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This is a subject that I feel gets very little attention in the realms of philosophy and theology. Many of the philosophical arguments used by theists today are derived from (or are similar to) St. Thomas Aquinas's Five Proofs in the Summa Theologica written in 1274. This topic is basically a challenge to atheists (or anyone otherwise interested) to invalidate St. Thomas's Proofs. I stress the importance of the word "invalidate" because these proofs, if accepted, mean that it is only logical that one or many supernatural forces exist and that they have certain distinguishable traits (calling this force God would be too assumptive given that ultimately not all the qualities of this being are learned through these proofs, but for all intents and purposes, it will be called God from here on out.) My role in this will be not so much as a debater, but as a clarifier, because I've seen from experience with others that dissent on these proofs comes misunderstanding of concepts, inconsistent logic, and stubbornness. Therefore, I will correct any inconsistent positions, and, if necessary, debate those inconsistencies. If, ultimately, no one can effectively invalidate all of these proofs, then it must ultimately be accepted that they serve as logical reason to assert God's existence.
Unfortunately, I won't post all five of the proofs, because there is one I disagree with, and another which I don't fully understand. Therefore, I'll only post the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd proofs.
Our senses prove that some things are in motion.
2.
Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion.
3.
Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion.
4.
Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another).
5.
Therefore nothing can move itself.
6.
Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else.
7.
The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum.
8.
Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The Third Way: Argument from Possibility and Necessity (Reductio argument)
1.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, that come into being and go out of being i.e., contingent beings.
2.
Assume that every being is a contingent being.
3.
For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist.
4.
Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist.
5.
Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed.
6.
Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence.
7.
Therefore, nothing would be in existence now.
8.
We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being is a contingent being.
9.
Therefore not every being is a contingent being.
10.
Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. This all men speak of as God.
Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another).
5.
What does this even mean? Particularly, what is a "being"? I can argue that we have in fact observed the opposite of this statement - conservation of mass holds for just about everything.
2.
Assume that every being is a contingent being.
3.
For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist.
4.
Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist.
5.
Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed.
"Could have" is not a sufficient condition for the rest of the argument. I can defeat your argument here by saying that there wasn't actually a time when no things existed, even if all the things are individually contingent.
6.
Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence.
7.
Therefore, nothing would be in existence now.
8.
We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being is a contingent being.
9.
Therefore not every being is a contingent being.
10.
Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. This all men speak of as God.
Not objectively. I mean, sure I can make a subjective argument that I am better than all things and thus define "God" as me, but what weight does that really have?
2.
Predications of degree require reference to the “uttermost” case (e.g., a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest).
This isn't the case at all. There is no "hottest" thing possible because you can always increase the temperature by one. It's like saying that the ordering of the natural numbers requires reference to some "biggest" natural number - but this isn't the case at all. There is no biggest natural number.
3.
The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus.
How do we see this? What goal? How do we know it isn't by chance?
2.
Most natural things lack knowledge.
3.
But as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, what lacks intelligence achieves goals by being directed by something intelligence.
4. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
From what I get...
Here it'd be a first cause making gravity possible (the composition of this planet) which takes us to the question: what does makes this planet being in motion? then that would be what's writen here:
8.
Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
It may vary depending from the point of view you look at it.
I could say that what ballin says, is right, as I could say that these points are also right, one would be the atheist side and the other the believer or some assumptive entity.
I'm not saying ballin is atheist, but trying to make a scene between the two sides.
I'd say it's something that would lead to an endless discussion, since is kind of imposible proof or disproof God's existence with sience, or maybe it's posible to do it, whichever the case is, wouldn't have an end.
Moreover, Believing in God comes from faith, which we all know what faith means (and by that meaning is why atheists doesn't trust it).
I don't know of too many people willing to wholly reject the notion of a first cause.
What I hate is when people do all this philosophy bs and say "look, if you define God in this very vague sense [first cause] then we both agree God exists. Therefore the Southern Episcopalean Church is exactly right" It doesn't follow. You really can't assert anything following the premise that there is a first cause, certainly not stuff like heaven exists or God is benevolent or jesus loves you, at least not for any reasonable definitions of those terms.
it's extremely vague; it appears to be that he's just taking rules that most people would agree with and slapping a "god" label on them. instead of seeking other plausible causes for things such as motion and time, he immediately points to god as the only possible cause. it's understandable thinking for the time he lived in, but given the information we have access to now, his ways are basically irrelevant.
A person's motion ultimately results from the motion of its body parts, which are moved by the brain, which is moved by electrochemical pulses, which are initiated in the mothers womb, which is another system of movement that extend back to the first organisms. People, scientifically speaking, do not move themselves.
Potential motion is the ability for a thing to move. Example: A marble sitting still on a table has potential motion to move up, down, left, right, or any combination of those directions.
Through the wording of the premise established by Aquinas, gravity would be an exception. However, this exception isn't important, because gravity can be included in the conclusion Aquinas makes at #6.
6. Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else.
Aquinas makes the statement of #3 in order to establish this conclusion; however, Aquinas could not have taken gravity into acount because gravity was discovered 400 years after this was written. Nonetheless, gravity does not invalidate the argument because gravity is perfectly in line with the conclusion of #6. Gravity is a force that causes other things to move, meaning that one possible scenario of a thing being moved by another could be gravitational pull.
I encourage you to make arguments that INVALIDATE these proofs rather than nit-picking at them.
Except God apparently - self contradictory argument
This is not a self contradictory argument. Notice, Aquinas does not define God until the very end. He lets the facts themselves speak for the necessary traits of God, and these traits happen to necessitate that some force which does not require (the human understanding of)
movement and can cause (t.h.u.o.) movement. God, as described by Aquinas, is naturally exempt from these premises because it is necessary that he is, otherwise existence as we know it would be illogical, irrational, and impossible.
One thing should already be established: For any thing which is moving, there is something that moved it.
If you do not agree with this then we must debate this instead of the following statement.
If you do believe this, then a wholly natural (meaning "of the reality we exist in") formation of matter and life as we know it would be impossible. Why? Because in order for things as we know them to exist without a first mover, it would be necessary that there is an infinitely backwards extending sequence of things which cause other things to move. However, this is what I call the Infinity Paradox.
1. If there is an infinite amount of criteria that needs to be completed to achieve a goal, that goal will never be achieved.
2. If an end exists, yet the origins of that end are infinite, it is illogical for the end to exist.
Example for #1: You're making a cake with a recipe; however, the recipe calls for an infinite amout of ingredients. You will never, at any point, have a cake because you can never finish.
Example for #2: You have a cake, but it was made from an infinite amount of ingredients. The existence of such a cake is illogical because the cake should've never been finished. The only rational explanation for the cake is that it does not have an infinite set of ingredients.
Relevance of #1: If there is an infinite sequence of motion that must occur to create matter, or to create the earth, or to put the moon into the earth's orbit, etc, none of these things will ever happen.
Relevance of 2# If the earth exists, then it is impossible that an infinitely backwards series of motion resulted in it, because the result of earth would have never been achieved because the criteria for making it would never end.
The existence of anything is only explainable through a first mover, who is exempt from the laws of reality.
But won't necessarily have any of the other properties that are attributed to God.
The efficient cause is the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away, and the act of chiseling, that causes the statue. This answers the question: how does it happen? It is the sort of answer we usually expect when we ask about cause; the thing which happened to bring about certain results.
Should I assume that you're asking why to #6, or are you also confused about the previous criteria? To me they seem fairly self-explanatory, unless you believe that something (within this reality) can exist of itself without cause. However, in the interest of time, I won't address this unless you require it.
Onto the issue of #6. If you read what I've posted up until now, the you should already know what I'm about to say. This is yet another issue of the Infinity Paradox. The series of efficient causes cannot go on forever, because then there would be no logical explanation for why any thing exists. If an infinite amount of causes had to occur to create atoms, earth, humans, etc, then none of these would exist because the criteria necessary for their creation would never end. An infinite string of efficient causes is illogical and impossible in this reality.
What does this even mean? Particularly, what is a "being"? I can argue that we have in fact observed the opposite of this statement - conservation of mass holds for just about everything.
Something that does not exist in and of itself but depends for its existence upon some other being.
The first premise refers more broadly to generally earthly things such as trees and human life. Also, each statement that he makes is essentially an argument:
1. Some things are possible to exist.
2. Some others are possible to not exist.
3. Some things come into being.
4. Some things go out of being.
Each of these should be treated individually. In the broader spectrum which Aquinas referred to, he likely did not consider mass; however, this does not exempt mass from these criteria.
1. Is it possible for mass to exist? Yes.
2. Is it possible for mass to not exist? Yes.
3. Is it possible for mass to come into existence? Questionable.
4. Is it possible for mass to come out of existence? Questionable.
Now I will address the third and fourth questions.
Mass is a physical entity. Therefore, it exists within time. With this established, an uncreated existence of matter submits reality, yet again, to the Infinity Paradox. It is evident that mass exists; therefore, it is illogical to assume that mass was not created. Because if mass were not created, and simply existed with no explanation, then this would mean that time existed infinitely backwards. For if mass exists, then there is a time where it existed. However, it is impossible that mass existed without creating because then mass's existence's time span would be infinitely backward. However, this would result in the impossibility of moments of time which have already occurred. Earth would never have been created because time would never reach the moment/moments in time which resulted in earth's creation because the amount of time required to reach that point would never end. The same is true of every existence. Basically, if once can go forever back in history, it is impossible that any point in time was ever reached.
Therefore, the only possible explanation to solve this paradox is that matter was brought into being, which means that it is possible for mass to come into being. However,
mass (or whatever is the smallest unit of being) does not create itself, it is created by something else (as this point I expect someone to explain where mass comes from, but be aware that I will ask you to explain the origins of every thing that exists and submit you again to the efficient cause argument in relation to the Infinity Paradox. However, noting in this reality can be responsible for the utmost cause of beings because eventually the efficient causes of natural things will have to end, leaving some being without origin. It is then that that being's existence must be subjected to a supernatural force which can bring it into being.
The fourth question is not currently answerable because mass has not been observed to not leave existence.
"Could have" is not a sufficient condition for the rest of the argument. I can defeat your argument here by saying that there wasn't actually a time when no things existed, even if all the things are individually contingent.
1.You can't make that argument because you can't prove it.
2. If all (naturally) existing things are contingent then you cannot make this argument because you'd run into the Infinity Paradox again, this time with infinitely regressing contingency.
3. If you agree, through my previous argument, that the quintessential element of being (whatever it may be) was unnaturally brought into being then the words "could have" should now be replaced with "was." Because to be brought into being is naturally to make exist what once did not exist.
Ok, so the first 3 arguments are just versions of the first cause argument. Anyway, these don't show that God has any other properties.
I'm not trying to prove the other properties of God, I'm just trying to prove its existence. If you're not disagreeing with his existence, then there's no reason to argue.
