Parasol
Smash Cadet
- Joined
- Jan 12, 2012
- Messages
- 36
Take note: This discussion has nothing to do with theology.
Note once more: This discussion has absolutely nothing to do with theology.
And one final note: The topic at question is not whether free will exists but whether it can exist under the mentioned circumstances.
My friend and I shared a discussion on the topic of free will, and within that discussion we attempted to merely define its concept. Initially we settled on free will being defined as "the ability to make decisions of one's own individual will." That is, for the most part, the universal definition of the term. Later we asked ourselves if free will does indeed pertain to our reality, and if so, what its compositions are. Our viewpoints differed when we threw morality into the mix.
His argument was that free will is empty of any individual choice if the choice of morality is not in play. If we were programmed to be only good or evil (and thus, in effect without the other, neutral) but could still choose to drink a Coca Cola over a Pepsi, he argues we would still have no free choice. He argued that all choices made in life can be categorized as either good, neutral, or evil, and thus "if morality is stripped from our choices, those choices become simply neutral, or in other words, simply nothing."
I, however, view morality as its own choice and not a choice type, and I argued that a reality absent from morality could still, potentially, incorporate free will. My main argument on the matter was as follows: "Jake, I very much would like to morph my own body into a unicorn. Now, I would very much like to, but unfortunately, I cannot, because that choice is not available to me in this reality. But because I am deprived of that one choice, surely that doesn't mean I am deprived of free will entirely.
"On the same principle, if the choice of being good over evil was absent from my reality, but I could still choose to take the back roads to work rather than the freeway, or to watch drama rather than comedy, or to whistle rather than sing, I argue that I would still have the sense of free will about me." My argument stems from the idea that morality is a specific choice in itself, while his argument stems from the idea that morality is a function which defines the type of choices made.
So here are a couple of questions to get discussion flowing:
1) Is morality better defined as its own choice or as a category for all choices made?
2) If I tried hard enough, could I morph myself into a pretty unicorn?
and ultimately,
2) Can free will exist without morality?
Note once more: This discussion has absolutely nothing to do with theology.
And one final note: The topic at question is not whether free will exists but whether it can exist under the mentioned circumstances.
My friend and I shared a discussion on the topic of free will, and within that discussion we attempted to merely define its concept. Initially we settled on free will being defined as "the ability to make decisions of one's own individual will." That is, for the most part, the universal definition of the term. Later we asked ourselves if free will does indeed pertain to our reality, and if so, what its compositions are. Our viewpoints differed when we threw morality into the mix.
His argument was that free will is empty of any individual choice if the choice of morality is not in play. If we were programmed to be only good or evil (and thus, in effect without the other, neutral) but could still choose to drink a Coca Cola over a Pepsi, he argues we would still have no free choice. He argued that all choices made in life can be categorized as either good, neutral, or evil, and thus "if morality is stripped from our choices, those choices become simply neutral, or in other words, simply nothing."
I, however, view morality as its own choice and not a choice type, and I argued that a reality absent from morality could still, potentially, incorporate free will. My main argument on the matter was as follows: "Jake, I very much would like to morph my own body into a unicorn. Now, I would very much like to, but unfortunately, I cannot, because that choice is not available to me in this reality. But because I am deprived of that one choice, surely that doesn't mean I am deprived of free will entirely.
"On the same principle, if the choice of being good over evil was absent from my reality, but I could still choose to take the back roads to work rather than the freeway, or to watch drama rather than comedy, or to whistle rather than sing, I argue that I would still have the sense of free will about me." My argument stems from the idea that morality is a specific choice in itself, while his argument stems from the idea that morality is a function which defines the type of choices made.
So here are a couple of questions to get discussion flowing:
1) Is morality better defined as its own choice or as a category for all choices made?
and ultimately,
2) Can free will exist without morality?