Science is a First-Order Discipline: Why Science Needs Philosophy

[Theftz22]

Two Presuppositions of Science

1. The Soundness of Induction

What is the presupposition?

Induction in science can be described as the generalization of observations and data collected in the past to a general theory or law applied in the present and into the future. Because empirical investigation can only observe what has been rather than what will be in the future, all attempts to make general theories or laws about the universe as it is and as it will be must assume that the future will resemble the past. Without this assumption, science cannot make general theories and laws that continuously apply to the universe and so it has no predictive power and can make no statements regarding the future.

Why must it be presupposed rather than proven?

You cannot scientifically prove that the past will resemble the future. In order to prove this empirically, you would need to have empirical access to the future. However we do not have empirical access to the future. At some point the future becomes the present, at which time it is empirically accessible, but the future with respect to that present time is still not empirically accessible. So at every given time, the future is still not empirically accessible. This proves that science alone cannot scientifically justify this presupposition.

2. The Reliability of our Cognitive Faculties

What is the presupposition?

By reliability of our cognitive faculties, I mean that our sensory experience is giving us an accurate, objective representation of reality as it actually is. In order for scientific, empirical investigations to be giving us any information as to the universe and reality as it actually is, our sensory data must not be flawed or illusory but instead be actually representing the universe as it actually is. If our cognitive faculties are not doing this, then all of scientific discovery is false with respect to reality as it actually is. For example, it is possible that you are a brain in a vat being stimulated to experience all of the things that you are experiencing right now. If you are a brain in a vat, then all empirical investigations of this fake reality are giving you false data as to how reality actually is. So for science to be giving us accurate information, it must assume that all such possible situations are false, i.e. it must assume that our cognitive faculties are reliable.

Why must it be presupposed rather than proven?

This one should be obvious. Any empirical attempts to prove that our cognitive faculties are reliable must already presuppose that they are reliable. For if they are not, then that empirical attempt is giving false data. Any empirical investigations that attempt to seek truth about reality as it actually is already assume that our empirical investigations reveal actual truth. Put simply, you cannot scientifically prove that you are not a brain in a vat.

First-Order Discipline Step

By first-order discipline I simply mean some discipline that cannot justify its own presuppositions. Thus, the two above presuppositions of science that cannot themselves be scientifically proven show that science is a first-order discipline.

The Epistemic Step

I want to defend the contention that it is irrational to accept something without justification unless it is a properly basic belief. By properly basic belief I mean something that is not inferred from any more fundamental beliefs but forms the foundation of your noetic structure. You can only deny this premise on pain of irrationality. If something can be accepted rationally without justification or being properly basic, then everyone is rationally allowed to accept anything and everything. Among those beliefs for example is the belief that the whole enterprise of science is false. So if you deny this premise, then you must concede that everyone is rationally warranted in believing that science is false, and you would have no right to say that anyone is irrational about anything. To deny this premise therefore is self-defeating.

What follows

The conclusion is that in order for science to be rationally acceptable, some use of philosophy must be invoked. Either the soundness of induction and the reliability of our cognitive faculties would have to be proved in a philosophical argument, or a philosophical epistemology allowing them to be properly-basic beliefs would have to be adopted. Therefore, in order to be rationally acceptable, science needs philosophy.

 

[rvkevin]

Concerning the reliability of induction, if we were to take two models, one in which the universe obeys certain mathematical laws and one where its laws change continuously and empirically test their predictions, we would find which one models nature better. We have and come to the conclusion that the model with fixed laws makes better predictions than the competing model. This is the reason why we are confident that the universe obeys laws, because we have empirical data that supports this notion over the competing hypothesis. This predictive success allows us to predict the future with confidence because the empirical data justifies the presuppositions needed in order to make those projections. Just because this is not a deductive inference does not invalidate it.

Concerning the reliability of our senses, one counterexample does not invalidate a probabilistic argument. Science does not deal with proof. Saying our senses are reliable or generally reliable does not imply that our senses are 100% accurate. Also, it would be noted that such hypothetical would be considered most likely false from a scientific framework since they are unfalsifiable, and therefore evidence can't be used to increase their probability of being true. In such an instance where these scenarios are most likely false, it doesn't make much sense to mention them. If you are in search for absolute certainty, then the example given is an epistemological roadblock for all worldviews, philosophy included. However, this hardly effects science since science and skepticism are comfortable bed-fellows.

At most, you could say that science is a philosophy. That I would not argue with, considering the word philosophy would be fairly watered down at that point and it would only be a semantic difference. This would in no way give credence to any other activities that go on under the banner of philosophy. A side note, simply because we might be able to explain the success of science using the tools of philosophy does not mean that is the justification for why we use it. We use it because it works, not because we have some mental explanation for why we think it works. If it turned out to be a failed enterprise, then we would expel it without a second thought about the philosophy behind it that supposedly made it work.

 

[AltF4]

Our cognitive faculties are terrible instruments and ought not to be trusted whenever possible. I don't think anyone ever would make assumption #2. Certainly not a scientist. Great pains and efforts go toward making elaborate instruments that are far more reliable than our human senses. Our senses rarely see the word as it actually is.

Unless you mean there's no deliberate, intentional, and malicious skew on our senses. Like the idea that maybe there's an evil genius who can insert ideas into our minds. So that in reality, "1+1=2" is false. But this evil genius insert the idea that it's true into my mind every time I think about it.

In which case, sure. Yes, you have to assume that this is not the case. But that's not a shortcoming of science, but just knowledge generally. You literally can't know anything without making that assumption.

Also, I wouldn't formulate assumption #1 as you have. The future is not always like the past. In fact, it may very well be the case that natural laws change over time. What you really want to say is that there is some sort of order behind the universe. That the universe obeys some set of laws, whatever that may be. Or in other words: causality. In which case, I agree with you that this assumption is completely necessary. Or else nothing makes sense. Up is down, black is white. Things just happen for no reason at all.