I specifically stated earlier that I wasn't going to address the 4th and 5th proofs because I disagree with them
it's extremely vague; it appears to be that he's just taking rules that most people would agree with and slapping a "god" label on them. instead of seeking other plausible causes for things such as motion and time, he immediately points to god as the only possible cause. it's understandable thinking for the time he lived in, but given the information we have access to now, his ways are basically irrelevant.
Are you saying that there are other plausible reasons for motion and time which invalidate Aquinas's proofs? Because in hundreds of years, it seems, no one has discovered them. By your dismissive attitude, I'm convinced that this entire post was made without actual thought to back it up. If the information we have access to now can make these proof irrelevant, then how about you demonstrate it.
Are you saying that there are other plausible reasons for motion and time which invalidate Aquinas's proofs? Because in hundreds of years, it seems, no one has discovered them. By your dismissive attitude, I'm convinced that this entire post was made without actual thought to back it up. If the information we have access to now can make these proof irrelevant, then how about you demonstrate it.
alright, you're right. with further research I couldn't find any other reasons that would invalidate aquina's proofs; but that does make aquina's proofs valid. if my understanding is correct, he's using the logic that because there is no other reason present, that his reason is true. if he was using these proofs as prove the possibility of god then they would make more sense, but using them to try to prove god is silly in my opinion; just because we don't have the information to invalidate them at the moment doesn't make them the definite answer.
A person's motion ultimately results from the motion of its body parts, which are moved by the brain, which is moved by electrochemical pulses, which are initiated in the mothers womb, which is another system of movement that extend back to the first organisms. People, scientifically speaking, do not move themselves.
I don't understand what point you're trying to make with this. when you are in your mother's womb, you don't have all the electrochemical pulses that your brain will send throughout your lifetime, nor did your mother have those pulses when she was a fetus. (correct me if I misinterpreted this, it wasn't exactly clear.)
1. If there is an infinite amount of criteria that needs to be completed to achieve a goal, that goal will never be achieved.
2. If an end exists, yet the origins of that end are infinite, it is illogical for the end to exist.
Example for #1: You're making a cake with a recipe; however, the recipe calls for an infinite amout of ingredients. You will never, at any point, have a cake because you can never finish.
Example for #2: You have a cake, but it was made from an infinite amount of ingredients. The existence of such a cake is illogical because the cake should've never been finished. The only rational explanation for the cake is that it does not have an infinite set of ingredients.
Relevance of #1: If there is an infinite sequence of motion that must occur to create matter, or to create the earth, or to put the moon into the earth's orbit, etc, none of these things will ever happen.
Relevance of 2# If the earth exists, then it is impossible that an infinitely backwards series of motion resulted in it, because the result of earth would have never been achieved because the criteria for making it would never end.
The existence of anything is only explainable through a first mover, who is exempt from the laws of reality.
why is it not possible that there never was a beginning? what if motion, time, and the universe has always existed? can it not be that all energy has been recycled on a infinite scale, and that motion never began, it just always was?
alright, you're right. with further research I couldn't find any other reasons that would invalidate aquina's proofs; but that does make aquina's proofs valid. if my understanding is correct, he's using the logic that because there is no other reason present, that his reason is true.
Aquinas's proofs are very very slightly subject to interpretation, and that interpretation is whether or not whether or not Aquinas's premises are possible to be untrue. That, no one can say for sure, because they come solely form observing nature, though they happen to be in accordance with scientific laws. I, personally, think the whole "I can't prove Aquinas wrong but that doesn't mean that there isn't something that can prove him wrong" bit is weak, because the same can be said on the theistic side of the argument.
if he was using these proofs as prove the possibility of god then they would make more sense, but using them to try to prove god is silly in my opinion; just because we don't have the information to invalidate them at the moment doesn't make them the definite answer.
How so? Aquinas doesn't immediately assert that the God he names is the traditionally believed Christian God. Aquinas established a supernatural presence which is the only explanation for the world, then, rather arbitrarily, gives that presence the name "God." He only really proves the existence of a supernatural force; however, whether or not this God is the Christian God is irrelevant in the long run because he effectively gives the faith in the gods of Christians, Muslims, Jews, w/e a more factual and scientific basis. Some may call this basic supernatural force God, and some may not, but it's rather foolish to say that it's not God, because gods are always understood as supernatural.
I don't understand what point you're trying to make with this. when you are in your mother's womb, you don't have all the electrochemical pulses that your brain will send throughout your lifetime, nor did your mother have those pulses when she was a fetus. (correct me if I misinterpreted this, it wasn't exactly clear.)
This was directed towards ballin's comment about people moving themselves. No specific point relevant to the overall topic.
why is it not possible that there never was a beginning? what if motion, time, and the universe has always existed? can it not be that all energy has been recycled on a infinite scale, and that motion never began, it just always was?
I've already explained this in detail several times. It's because the eternal existence of these things suggest an infinity, from which no progress into what we have now could've been made. For more clarity, go back and read.
After reading the parts about proofs 1-3, I have a couple comments.
On argument 1: The Michelson–Morley experiment is entirely new to me. Perhaps I need more time ot digest its message, but as of now I do not see how it relates to Aquinas's premises about motion in the way in which the argument claims it does. I'm open ot some clarification.
On argument 2: The argument fails to address the origins of antiparticles, which easily fits into the impossiblity of infinite regressive efficient causes. Also, the argument inevitably submits that God could still exist, which makes it moot.
On argument 3:This argument very clearly misunderstands the necessary traits of "God." It is impossible for God to be a contingent being, because then it would be susceptible to the paradox of infinite regression of contingency until a non-contingent being is once again posited. Non-contengency is an essential component of God's nature and the absence of that quality would make it not God.
I didn't address the rest of the arguments because they're about proofs 4 and 5.
I won't spend too much more time on this article unless someone uses it as a basis for an argument.
Aquinas's proofs are very very slightly subject to interpretation, and that interpretation is whether or not whether or not Aquinas's premises are possible to be untrue. That, no one can say for sure, because they come solely form observing nature, though they happen to be in accordance with scientific laws. I, personally, think the whole "I can't prove Aquinas wrong but that doesn't mean that there isn't something that can prove him wrong" bit is weak, because the same can be said on the theistic side of the argument.
what's wrong with having improvable parts on both sides? it's the common "agnostic" (although that's a misused term) view, that neither side can be fully proven.
How so? Aquinas doesn't immediately assert that the God he names is the traditionally believed Christian God. Aquinas established a supernatural presence which is the only explanation for the world, then, rather arbitrarily, gives that presence the name "God." He only really proves the existence of a supernatural force; however, whether or not this God is the Christian God is irrelevant in the long run because he effectively gives the faith in the gods of Christians, Muslims, Jews, w/e a more factual and scientific basis. Some may call this basic supernatural force God, and some may not, but it's rather foolish to say that it's not God, because gods are always understood as supernatural.
I never stated that the god he names is the christian god either. it doesn't matter if it is the christian god or not really in this argument. specific traits of the god aren't taken into account. I was only stating that this doesn't prove the supernatural in my view, it only "proves" the possibility of one.
what's wrong with having improvable parts on both sides? it's the common "agnostic" (although that's a misused term) view, that neither side can be fully proven.
I never stated that the god he names is the christian god either. it doesn't matter if it is the christian god or not really in this argument. specific traits of the god aren't taken into account. I was only stating that this doesn't prove the supernatural in my view, it only "proves" the possibility of one.
We're at a disconnect. You're insisting that despite the rational fortitude of Aquinas's proofs there might still be a way to disprove them. That may be true, but the rationality of Aquinas's proofs diminish this possibility to unlikelihood. The only thing stopping these proofs is your arbitrary idea of unknown possible counterarguments. But this is essentially the same thing as saying that "2+2 might not = 4 because there could be something that proves that this isn't true." There is no way to argue this because you can always refer your arguments to the fact that absolutes cannot be known. There's no point in continuing in this line of though any further, unless you can give some reason from the proofs themselves as to why it might be possible that they can be invalid.
but that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that there is something about the proofs that strike me as illogical or not right, although I can't pinpoint it. I'm not the most logical person, but I'm not the most illogical, and I'm currently stuck at a "I don't know" level when it comes to these.
I don't believe it, but I don't know how to disprove it. it's as simple as that.
EDIT:: I'll reply further to the proofs tomorrow. I don't have the time tonight, but there are a couple questions I have.
A person's motion ultimately results from the motion of its body parts, which are moved by the brain, which is moved by electrochemical pulses, which are initiated in the mothers womb, which is another system of movement that extend back to the first organisms. People, scientifically speaking, do not move themselves.
If you believe in determinism, this is true. I believe in free will, though.
Not to mention that determinism appears to be false on the quantum level anyway - what causes electrons to move so randomly?
Potential motion is the ability for a thing to move. Example: A marble sitting still on a table has potential motion to move up, down, left, right, or any combination of those directions.
Can you give an example of something that does not have potential motion?
And can someone please define motion?
Through the wording of the premise established by Aquinas, gravity would be an exception. However, this exception isn't important, because gravity can be included in the conclusion Aquinas makes at #6.
Aquinas makes the statement of #3 in order to establish this conclusion; however, Aquinas could not have taken gravity into acount because gravity was discovered 400 years after this was written. Nonetheless, gravity does not invalidate the argument because gravity is perfectly in line with the conclusion of #6. Gravity is a force that causes other things to move, meaning that one possible scenario of a thing being moved by another could be gravitational pull.
I encourage you to make arguments that INVALIDATE these proofs rather than nit-picking at them.
lol. It's not nitpicking when it completely invalidates the argument. Unless you think gravity is an "actual motion".
Anything in motion is moved by something else? What do you mean by "something else" here? Is gravity "something else", because I don't think gravity is an entity or object? How does it follow that God is an entity or object, if one of the things that moves stuff is not?
This is not a self contradictory argument. Notice, Aquinas does not define God until the very end. He lets the facts themselves speak for the necessary traits of God, and these traits happen to necessitate that some force which does not require (the human understanding of)
movement and can cause (t.h.u.o.) movement. God, as described by Aquinas, is naturally exempt from these premises because it is necessary that he is, otherwise existence as we know it would be illogical, irrational, and impossible.
I mean, I was joking there (as evidenced by the sign), but there is a valid point buried there. If there is something (God) that moves itself, then the argument contradicts itself. This would imply that God is not something, or perhaps that God is akin to gravity (which is not "something", in my opinion).
If that is the case, then perhaps using the word "God" to describe this first cause is misleading. That is the point I am making when I say that the first cause will not necessarily have any of the other properties that are usually assigned to God.
One thing should already be established: For any thing which is moving, there is something that moved it.
If you do not agree with this then we must debate this instead of the following statement.
