it can be reasonably suggested to lack consciousness. The problem of making a blind assumption, as I mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, is never actually present. Either for the materialist or anyone else. As soon as you accept that your own consciousness is attached to(though not necessarily completely caused by) your own body, you have reason upon in which to judge which objects likely have consciousness attached.

 

[GofG]

The criterion is that the robot has thoughts and feelings. There being the presence of conscious experience is something that comes out of nothing. Any experience begins in the fact that the experience exists. Your objection has been working backwards throughout this entire discussion; it is consciousness where awareness is located and it if by definition must exist if there are thoughts, emotions, feelings, etc., etc.

Not necessarily. I can conceive of beings who are self-aware without being conscious, and I can conceive of beings who have thoughts and self-awareness and consciousness but no feelings or emotions, and I can conceive of beings who have feelings and emotions but with no consciousness. Conscious experience does not come out of nothing; it comes out of (or rather, is) the physical processes which create it.

You seem to be saying a lot which seems right to you, maybe, but there isn't really any reason to believe it.

Consciousness is necessary is a first principle for anyone, as else there could not be the experience of inquiring if consciousness. One does not show that consciousness must be, it is the point where one must begin.

Of course, it is true that the only consciousness you must assume is present is your own experience. Since feeling of a consciousness cannot be experienced itself without being part of that consciousness, one might well ask the question: how do I know any perceived object(be it what I feel is "my body," that other human body, that robot, or a rock) in the world actually had a consciousness attached to it? I might have a consciousness experience that makes it feel like my consciousness owns a body, that that human body over there has a consciousness within it, or that the rock sitting on the ground is currently thinking about lemon pies; however, the is not sufficient to show that there is necessarily a consciousness attached to any of those objects(my feelings of experience could be wrong).

This where your attack on materialism makes it mistake. You accused that if materialism was to assume consciousness in one result of the physical world, it would have to assume that everything did or nothing did, which is absurd because not only might it be that different physical process produce different things(this would be an assumption that is just as much supported as taking that everything must be conscious or that there was no consciousness but your own) but also because assuming consciousness's attachment to objects in the world is equally a problem for anyone else. If you are to reject materialism and all conscious experience is a result of objects in the physical world, you actually still have the problem of being unable to tell what has consciousness and what does not.

You don't, though, because consciousness arises from almost-known physical patterns of electricity moving around a medium of sufficient complexity. All you have to do to ensure that an object is conscious is observe those physical patterns in it.

Let us assume that consciousness experience is not always a result of physical process, now you see a rock in front of you, how do you know that it doesn't, like you, possess a consciousness that is attached to a physical body(the rock) but does not stem in origin from that rock body? You can't. You have to make just as make of an assumption to say that it possess consciousness or does not consciousness as any materialist. The presence of a consciousness attached to an object is, since one cannot observe a consciousness experience and show how it is necessarily attached to an object, is always an assumption no matter who it is.

So how then do we consider that is is reasonable to reject that some objects have consciousness attached to them and others not? The answer, whether materialist or otherwise, is that we have, in the former paragraphs, ignored that something important happens when we take the assumption that an individual's body is attached to their consciousness experience: it suggests to an individual the nature of where the presence of another consciousness might occur. Once I take the assumption that my body is actually my body and that the changes in my conscious experience are trigged by events that happen to my body, I build a series of connections about what events in the world are attached to a conscious experience(for example, when my hand touches the table, I feel a texture), so when I see that there is a body, a body that looks very like mine, on the other side of the room touch a table with its hand, it becomes reasonable to suggest that there is a consciousness experiencing the texture of the table. On the other hand, a rock displays non of these behaviours and is of a completely different nature to me body, so it can be reasonably suggested to lack consciousness. The problem of making a blind assumption, as I mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, is never actually present. Either for the materialist or anyone else. As soon as you accept that your own consciousness is attached to(though not necessarily completely caused by) your own body, you have reason upon in which to judge which objects likely have consciousness attached.

I... I don't quite understand your argument here. You seem to be arguing against Dre's dualism and for materialism, but you are doing it with arguments that fall apart. I will refrain from further commenting until I understand better.