And lastly, the conclusion "science needs philosophy" is true. Obviously. But that's not a unique position for science. Every human endeavor has to make certain assumptions (usually implicit) about silly things like evil geniuses and causality.

I'm not sure what the real "point" is here.

 

[Dre89]

As for his "real" point, what you gave to understand is that we deal with a lot of scientific minds who want to discard philosophy entirely, and think that all knowledge is accessible through the scientific method (Peter Atkins is a good example). I think that's who he is addressing.

 

[Battlecow]

Too much word make head hurt.

 

[Theftz22]

Concerning the reliability of induction, if we were to take two models, one in which the universe obeys certain mathematical laws and one where its laws change continuously and empirically test their predictions, we would find which one models nature better. We have and come to the conclusion that the model with fixed laws makes better predictions than the competing model. This is the reason why we are confident that the universe obeys laws, because we have empirical data that supports this notion over the competing hypothesis. This predictive success allows us to predict the future with confidence because the empirical data justifies the presuppositions needed in order to make those projections. Just because this is not a deductive inference does not invalidate it.

Most importantly this is simply patently circular reasoning. You're saying that the predictive past success of induction is reason to think that it will continue to be successful in the future, but that's simply to assume induction will hold. An inductive justification for induction is circular and simply holds no water.

Concerning the reliability of our senses, one counterexample does not invalidate a probabilistic argument. Science does not deal with proof. Saying our senses are reliable or generally reliable does not imply that our senses are 100% accurate. Also, it would be noted that such hypothetical would be considered most likely false from a scientific framework since they are unfalsifiable, and therefore evidence can't be used to increase their probability of being true. In such an instance where these scenarios are most likely false, it doesn't make much sense to mention them. If you are in search for absolute certainty, then the example given is an epistemological roadblock for all worldviews, philosophy included. However, this hardly effects science since science and skepticism are comfortable bed-fellows.

The brain in a vat example was just an example, not the crux of the argument. The point is that our senses need to be in some way tracking the actual reality. It's possible that they could not be, and there is no way way scientifically, either certainly or probabilistically, to determine whether or not they actually are. There are many possible examples of how this could be the case, such as the brain in a vat, computer simulation, evil god, etc. The point is that it could be the case, and there is no empirical way to decide between the two, probabilistically or not.

Our cognitive faculties are terrible instruments and ought not to be trusted whenever possible. I don't think anyone ever would make assumption #2. Certainly not a scientist. Great pains and efforts go toward making elaborate instruments that are far more reliable than our human senses. Our senses rarely see the word as it actually is.

Unless you mean there's no deliberate, intentional, and malicious skew on our senses. Like the idea that maybe there's an evil genius who can insert ideas into our minds. So that in reality, "1+1=2" is false. But this evil genius insert the idea that it's true into my mind every time I think about it.

In which case, sure. Yes, you have to assume that this is not the case. But that's not a shortcoming of science, but just knowledge generally. You literally can't know anything without making that assumption.

Our cognitive faculties may not be as accurate as we like, but it is still presupposed that they do in some sense track reality. We still need our cognitive faculties to tell us whether our instruments are reliable. We need our senses to feed back to us any data and observations from any experiment, even if they are conducted by use of tools.

Now I'm not saying that this is a shortcome of science, just of scientism. For science alone cannot rationally justify itself in proving that our cognitive faculties are reliable, but this is not a problem if we have philosophical arguments or an epistemology that allows it to be properly basic. So I am not saying it's a fault of science, but it is a fault of science exclusivism.

On a side note not all knowledge needs this assumption such as logical and mathematical truths, or the truth that I exist, or even other truths I would maintain are a-priori but that is tangential to my topic here.

Also, I wouldn't formulate assumption #1 as you have. The future is not always like the past. In fact, it may very well be the case that natural laws change over time. What you really want to say is that there is some sort of order behind the universe. That the universe obeys some set of laws, whatever that may be. Or in other words: causality. In which case, I agree with you that this assumption is completely necessary. Or else nothing makes sense. Up is down, black is white. Things just happen for no reason at all.

I just generally mean the process of making conclusions about the future based on the past. This is not exclusive to 5 million years from now, but simply 5 minutes from now. The fundamental laws of physics and interactions of particles (call it causality if you want) are expected to continue to hold tomorrow morning based off of the fact that they always have in the past.

 

[AltF4]

Yea, I don't think you're going to get any real argument from me, Underdogs. Though I'm curious as to who you might think would. Dre mentioned Peter Atkins. I'm not familiar with him, and a cursory Google search didn't turn up anything relevant.

I find it hard to believe that anyone of any intelligence wouldn't accept that you have to make some basic assumptions. I mean, once someone presents the "evil genius inserting thoughts into your brain" theory, you're forced to accept a simple fact: You can't disprove that, and therefore you cannot ever know anything for 100% certain. Not even math and logic. You can at best get to 99.9% with so many trailing 9's that you lose count, and just round up for the sake of simplicity.

I suspect that when someone calls them self an empiricist. (Which you will catch me doing) They're probably not saying that they literally exclusively gather knowledge from only experiment. I honestly don't know how that would even work. Obviously we have to make certain assumptions. And there's things like math. Empiricism just means to me that empirical data is the most important of our sources of knowledge. That no matter how sure you think you are about something, you have to put it to the test in the real world.

(Being a computer engineer reminds you on a daily basis about humility. Things which couldn't possibly go wrong usually do.)


But this all isn't saying very much. At best, the claim you're making is: "Philosophy has at least accomplished one thing in its entire history". I would have hoped for a stronger statement.