If you do believe this, then a wholly natural (meaning "of the reality we exist in") formation of matter and life as we know it would be impossible. Why? Because in order for things as we know them to exist without a first mover, it would be necessary that there is an infinitely backwards extending sequence of things which cause other things to move. However, this is what I call the Infinity Paradox.
I don't see why this is the case. For example, there is an infinite regress of natural numbers, yet each of the numbers still "exists"
Example for #1: You're making a cake with a recipe; however, the recipe calls for an infinite amout of ingredients. You will never, at any point, have a cake because you can never finish.
Example for #2: You have a cake, but it was made from an infinite amount of ingredients. The existence of such a cake is illogical because the cake should've never been finished. The only rational explanation for the cake is that it does not have an infinite set of ingredients.
This is because the number of objects in the physical universe is at least assumed to be finite. But what does that have to do with the number of CAUSES being finite?
Relevance of #1: If there is an infinite sequence of motion that must occur to create matter, or to create the earth, or to put the moon into the earth's orbit, etc, none of these things will ever happen.
But who says matter was created or destroyed at all (conservation of mass holds for nearly everything, as far as we can tell)?
Also, see again Zeno's paradoxes: it takes an infinite number of actions to run from point A to point B, yet it is still possible.
Relevance of 2# If the earth exists, then it is impossible that an infinitely backwards series of motion resulted in it, because the result of earth would have never been achieved because the criteria for making it would never end.
I just don't see how this works. If the past extends backwards indefinitely, how is that different from the fact that the real numbers extend backwards indefinitely from, say, the number 24?
Again, who says the universe even had a beginning? (and don't bring up the big bang - just because we can't know what happened before that doesn't mean that that was the beginning of the universe).
This is a strawman. Neither I nor Aquinas makes this assumption.
Did I say that either of you make this assumption?
Not to mention that you criticize me for "nitpicking" earlier, but I am only attacking the argument presented. So you both expect me to put words in your mouth and expect me not to put words in your mouth.
Also, the point remains that it is incredibly misleading to refer to this first cause as God.
The efficient cause is the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away, and the act of chiseling, that causes the statue. This answers the question: how does it happen? It is the sort of answer we usually expect when we ask about cause; the thing which happened to bring about certain results.
But there are multiple causes for any event. Was the cause the person chiseling away, or was it the chisel hitting the stone, or was it the fact that the stone even existed in the first place, or the fact that the molecules are made of matter instead of antimatter?
All of these things are necessary for the event to take place. I don't think that there is a single thing that was THE CAUSE.
To me, causation implies predictability, meaning that if you know all the circumstances then you know what will happen. But I don't think this is the case with things in quantum mechanics which are random, or with the behavior of people. I don't accept determinism.
Should I assume that you're asking why to #6, or are you also confused about the previous criteria? To me they seem fairly self-explanatory, unless you believe that something (within this reality) can exist of itself without cause. However, in the interest of time, I won't address this unless you require it.
No, I was asking about 6 (that's why I stopped there).
But I also do not understand why something can't exist without a prior cause. I suppose it depends again on your definition of "something" (and once again what you mean by "cause").
I just don't see why that HAS to be the case. What is the justification for that statement?
Onto the issue of #6. If you read what I've posted up until now, the you should already know what I'm about to say. This is yet another issue of the Infinity Paradox. The series of efficient causes cannot go on forever, because then there would be no logical explanation for why any thing exists. If an infinite amount of causes had to occur to create atoms, earth, humans, etc, then none of these would exist because the criteria necessary for their creation would never end. An infinite string of efficient causes is illogical and impossible in this reality.
Responded above I guess, but I again don't see why there has to be some "beginning point". If infinitely many causes extend backwards infinitely, then we can never reach a beginning point.
Mass is a physical entity. Therefore, it exists within time. With this established, an uncreated existence of matter submits reality, yet again, to the Infinity Paradox. It is evident that mass exists; therefore, it is illogical to assume that mass was not created. Because if mass were not created, and simply existed with no explanation, then this would mean that time existed infinitely backwards. For if mass exists, then there is a time where it existed. However, it is impossible that mass existed without creating because then mass's existence's time span would be infinitely backward. However, this would result in the impossibility of moments of time which have already occurred. Earth would never have been created because time would never reach the moment/moments in time which resulted in earth's creation because the amount of time required to reach that point would never end. The same is true of every existence. Basically, if once can go forever back in history, it is impossible that any point in time was ever reached.
Again, I disagree ... I don't see a contradiction in time extending back infinitely.
Therefore, the only possible explanation to solve this paradox is that matter was brought into being, which means that it is possible for mass to come into being. However,
mass (or whatever is the smallest unit of being) does not create itself, it is created by something else (as this point I expect someone to explain where mass comes from, but be aware that I will ask you to explain the origins of every thing that exists and submit you again to the efficient cause argument in relation to the Infinity Paradox. However, noting in this reality can be responsible for the utmost cause of beings because eventually the efficient causes of natural things will have to end, leaving some being without origin. It is then that that being's existence must be subjected to a supernatural force which can bring it into being.
Ok, I know this has to come up sometime, but the standard question is: Well then, what caused God?
I know you will say that God is the ONE thing that does not require cause, but why can't mass for example be that one thing?
This goes back to the point about self contradictory argument and the point about what the properties of God are, but anyway clearly your position is not simply that "everything has a cause", it's that "everything but God has a cause". I think you need to elaborate more on this.
1.You can't make that argument because you can't prove it.
lol really? I'm simply pointing out that his logic does not follow. I'm not saying particularly that it is the case that individually contingent beings have always been present, but it's at least POSSIBLE, and his logic completely ignores this possibility.
Let me explain myself a little further: if we can assume that there was some beginning of time, and that there are two contingent beings A and B, that existed at that starting point. Now, after 1 hour, A ceases to exist and being C comes into existence. After another hour, B ceases to exist and D comes into existence. You see the pattern here. There are individually contingent beings, but at no point was there ever a time where nothing existed.
I'm not trying to prove the other properties of God, I'm just trying to prove its existence. If you're not disagreeing with his existence, then there's no reason to argue.
See point about it being misleading to refer to the first cause as "God".
Also, I would like to briefly point out that I have not made many direct claims about the existence of God or a first cause. I am simply stating that the arguments presented are faulty.
Aquinas's proofs are very very slightly subject to interpretation, and that interpretation is whether or not whether or not Aquinas's premises are possible to be untrue. That, no one can say for sure, because they come solely form observing nature, though they happen to be in accordance with scientific laws. I, personally, think the whole "I can't prove Aquinas wrong but that doesn't mean that there isn't something that can prove him wrong" bit is weak, because the same can be said on the theistic side of the argument.
I don't think that they are in accordance with scientific laws (especially not current scientific laws), and anyway scientific laws aren't proven. They are just formulas that match up with previous observations and predict future observations. Someone could find a counterexample to scientific laws tomorrow.
On argument 1: The Michelson–Morley experiment is entirely new to me. Perhaps I need more time ot digest its message, but as of now I do not see how it relates to Aquinas's premises about motion in the way in which the argument claims it does. I'm open ot some clarification.
It's one of the experiments that led to Einstein's relativity, which takes as a basis that there is no absolute frame of reference, and thus a better definition of "motion" is needed. I discussed this earlier.
We're at a disconnect. You're insisting that despite the rational fortitude of Aquinas's proofs there might still be a way to disprove them. That may be true, but the rationality of Aquinas's proofs diminish this possibility to unlikelihood. The only thing stopping these proofs is your arbitrary idea of unknown possible counterarguments. But this is essentially the same thing as saying that "2+2 might not = 4 because there could be something that proves that this isn't true." There is no way to argue this because you can always refer your arguments to the fact that absolutes cannot be known. There's no point in continuing in this line of though any further, unless you can give some reason from the proofs themselves as to why it might be possible that they can be invalid.
These proofs, if accepted, mean that it is only logical that one or many supernatural forces exist and that they have certain distinguishable traits (calling this force God would be too assumptive given that ultimately not all the qualities of this being are learned through these proofs, but for all intents and purposes, it will be called God from here on out.) My role in this will be not so much as a debater, but as a clarifier, because I've seen from experience with others that dissent on these proofs comes misunderstanding of concepts, inconsistent logic, and stubbornness. Therefore, I will correct any inconsistent positions, and, if necessary, debate those inconsistencies. If, ultimately, no one can effectively invalidate all of these proofs, then it must ultimately be accepted that they serve as logical reason to assert God's existence.
The only thing Aquinas ever shows is that the universe began to exist, was caused by *something to exist, and that some element having to do with the beginning of the universe is self-necessary (assuming you agree with all three). Neither you nor him have any right or reason to say it's a deity.
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6. Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else.
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8. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
the things that are bolded seem to be a double standard. if everything in motion had to be placed in motion, then why is god exempt from this rule? as you said later on:
The existence of anything is only explainable through a first mover, who is exempt from the laws of reality.
if god is exempt from the laws of reality, then how can you argue that he is real? for something to be placed in the realm of reality, wouldn't it have to follow the rules of being real? it's the same reason you can't put i on a real number line: it doesn't follow the rules of real numbers, thus it isn't real. it's the age old question of "who created god?" just placed in a different context.
1. If there is an infinite amount of criteria that needs to be completed to achieve a goal, that goal will never be achieved.
2. If an end exists, yet the origins of that end are infinite, it is illogical for the end to exist.
1. I don't see how this works. say you have the number 5; there is an infinite amount of criteria that can lead to 5 (1 + 4, 3 + 2, 5 + 0, 6 - 1, etc. on to infinity). does this mean that it is impossible to reach the number 5? unless you mean something else by criteria, in which case you should explain what you mean.
2. who says there has to be an end? just because there is something now, doesn't mean that it has to have an end or a beginning. it could work like a number line, where you can pick anywhere on the number line and having that number exist, without there being an end or a beginning to that number line. this also applies to your examples:
Relevance of #1: If there is an infinite sequence of motion that must occur to create matter, or to create the earth, or to put the moon into the earth's orbit, etc, none of these things will ever happen.
Relevance of 2# If the earth exists, then it is impossible that an infinitely backwards series of motion resulted in it, because the result of earth would have never been achieved because the criteria for making it would never end.
first off, I disagree with the bold, but regardless my point still stands. if you can represent infinity to stretch onward in both directions of a number line, why is it not possible to pick a point on that line (say the creation of earth) same as picking a number on a number line? you're going from infinity to that number/point in time, you're taking that number/point in time and looking backwards towards infinity.
the entire proof all assumes that "for any thing which is moving, there is something that moved it" is true, which both ballin and I stated we don't believe is true.
EDIT:: I apologize if these points were already addressed.
I wouldn't specifically call my beliefs determinism, because nature, by-in-large, seems to work in a deterministic fashion, but human obviously have free will.
Also, I don't see what the opposition is between free will and determinism to begin with. Free-will has no effect on electron movement, but determinism, to some extent, does. These are two completely separate concepts in regards to science and philosophy.
