Brute Contingencies

[Dre89]

I think this is an issue that can generate good discussion, but I'm also interesed in it for personal reasons seeing as it's basically the only thing that's stopping me from being an atheist now.

Basically, the question is whether you believe contingent things (ie. beings or properties of beings) can exist without any explanation whatsoever.

Contingent things are things that could have been otherwise, or don't exist necessarily. For clarification, time and space are contingent because even if you argue that time and space exist necessarily, they have properties that are contingent (eg. whether you believe time is infinite or not etc.) If you believe these properties aren't contingent, then you're basically saying that it would be impossible for anything to exist if time or space existed in a different way.

I'll input my answer to the question later (because I can't be bothered at the moment) if discussion picks up.

 

[rvkevin]

I think the question boils down to whether logically contingent things can be physically necessary. I don't see why they can't, which leaves open the possibility of brute contingencies.

 

[Dre89]

I'm not sure what you mean by 'physically' necessary. If I say a unicorn is necessarily the first cause, then I'm saying only a unicorn could have caused this universe. So then I would have to show how every single property of the unicorn was necessary for causality (eg. the length of its horn, the colour of its fur, it's weight etc.). It seems like a very tall order to try and say something physical was necessary, and most atheists wouldn't do that.

Also, if it's necessary, then it wouldn't be contingent.

The reason why I think contingent things can't exist without explanation is because of ontological priority. For example, when a chld is conceived, the possibility of it being either male or female (or maybe other things too but we'll omit them for economy's sake) is ontologically prior to what gender it actually turns out to be.

The problem is that the first cause can't have anything ontologically prior to it (otherwise it wouldn't be the first cause) yet contingent things by definition have ontologically prior possibilities. If it's a contingent thing, then it is simply one of multiple possibilities that could have been.

You can't just say ' they exist without explanation' because you're ignoring the ontological priority. If the first cause was contingent, then there would be an infinite set of possibilities prior to it, then some of them would have been selected in some way (obviously there wasn't literally a selection process in that properties were all lined up and getting picked at random, but you get what I mean). But what you have a contingent existence with supposedly nothing prior to it, you somehow go from infinite possibilities>specifc reality.

The only way it avoid ontological priority is to say it exists necessarily, but then you have the problem that I showed before.

I just don't see it's logically feasible that a contingent thing could exist without explanation, although I'd very much liked to be convinced.

 

[rvkevin]

But what you have a contingent existence with supposedly nothing prior to it, you somehow go from infinite possibilities>specifc reality.

I don't exactly follow where the problem lies with brute facts. We can simulate different universes using different programs using different seeds and physical laws. Each universe would be unique and they would arise from what you call a brute contingency. Each seed would be arbitrary out of the spectrum of seeds, yet it doesn't make a difference to the creation of that specific simulation. If there were simulated life forms in that universe asking the same questions, the correct response would be "that is the initial seed that we are stuck with, seemingly randomly." It would be a universe starting from a brute contingency. We can simulate it so I don't see why it would be logically impossible for it to actually occur. Since its not logically impossible, the next step is to look for evidence for whether it actually happened.

 

[Dre89]

I don't exactly follow where the problem lies with brute facts. We can simulate different universes using different programs using different seeds and physical laws. Each universe would be unique and they would arise from what you call a brute contingency. Each seed would be arbitrary out of the spectrum of seeds, yet it doesn't make a difference to the creation of that specific simulation. If there were simulated life forms in that universe asking the same questions, the correct response would be "that is the initial seed that we are stuck with, seemingly randomly." It would be a universe starting from a brute contingency. We can simulate it so I don't see why it would be logically impossible for it to actually occur. Since its not logically impossible, the next step is to look for evidence for whether it actually happened.

But in this case the most ontologically prior existence is the seed creator, so the analogy doesn't apply. The question would be whether the seed creator is contingent or not. If it isn't, then it needs to be explained why it must necessarily exist, and how existence is impossible without its specific form. If it is contingent, you have the same problem as before. If you say there is no seed creator and the seeds just exist, then you haven't answered the question and have the same problem as before.

 

[rvkevin]

But in this case the most ontologically prior existence is the seed creator, so the analogy doesn't apply. The question would be whether the seed creator is contingent or not. If it isn't, then it needs to be explained why it must necessarily exist, and how existence is impossible without its specific form. If it is contingent, you have the same problem as before. If you say there is no seed creator and the seeds just exist, then you haven't answered the question and have the same problem as before.

To the people inside of the universe, they would be brute facts. The initial condition and physical laws would be contingent and they would describe the entirety of the actions in that universe. Asking why they are like that would be an unanswerable question. At best, the answer is, it just is. If someone in that universe is unsatisfied with such an answer, then that person must either make up an answer or pester others in that universe about needing to explain the unexplainable. Perhaps this is where the 'why' question falls apart and it simply becomes meaningless.