 

[Dre89]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkBD20edOco In this clip Atkins says he thinks science is omnipotent.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yx0CXmagQu0 This is a full debate/discussion with Oxford mathematician and philosopher of science John Lennox (a Christian). You can also look up his full debate with William Lane Craig.

 

[rvkevin]

Most importantly this is simply patently circular reasoning. You're saying that the predictive past success of induction is reason to think that it will continue to be successful in the future, but that's simply to assume induction will hold. An inductive justification for induction is circular and simply holds no water.

The question is whether induction or our projections are justified, not whether they will hold or not. You are confusing absolute certainty with a high degree of confidence here. Our projections may or may not be correct, but the question is whether we have good empirical grounds for making those projections. From previous trials, we know the relative success of the disparate models and those trials tell us something about the nature of the universe. It is this evidence that allows us to confidently say that nature obeys the laws that we are able to define mathematically. This is simply a description of how the universe works. It just so happens that this description also allows us to make predictions concerning the future. Do you think that all descriptions of nature are circular? If not, why then single out this one?

There are many possible examples of how this could be the case

And they are all unfalsifiable, which means that they don’t merit mentioning. There cannot be any evidence, even in principle, for these claims. Since they can’t ever be considered to be justified beliefs, they are off the table sort of speaking, so why even mention them?

For the other part, first define “actual reality.” A little preemptive, don’t say that realism is a controversial topic within philosophy. You have said that science can’t do X, so actually explain what it can’t do.

I’m also curious, how does philosophy traverse this epistemic limit? After all, this is not merely to show the limits of science, but to show that science needs philosophy. How does bringing philosophy into the picture help solve these questions at all?

 

[Theftz22]

Alt, my post is directed at anyone who would label themselves as subscribing to scientism/scientific exclusivism/empiricism (as in affirms the proposition "We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience,". There are surprisingly many people who would describe themselves as one of those.

Either way, "Philosophy has at least accomplished one thing in its entire history" is not the conclusion of my argument. The conclusion is that science depends on philosophy for its rational acceptability. If you think providing a rational basis for science is nothing of great importance then I guess my conclusion isn't a "strong statement". Anyway, philosophy certainly does that and a thousand other things but the topic of argument is just that one particular feature.

 

[Dre89]

Our projections may or may not be correct, but the question is whether we have good empirical grounds for making those projections. .

Having good empirical grounds to verify empirical methodology is circular. That's like saying a theist has good biblical grounds to verify the Bible.

If one's observation is in question, you can't say that you've observed that your observation is correct for the most part.

 

[Theftz22]

The question is whether induction or our projections are justified, not whether they will hold or not. You are confusing absolute certainty with a high degree of confidence here. Our projections may or may not be correct, but the question is whether we have good empirical grounds for making those projections. From previous trials, we know the relative success of the disparate models and those trials tell us something about the nature of the universe. It is this evidence that allows us to confidently say that nature obeys the laws that we are able to define mathematically. This is simply a description of how the universe works. It just so happens that this description also allows us to make predictions concerning the future. Do you think that all descriptions of nature are circular? If not, why then single out this one?

Whether or not your belief in induction is justified will depend upon if you have good arguments for it or hold it as properly basic. Again, inductive justifications of induction provide no level of support for induction, not even probabilistically, because you have no warrant for thinking that your premise is true independent of already assuming your conclusion, so know justification is gained. Circular arguments do not yield epistemic justification.

Now I do not think that all descriptions descriptions of nature are circular because I think I have non-circular justification for thinking that induction will hold because it is properly basic.

And they are all unfalsifiable, which means that they don’t merit mentioning. There cannot be any evidence, even in principle, for these claims. Since they can’t ever be considered to be justified beliefs, they are off the table sort of speaking, so why even mention them?

Sure they're falsifiable, maybe not scientifically but philosophically. Want to know how? To just give a brief sketch, the evil god scenario runs into what I'd call a "Problem of Good" (mirror of the problem of evil) and impossibility arguments, and both the others fall shy of Occham's Razor. Anyway, these are just examples as I said and not the brunt of the argument.

For the other part, first define “actual reality.” A little preemptive, don’t say that realism is a controversial topic within philosophy. You have said that science can’t do X, so actually explain what it can’t do.

I said science by itself can't make justified statements as to the nature of reality as it actually is. By reality I mean something like the objective, external world as it actually is independent of how we perceive it to be. Sorry if you don't think that's a good enough definition. I think you understand the concept.

 

[rvkevin]

Having good empirical grounds to verify empirical methodology is circular.

Would you care to specifically point out where I assumed the conclusion in the premises? After all, the section you quoted didn't even state a premise or a conclusion, it was merely a comment of how our predictions don't have to always be correct, but that they should be somehow justified. Also, if you think making predictions that are continuously inconsistent with observation doesn't impact the justification of the belief, I think you should take a step back and re-evaluate your stance.

 

[Dre89]

The question isn't whether we have good empirical grounds to make projections, it's whether we have good epistemic grounds to make empirical projections.

 

[rvkevin]

Whether or not your belief in induction is justified will depend upon if you have good arguments for it or hold it as properly basic. Again, inductive justifications of induction provide no level of support for induction, not even probabilistically, because you have no warrant for thinking that your premise is true independent of already assuming your conclusion, so no justification is gained. Circular arguments do not yield epistemic justification.

I just asked Dre this, would you care to specifically point out where I assumed the conclusion in the premises? I find it odd that this hasn’t happened yet. I think it is because I haven’t assumed induction. It is only after the observations have been made can we determine whether induction does or does not hold. This is the exact opposite of assuming the conclusion which means that your accusation of circular reasoning is misplaced.

Now I do not think that all descriptions of nature are circular because I think I have non-circular justification for thinking that induction will hold because it is properly basic.