Can you give an example of something that does not have potential motion?
lol. It's not nitpicking when it completely invalidates the argument. Unless you think gravity is an "actual motion".
Anything in motion is moved by something else? What do you mean by "something else" here? Is gravity "something else", because I don't think gravity is an entity or object? How does it follow that God is an entity or object, if one of the things that moves stuff is not?
Gravity isn't an actual motion, but you're needlessly misconstruing the depth of the conversation. Ultimately, forces are what cause things to move. When a cue ball strikes another ball, it's not the ball itself that causes consequent motion, but the force of the ball's movement. Gravity is a force exerted by a mass, meaning that gravity itself isn't the cause, but the object which exerts it, just like any other motion.
I mean, I was joking there (as evidenced by the sign), but there is a valid point buried there. If there is something (God) that moves itself, then the argument contradicts itself. This would imply that God is not something, or perhaps that God is akin to gravity (which is not "something", in my opinion).
The red is the problem with this argument. God, by its nature, is not something that is moved. That is, movement is not a necessary reality in God's plane of existence. This is necessarily true because if it were as you say, there would be a contradiction, requiring the positing of yet another higher power to revolve the contradiction.
You should understand that ascribing earthly limitations and qualities to God is futile, because the necessary traits of God include, first and foremost, exemption of earthly limitations and qualities in order to solve earthly paradoxes without more consequent. For example, the question of "Who created God?" is unanswerable because it is necessary that God is exempt from the limitation of creating in order for it to be truly considered God. It's an invalid question.
However, since we lack the understanding of God, we ultimately must rely on our only means of relating concepts to each other: words. However, since words are are our means of relaying earthly concepts, they will naturally be insufficient in relaying un-worldly concepts because we have not experienced and may be unable to experience un-worldly concepts. Therefore, when refrencing God, be sure to understand that some words used to characterize it may not necessarily mean the same thing for God as it does to a typical worldly thing.
If that is the case, then perhaps using the word "God" to describe this first cause is misleading. That is the point I am making when I say that the first cause will not necessarily have any of the other properties that are usually assigned to God.
Well, I've already given you some reasons why you should. It's really up to you to explain your position for discussion of this topic to go any further.
Finally, someone will explain why there cannot be an infinite regress of actions.
I'm fully aware of Zeno's paradoxes, and they are, in fact, something i struggle with every day. However, Zeno's paradoxes (particularly, Achilles and the Tortise) ultimately suggest a logical flaw in space. This logical flaw(which is, the seeming self-evidence of infinitely small space) can also lead to another argument for the existence of God, in which, since it is illogical for things to move within space given the infinite smallness, the existence of movement must necessitate the existence of a God that can enable movement despite its impossibility. So yes, Zeno's paradoxes do possibly create a problem for Aquinas's proofs, but, disproving Aquinas doesn't save you from the problem of Zeno. If, indeed, you do have to submit that Zeno's Paradoxes necessitate the existence of God, then Aquinas's proofs will concurrently follow because the issue is resolved.
However, even still, Zeno's paradoxes do not necessarily pose a threat to Aquinas's arguments. These paradoxes create a problem with the statement you quoted, but those were my words, extending the idea into a broader realm. Aquinas's arguments deal more specifically with motion, which "Achilles and the Turtle" does not address, and of which "The Flying Arrow" is flawed (see parentheses). The argument of Achilles and the Turtle suggests a logical problem in space, but Aquinas's proof does not center around space. There is no grounds on which to say that "Ability-despite-infinity" should extent to all infinity paradoxes because this one is specific to space.
(I say it's flawed because the arrow argument claims that time is composed of a series of instances; however, this is a false premise. No instance in time can adequately describe time's function because at any "point" in time there is an infinitely shrinking void of smaller instances. Therefore, instances are an inadequate standard for understanding time and motion because instances, in themselves, ignore an infinite amount of smaller time spans.)
I don't see why this is the case. For example, there is an infinite regress of natural numbers, yet each of the numbers still "exists"
Numbers exist only in the mind. Mental existences are not physical existences, thus, they are not bound by the same rules as physical existences. For example: Are numbers subject to gravity? No. Why? because numbers aren't things in reality. The things that Aquinas discusses are things which are subject to the laws of nature.
This is because the number of objects in the physical universe is at least assumed to be finite. But what does that have to do with the number of CAUSES being finite?
Even if the number of objects in the world were infinite, the cake in Example 1 would still never come to existence because it would still take an infinite amount of time to make. The cake in Example 2 would still be illogical because the cake should've never been finished. And the number of causes would still have to be finite in order to make Example 1 possible and Example 2 rational.
But who says matter was created or destroyed at all (conservation of mass holds for nearly everything, as far as we can tell)?
The infinite time paradox addresses this. If was never created, then time is infinite backwards, therefore nothing that exists now would come into existence because time would never reach that point. Go back and read again for clarity. In order for the current state of reality and the flow of time to make sense, matter must've been created at some point, otherwise time would be infinite.
Also, see again Zeno's paradoxes: it takes an infinite number of actions to run from point A to point B, yet it is still possible.
I just don't see how this works. If the past extends backwards indefinitely, how is that different from the fact that the real numbers extend backwards indefinitely from, say, the number 24?
Again, who says the universe even had a beginning? (and don't bring up the big bang - just because we can't know what happened before that doesn't mean that that was the beginning of the universe).
See infinity paradox again. If the universe was not created, then time is infinite.
(The idea that the big bang was the beginning of the universe is a joke anyway.)
Did I say that either of you make this assumption?
Not to mention that you criticize me for "nitpicking" earlier, but I am only attacking the argument presented. So you both expect me to put words in your mouth and expect me not to put words in your mouth.
But there are multiple causes for any event. Was the cause the person chiseling away, or was it the chisel hitting the stone, or was it the fact that the stone even existed in the first place, or the fact that the molecules are made of matter instead of antimatter?
All of these things are necessary for the event to take place. I don't think that there is a single thing that was THE CAUSE.
I guess you didn't really bother to read any further from what I linked. Taken from the same page: The efficient cause is the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away, and the act of chiseling, that causes the statue. This answers the question: how does it happen? It is the sort of answer we usually expect when we ask about cause; the thing which happened to bring about certain results.
Never was it stated that there could be only one efficient cause. The example on the page says the exact opposite.
To me, causation implies predictability, meaning that if you know all the circumstances then you know what will happen. But I don't think this is the case with things in quantum mechanics which are random, or with the behavior of people. I don't accept determinism.
No, I was asking about 6 (that's why I stopped there).
But I also do not understand why something can't exist without a prior cause. I suppose it depends again on your definition of "something" (and once again what you mean by "cause").
I just don't see why that HAS to be the case. What is the justification for that statement?
When I think of something, I refer to any physical entity. Now, the reason why something can't exist without prior cause is because the qualities of that existence would be an enigma. Scenario: A single proton exists in space and time for all eternity. It has no cause. Why is the proton a proton? Why is it positively charged? Why is it a proton and not an electron, or a neutron, or something else entirely? Why does it occupy the space it rests in and not some other space? Why is it the size that it is? If the qualities of a thing cannot be explained, then the reason why that thing exists in the manner which it exists is also not explained. If the reason why that thing exists in the manner it exists is not explained, then all potential for that thing to change its state of being are not explained. If this potential is not explained, then all actualities extending from that potential are not explained. Life as we know it is a result of one of those actualities, and if there is a/are quintessential physical entity/s that exist/s uncaused and unexplainable, then all scientific understanding of reality will ultimately submit to an unscientific and unreasonable entity which exists in a manner unique to an infinite amount of equally possible alternate possibilities, yet omitting all other alternate possibilities in favor of one for no reason.
In short, there would be an unanswerable question of "Why is the universe the way it is instead of some other way?"
Responded above I guess, but I again don't see why there has to be some "beginning point". If infinitely many causes extend backwards infinitely, then we can never reach a beginning point.
The contradiction in infinite regressing time exists when one insists that time can move forward from this backward infinity. I've given you my reasons for why this is a contradiction. It's really up to you to explain how this is not a contradiction.
Ok, I know this has to come up sometime, but the standard question is: Well then, what caused God?
I know you will say that God is the ONE thing that does not require cause, but why can't mass for example be that one thing?
First, refer to my large pink quote. Mass cannot be "that one thing mass" is subject to the laws of physics and science, thus making it subject to all the problems listed in the pink. God, being a non-physical thing is not subject to the laws of science and physics, thus it is possible to ascribe in it that quality.
This goes back to the point about self contradictory argument and the point about what the properties of God are, but anyway clearly your position is not simply that "everything has a cause", it's that "everything but God has a cause". I think you need to elaborate more on this.
lol really? I'm simply pointing out that his logic does not follow. I'm not saying particularly that it is the case that individually contingent beings have always been present, but it's at least POSSIBLE, and his logic completely ignores this possibility.
This problem is solved by #3 of my comments on this matter, which you seem to have ignored.
Let me explain myself a little further: if we can assume that there was some beginning of time, and that there are two contingent beings A and B, that existed at that starting point. Now, after 1 hour, A ceases to exist and being C comes into existence. After another hour, B ceases to exist and D comes into existence. You see the pattern here. There are individually contingent beings, but at no point was there ever a time where nothing existed.
1. If A and B existed at the start of time without being brought into existence by another being, they do not fit the definition of contingent beings.
2. The "coming into existence" of C and D is impossible without them being created. If they are not created by the leaving-of-existence of A and B respectively, then the effect of their creation should be ascribed to a non-natural cause. Things don't simply come into existence from nothing. If this were true, then it would be commonplace to see matter appear out of nowhere in the world.
See point about it being misleading to refer to the first cause as "God".
I don't think that they are in accordance with scientific laws (especially not current scientific laws), and anyway scientific laws aren't proven. They are just formulas that match up with previous observations and predict future observations. Someone could find a counterexample to scientific laws tomorrow.
Regardless of human understanding of scientific law, there are clearly laws that govern how the universe works, and these arguments don't violate the ones we think we understand. We'll never be able to ascertain that any scientific law is 100% correct, so saying that scientific laws can be disproven is sort of a moot point. The real issue is whether or not it is possible that these proofs could ever violate any scientific laws, which I, personally, think will not happen, though this also can never be known 100%.
It's one of the experiments that led to Einstein's relativity, which takes as a basis that there is no absolute frame of reference, and thus a better definition of "motion" is needed. I discussed this earlier.
I have always taken issue with this part of Einstien's relativity. If motion is relative and there is no absolute frame of reference, then the effects of motion should differ from person to person. For example, if motion is relative, then when an arrow is shot it could appear to some to hit the target and appear to others to miss. However, we know this is not true because the frame of reference which identifies the effects of the arrows motion is the particular space it occupies after its motion is over.
However, I don't claim to understand Einstein's relativity fully, and am aware that I might be misunderstanding something.