 

[Dre89]

No, the problem is that you're assuming that it's logically conceivable that things can just exist without explanation.

There's no default position on the issue because there's no precedent.

You're basically saying "well we'll just assume this specific philosophical position because it's easier". That's basically it. You're completely ignoring all the logical implications of saying that something can be the first cause whilst still having things ontologically prior it.

 

[rvkevin]

No, the problem is that you're assuming that it's logically conceivable that things can just exist without explanation.

Its logically conceivable because I can conceive of a case where it is true. Its not really an assumption at this point. I don't see the point that you're making.

You're completely ignoring all the logical implications of saying that something can be the first cause whilst still having things ontologically prior it.

I think the problem lies in what we mean by the first cause. If you have a system and you go back in time until you cannot anymore, until you reach the initial iteration of the system, what would you call that? Perhaps you would call it an uncaused first state, but this is what I am referring to. So either that conceivable system is uncaused, or it is built upon a brute contingency. If the programmer is throwing you through the loop, you can eliminate him and leave the simulation as is.

 

[Dre89]

Its logically conceivable because I can conceive of a case where it is true. Its not really an assumption at this point. I don't see the point that you're making.

No you can't conceive of it. That's like conceiving of a married bachelor. Conceiving of a first cause that that has something ontologically prior to it is by definition a contradiction and thus not logically conceivable.

I think the problem lies in what we mean by the first cause. If you have a system and you go back in time until you cannot anymore, until you reach the initial iteration of the system, what would you call that? Perhaps you would call it an uncaused first state, but this is what I am referring to. So either that conceivable system is uncaused, or it is built upon a brute contingency. If the programmer is throwing you through the loop, you can eliminate him and leave the simulation as is.

Simulation with programmer analogies don't apply because they already require the existence of several other things. Basically any analogy which assumes prior existences is flawed because the whole point is that we're talking about a state whether there was no existence whatsoever. That's the key point, because had something already existed, then yes contingences would be possible, but that's not what we're talking about.

I'd like you to give me a direct answer to this question- how is it possible that something exists as the first cause despite having something ontologically prior to it? I want to see how this isn't a contradiction.

 

[rvkevin]

Simulation with programmer analogies don't apply because they already require the existence of several other things. Basically any analogy which assumes prior existences is flawed because the whole point is that we're talking about a state whether there was no existence whatsoever. That's the key point, because had something already existed, then yes contingencies would be possible, but that's not what we're talking about.

Like I said, remove the programmer and then you have a standalone universe that began based on brute contingencies.

I'd like you to give me a direct answer to this question- how is it possible that something exists as the first cause despite having something ontologically prior to it? I want to see how this isn't a contradiction.

There wouldn't be a 'the' first cause. The initial conditions would be a 'package' or a combination of factors. Some of these factors would be contingent and have what you call ontological priors (i.e. necessary preconditions). However, you could change those contingent factors to others that require other necessary preconditions. This would mean that those ontologically prior conditions aren't necessary for the beginning of every universe, just that particular one. The reason for why they manifested in that particular universe would again boil down to "it just did;" they would be brute contingencies. Is there is a specific trait that you think that is necessary for every universe? I can't think of one at the moment.

 

[Dre89]

Removing the programmer is like saying remove the trigger-puller and you just have a gun shot. It's not possible to have a gun shot without pulling the trigger, so you can't just assume it's possible to have a program without the programmer. That's the whole point of the debate.

Also, whatever the package is, the OP conditions are the same, because they are the infinite possibilities that the initial conditions could have been.

Somehow, there is a movement from the infinite possibilities, to the actual reality. It's seems silly to then call the actual reality (which is the contingent first cause) a first cause, because it is not the first action.

You're also not explaining the existence of the packages. If this happening multiple times, you've just regressed the question a step further back to what is causing the creation of all these packages.

They basically all just become properties in a bigger contingent package.

Remember time itself is contingent, so what you're saying is that out of infinite possibilities, time and others were chosen by a certain process, then proceeded to exist as the initial conditions.

 

[rvkevin]

Removing the programmer is like saying remove the trigger-puller and you just have a gun shot. It's not possible to have a gun shot without pulling the trigger, so you can't just assume it's possible to have a program without the programmer. That's the whole point of the debate.

It's logically possible, which is all that is needed for the debate.

Also, whatever the package is, the OP conditions are the same, because they are the infinite possibilities that the initial conditions could have been.

The OP conditions are not the same for every universe. Therefore, they are not logically necessary. They are only necessary for that particular universe.

Somehow, there is a movement from the infinite possibilities, to the actual reality. It's seems silly to then call the actual reality (which is the contingent first cause) a first cause, because it is not the first action.