 

[ElvenKing]

Not necessarily. I can conceive of beings who are self-aware without being conscious, and I can conceive of beings who have thoughts and self-awareness and consciousness but no feelings or emotions, and I can conceive of beings who have feelings and emotions but with no consciousness. Conscious experience does not come out of nothing; it comes out of (or rather, is) the physical processes which create it.

You seem to be saying a lot which seems right to you, maybe, but there isn't really any reason to believe it.



You don't, though, because consciousness arises from almost-known physical patterns of electricity moving around a medium of sufficient complexity. All you have to do to ensure that an object is conscious is observe those physical patterns in it.



I... I don't quite understand your argument here. You seem to be arguing against Dre's dualism and for materialism, but you are doing it with arguments that fall apart. I will refrain from further commenting until I understand better.

No, you cannot. Conceiving that there is a being without consciousness is a conscious experience in of itself(you are aware of the conception of there being objects without consciousness). It IS correct that the necessarily only requires your consciousness. You could reject that any other consciousness existed. There is no reason, without first assuming that your consciousness is attached to what feels like your body, to think that an object must have a consciousness attached to it. We don't observe the presence of a connection between an object and consciousness, as the feelings of consciousness do not have an empirical existence themselves(while we can see a body scream, wince and jerk away, one never sees the feeling of pain that we hold the consciousness of that body is experiencing). It is perfectly reasonable to suggest that consciousness results from physical processes, but those physical process are not feelings of consciousness themselves. This is really the only point where materialists sometimes make an error, for otherwise, they do hold the suggested position(since there is evidence, through that dead bodies no longer behave in a manner that suggest there is a consciousness attached to them, to suggest that consciousness experience ends when the brain ceases to function).

Only if first assumed that my is consciousness attached to the object which is felt my body, as otherwise I have no reason to think that the presence of such electrical signals in such a medium indicates the presence of consciousness.

That is because you are making the incorrect equivocation between consciousness experience as it is felt and the physical process that caused such an experience to be. It is like saying that because the wind causes the door to move, the moving door is the wind itself.

 

[Alphicans]

Whoa, looks like a rerun of that atheism thread in user blogs lol.

Where has the free will stuff gone to? There was like minor discussion for the first maybe 2 pages, and then it became a consciousness debate.

I don't know a ton about free will, but I know that both determinism and free will have certain "mysteries" associated with them. The mystery for determinism is pretty obvious: how can the world I live in be deterministic when I value that I have free will so much? Even people who say they believe in determinism most likely violate their own belief system, because thinking about what options you have and choosing one of them will always seem like it's your choice. It's pretty well impossible to be in a scenario where you allow nature to take over, you must make a decision and when you do make that decision you obviously think you had the choice to make that decision.

Free will on the other hand has a big mystery behind it as well. Does free will not imply an in deterministic universe? In an in-deterministic universe, how do we have the choice? Suppose you're in a scenario where you either say yes or no (doesn't matter what you're talking about). Now suppose that for this decision it comes down to one final neuron firing, and as the electrical pulse is traveling up the neuron it comes to a fork, and if it goes right you say no, and if it goes left you say yes. How do I have that choice? It either happens one way or the other, but it's very unclear as to how I actively made that decision. Of course that's assuming physicalism, but can being a dualist help this situation at all? I don't know about that, because there would have to be some sort of non-physical process that happens right before you make that decision in your non-physical mind aswell.

I know there is stuff about agent causation to account for free will, but I don't know nearly enough stuff about that. Anyways, I guess the question here is what mystery can either be explained or which one is easier to deal with?

 

[Holder of the Heel]

I don't understand what you mean by how determinism has a mystery to it entailed in that post?

And yeah haha we primarily accepted determinism in general, and of course free will and determinism involves consciousness implications, and it started as the notion that under such an assumption, without some mysterious free will, a robot could essentially be like us.

Essentially because I am taking part in the user blog thread, I am taking a break from seriously getting in on this ha.

 

[Alphicans]

How can you accept determinism yet make choices? It's not like when you make a choice you're thinking you have to make that choice, no, you're thinking about which choice to make. I hate to make absolute claims, but I think it's appropriate here, it seems impossible that you could live your life without believing in free will.