2+2 = 4 is deductively proven. I am asserting that your arguments are not a proof.
The only thing Aquinas ever shows is that the universe began to exist, was caused by *something to exist, and that some element having to do with the beginning of the universe is self-necessary (assuming you agree with all three). Neither you nor him have any right or reason to say it's a deity.
Aquinas also effectively shows that that necessary existence must exist outside the bounds of this reality, lest it be subject the the same paradoxes that restricted by physical things. Now, a supernatural being is definitely a rank or essential nature of a god, which means that a person does have right and reason to call it a god.
the things that are bolded seem to be a double standard. if everything in motion had to be placed in motion, then why is god exempt from this rule? as you said later on:
if god is exempt from the laws of reality, then how can you argue that he is real? for something to be placed in the realm of reality, wouldn't it have to follow the rules of being real? it's the same reason you can't put i on a real number line: it doesn't follow the rules of real numbers, thus it isn't real. it's the age old question of "who created god?" just placed in a different context.
1. I don't see how this works. say you have the number 5; there is an infinite amount of criteria that can lead to 5 (1 + 4, 3 + 2, 5 + 0, 6 - 1, etc. on to infinity). does this mean that it is impossible to reach the number 5? unless you mean something else by criteria, in which case you should explain what you mean.
Well, here's a task for you: Count to 5 starting from negative infinity. I think I've proved my point. You can only count to five if you choose a number to START from. Infinity does not start.
2. who says there has to be an end? just because there is something now, doesn't mean that it has to have an end or a beginning. it could work like a number line, where you can pick anywhere on the number line and having that number exist, without there being an end or a beginning to that number line. this also applies to your examples:
first off, I disagree with the bold, but regardless my point still stands. if you can represent infinity to stretch onward in both directions of a number line, why is it not possible to pick a point on that line (say the creation of earth) same as picking a number on a number line? you're going from infinity to that number/point in time, you're taking that number/point in time and looking backwards towards infinity.
I've addressed this earlier. Numbers are not an adequate standard to compare to reality because numbers are not real things subject to the laws of physics. Numbers are not created, they are not subject to time, to do not experience gravity, they do not move, they do not experience any of these things because the do not exist in reality.
the entire proof all assumes that "for any thing which is moving, there is something that moved it" is true, which both ballin and I stated we don't believe is true.
I wouldn't specifically call my beliefs determinism, because nature, by-in-large, seems to work in a deterministic fashion, but human obviously have free will.
Also, I don't see what the opposition is between free will and determinism to begin with. Free-will has no effect on electron movement, but determinism, to some extent, does. These are two completely separate concepts in regards to science and philosophy.
In order to have free will, you have to believe that humans can move themselves. If they can't move themselves, then all of their actions are not the result of free will.
Gravity isn't an actual motion, but you're needlessly misconstruing the depth of the conversation. Ultimately, forces are what cause things to move. When a cue ball strikes another ball, it's not the ball itself that causes consequent motion, but the force of the ball's movement. Gravity is a force exerted by a mass, meaning that gravity itself isn't the cause, but the object which exerts it, just like any other motion.
Ok, but this massively changes the argument from "only an actual motion can cause actual motion" to "only a force can cause actual motion"
This does not have the same recursive quality that allows you to deduce the existence of a "first mover". You have to make some other assumption like "only an actual motion can cause a force" or "only a force can cause a force" but I fail to see how either is the case for a force like gravity. Gravity appears to be a force that is not caused by any other force.
It might help if you clarified your argument using these new terms.
The red is the problem with this argument. God, by its nature, is not something that is moved. That is, movement is not a necessary reality in God's plane of existence. This is necessarily true because if it were as you say, there would be a contradiction, requiring the positing of yet another higher power to revolve the contradiction.
You should understand that ascribing earthly limitations and qualities to God is futile, because the necessary traits of God include, first and foremost, exemption of earthly limitations and qualities in order to solve earthly paradoxes without more consequent. For example, the question of "Who created God?" is unanswerable because it is necessary that God is exempt from the limitation of creating in order for it to be truly considered God. It's an invalid question.
However, since we lack the understanding of God, we ultimately must rely on our only means of relating concepts to each other: words. However, since words are are our means of relaying earthly concepts, they will naturally be insufficient in relaying un-worldly concepts because we have not experienced and may be unable to experience un-worldly concepts. Therefore, when refrencing God, be sure to understand that some words used to characterize it may not necessarily mean the same thing for God as it does to a typical worldly thing.
I think you are saying that God is "something", but is not a physical something.
Note that none of this makes sense with the original argument, which asserts that only actual motions can cause motions (but here you are saying God can't be an actual motion).
This is why I am saying that your argument appears to lead to the conclusion that God is a force like gravity (perhaps it even IS gravity), rather than a being.
Yes, but you still seem content to refer to this first force as God, which is incredibly misleading. How is this a challenge to atheists at all, when the thing that you claim to have proof of doesn't resemble God in any way?
Well, I've already given you some reasons why you should. It's really up to you to explain your position for discussion of this topic to go any further.
What reasons are those again? I already explained that I think humans can move themselves.
I'm fully aware of Zeno's paradoxes, and they are, in fact, something i struggle with every day. However, Zeno's paradoxes (particularly, Achilles and the Tortise) ultimately suggest a logical flaw in space. This logical flaw(which is, the seeming self-evidence of infinitely small space) can also lead to another argument for the existence of God, in which, since it is illogical for things to move within space given the infinite smallness, the existence of movement must necessitate the existence of a God that can enable movement despite its impossibility. So yes, Zeno's paradoxes do possibly create a problem for Aquinas's proofs, but, disproving Aquinas doesn't save you from the problem of Zeno. If, indeed, you do have to submit that Zeno's Paradoxes necessitate the existence of God, then Aquinas's proofs will concurrently follow because the issue is resolved.
The problem of Zeno is solved by admitting that supertasks are possible. I see no reason to accept the premise that "you can't do an infinite number of actions". You appear to be assuming that "you can't do an infinite number of actions unless there is a God" but I don't see why you would ever assume this.
However, even still, Zeno's paradoxes do not necessarily pose a threat to Aquinas's arguments. These paradoxes create a problem with the statement you quoted, but those were my words, extending the idea into a broader realm. Aquinas's arguments deal more specifically with motion, which "Achilles and the Turtle" does not address, and of which "The Flying Arrow" is flawed (see parentheses). The argument of Achilles and the Turtle suggests a logical problem in space, but Aquinas's proof does not center around space. There is no grounds on which to say that "Ability-despite-infinity" should extent to all infinity paradoxes because this one is specific to space.
But we weren't talking about Aquinas's words there, we were talking about whether it's possible for there to be an infinite sequence of causes. If that point invalidates the first premise of your argument that there cannot be an infinite sequence, then your argument has been invalidated.
(I say it's flawed because the arrow argument claims that time is composed of a series of instances; however, this is a false premise. No instance in time can adequately describe time's function because at any "point" in time there is an infinitely shrinking void of smaller instances. Therefore, instances are an inadequate standard for understanding time and motion because instances, in themselves, ignore an infinite amount of smaller time spans.)
It's funny because the arrow is an example of the kind of sophistry that you can obtain when you make implicit assumptions.
Numbers exist only in the mind. Mental existences are not physical existences, thus, they are not bound by the same rules as physical existences. For example: Are numbers subject to gravity? No. Why? because numbers aren't things in reality. The things that Aquinas discusses are things which are subject to the laws of nature.
Well, I subscribe to Platonism, which says that numbers are "real things" (but nonphysical entities obviously).
But the point is that I don't see why that statement HAS to be true. Sure, if I accept that nothing can have an infinite number of prior causes, then your argument holds perfectly. But I don't think that I have to accept that premise.
Even if the number of objects in the world were infinite, the cake in Example 1 would still never come to existence because it would still take an infinite amount of time to make. The cake in Example 2 would still be illogical because the cake should've never been finished. And the number of causes would still have to be finite in order to make Example 1 possible and Example 2 rational.
But if time extends infinitely backwards, then there is no contradiction in something taking an infinite amount of time to make.
And really, the point is that there never was a time where there wasn't a cake. (a cake in this case being the universe).
Also, once again infinite actions do not necessarily take infinite time to accomplish: see Zeno.
The infinite time paradox addresses this. If was never created, then time is infinite backwards, therefore nothing that exists now would come into existence because time would never reach that point. Go back and read again for clarity. In order for the current state of reality and the flow of time to make sense, matter must've been created at some point, otherwise time would be infinite.
It seems that 90% of this is just assuming your conclusion that time or the physical universe cannot extend infinitely backwards.
The burden of proof is on you to show why it cannot be the case that the universe has always existed. Clearly, you think that there IS something that has always existed. So what specific properties of the universe preclude it from being something that has always existed?
You accused me of "nitpicking" when what I said invalidated the argument as presented. I don't want to put words in your mouth about what your argument actually is.
In fact, it would be nice if you reformulated the argument so I would know what exactly you are saying now.
I guess you didn't really bother to read any further from what I linked. Taken from the same page: The efficient cause is the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away, and the act of chiseling, that causes the statue. This answers the question: how does it happen? It is the sort of answer we usually expect when we ask about cause; the thing which happened to bring about certain results.
Never was it stated that there could be only one efficient cause. The example on the page says the exact opposite.
Ok, so how do you know that there is ONE first cause? The conclusion of your argument should be that there exists at least one thing that causes itself. I might argue that all human minds are examples of first causes.
Also, I don't think that page makes it particularly clear what "cause" means, so I'll propose a working definition:
Let A be an entity or an event, and let B be an event.
A is a cause of B if B would not have happened without the presence of A.
Sound right? (I could probably poke some holes in this definition, but it seems better than any proposed so far).
Note that causes only really apply to events here, but I suppose you could extend the definition to beings by letting B be the event where the being comes into existence.
But I don't really think that matter necessarily "comes into existence" - it's plausible that it has always existed.
This doesn't take into account matter/energy conversions, where matter can actually come into existence from energy, but I suppose this would imply to me that energy is a "thing" itself, just as matter is, and that conservation of mass-energy holds. I think this raises interesting questions about the ontological status of energy.
Event A is an ultimate cause of Event B if B will always happen once A happens.
This implies predictability, and is a different notion of causation from my definition above.
If ultimate causation does not always hold (as in the case of quantum mechanics or human actions) then that casts serious doubt on a "first cause" argument.
When I think of something, I refer to any physical entity. Now, the reason why something can't exist without prior cause is because the qualities of that existence would be an enigma. Scenario: A single proton exists in space and time for all eternity. It has no cause. Why is the proton a proton? Why is it positively charged? Why is it a proton and not an electron, or a neutron, or something else entirely? Why does it occupy the space it rests in and not some other space? Why is it the size that it is?
I suppose my answer to all those questions would be "Why not?" Some things just are the way they are. Why is the gravitational constant 9.8 m/s^2? I don't know, but that's just the way it is.