How does saying “this is properly basic to me” yield epistemic justification? It’s basically the equivalent of “I know that I know that I know.” This is just as baseless as asserting your belief without justification. Is this justification of your “properly basic belief” also a “properly basic belief”?

Sure they're falsifiable, maybe not scientifically but philosophically. Want to know how? To just give a brief sketch, the evil god scenario runs into what I'd call a "Problem of Good" (mirror of the problem of evil) and impossibility arguments, and both the others fall shy of Occham's Razor. Anyway, these are just examples as I said and not the brunt of the argument.

So your saying that this God model makes some predictions (i.e. there will be no “good” things) and those predictions have been empirically falsified? Sorry, but when you bring in empirical observations, you have brought the subject back to the sciences. Also, this has not been falsified by philosophy as Stephen Law has already addressed this point. In order for some negative emotions, such as jealousy, there needs to be some amount of good things. This is what happens when you have an idea that doesn’t have the precise implications drawn out; it becomes so malleable to conform to any set of observations, which makes it unfalsifiable. By being unfalsifiable, it is no longer significant to the sciences, but as we see here it still wastes time in philosophy circles. How about picking an example that demonstrates the crux of your argument so we can stop beating around the bush.

I said science by itself can't make justified statements as to the nature of reality as it actually is. By reality I mean something like the objective, external world as it actually is independent of how we perceive it to be. Sorry if you don't think that's a good enough definition. I think you understand the concept.

What’s the point here? That science would only be able to discover things we are able to test for? Sounds about right. Let’s say that we are in a computer simulation that we can't in principle escape and you would consider some other "universe" to be reality. We wouldn’t be able to make many informed statements about such a place, but so what? It is simply an epistemological limit on what we can know. Does science assume that we can describe such a place? No. This should be obvious given the state of string theory. It is not even considered a science yet since it is not experimentally active. This doesn't prevent us from hypothesizing different universes, but empirical experiment is what is needed to determine the correct hypotheses from the incorrect ones. Philosophy doesn’t aid us in describing such a place, so I don’t see the need for science to adopt philosophy in this instance or how bringing in philosophy even helps to solve the problem.

 

[AltF4]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkBD20edOco In this clip Atkins says he thinks science is omnipotent.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yx0CXmagQu0 This is a full debate/discussion with Oxford mathematician and philosopher of science John Lennox (a Christian). You can also look up his full debate with William Lane Craig.

I wonder what he actually meant by "science is omnipotent". Craig didn't even challenge the statement, and it just kind of went by. I'm not very sure I understand what he was trying to say. Clearly not really literally omnipotent in the way that the christian god is usually defined.

Btw, Craig is completely and totally wrong about the speed of light thing. That was a bad example. The speed of light can be directly measured in a high school classroom. And it's also predicted to be constant by previous theory. (Though at the time, everyone thought that prediction must be wrong, and constituted a flaw in the theory)

I'll see if I can't get around to watching the other video, but it's much longer. Also, why must everyone on YouTube put ridiculous descriptions on their videos?

Atheist and Oxford professor Dr. Peter Atkins (a chemist) debates theist and also Oxford professor Dr. John Lennox (a mathematician and philosopher) on God, science, and atheism. Dr. Atkins gives an emotional, arrogant, and bigoted presentation, while Dr. Lennox responds rationally and analytically. Dr. Lennox has soundly defeated atheist Richard Dawkins in three debates, and was voted a winner against his debate with Christopher Hitchens. Now watch as he defeats Dr. Atkins!

...really? Everyone does it on every side of every debate.

 

[blazedaces]

underdogs22,

I believe that Alt4's reaction is similar to my own because I have been accused of being an empiricist or someone who "only believes in science" by friends and family many times. According to you though, you're directing your post to those who are very strictly speaking believers in "scientific exclusivism". So what I'm about to say will probably not be directed at you, but relates to the topic at hand.

I personally do not see a reason to label philosophy and science separately when discussing how one views the world. In order for me to believe something, it must be proven to me to a rather high degree of certainty. That's basically my philosophy for why I believe everything in my life... and in a way why I don't believe everything in my life.

Usually I'm labeled as an empiricist as soon as I demand proof for something. For example, someone who will remain unnamed recently confessed to me that she chooses a diet given to her by her chiropractor who practices in "chinese medicine" and "homeopathy" while ignoring the one given to her by her doctor. I tried to convince her not to do this, for her own sake. Eventually we got into an argument in which I asked her to find me proof that these practices had any merit because I had already researched them and found that no proof exists validating them. You can imagine how the conversation went from there... And I'm digressing...

To get back to the point I'm trying to make when you say that science needs philosophy my response is, why doesn't philosophy need science? Weren't some current scientific theories at some point just lying in the realm of philosophy? Is there really such a strong difference between the two? If something is hypothetical in nature, like string theory, is that not considered a philosophy? Do we not consider different abstract theories of explaining certain pieces of evidence philosophy? At what point does philosophy cross the line into science and vice versa? Why do we even need the distinction?

-blazed

 

[Theftz22]

I just asked Dre this, would you care to specifically point out where I assumed the conclusion in the premises? I find it odd that this hasn’t happened yet. I think it is because I haven’t assumed induction. It is only after the observations have been made can we determine whether induction does or does not hold. This is the exact opposite of assuming the conclusion which means that your accusation of circular reasoning is misplaced.

Not at all. The circularity lies in saying that the reason that we have to think that induction will hold is that it has done so in the past. That's using an inductive premise to support the conclusion that induction will hold, which is circularity. You do this here:

We have and come to the conclusion that the model with fixed laws makes better predictions than the competing model. This is the reason why we are confident that the universe obeys laws, because we have empirical data that supports this notion over the competing hypothesis. This predictive success allows us to predict the future with confidence because the empirical data justifies the presuppositions needed in order to make those projections.