So the mystery is: how could determinism be true if humans require free will to live?

 

[ElvenKing]

Whoa, looks like a rerun of that atheism thread in user blogs lol.

Where has the free will stuff gone to? There was like minor discussion for the first maybe 2 pages, and then it became a consciousness debate.

I don't know a ton about free will, but I know that both determinism and free will have certain "mysteries" associated with them. The mystery for determinism is pretty obvious: how can the world I live in be deterministic when I value that I have free will so much? Even people who say they believe in determinism most likely violate their own belief system, because thinking about what options you have and choosing one of them will always seem like it's your choice. It's pretty well impossible to be in a scenario where you allow nature to take over, you must make a decision and when you do make that decision you obviously think you had the choice to make that decision.

Free will on the other hand has a big mystery behind it as well. Does free will not imply an in deterministic universe? In an in-deterministic universe, how do we have the choice? Suppose you're in a scenario where you either say yes or no (doesn't matter what you're talking about). Now suppose that for this decision it comes down to one final neuron firing, and as the electrical pulse is traveling up the neuron it comes to a fork, and if it goes right you say no, and if it goes left you say yes. How do I have that choice? It either happens one way or the other, but it's very unclear as to how I actively made that decision. Of course that's assuming physicalism, but can being a dualist help this situation at all? I don't know about that, because there would have to be some sort of non-physical process that happens right before you make that decision in your non-physical mind aswell.

I know there is stuff about agent causation to account for free will, but I don't know nearly enough stuff about that. Anyways, I guess the question here is what mystery can either be explained or which one is easier to deal with?

There is a reason for that: we appear to have the freedom to make the world through the actions we take. The thing about determinism is that it address what causes something that has happen. One can only look back on events that have already occur to say: "Well, that is what was always going to happen." To a being, such as humans, who have the capacity to predict what will happen in the future to a great extent, this cannot reflect the lived experience because we are always taking in what is going on around us and what this will then mean in the future, realising the role our actions and the actions of others, will play in what happens next(and how we might act to produce a different future). Even if we have no power to define future events beyond how we are caused to, it still appears that there is freedom to define the future because we how no idea what future we will be caused to define.

For free will to exist, you have to define a force of will that can simply select what action should be taken for the reason: "The action must happen."

 

[Alphicans]

I understand all of this, but a question remains.

Even if I blatantly state I believe in determinism and say I cannot explain how I could possibly have free will, I can never live my life and be successful (as in living very long at all). I MUST live my life assuming free will exists, because I have no other choice (if I want to live). So you could say that our perception of free will is just evolutionary to living things so we don't die off, but why would we evolve such a trait... How could such a trait even come into existence? Did any animals ever live in a deterministic way. How could you even live in a deterministic way? It really doesn't make sense does it. How true is determinism if every living thing doesn't follow it as a way of living? We can say it's true, but what good is it to say it's true when we all know we're going to be deciding what we want to eat within the next 24 hours?

I don't think it's necessary for me to find this force of will, when it is impossible to live without it.

 

[Dre89]

There is a reason for that: we appear to have the freedom to make the world through the actions we take. The thing about determinism is that it address what causes something that has happen. One can only look back on events that have already occur to say: "Well, that is what was always going to happen." To a being, such as humans, who have the capacity to predict what will happen in the future to a great extent, this cannot reflect the lived experience because we are always taking in what is going on around us and what this will then mean in the future, realising the role our actions and the actions of others, will play in what happens next(and how we might act to produce a different future). Even if we have no power to define future events beyond how we are caused to, it still appears that there is freedom to define the future because we how no idea what future we will be caused to define.

For free will to exist, you have to define a force of will that can simply select what action should be taken for the reason: "The action must happen."

If we were determined there wouldn't be any need of a conciousness that needs to be decevied. Actions would simply be a result of some form of formula entailing external stimulus, genetic coding of one's personality,past experiences, the strength of desires etc.

That's like saying robots need to believe they're free in order to function.

 

[GofG]

There is no reason, without first assuming that your consciousness is attached to what feels like your body, to think that an object must have a consciousness attached to it. We don't observe the presence of a connection between an object and consciousness, as the feelings of consciousness do not have an empirical existence themselves(while we can see a body scream, wince and jerk away, one never sees the feeling of pain that we hold the consciousness of that body is experiencing). It is perfectly reasonable to suggest that consciousness results from physical processes, but those physical process are not feelings of consciousness themselves.

