This is just dumb. You're choosing your own definition for Free Will rather than the one everyone else is using, then asserting that it must then exist.
Well woopdey ****! I can do that too. I choose god to be defined as my computer monitor right in front of me. Look! God exists!
Your definition of Free Will is not the definition we have all been going on. You're arguing some lame strawman you ripped from the cold dead hands of Immanuel Kant.
Free Will is the ability for an agent to choose their actions and not be confined only to that dictated by the laws of nature. It has nothing to do with moral responsibility.
For starters, Kant only suggested that we are only acting autonomously when we act morally.
The idea that free will is identical to moral responsibility is far from being unique to Kant anyhow, most philosophers hold that view.
For starters, the version of free will I am using is far from being unestablished.
You claim that free will is freedom of action. That definition is idiotic and pointless.
My definition of free will is freedom of
will. There is no difference in practice between the two, but my definition is far more flexible and useful.
This is a biological question, not a moral one. Biological imperatives do not imply morality.
Again, you have simply shifted 'good' to be 'evolutionarily/sociologically advantageous'. I could care less about what morality
is. Merely that it exists. My method of proving existence may clash with traditional empiricism, but it is far from being a new and radical method. At the very least, I have established that we have a perception of 'good' and 'bad'.
A robot is not any less inanimate than a windmill. It's just more complex.
I am not differentiating between a robot and a windmill. I am differentiating between a robot and a deck of cards. And it can be stated that you
do hold the deck morally responsible for its actions, just not to the extent that you do with a robot. You would not use a deck that lacks an ace of spades
I agree with AltF4. You have not only redefined everyone's definition of free will to be equivalent to moral responsibility, but you seem to have redefined moral responsibility to something that doesn't even make sense.
Freedom of will is a perfectly valid definition of free will.
And moral responsibility is nothing more than the ability to be judged for one's actions. We do this all the time.
Oh, and I almost forgot, Yossarian. You in no way addressed either of my arguments for why Free Will cannot exist.
-In my previous thread (which was far more relevant than this one) I gave a lengthy description as to exactly how Free Will violates causality. In order to counter this argument, you have to point out what part of it is incorrect. You have yet to do this.
You have a faulty definition.
You have shown that freedom of
action is impossible, but failed to show how freedom of will is invalid.
-Emergence cannot be explained by apparent complexity! That's exactly what makes it "the problem of emergence"!
For example, a computer has only three operations: AND, OR, and NOT. Everything a computer does is some combination of these three things. No matter how complex you make a computer it is completely deterministic. It has no Free Will, despite how much you make it LOOK like it does. Period.
It does not matter how much "apparent" uniqueness we have, the problem of emergence remains.
Fair enough. If you refuse to accept the argument that we are unique compared to anything else we have encountered....
We still hold animals responsible for their actions, albeit not in the extent that we hold each other too. When a pitbull kills a child, we kill the pitbull. So the pitbull
does have free will. We simply perform more interactions than a pitbull can and have superior reasoning, hence we are held more responsible for our actions. [ So we are not unique in the slightest]
And again, you using freedom of action. Not freedom of will.
To reiterate, moral responsibility are free will are intrinsically linked, as we cannot have the former without the latter. The idea that in order to be morally responsible for an action, one needs alternative led to the definition of free will you are using. But one does
not need an alternative to be held morally responsible for one's actions, as I have shown earlier in the thread. If one does not need alternatives to be morally responsible, than it stands that one does not need alternatives to have freedom of will