You say that the past predictive success of induction is reason to think it will hold in the future, which just is induction. And also here:

From previous trials, we know the relative success of the disparate models and those trials tell us something about the nature of the universe. It is this evidence that allows us to confidently say that nature obeys the laws that we are able to define mathematically.

Again, the past success of induction will only count as evidence that it will hold in the future if you already assume the future will resemble the past.

How does saying “this is properly basic to me” yield epistemic justification? It’s basically the equivalent of “I know that I know that I know.” This is just as baseless as asserting your belief without justification. Is this justification of your “properly basic belief” also a “properly basic belief”?

A properly basic belief in epistemology is simply one that forms the foundation of the rest of our beliefs and is not inferred by any others. It's not a question of whether or not beliefs can be properly basic, but just what kinds of beliefs can be properly basic. It's obvious that if you don't adopt certain starting points or properly basic beliefs, you will not be able to infer any knowledge whatsoever and will be reduced to complete skepticism. This is why beliefs that are properly basic are epistemically justified. Now you might say, okay why can't science just assume induction and the reliability of our cognitive faculties to be properly basic? Well I'd say that science is a field that concerns empirical investigation, and so to be engaging in epistemology is outside of its field and is defined as in the realm of philosophy. Of course, you might just re-define science, but then the point simply remains that empirical exclusivism cannot justify itself, and you've simply married science and philosophy.

So your saying that this God model makes some predictions (i.e. there will be no “good” things) and those predictions have been empirically falsified? Sorry, but when you bring in empirical observations, you have brought the subject back to the sciences. Also, this has not been falsified by philosophy as Stephen Law has already addressed this point. In order for some negative emotions, such as jealousy, there needs to be some amount of good things. This is what happens when you have an idea that doesn’t have the precise implications drawn out; it becomes so malleable to conform to any set of observations, which makes it unfalsifiable. By being unfalsifiable, it is no longer significant to the sciences, but as we see here it still wastes time in philosophy circles. How about picking an example that demonstrates the crux of your argument so we can stop beating around the bush.

Yes obviously it is empirical fact that good exists and that is where science can enter in, but it's only a philosophical argument that can draw out the fact that an omnipotent, omnimalevolent being's existence is incompatible with the existence of good. There's no way to scientifically prove that, an argument with philosophical premises must be used.

As for Law, I'd just disagree with him there. I think we have experience of some things without having experience of their antitheses such as necessary truths of logic and mathematics or the property of non-square circularity. For example I can know what it feels like to exist without experiencing what it's like to not exist, which I cannot by definition experience.

Anyway the crux of my argument doesn't need any examples to demonstrate it in order for it to be sound, they are merely illustrative. Not that I concede that any of the examples don't work anyway.

What’s the point here? That science would only be able to discover things we are able to test for? Sounds about right. Let’s say that we are in a computer simulation that we can't in principle escape and you would consider some other "universe" to be reality. We wouldn’t be able to make many informed statements about such a place, but so what? It is simply an epistemological limit on what we can know. Does science assume that we can describe such a place? No. This should be obvious given the state of string theory. It is not even considered a science yet since it is not experimentally active. This doesn't prevent us from hypothesizing different universes, but empirical experiment is what is needed to determine the correct hypotheses from the incorrect ones. Philosophy doesn’t aid us in describing such a place, so I don’t see the need for science to adopt philosophy in this instance or how bringing in philosophy even helps to solve the problem.

So then you would concede the point science alone cannot make justified statements as to reality as it actually is? As long as you're willing to concede, that, you can rephrase it all you want it doesn't really bother me.

Philosophy I believe can make statements describing reality as it actually is, however the point here is simply that science can make statements about reality so long as it is aided by some kind of philosophy. I guess that's one way philosophy helps solve the problem.

 

[Dre89]

Alt- Craig mentions those 5 points in response to Atkin's claim of omnipotency.

I hate the bias too. The thing, they're the type of people who will agree with anything the academic on their side says, they'll give them complete authority, so they're the types that shouldn't even bother trying to rationalize their beliefs.

Blazed- Philisophy doesn't need science because philosophy is prior to it, like every other discipline. That's why you have philosophy of science etc.

However, certain specific philosophies rely on science. Scientism for example, or pretty much any physical argument made for or against God, such as ID.

 

[AltF4]

Doesn't Craig look just like a young Steven Colbert in that video?
http://s3-ak.buzzfed.com/static/ima...young-stephen-colbert-26603-1291182414-10.jpg

Also, here's the original debate video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h6Ycav742jI&html5=True
The other one is heavily edited. I wouldn't bother watching it.

All of the "truths" that Craig comes up with to show that Science isn't omnipotent are just assumptions. Things that you have to assume in order to function on a day-to-day basis, but aren't strictly provable. You can't call them an actual truth. After all, they're an assumption. They may, in fact, not be true. (Maybe there really IS an evil genius controlling my thoughts)

So I don't know how you can come to the conclusion that "Science needs philosophy" from that. I would concede that point if you could show something knowable only through philosophy and not science. IE: If there is something that can be known by sitting and thinking, but NOT by testing it.

And even then we're just playing a pissing game here over who's college major is better. The argument over that statement is pointless, if you ask me. If it were false, should we stop spending research dollars on science and put it instead into metaphysics research? I mean, what actual conclusion do you draw?

 

[Dre89]

But the point is science assumes these things.

Also, in terms of metaphysical statements like the evil genius, philosophy doesn't prove or disprove them absolutely, but it's philosophical propositions that we use to form reasonable belief.

Plus, my aquatic deity argument is something known through philosophy, but not through science.

 

[rvkevin]

You say that the past predictive success of induction is reason to think it will hold in the future, which just is induction.