Only if first assumed that my is consciousness attached to the object which is felt my body, as otherwise I have no reason to think that the presence of such electrical signals in such a medium indicates the presence of consciousness.

That is because you are making the incorrect equivocation between consciousness experience as it is felt and the physical process that caused such an experience to be. It is like saying that because the wind causes the door to move, the moving door is the wind itself.

You are wrong. The physical processes are feelings of consciousness themselves. Anything inconsistent with this is dualism.

 

[ElvenKing]

If we were determined there wouldn't be any need of a conciousness that needs to be decevied. Actions would simply be a result of some form of formula entailing external stimulus, genetic coding of one's personality,past experiences, the strength of desires etc.

That's like saying robots need to believe they're free in order to function.

False, consciousness is always required because we have the experience of being aware of something.

Actions being determined by such forces does not make consciousness any less of a felt experience. You are confusing having defining control over your actions with feeling a consciousness experience of existence.

No, it isn't. There can be systems created or programmed to do something that do not have a consciousness experience(a wind-up watch acts in the sense that it moves, but it doesn't have an awareness of what is going on. Calculators add up without being aware of what is going on around it).

You are wrong. The physical processes are feelings of consciousness themselves. Anything inconsistent with this is dualism.

Incorrect, they are different. To feel an experience of consciousness is not to see a connection between consciousness and a physical object in the world, nor is to see an object in the world to see the presence of a conscious experience. It is true, assuming that you consciousness is attached to your body, that the physical process are required for your consciousness to be present, but it remains that observing those processes is not the same as actually feeling the conscious experience.

 

[GofG]

Incorrect, they are different. To feel an experience of consciousness is not to see a connection between consciousness and a physical object in the world, nor is to see an object in the world to see the presence of a conscious experience. It is true, assuming that you consciousness is attached to your body, that the physical process are required for your consciousness to be present, but it remains that observing those processes is not the same as actually feeling the conscious experience.

I didn't say it was. It is the same as knowing that the mind containing whatever processes you're observing is actually feeling the conscious experience, however.

 

[Dre89]

False, consciousness is always required because we have the experience of being aware of something.

Actions being determined by such forces does not make consciousness any less of a felt experience. You are confusing having defining control over your actions with feeling a consciousness experience of existence.

No, it isn't. There can be systems created or programmed to do something that do not have a consciousness experience(a wind-up watch acts in the sense that it moves, but it doesn't have an awareness of what is going on. Calculators add up without being aware of what is going on around it).



Incorrect, they are different. To feel an experience of consciousness is not to see a connection between consciousness and a physical object in the world, nor is to see an object in the world to see the presence of a conscious experience. It is true, assuming that you consciousness is attached to your body, that the physical process are required for your consciousness to be present, but it remains that observing those processes is not the same as actually feeling the conscious experience.

We wouldn't need self-awareness because we only need it to freely make decisions. Insects aren't self aware but are capable of responses to stimulus and acting upon desires. Humans would just be like that, just much more complex.

 

[GofG]

We wouldn't need self-awareness because we only need it to freely make decisions.

If you can find any evidence for this, then you should present it.

 

[ElvenKing]

We wouldn't need self-awareness because we only need it to freely make decisions. Insects aren't self aware but are capable of responses to stimulus and acting upon desires. Humans would just be like that, just much more complex.

Yes, insects actually have some form of conscious experience(for example, "There is light over there." ).

Yes, they would, and in that extra complexity is the high level of self-awareness that you refer to.

That is simply not true. There is "no need" required for self-awareness and the human consciousness experience. Such experience something that "is" and we know that it is. Whether it is there for a purpose is an entirely different question and the presence or absence of one has no effect on the reality that conscious experience is.

I didn't say it was. It is the same as knowing that the mind containing whatever processes you're observing is actually feeling the conscious experience, however.

Yes, but that was not what I was referring to; I was speaking of actually feeling the experience.