If the qualities of a thing cannot be explained, then the reason why that thing exists in the manner which it exists is also not explained. If the reason why that thing exists in the manner it exists is not explained, then all potential for that thing to change its state of being are not explained. If this potential is not explained, then all actualities extending from that potential are not explained. Life as we know it is a result of one of those actualities, and if there is a/are quintessential physical entity/s that exist/s uncaused and unexplainable, then all scientific understanding of reality will ultimately submit to an unscientific and unreasonable entity which exists in a manner unique to an infinite amount of equally possible alternate possibilities, yet omitting all other alternate possibilities in favor of one for no reason.
In short, there would be an unanswerable question of "Why is the universe the way it is instead of some other way?"
As I said above, I don't think that everything needs an explanation.
Also, I don't see how introducing God answers all these questions. It merely becomes "Why did God make a universe where the gravitational constant is 9.8 m/s^2?" and "Why did God have the desire to make humans, rather than Vulcans or any other alternate possibility?"
The contradiction in infinite regressing time exists when one insists that time can move forward from this backward infinity. I've given you my reasons for why this is a contradiction. It's really up to you to explain how this is not a contradiction.
I don't think you've given legitimate reasons. I'd say the burden of proof is still on you. You basically just asserted that it was impossible. I mean, you would agree that time will extend forward infinitely, right? Why not backward too?
Note that I am not saying that time definitely extends backwards infinitely; I just think it is possible.
This problem is solved by #3 of my comments on this matter, which you seem to have ignored.
Well, that's partially because I am confused about what #3 is saying about how the quintessential element of being was unnatural. I don't know what this means. Could you rephrase?
1. If A and B existed at the start of time without being brought into existence by another being, they do not fit the definition of contingent beings.
Can A and B "depend on" each other? Just asking to see what you say.
Anyway, I think I agree with the argument that not all beings depend on other beings (assuming time does not extend infinitely backwards). But it does not demonstrate that there is only one nondependent being called God. There could be many nondependent beings.
Perhaps each piece of matter is a nondependent being.
2. The "coming into existence" of C and D is impossible without them being created. If they are not created by the leaving-of-existence of A and B respectively, then the effect of their creation should be ascribed to a non-natural cause. Things don't simply come into existence from nothing. If this were true, then it would be commonplace to see matter appear out of nowhere in the world.
Just FYI, it doesn't really add anything to say "addressed", it just makes the post longer. Why not just delete that portion of the quote?
Regardless of human understanding of scientific law, there are clearly laws that govern how the universe works, and these arguments don't violate the ones we think we understand. We'll never be able to ascertain that any scientific law is 100% correct, so saying that scientific laws can be disproven is sort of a moot point. The real issue is whether or not it is possible that these proofs could ever violate any scientific laws, which I, personally, think will not happen, though this also can never be known 100%.
Well, the first "proof" as presented violates numerous scientific laws (see argument about gravity). So as I said before it might be good to rephrase.
I have always taken issue with this part of Einstien's relativity. If motion is relative and there is no absolute frame of reference, then the effects of motion should differ from person to person. For example, if motion is relative, then when an arrow is shot it could appear to some to hit the target and appear to others to miss. However, we know this is not true because the frame of reference which identifies the effects of the arrows motion is the particular space it occupies after its motion is over.
However, I don't claim to understand Einstein's relativity fully, and am aware that I might be misunderstanding something.
Aquinas also effectively shows that that necessary existence must exist outside the bounds of this reality, lest it be subject the the same paradoxes that restricted by physical things. Now, a supernatural being is definitely a rank or essential nature of a god, which means that a person does have right and reason to call it a god.
I think this is a misinterpretation of the results. The real result of these proofs (if they are correct) would be to show that certain assumptions that we might make about objects are false (like that they are all dependent on other objects).
Also, is gravity supernatural?
Well, here's a task for you: Count to 5 starting from negative infinity. I think I've proved my point. You can only count to five if you choose a number to START from. Infinity does not start.
Well, here's a task for you: Count to 5 starting from negative infinity. I think I've proved my point. You can only count to five if you choose a number to START from. Infinity does not start.
and what point exactly does this prove? not being able to start counting at infinity doesn't make 5 any less real, in the same way that not having a start for the universe makes the universe any less real at this point in time.
I've addressed this earlier. Numbers are not an adequate standard to compare to reality because numbers are not real things subject to the laws of physics. Numbers are not created, they are not subject to time, to do not experience gravity, they do not move, they do not experience any of these things because the do not exist in reality.
by your standard, god does is not subject to the laws of physics. she is not created, she is not subject to time, she does not experience gravity; so how is that she exists in reality if you claim numbers do not? what keeps numbers from being exempt from these rules in the same god is? you can't compare god to reality but say I can't compare numbers.
Ok, but this massively changes the argument from "only an actual motion can cause actual motion" to "only a force can cause actual motion"
This does not have the same recursive quality that allows you to deduce the existence of a "first mover". You have to make some other assumption like "only an actual motion can cause a force" or "only a force can cause a force" but I fail to see how either is the case for a force like gravity. Gravity appears to be a force that is not caused by any other force.
My string theory is purely on a layman's level, but IIRC, the fundamental forces (Gravity, EM, the strong and the weak force) are all transferred by an elementary particle (For electro-magnetism, it's the photon, for instance). For gravity I believe it's speculated to be the graviton. Assuming this is correct (which I admit is a big assumption, however I'm not aware of any other major theories about gravity.), it would take it back to actual motion causing actual motion. For example, the motion caused by gravity, is caused by the graviton's motion, which was originally caused by the planet's motion, which must have been originally caused by something else.
@Ocean
The whole set of assumptions and statements involved in these arguments are based on our observations about this universe. (Like things being moved requiring a mover.) Since God exists outside of our universe, you can't apply the same laws to him.
@Zeno's paradoxes
The central point to the infinite amount of motion being possible is that the distances covered with each step shrink to 0. However, if there's a bound on the smallest possible size (Which appears to be the case, even if it's as ridiculously small as strings are conjectured to be), then you're forced to stick to finite amounts. Using the cake example, you could add 1 cup of flour, then half a cup of flour, and so on, but you can't exactly add half a flour molecule to the cake. (Technically it's more complicated then that, as you could divide the molecule into individual atoms, and so on, but eventually you must stop.)
In order to have free will, you have to believe that humans can move themselves. If they can't move themselves, then all of their actions are not the result of free will.
I don't agree with this. There are naturally things in humans that are a result of predetermined results and of choices, determinism doesn't seem to oppose free will. For example, free will doesn't the natural functions of the human body such as heart-beat, breathing, organ function, and senses. These are all predetermined consequences fulfilled and set in motion by other predetermined processes (I.E. a the automatic function of a woman's body to make a baby.) However, free will does enable humans to do other things such as walk, think, make decisions, etc. These are things enabled by the human capacity of thought, but thought is ultimately enabled when a person is made in a mother's womb, which is a predetermined process. I still don't see where the two concepts are incompatible.
Ok, but this massively changes the argument from "only an actual motion can cause actual motion" to "only a force can cause actual motion"
This does not have the same recursive quality that allows you to deduce the existence of a "first mover". You have to make some other assumption like "only an actual motion can cause a force" or "only a force can cause a force" but I fail to see how either is the case for a force like gravity. Gravity appears to be a force that is not caused by any other force.
It might help if you clarified your argument using these new terms.
Actually, I understand your point now. Gravity is a force exerted by one object on another, but an object doesn't have to move to exert gravity. Although something would ultimately have to account for what causes gravity, this is no longer within the realms of the argument of the first proof. I concede the first proof.
I think you are saying that God is "something", but is not a physical something.
Note that none of this makes sense with the original argument, which asserts that only actual motions can cause motions (but here you are saying God can't be an actual motion).
This is why I am saying that your argument appears to lead to the conclusion that God is a force like gravity (perhaps it even IS gravity), rather than a being.
I have more evidence to deduce that God is a force than to deduce that it is a being; however, this obviously doesn't mean that it can't be argued (which I actually see becoming important later in this debate.) However, God cannot be gravity, because
1. Gravity is contingent to physical beings.
2.Gravity is not a supernatural power.
3. Gravity cannot bring things into being.
But this really isn't relevant to the debate as of now, there's no need to argue it.
Yes, but you still seem content to refer to this first force as God, which is incredibly misleading. How is this a challenge to atheists at all, when the thing that you claim to have proof of doesn't resemble God in any way?
On the contrary, the thing does have a strong resemblence to God. It is supernatural, timeless, and capable of bringing things into being. This would be enough for most religions to assume that it is God, even if the other qualities can't be proven (some of which I do have an argument for but won't bring up until later.)
What reasons are those again? I already explained that I think humans can move themselves.
This relates to the Infinity Paradox, whicb I am still in the process of proving.
The problem of Zeno is solved by admitting that supertasks are possible. I see no reason to accept the premise that "you can't do an infinite number of actions". You appear to be assuming that "you can't do an infinite number of actions unless there is a God" but I don't see why you would ever assume this.
Admitting the possibility of supertasks is not a solution to the problem because this admission comes from no explainable fact. You can't simply ignore that this paradox is still a paradox. I wouldn't make such an admission without attributing its capability to a supernatural force, because in practice supertasks are still impossible. Unlike Zeno's paradox, when people move the infinitely small spaces which they should not be able to move through seem "ignored", as best I can describe. However, if one were to actually try to manually move from one point to another while attempting to occupy every infinitely small space, they wouldn't be able to do it because Zeno's paradox still holds true.
But we weren't talking about Aquinas's words there, we were talking about whether it's possible for there to be an infinite sequence of causes. If that point invalidates the first premise of your argument that there cannot be an infinite sequence, then your argument has been invalidated.
I don't know what you're getting at, but it sounds like this isn't a contention.
Well, I subscribe to Platonism, which says that numbers are "real things" (but nonphysical entities obviously).
But the point is that I don't see why that statement HAS to be true. Sure, if I accept that nothing can have an infinite number of prior causes, then your argument holds perfectly. But I don't think that I have to accept that premise.
Subscribing to Platonism doesn't make numbers any more or less real. I'd like to hear an argument for how numbers can be real things, not a statement of belief.
However, I do think that numbers can be used to illustrate just what the problem with infinities is. Lets set up a scenario:
Elapsed time of this reality = Numberline
Infinite Prior Causes = Negative infinity
Current Reality (Earth)= 1
Your argument is that something with an infinite number of prior causes can still result in our current reality. So given these premises, count to 1 starting from negative infinity.
I think you should see my point now, it's not possible. Not only will you never reach 1, you'll never even be able to start because you cannot possibly pick a point that satisfies the quality of negative infinity. In the same right, its not possible that a thing can have an infinite amount of causes because inevitably nothing would be able to result from it.
Therefore, if something exists it does not have an infinite amount of causes.