Those predictive successes are empirical data points that tell us about nature. For example, say you hypothesize your evil omnipotent god, which means that, if true, we would find no instance of good and the source of our sorrows can’t be eliminated since we are unable to beat this evil god at his game. We find an instance of good. This empirical observation would falsify the hypothesis being made. The implication of this finding has significance for future findings. It predicts that when we learn the source of our sorrows, it won’t be this evil god. I have made a prediction of the future without resorting to induction at all or have I?

Yes obviously it is empirical fact that good exists and that is where science can enter in, but it's only a philosophical argument that can draw out the fact that an omnipotent, omnimalevolent being's existence is incompatible with the existence of good. There's no way to scientifically prove that, an argument with philosophical premises must be used.

This is just semantics. This is simply the step of specifying what your hypothesis entails (i.e. what empirical data would confirm or falsify your hypothesis). This is the first step of the scientific method of coming up with a hypothesis.

So then you would concede the point science alone cannot make justified statements as to reality as it actually is?

I would concede that there are aspects of reality that are inaccessible to science. However, I don’t feel the need to apply such a definition of reality. If we are in a computer simulation, I am perfectly content of saying that this is our reality and science can tell us more about it. There may be a different realm with different physical laws that we don’t have access to. Since we are unable to experiment in such a realm, we can’t say how it behaves. However, if we could access it, then science would enable us to discover how it works as well.

 

[Dre89]

So Rv are you saying that empiricism accesses all knowable truths, and the onlt hings that empiricism can't access are things that are unknowable (eg. brain in a vat)?.

Because if so, that simply isn't the case. I can think of a proposition, whose truth is know by philosophical methodology, but not by that of science.

 

[Theftz22]

So I don't know how you can come to the conclusion that "Science needs philosophy" from that. I would concede that point if you could show something knowable only through philosophy and not science. IE: If there is something that can be known by sitting and thinking, but NOT by testing it.

Firstly that isn't how I reached my conclusion here, but let me just show you how easy your challenge is here: I'll take an example from the very passage you just wrote. You state that you would "concede that point if you could show something knowable only through philosophy and not science." I'll assume for the minute that there existing some fact that is knowable only through philosophy and not science would prove that science needs philosophy. Would that entailment be scientifically provable? Is there any way to design an empirical experiment to show that "there exists some fact that is knowable only through philosophy and not science" entails that "science needs philosophy"? Well clearly not, rather this is an a priori philosophical conclusion that you came to.

And even then we're just playing a pissing game here over who's college major is better. The argument over that statement is pointless, if you ask me. If it were false, should we stop spending research dollars on science and put it instead into metaphysics research? I mean, what actual conclusion do you draw?

Philosophy tends to find truth to be worth seeking regardless of its practical import.

Those predictive successes are empirical data points that tell us about nature. For example, say you hypothesize your evil omnipotent god, which means that, if true, we would find no instance of good and the source of our sorrows can’t be eliminated since we are unable to beat this evil god at his game. We find an instance of good. This empirical observation would falsify the hypothesis being made. The implication of this finding has significance for future findings. It predicts that when we learn the source of our sorrows, it won’t be this evil god. I have made a prediction of the future without resorting to induction at all or have I?

No you haven't. Firstly the Problem of Good is predicated off of philosophical premises, and besides the example does assume induction. It assumes that the causal way in which the omnimalevolent interacts with the world will be constant, that the causal efficacy of our actions with respect to his will remain constant, and that his non-existence will remain constant.

This is just semantics. This is simply the step of specifying what your hypothesis entails (i.e. what empirical data would confirm or falsify your hypothesis). This is the first step of the scientific method of coming up with a hypothesis.

Perhaps you want to call it part of the scientific method, but it can't be done empirically, and so it is a philosophical step tacked onto the scientific method. You can't decide empirically what a hypothesis would entail if it were true, since you don't have empirical access to a reality in which it actually is true (of course here I mean new hypotheses, not the extension of an already existing model onto a new territory).

I would concede that there are aspects of reality that are inaccessible to science. However, I don’t feel the need to apply such a definition of reality. If we are in a computer simulation, I am perfectly content of saying that this is our reality and science can tell us more about it. There may be a different realm with different physical laws that we don’t have access to. Since we are unable to experiment in such a realm, we can’t say how it behaves. However, if we could access it, then science would enable us to discover how it works as well.

It seems to me that you're the one wrapped up in semantics, not me. Fine maybe you don't to use the label "reality". You can have it. As I said, what I mean is the objective, external world as it actually is independent of how we perceive it to be.

 

[rvkevin]

Perhaps you want to call it part of the scientific method, but it can't be done empirically, and so it is a philosophical step tacked onto the scientific method.

Do you disagree that part of making a hypothesis is to clearly define what it is that you are stating? Do you disagree that forming a hypothesis is part of the scientific method? This is not a re-definition of or an addition to science; this is the first thing that one learns about the scientific method.

Fine maybe you don't to use the label "reality". You can have it. As I said, what I mean is the objective, external world as it actually is independent of how we perceive it to be.

I think this is unknowable. You can always ask whether there is another layer to the onion. You never know when you are at the outermost layer or when you are simply stuck moving outwards since they are empirically equivalent. I know of no method to give one an edge over the other. Unless there is a way to tell them apart, I consider it an epistemological limit to our knowledge.

Firstly the Problem of Good is predicated off of philosophical premises, and besides the example does assume induction. It assumes that the causal way in which the omnimalevolent interacts with the world will be constant, that the causal efficacy of our actions with respect to his will remain constant, and that his non-existence will remain constant.