You need the assumption that what you feel in conscious experience is attached to your body. Otherwise, there is no reason to indicate that there would be a presence of feelings of consciousness attached to that process. Here is a simple question: how do you know what processes produce consciousness?

 

[GofG]

You need the assumption that what you feel in conscious experience is attached to your body. Otherwise, there is no reason to indicate that there would be a presence of feelings of consciousness attached to that process. Here is a simple question: how do you know what processes produce consciousness?

Current neuroscience is not to the point where we know enough about the physical processes to, say, emulate consciousness on a computer. But we do definitely know enough to know that the process is entirely physical. I suggest reading a very recent textbook such as 'Consciousness: An Introduction' by Susan Blackmoore

 

[ElvenKing]

Current neuroscience is not to the point where we know enough about the physical processes to, say, emulate consciousness on a computer. But we do definitely know enough to know that the process is entirely physical. I suggest reading a very recent textbook such as 'Consciousness: An Introduction' by Susan Blackmoore

The question was not about the exact workings of what physical process produce consciousness, it was about how we know that one physical process does when another does not.

How do we know, for example, that the physical process of the human body produces consciousness while the physical process of a rock being eroded by water does not?

 

[GofG]

The question was not about the exact workings of what physical process produce consciousness, it was about how we know that one physical process does when another does not.

How do we know, for example, that the physical process of the human body produces consciousness while the physical process of a rock being eroded by water does not?

Because we can look at the patterns of electricity in the brain which give rise to consciousness and see that there are no patterns isomorphic to this pattern in a rock.

If it could be shown that there are patterns in the erosion of a rock which are the same as (or at least of a very similar nature to) the patterns of neuron activity in the human brain which give rise to consciousness, then yes, the erosion of a rock by water would be a conscious and self-aware function, just like humans.

The chance of this is so low in my mind that I do not even have any ethical problems with possibly creating a conscious life every time I pour water onto a rock. On the other hand, I would have huge ethical problems with possibly creating a conscious mind via whole-brain emulation, which I believe actually would contain those same physical patterns.

 

[theunabletable]

Where has the free will stuff gone to? There was like minor discussion for the first maybe 2 pages, and then it became a consciousness debate.

I tried to talk about free will, but no one responded to meee

how can the world I live in be deterministic when I value that I have free will so much? Even people who say they believe in determinism most likely violate their own belief system, because thinking about what options you have and choosing one of them will always seem like it's your choice. It's pretty well impossible to be in a scenario where you allow nature to take over, you must make a decision and when you do make that decision you obviously think you had the choice to make that decision.

Just because what choice I'd make is essentially what would happen every time, if all the scenarios were the same, doesn't mean that I don't feel anything.

There are sooo many variables in our world, that if the world is deterministic, in effect, we DO still have free choice, although this is a bit disingenuous, because I think free choice in this instance means something different to me than it does to you.

I think for free choice to exist on a fundamental level, there must be a trait that events can have, that replaces randomness, and determinism

How can you accept determinism yet make choices? It's not like when you make a choice you're thinking you have to make that choice, no, you're thinking about which choice to make. I hate to make absolute claims, but I think it's appropriate here, it seems impossible that you could live your life without believing in free will.

So the mystery is: how could determinism be true if humans require free will to live?

I'll give a short analogy to say what I mean, but I might say it badly, so bare with me lol.

So I think we can both agree that pain objectively exists, right? And for most of us, it's an objectively bad thing, right (by this, I mean you'd agree that we both really don't like pain, and that it's not a good thing for us to feel it?)?

Alright say I'm in front of a button, and if I press it, I don't feel pain. If I don't press it, I'll get shocked and it'll be very painful.

I wouldn't throw up my hands and say "It doesn't matter what decision I pick, I'll either feel pain, or not feel pain either way, no matter what," I'd make the "choice" to press the button so that I don't feel any pain. Given the exact same circumstances, I'd do it every time, though. If I'd had identical experiences, and if I had the exact same genes, and the exact same brain, if literally all the things were the same, I would react the same way, and come to the same choice the same way. Atleast as best as I understand a general determinist mindset.

idk whether I'm a determinist or not, I'm not sure what I believe quite yet, but under determinism, I don't think that what you mentioned is much of an issue.