But if time extends infinitely backwards, then there is no contradiction in something taking an infinite amount of time to make.
It seems that 90% of this is just assuming your conclusion that time or the physical universe cannot extend infinitely backwards.
The burden of proof is on you to show why it cannot be the case that the universe has always existed. Clearly, you think that there IS something that has always existed. So what specific properties of the universe preclude it from being something that has always existed?
The property of the universe that puts it in this reality is what precludes it. As long as something exists in this reality, asserting that it has always existed submits it to the Infinity Paradox.
You accused me of "nitpicking" when what I said invalidated the argument as presented. I don't want to put words in your mouth about what your argument actually is.
In fact, it would be nice if you reformulated the argument so I would know what exactly you are saying now.
Since I've conceded that first proof, this really isn't important anymore.
Ok, so how do you know that there is ONE first cause? The conclusion of your argument should be that there exists at least one thing that causes itself. I might argue that all human minds are examples of first causes.
The workings of the human mind are irrelevant even if they can be considered a first cause, because the human mind doesn't bring anything into reality.
Also, I don't think that page makes it particularly clear what "cause" means, so I'll propose a working definition:
Let A be an entity or an event, and let B be an event.
A is a cause of B if B would not have happened without the presence of A.
Sound right? (I could probably poke some holes in this definition, but it seems better than any proposed so far).
Note that causes only really apply to events here, but I suppose you could extend the definition to beings by letting B be the event where the being comes into existence.
This doesn't take into account matter/energy conversions, where matter can actually come into existence from energy, but I suppose this would imply to me that energy is a "thing" itself, just as matter is, and that conservation of mass-energy holds. I think this raises interesting questions about the ontological status of energy.
I'm ultimately not interested in debating whether or not energy is a "thing", that's definition. All I need to show is that energy exists in this reality, which clearly it does.
Let me define an "ultimate cause" as follows:
Event A is an ultimate cause of Event B if B will always happen once A happens.
This implies predictability, and is a different notion of causation from my definition above.
If ultimate causation does not always hold (as in the case of quantum mechanics or human actions) then that casts serious doubt on a "first cause" argument.
Asking "Why not?" doesn't answer the question. I'm not suggesting that it should not or could not be the way it is, I'm asking why, given that things can exist without cause, out of all the possibilities of things that could, does this particular one exist and in the manner which it exists. "Why not?" does not answer this question.
Some things just are the way they are. Why is the gravitational constant 9.8 m/s^2? I don't know, but that's just the way it is.
That answer is insufficient considering the way we understand the universe so far. All through history, one of humanity's main goals has been to find out why and how the world (and reality) works the way it works. This is why both science and religion have arisen as methods of understanding reality. This has all been under the assumption that observed effects have related causes or reasons. To legitimize excluding something from this trend you have to provide a reason. However you don't. You assume that simply because science, in this case, cannot explain why the gravitational constant is the way it is, that this constant must be true of its own self, however, you have no grounds to make this claim and are essentially making an act of faith by assuming that reality and all its unique characteristics and rules just "are." You provide no reason to anyone, even yourself, why and how this can be true and are ultimately submitting yourself to ignorance. On the opposite side, if we do assume that all observed effects have related causes, even those not discernible by science, it is possible that we can come to some conclusion without science.
However, I've already made my argument for why thing can't exist without cause already, so arguing that is much more important at this point.
Also, I don't see how introducing God answers all these questions. It merely becomes "Why did God make a universe where the gravitational constant is 9.8 m/s^2?" and "Why did God have the desire to make humans, rather than Vulcans or any other alternate possibility?"
The only reasons I asked those questions in the first place was to imply that things cannot exist without cause. It's already established that God would be a supernatural being that exists in a realm where cause is nonexistent, so asking these questions is irrelevant.
I don't think you've given legitimate reasons. I'd say the burden of proof is still on you. You basically just asserted that it was impossible. I mean, you would agree that time will extend forward infinitely, right? Why not backward too?
Note that I am not saying that time definitely extends backwards infinitely; I just think it is possible.
Anything can extend forward from a starting point, but nothing can extend forward if it never starts. If time extends backward infinitely then it never starts.
Well, that's partially because I am confused about what #3 is saying about how the quintessential element of being was unnatural. I don't know what this means. Could you rephrase?
What that basically says is, "If you believe that the most basic entity of reality (for example lets assume that it's energy or mass) was created, then it is certain that there was a time when nothing existed.
Can A and B "depend on" each other? Just asking to see what you say.
Anyway, I think I agree with the argument that not all beings depend on other beings (assuming time does not extend infinitely backwards). But it does not demonstrate that there is only one nondependent being called God. There could be many nondependent beings.
Perhaps each piece of matter is a nondependent being.
Aquinas never says that there is only one of these nondependent beings. And it would be inherently faulty to try to quantify these nondependent beings because since they are supernatural, plurality and numbers might not necessary apply to "them." Matter is definitely not the nondependent being because matter isn't supernatural, and can be created and destroyed.
The last sentence doesn't follow. Just because something is possible doesn't mean that it will be "commonplace".
I misspoke. The point is if things can come into existence without cause there's no reason to believe that it would happen only once. Therefore, in an infinite regression of time random appearances of things would've already occurred an infinite amount of times, thus filling all available space (if space is finite) or creating a paradox in which in which infinite space is infinitely filled (because even though the space itself is infinite, the random occurrence of matter is also infinitely repeating.) It is clear to see that neither of which has happened, from which we can determine that the creation of things occurs finitely. If we can determine that the creation of things is finite, then we can also infer that there is a reason why this creation was finite. This introduces purpose to the things that are created, and implies that whatever supernatural force exists has will. But now I'm getting off the subject. This point is really only important if I can solidify the proofs of other things I've asserted. So pay no mind to this for the moment.
Just FYI, it doesn't really add anything to say "addressed", it just makes the post longer. Why not just delete that portion of the quote?
Well, I've admitted that I might misunderstand Einstein's Relativity, but to me it translates into: Observed effects are not the same and differ based on the viewer. And from that I argue this would mean that actual events are relative, such as the example of the arrow. We'd probably do much better here if you or someone could explain Einstein's relativity.
Also, it was once generally accepted that the world was flat. Just because people agree with something doesn't make that belief factual.
I think this is a misinterpretation of the results. The real result of these proofs (if they are correct) would be to show that certain assumptions that we might make about objects are false (like that they are all dependent on other objects).
That could be true, but I have a lot of faith that science's current achievements, particularly in scientific law, won't change very drastically regardless of what we find out.
Yep, infinity implies that there is no starting point.
Yeah, but if he disagrees with my points without giving me a reason, he makes it impossible for me to prove my point because I don't know where his disagreement lies. It's like responging to the entire first post with "Nope, I don't agree." If you don't explain why you don't agree, then I can't make an argument as to why you should.
and what point exactly does this prove? not being able to start counting at infinity doesn't make 5 any less real, in the same way that not having a start for the universe makes the universe any less real at this point in time.
This proves that nothing can happen if something doesn't start. If the universe didn't start, then the universe wouldn't exist. And with that I prove that the universe began, meaning that all things that exist were created.
by your standard, god does is not subject to the laws of physics. she is not created, she is not subject to time, she does not experience gravity; so how is that she exists in reality if you claim numbers do not? what keeps numbers from being exempt from these rules in the same god is? you can't compare god to reality but say I can't compare numbers.
My string theory is purely on a layman's level, but IIRC, the fundamental forces (Gravity, EM, the strong and the weak force) are all transferred by an elementary particle (For electro-magnetism, it's the photon, for instance). For gravity I believe it's speculated to be the graviton. Assuming this is correct (which I admit is a big assumption, however I'm not aware of any other major theories about gravity.), it would take it back to actual motion causing actual motion. For example, the motion caused by gravity, is caused by the graviton's motion, which was originally caused by the planet's motion, which must have been originally caused by something else.
The motion of gravitrons wouldn't be caused by the planet's motion though, AFAIK. The gravitrons would be caused simply by the planet existing. So they aren't caused by an actual motion.
@Ocean
The whole set of assumptions and statements involved in these arguments are based on our observations about this universe. (Like things being moved requiring a mover.) Since God exists outside of our universe, you can't apply the same laws to him.
One of the errors being made here IMO is overgeneralizing some of our basic observations. It may generally be true that things being moved require a mover, but that doesn't mean it is always the case at all. For another example of this, see the philosophical debate about action at a distance. Many philosophers rejected Newton's gravity since previous models of the universe didn't have action at a distance. But this was an unjustified assumption. My philosophical position on the matter would be "action at a distance happens; get over it".
Similarly, I would say that some things, like humans, can move themselves.
@Zeno's paradoxes
The central point to the infinite amount of motion being possible is that the distances covered with each step shrink to 0. However, if there's a bound on the smallest possible size (Which appears to be the case, even if it's as ridiculously small as strings are conjectured to be), then you're forced to stick to finite amounts. Using the cake example, you could add 1 cup of flour, then half a cup of flour, and so on, but you can't exactly add half a flour molecule to the cake. (Technically it's more complicated then that, as you could divide the molecule into individual atoms, and so on, but eventually you must stop.)
I think matter is discrete, but I think space is continuous (even if there is a minimum length of objects, you can still envision space as continuous, since that minimum length can be moved around continuously).
Anyway, the point of the example is that you need more of an argument than just "infinity is impossible!" because we do infinite tasks all the time.
I don't agree with this. There are naturally things in humans that are a result of predetermined results and of choices, determinism doesn't seem to oppose free will. For example, free will doesn't the natural functions of the human body such as heart-beat, breathing, organ function, and senses. These are all predetermined consequences fulfilled and set in motion by other predetermined processes (I.E. a the automatic function of a woman's body to make a baby.) However, free will does enable humans to do other things such as walk, think, make decisions, etc. These are things enabled by the human capacity of thought, but thought is ultimately enabled when a person is made in a mother's womb, which is a predetermined process. I still don't see where the two concepts are incompatible.
How is thought ultimately enabled when a person is made in a mother's womb? Is that the "ultimate cause" (to use my terminology before)? Because I don't think that your mother's womb or any of your experiences after that are going to perfectly determine all your thoughts and actions for your entire life. Some of your thoughts and actions are ultimately caused only by YOU, your mind, your consciousness, your soul, whatever you want to call it. Even someone with perfect knowledge of all the past events of your life and your DNA and everything would not be able to know what decision you will make with absolute certainty. This is what I call free will. And in order for this to happen, humans have to be able to move themselves.
Actually, I understand your point now. Gravity is a force exerted by one object on another, but an object doesn't have to move to exert gravity. Although something would ultimately have to account for what causes gravity, this is no longer within the realms of the argument of the first proof. I concede the first proof.
Why does something have to cause gravity? Can't some things just be the way that they are?