What do you mean the causal way in which the omnimalevolent deity interacts with the world will be constant? It doesn’t matter by what method he chooses to interact in the world. The hypothesis states that he has the desire and the ability to make the world the least desirable place possible. The fact that it isn’t falsifies the hypothesis. There is no assumption that he must act in a particular way. The effectiveness of our actions doesn’t matter since the deity is defined to be omnipotent. If our actions suddenly mattered, then that would also falsify the hypothesis. Sure, some time in the future the conditions might change such that the worst possible misery for everyone would entail the possibility some terrible deity has been created, but this is an empirical observation of whether the relevant conditions have remained the same. However, just add the property of being eternal to it and the example is unchanged, leaving only the semantic issues. These are semantic and empirical issues; I don’t see where induction plays a role.

So Rv are you saying that empiricism accesses all knowable truths, and the only things that empiricism can't access are things that are unknowable (eg. brain in a vat)?.

Because if so, that simply isn't the case. I can think of a proposition, whose truth is know by philosophical methodology, but not by that of science.

I’m starting to stray away from the term empiricist because some people here perceive it to exclude the defining of terms. However, outside of semantic truths (i.e. word play), I would say the same for science as I have never seen a counterexample. I would also add that knowing semantic truths do not count as learning about nature since you don't have a better understanding of nature than when you didn't know if they semantically fit. Feynman illustrates this idea here.

 

[AltF4]

Underdogs and Dre:

I think I worded my "challenge" poorly. What I mean is that science isn't a collection of facts. It's not a listing of things that we know. It's a process, it's a method. We can use this method to learn new things about the universe.

All the examples that you've given so far (even in the OP) have been base assumptions. Things about causality, and brains in vats. Sure, we have to assume those things in order to function in a day-to-day basis. But what I'm interested in is where you go from there. Something that isn't simply assumed purely in a basic kind of way. But a product of the "The Philosophical Method" (whatever that is).

I want something that you can actually have supporting reasons to think is true (not a basic assumption), but cannot also have empiric justification.

For example, math itself has empiric justification. Math works in the real world. When you take one object and place it next another, you get two objects. Every time. "1+1=2" is not just a definition in an abstract sense, it's a falsifiable claim. We have good empiric justification to believe that math is correct and true.

Dre's Aquatic Deity can be shown to be inherently contradictory, and thus you can conclude right off the bat that it doesn't exist. However, you could go further. (You just don't need to) You can also have good empiric justification for believing the Aquatic Deity doesn't exist by searching every inch of water on Earth. It's just like the Loch Ness Monster, we can dredge the depths over and over and look for the creature. If it exists, we should expect to find it or some evidence of it.

EDIT: Also, I think that the statement "Science needs philosophy" is highly misleading. It makes it sound as if scientists need to ask for permission from philosophers before performing experiments. The truth is that even if you were completely 100% right and that science cannot be justified except by philosophical means, nobody would care. Science gives us useful things and no amount of philosophizing about it will stop that. So in what sense can science be said to need anything?

 

[Dre89]

Science needs philosophy, not philosophers.

No one argues that music needs philosophy because musicians don't go around rejecting all of philosophy, whereas certain scientists do.

 

[blazedaces]

According to Underdogs, forming a hypothesis is philosophy... To which I retort that in order to prove a hypothesis, you need science. Yet again science and philosophy have a symbiotic relationship. One needs the other.

Dre, if you want to say otherwise, then please provide a definition for philosophy and science. I call all of this nonsense until you do so. We're just playing word salad and it's getting us nowhere.

And dre, are you telling me that you are justified in putting a label on all "scientists" and "musicians" in the world and claiming that because one or more do one thing that they all must be that way?

-blazed

 

[Dre89]

No, I said certain scientists.

What Doggs and I are addressing are scientists that are scienticismists as well. Scientism is a philosophy.

 

[rvkevin]

If we are going to use the term philosophy so loosely as to include the scientific method, lets say that scientists routinely use philosophy. What is it that philosophers do that scientists do not? What is the need for a separate department in universities? Surely these departments aren't doing science, so what are they doing?

 

[Dre89]

Pure science conducts no philosophy apart from properly basic assumptions.

Scientism requires philosophical justification. That's a philosophy, which science does not educate in.

 

[rvkevin]

Pure science conducts no philosophy apart from properly basic assumptions.

Scientism requires philosophical justification. That's a philosophy, which science does not educate in.

Is this targeted to me? I'm curious because if it is, then it seems like you didn't even look at what I wrote. Do you think you even came close to answering my questions?

 

[Dre89]

Yes I do, because what philosophy does is study the philosohies that scientists simply assume, same as how science studies the scientific thoeories the public assumes on the authority of scientists.

We need philosophers because there's a difference between doing philosophy and assuming one.

For example, if philosophy wasn't practiced as a separate discipline, the only metaphysical positions we'd have are scientism and theism based purely on scientific arguments. Scientists uneducated in philosophy generally have poor epistemic behind their metaphysical position, so philosophy would be severely compromised if it wasn't acknowledged as a separate discipline.

 

[rvkevin]

We've established that the philosophy inherent to the scientific enterprise reduces to semantics. How do you study this? What is the difference between assigning a definition to a word and doing philosophy?

 

[Dre89]

I don't understand what you mean.

Scientism is not the only philosophy a scientists can have, they can have any philosophy, it's just the most common one amongst scientists.

Philosophy is more than assigning definitions to words because philosophy creates concepts which need a word assigned to them to define.

 

[rvkevin]

Scientism is not the only philosophy a scientists can have, they can have any philosophy, it's just the most common one amongst scientists.

We're talking about science, not what scientists can rationalize. There are many beliefs held by scientists that don't mesh with scientific principles, but that doesn't validate them.

Philosophy is more than assigning definitions to words because philosophy creates concepts which need a word assigned to them to define.

I don't understand what you mean. The definition of a word determines its semantic content which is the concept that the word illustrates. They are synonymous.

