Me and Naci have decided to set a precedent and initiate a 1v1 debate. To the relief of many people, I will be actually be arguing that God does not exist (so it technically counts as a devil's advocate argument too), and Naci will be arguing that He does.
The format won't be too complicated, we're just going to debate until we feel we have exhausted our arguments. Obviously, no one else should be posting in here.
I'm going to see if I can get some judges, but if not it doesn't really matter. This thread can just be considered a draft that can be tweaked for later 1v1 threads, what's important is that we get somehing happening.
Note: Naci is having issues with his computer at the moment, so he may have to wait a day or two before he can post.
If you guys want to discuss this debate, do it in the social thread, not here. I guess the only other people who should post here are the judges once we've finished.
My argument will be divided into three parts-
1. God is not necessary
2. The original being cannot be perfect.
3. The existence of gratuitous evil renders the existence of a personal God unlikely.
1. God is not necessary
The main philosophical arguments for God seek to prove that God's existence is necessary to actuate the universe. To sum it up, the claim is that all beings are contingent, in that they necessitate prior truths, they are actuated into existence by a prior being. On these grounds, the theists concludes that there must be a self-necessary being that necessitates no prior truths, and is responsible for all existence.
Essentially, the theist is saying that contingency is the essence of being, otherwise God would not be necessitated. However, in God existing, contingency is no longer the essence of being, for you have a being (God) that exists without contingency. Therefore, it is conceivable that non-contingent beings may exist.
Ultimately, the theory is flawed because God is only necessary if the essence of being is contingency. Yet if God exists, then contingency is not the essence of being, for a non-contingent being exists.
2. The original being cannot be perfect
God cannot be perfect because in being perfect, He comprimises His self-necessity. Perfection is generally adhering to a purpose. For example, in achieving a perfect score in a dart game, you have fulfilled the object of the game with maximum efficiency. However, the object of the game is determined prior to the game, giving the player an object to fulfill.
Similarly, what is perfection for a being exists before the being is actuated into existence. It does not chose what it was actuated for, for that reason was conceived prior to its actuality. In this sense, to be perfect a being must adhere to a prior concept of eprfection.
The issue with God however is that nothing exists prior to Him, there cannot be a prior concept of perfection fro Him to adhere to. Naturally, the theist will respond by saying that God's action defines perfection, rather than adheres to it. This is all well and good until we address how the action is willed. A perfect action would stem from a perfect will, so the reasoning behind that action would be perfect. The problem is, what makes God will a certain action? The notion of a 'perfect will' supposes that the will is adhering to a prior concept of perfection, meaning God is no longer self-necessary.
3. The existence of gratuitous evil renders the existence of a personal God unlikely.
There are several arguments I could have applied from the problem of evil but for convenience sake (both mine and Naci's) I'll employ one of the simpler and more straight-forward arguments. The issue is the existence of gratuitous evil, in that it renders the existence of a good God unlikely.
Theists often claim that God brings good from all evil, even if we cannot see it. Evil that appears to be purposeless, or seems to have no good brought from it is know as gratuitous evil. In response to gratuitous evil, the theist argues that we cannot know whether it is gratuitous or not, for it is conceivable that God could bring good from it in a way not subject to the limitations of human perception. Therefore, it is impossible to prove that gratuitous evil exists.
However, what we can prove is that certain evils at least appear purposeless. We can't prove if they are purposless or not, but one can safely say that they are certainly designed to appear to be purposeless. The question is then that if good wanted us to believe in Him, why did He not make it obvious that evil was for a good? Instead, He has designed evil in such a way that observing leads one away from God, not towards Him. In this case, it makes the existence such a good God highly unlikely.
The format won't be too complicated, we're just going to debate until we feel we have exhausted our arguments. Obviously, no one else should be posting in here.
I'm going to see if I can get some judges, but if not it doesn't really matter. This thread can just be considered a draft that can be tweaked for later 1v1 threads, what's important is that we get somehing happening.
Note: Naci is having issues with his computer at the moment, so he may have to wait a day or two before he can post.
If you guys want to discuss this debate, do it in the social thread, not here. I guess the only other people who should post here are the judges once we've finished.
My argument will be divided into three parts-
1. God is not necessary
2. The original being cannot be perfect.
3. The existence of gratuitous evil renders the existence of a personal God unlikely.
1. God is not necessary
The main philosophical arguments for God seek to prove that God's existence is necessary to actuate the universe. To sum it up, the claim is that all beings are contingent, in that they necessitate prior truths, they are actuated into existence by a prior being. On these grounds, the theists concludes that there must be a self-necessary being that necessitates no prior truths, and is responsible for all existence.
Essentially, the theist is saying that contingency is the essence of being, otherwise God would not be necessitated. However, in God existing, contingency is no longer the essence of being, for you have a being (God) that exists without contingency. Therefore, it is conceivable that non-contingent beings may exist.
Ultimately, the theory is flawed because God is only necessary if the essence of being is contingency. Yet if God exists, then contingency is not the essence of being, for a non-contingent being exists.
2. The original being cannot be perfect
God cannot be perfect because in being perfect, He comprimises His self-necessity. Perfection is generally adhering to a purpose. For example, in achieving a perfect score in a dart game, you have fulfilled the object of the game with maximum efficiency. However, the object of the game is determined prior to the game, giving the player an object to fulfill.
Similarly, what is perfection for a being exists before the being is actuated into existence. It does not chose what it was actuated for, for that reason was conceived prior to its actuality. In this sense, to be perfect a being must adhere to a prior concept of eprfection.
The issue with God however is that nothing exists prior to Him, there cannot be a prior concept of perfection fro Him to adhere to. Naturally, the theist will respond by saying that God's action defines perfection, rather than adheres to it. This is all well and good until we address how the action is willed. A perfect action would stem from a perfect will, so the reasoning behind that action would be perfect. The problem is, what makes God will a certain action? The notion of a 'perfect will' supposes that the will is adhering to a prior concept of perfection, meaning God is no longer self-necessary.
3. The existence of gratuitous evil renders the existence of a personal God unlikely.
There are several arguments I could have applied from the problem of evil but for convenience sake (both mine and Naci's) I'll employ one of the simpler and more straight-forward arguments. The issue is the existence of gratuitous evil, in that it renders the existence of a good God unlikely.
Theists often claim that God brings good from all evil, even if we cannot see it. Evil that appears to be purposeless, or seems to have no good brought from it is know as gratuitous evil. In response to gratuitous evil, the theist argues that we cannot know whether it is gratuitous or not, for it is conceivable that God could bring good from it in a way not subject to the limitations of human perception. Therefore, it is impossible to prove that gratuitous evil exists.
However, what we can prove is that certain evils at least appear purposeless. We can't prove if they are purposless or not, but one can safely say that they are certainly designed to appear to be purposeless. The question is then that if good wanted us to believe in Him, why did He not make it obvious that evil was for a good? Instead, He has designed evil in such a way that observing leads one away from God, not towards Him. In this case, it makes the existence such a good God highly unlikely.