I have more evidence to deduce that God is a force than to deduce that it is a being; however, this obviously doesn't mean that it can't be argued (which I actually see becoming important later in this debate.) However, God cannot be gravity, because
1. Gravity is contingent to physical beings.
2.Gravity is not a supernatural power.
3. Gravity cannot bring things into being.
But this really isn't relevant to the debate as of now, there's no need to argue it.
Well, truth be told, I agree that gravity probably isn't the only God. But it might be one of many Gods (along with spacetime, electromagnetic forces, etc).
On the contrary, the thing does have a strong resemblence to God. It is supernatural, timeless, and capable of bringing things into being. This would be enough for most religions to assume that it is God, even if the other qualities can't be proven (some of which I do have an argument for but won't bring up until later.)
When the thing in question is not necessarily even a being with consciousness and will, then I don't think we can call it God. The God of religions definitely has a will and is a being rather than a force.
Admitting the possibility of supertasks is not a solution to the problem because this admission comes from no explainable fact. You can't simply ignore that this paradox is still a paradox. I wouldn't make such an admission without attributing its capability to a supernatural force, because in practice supertasks are still impossible. Unlike Zeno's paradox, when people move the infinitely small spaces which they should not be able to move through seem "ignored", as best I can describe. However, if one were to actually try to manually move from one point to another while attempting to occupy every infinitely small space, they wouldn't be able to do it because Zeno's paradox still holds true.
I'm confused. When you run from point A to point B, don't you occupy every point in between?
Anyway, I maintain that Zeno's paradoxes are only true paradoxes if you make the additional unjustified assumption that supertasks are impossible. My admission that supertasks are possible comes from the explainable fact that I CAN move from point A to point B.
In fact, I would say that movement itself is a supertask, since to move from point 0 to point 1 we must first get to 1/2, and to move from 0 to 1/2 we have to get to 1/4, so we have to get to 1/8, and so on. Unless we admit that this supertask (of covering each of the half-distances) is possible, then all motion is impossible.
I don't know what you're getting at, but it sounds like this isn't a contention.
See my comment on action at a distance above for more explanation of what I mean about overgeneralizing these assumptions.
Subscribing to Platonism doesn't make numbers any more or less real. I'd like to hear an argument for how numbers can be real things, not a statement of belief.
I don't think they are physical things. But I think that I interact with them when I do math, so they must exist somehow. That's my reasoning anyway.
However, I do think that numbers can be used to illustrate just what the problem with infinities is. Lets set up a scenario:
Elapsed time of this reality = Numberline
Infinite Prior Causes = Negative infinity
Current Reality (Earth)= 1
Your argument is that something with an infinite number of prior causes can still result in our current reality. So given these premises, count to 1 starting from negative infinity.
I think you should see my point now, it's not possible. Not only will you never reach 1, you'll never even be able to start because you cannot possibly pick a point that satisfies the quality of negative infinity. In the same right, its not possible that a thing can have an infinite amount of causes because inevitably nothing would be able to result from it.
Therefore, if something exists it does not have an infinite amount of causes.
But what about something that has ALWAYS existed? Yes, you can't count from negative infinity, because there is no starting point. But this IS what I mean. If something is eternal, then it has no starting point.
I mean, what do you think about God in this case? If God always has existed, then there is no starting point for God either. I'm asking why the universe itself can't have the same property.
Even a process that takes an infinite amount of time to complete requires that it first be started, which infinite regress does not allow.
Yeah, I think I agree that something which exists which would also take an infinite amount of time to complete would imply that the thing has always existed.
I have reason to believe that SOMETHING has always existed, as shown by your argument.
I have no reason to believe in particular that the universe has always existed, but I don't see any reason why this can't be the case. And my only argument is that it is POSSIBLE.
It's not really that relevant, but I don't think you addressed the fact that infinite actions don't always take infinite time to complete, which seemed to be an assumption of your example.
The property of the universe that puts it in this reality is what precludes it. As long as something exists in this reality, asserting that it has always existed submits it to the Infinity Paradox.
What is so special about "this reality" that it has this special property of Infinity Paradox? Your argument to me essentially shows that there is SOMETHING which does not succumb to the Infinity Paradox.
I think that by definition "this reality" encompasses everything. Now, I think there is a big difference between "this reality" and "the physical universe" though.
The workings of the human mind are irrelevant even if they can be considered a first cause, because the human mind doesn't bring anything into reality.
I disagree about that. If my mind did not exist, this post would not exist (in whatever form it does as data stored on a server somewhere). My mind brought this post into reality (along with my fingers, this computer, the internet, etc). In fact, I would say my mind is the only ultimate cause (meaning I think that my fingers/the computer/the internet/every other cause could exist without this post existing, but my mind, using free will, decided to make this post. My mind is the only thing that 100% ensured that this post would come into existence).
Just because an event is predictable doesn't mean that it wasn't caused. How is this notion incompatible with your definition of cause?
I think the above may be a typo, but what I'm saying is that an UNpredictable event doesn't have an ultimate cause. Predictable events clearly have an ultimate cause: whatever set of circumstances that allow us to predict them.
Anyway, an ultimate cause is a cause of an outcome that, once we know about it, will allow us to predict what the outcome will be. So, the existence of the universe is a cause for just about anything, but it's not the ultimate cause for much of anything (the fact that I got a haircut last week is NOT predictable merely given the existence of the universe).
Asking "Why not?" doesn't answer the question. I'm not suggesting that it should not or could not be the way it is, I'm asking why, given that things can exist without cause, out of all the possibilities of things that could, does this particular one exist and in the manner which it exists. "Why not?" does not answer this question.
That answer is insufficient considering the way we understand the universe so far. All through history, one of humanity's main goals has been to find out why and how the world (and reality) works the way it works. This is why both science and religion have arisen as methods of understanding reality. This has all been under the assumption that observed effects have related causes or reasons. To legitimize excluding something from this trend you have to provide a reason. However you don't. You assume that simply because science, in this case, cannot explain why the gravitational constant is the way it is, that this constant must be true of its own self, however, you have no grounds to make this claim and are essentially making an act of faith by assuming that reality and all its unique characteristics and rules just "are." You provide no reason to anyone, even yourself, why and how this can be true and are ultimately submitting yourself to ignorance. On the opposite side, if we do assume that all observed effects have related causes, even those not discernible by science, it is possible that we can come to some conclusion without science.
However, I've already made my argument for why thing can't exist without cause already, so arguing that is much more important at this point.
See, I still don't get why these things have to have answers. Why am I a human? Why am I not a Vulcan? I don't know the answer, and in fact I don't think there CAN be an answer. Some things simply are.
Note that the goal of science is not to explain why. It's to figure out what is true about the universe. Science does not worry about why the gravitational constant is 9.8 rather than 9.7; it just worries about finding the gravitational constant in the first place.
Once again, I don't think the burden of proof is on me to show why these questions don't need answers.
The only reasons I asked those questions in the first place was to imply that things cannot exist without cause. It's already established that God would be a supernatural being that exists in a realm where cause is nonexistent, so asking these questions is irrelevant.
Now this I don't get at all. How can the answer to all these questions simply be "God made it that way"? How is that any better than "it just is that way"? In fact, I think it is much more bewildering to wonder why a being made things a certain way rather than things just happening to be that way (note that if God is not a being, but instead is just a force that made no conscious decision to make things this way, then there is absolutely no difference between saying "the gravitational constant is 9.8 because of God" and "the gravitational constant is 9.8 because that's just the way it is").
If it truly all goes back to cause, then I guess I will fall back on my "things that don't need causes don't need causes" argument.
Anything can extend forward from a starting point, but nothing can extend forward if it never starts. If time extends backward infinitely then it never starts.
Meh ... I agree that time never starts if it extends back infinitely.
What that basically says is, "If you believe that the most basic entity of reality (for example lets assume that it's energy or mass) was created, then it is certain that there was a time when nothing existed.
Ok, but I don't think the most basic part of reality was created, because of your argument. I would consider whatever eternal thing there is (you would call it God) to be the most basic entity of reality (it doesn't get much more basic than always existing).
I was sort of wondering that myself, because I lifted that terminology from your definition. I suppose it means "created by".
Aquinas never says that there is only one of these nondependent beings. And it would be inherently faulty to try to quantify these nondependent beings because since they are supernatural, plurality and numbers might not necessary apply to "them." Matter is definitely not the nondependent being because matter isn't supernatural, and can be created and destroyed.
Meh ... he pretty clearly uses the singular word "God" rather than "Gods". I'm glad you agree on this point, since this is something others like Dre never would have agreed on.
Interesting that you say matter can be created though. Why is that?
I misspoke. The point is if things can come into existence without cause there's no reason to believe that it would happen only once. Therefore, in an infinite regression of time random appearances of things would've already occurred an infinite amount of times, thus filling all available space (if space is finite) or creating a paradox in which in which infinite space is infinitely filled (because even though the space itself is infinite, the random occurrence of matter is also infinitely repeating.) It is clear to see that neither of which has happened, from which we can determine that the creation of things occurs finitely. If we can determine that the creation of things is finite, then we can also infer that there is a reason why this creation was finite. This introduces purpose to the things that are created, and implies that whatever supernatural force exists has will. But now I'm getting off the subject. This point is really only important if I can solidify the proofs of other things I've asserted. So pay no mind to this for the moment.
I guess ... I just feel like I will bring up the point again if I think it was ignored.
Well, I've admitted that I might misunderstand Einstein's Relativity, but to me it translates into: Observed effects are not the same and differ based on the viewer. And from that I argue this would mean that actual events are relative, such as the example of the arrow. We'd probably do much better here if you or someone could explain Einstein's relativity.
Also, it was once generally accepted that the world was flat. Just because people agree with something doesn't make that belief factual.
Actual events are relative under relativity AFAIK.
For background on relativity check Wikipedia or Einstein's book Relativity (available for free online here).
Edit: I just learned something from browsing http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity . In general relativity, gravity isn't a considered a force, but is simply the curvature of spacetime. So according to that, objects move relative to each other without there being a force.
I 100% agree that generally accepted is not the same as true. But relativity has a lot more actual evidence behind it than the belief that the world is flat (which not that many people actually ever believed IIRC).
That could be true, but I have a lot of faith that science's current achievements, particularly in scientific law, won't change very drastically regardless of what we find out.
Deductive reasoning is superior to inductive reasoning. If we deductively know that not all objects can have property X, then we can't make as much of the fact that all objects we have seen so far have property X.
Yeah, but if he disagrees with my points without giving me a reason, he makes it impossible for me to prove my point because I don't know where his disagreement lies. It's like responging to the entire first post with "Nope, I don't agree." If you don't explain why you don't agree, then I can't make an argument as to why you should.
Well, this is kind of the problem with a possibility argument. I simply don't accept your argument for something being impossible, so I think it is possible. I suppose I will at least try to explain which part of the argument I disagree with (e.g. humans can move themselves).