 

[blazedaces]

Scientism is ... just the most common one amongst scientists.

Any actual evidence to back this up?

Instinctively I disagree that you could possibly prove this. It's just a biased opinion you hold.

-blazed

 

[Dre89]

Bias opinion? You make it sound as if I'm saying it with a negative connotation.

Not many people will contest that a lot of scientists are empiricists or scientisimists, because most people not educated in philosophy and metaphysical propositions think they're not cognitive.

And seriously, that doesn't even matter. Posts like this just slow the debate down.

 

[Theftz22]

Do you disagree that part of making a hypothesis is to clearly define what it is that you are stating? Do you disagree that forming a hypothesis is part of the scientific method? This is not a re-definition of or an addition to science; this is the first thing that one learns about the scientific method.

I'm not sure what you mean by "define what it is that you are stating". Drawing out the hypothetical entailments of a given truth involves more that just definition. Anyway, as I said it may be called part of the scientific process, but it is not empirical, so that's the main issue here.

I think this is unknowable. You can always ask whether there is another layer to the onion. You never know when you are at the outermost layer or when you are simply stuck moving outwards since they are empirically equivalent. I know of no method to give one an edge over the other. Unless there is a way to tell them apart, I consider it an epistemological limit to our knowledge.

Good use of philosophy, RV. Not that I would agree with your philosophical conclusions. I think that Occham's Razor easily gives the edge to the simpler explanation of an objectively perceived external world.

What do you mean the causal way in which the omnimalevolent deity interacts with the world will be constant? It doesn’t matter by what method he chooses to interact in the world. The hypothesis states that he has the desire and the ability to make the world the least desirable place possible. The fact that it isn’t falsifies the hypothesis. There is no assumption that he must act in a particular way. The effectiveness of our actions doesn’t matter since the deity is defined to be omnipotent. If our actions suddenly mattered, then that would also falsify the hypothesis. Sure, some time in the future the conditions might change such that the worst possible misery for everyone would entail the possibility some terrible deity has been created, but this is an empirical observation of whether the relevant conditions have remained the same. However, just add the property of being eternal to it and the example is unchanged, leaving only the semantic issues. These are semantic and empirical issues; I don’t see where induction plays a role.

You make some pretty good points, and while the argument is still predicated off of philosophical premises, I'll do some concession here. It may be the case that some hypotheses can be falsified on empirical grounds, with relevant implications to the future. So I was overstating the case in the OP when I said that without induction, science can make no statements regarding the future. Nevertheless, I would maintain that the vast majority of the claims science makes about the future in terms of laws and theories are in fact predicated off of induction.

Underdogs and Dre:

I think I worded my "challenge" poorly. What I mean is that science isn't a collection of facts. It's not a listing of things that we know. It's a process, it's a method. We can use this method to learn new things about the universe.

All the examples that you've given so far (even in the OP) have been base assumptions. Things about causality, and brains in vats. Sure, we have to assume those things in order to function in a day-to-day basis. But what I'm interested in is where you go from there. Something that isn't simply assumed purely in a basic kind of way. But a product of the "The Philosophical Method" (whatever that is).

I want something that you can actually have supporting reasons to think is true (not a basic assumption), but cannot also have empiric justification.

What I'd encourage you to do (as well as RV) is to buy one edition of a professional analytic philosophy journal (like Ratio for example) and read it. Nevertheless if you want an example from me specifically I could give plenty but why don't you just read the entries on my blog for now.

EDIT: Also, I think that the statement "Science needs philosophy" is highly misleading. It makes it sound as if scientists need to ask for permission from philosophers before performing experiments. The truth is that even if you were completely 100% right and that science cannot be justified except by philosophical means, nobody would care. Science gives us useful things and no amount of philosophizing about it will stop that. So in what sense can science be said to need anything?

The conclusion in my OP was formulated quite clearly. It is that science needs some form of philosophy, via philosophical arguments or epistemology, in order to be rationally acceptable.

 

[rvkevin]

I'm not sure what you mean by "define what it is that you are stating". Drawing out the hypothetical entailments of a given truth involves more that just definition. Anyway, as I said it may be called part of the scientific process, but it is not empirical, so that's the main issue here.

A hypothesis needs to be able to state what should happen given a certain phenomena. If you propose a certain hypothesis, you need to be able to state what should happen when you do X so when you conduct the test you can see whether the result is what should have happened if the hypothesis was true. If you can’t do this, then you haven’t sufficiently defined the proposed hypothesis. If you think the definition of empiricism doesn’t allow for definitions, then I guess empiricism is inconsistent with science. This would seem like an unnecessarily narrow definition for empiricism since it would exclude empirical methodologies.

Good use of philosophy, RV. Not that I would agree with your philosophical conclusions. I think that Occham's Razor easily gives the edge to the simpler explanation of an objectively perceived external world.

You would then have to go into why Occham’s Razor is a good principle. Is it because when we find the actual explanation for something that it tends to be simpler than we thought? If so, that’s an empirical observation that we are making; this would make the justification for Occham’s Razor empirical in nature and thus be consistent with empiricism. It would be interesting to try to justify Occham’s Razor otherwise; I wouldn’t know where to start.

Funny how you should say that it’s a good use of philosophy considering that it is flawed. We could use Baye’s theorem to break the tie if the alternative hypotheses have a way to “break the illusion.” For example, it is possible if you’re in the matrix to then escape it. This means that it is an inferior hypothesis from an empirical standpoint. I should also note that this does not make it knowable, since simply being the best hypothesis doesn’t mean that we have enough confidence in it to call it knowledge. However, this would not apply to hypotheses in which you are locked into the world, but then again, I don’t consider any definition of reality that concludes that we are not real to be that meaningful.