There would be no movement from abstract possibilities to the actual universe. It's not like these different options exist in some warehouse and someone (either a programmer or a deity) picks them out of the lineup. They would be the first instance of that universe, so there that there would be no previous action.

You're also not explaining the existence of the packages. If this happening multiple times, you've just regressed the question a step further back to what is causing the creation of all these packages.

That's because certain things can't exist with null values for certain features. Suppose you visualize a human. That picture will contain a package of ontological priors. The visual can't take place without all of them coming together. These packets don't exist, they aren't 'created'. Its simply a way of saying that there is not a time delay between a contingency and its ontological prior. As such, the first instance of a universe can be made of brute contingencies and other properties that are not logically necessary.

Remember time itself is contingent, so what you're saying is that out of infinite possibilities, time and others were chosen by a certain process, then proceeded to exist as the initial conditions.

No, it is not logically necessary that these attributes were chosen by anything, by anyone, or for any reason. They could simply be.

 

[kataklysm336]

The OP conditions are not the same for every universe. Therefore, they are not logically necessary. They are only necessary for that particular universe.

I agree with this mostly. I feel that the universe (or reality in general, including what "existed" before the big bang) runs on a specific set of laws, themselves necessary for the creation of ANY universe, and in conjunction with contingent factors produce the universe we know. What we see as the universe (or reality/existence in general), is a continuum and to think of is as having a starting point or ending point is fallacious. Many parts of the universe (i.e. time or space) are contingent upon not only the laws of reality, but also upon each other, while the laws are simply necessary. I don't see the governing forces as a "first cause" and more as an environment that allows for a multitude of "causes" to exist. Ideas like "first" are relative to our human understanding of time, and to the form in which time exists in our universe. These "causes" are contingent upon the forces that allowed them to exist, and other causes that came about because of those forces. Time is contingent upon the laws of reality, space (which is also contingent upon those laws), and other forces we may be unaware of, and everything that is "caused" "after" time is contingent upon time, and the things time is contingent upon. This allows for multiple different possibilities.

Notes: I used things like "cause" and "after" loosely. They are related to our prospect of time, so in the scenario time doesn't "cause" things to happen, but is apart of a package (as revkin put it) that ultimately determines what happens "after". "After" is in quotations because, like I said, that is relative to our concept of time. These things are contingent on how time is created, and would have different definitions in a different environment.


Hope this makes sense...

 

[ElvenKing]

Simulation with programmer analogies don't apply because they already require the existence of several other things. Basically any analogy which assumes prior existences is flawed because the whole point is that we're talking about a state whether there was no existence whatsoever. That's the key point, because had something already existed, then yes contingences would be possible, but that's not what we're talking about.

I'd like you to give me a direct answer to this question- how is it possible that something exists as the first cause despite having something ontologically prior to it? I want to see how this isn't a contradiction.

It is a contradiction. However, rvkevin isn't wrong. He actually reasserts first cause in arguing that a given universe "simply is." In the instance where a universe "simply is," the reason for it being so is due to the fact that it is so, just like, for example, God would be if one were to ask why God was so. An initial response to this might be that this can't be because then there couldn't be other universes. This isn't actually a logical necessity. There might be two universes which "simply are" existing side by side. They would, of course, as the exist within the same reality of multiple universes, have to exist on a shared big canvas of reality, but they needn't be causally linked by a single point of origin. It might be that those separate universes were there from, existing for no other reason but than they simply were, the beginning. It might be that one universe existed and another, at a later point, simply came into being for no other reason than it came into being.

Of course, this could well be wrong too. It might be that there is one first cause from which all existent universes have sprung.

 

[Dre89]

Rv- The only reason why your analogy is conceivable is because something is still OP to it, so that kills any relevance it has.

Elven- Except that the God I'd argue for would be necessary, not 'just so'. A god that just is has the same problems as all other contingencies. That's why I disagree with the idea of gods with contingent properties like the Trinity.

There actually is a problem with saying two universes exist independently. I don't have the time to explain it now but look up 'Plato's' Third Man Argument'.

 

[ElvenKing]

Elven- Except that the God I'd argue for would be necessary, not 'just so'. A god that just is has the same problems as all other contingencies. That's why I disagree with the idea of gods with contingent properties like the Trinity.

There actually is a problem with saying two universes exist independently. I don't have the time to explain it now but look up 'Plato's' Third Man Argument'.

"Necessary" and "just so" are the same thing. The both refer to the same thing: the origin point of something made from causal forces. In my argument, the only reason that the two universe are is that they simply are. The existence of those universe is necessary to explain the existence of those universes. Both universes are a necessary part of reality. Just like in the argument for why God is so.

Sure, I covered that. As both universes exist within the same reality, they are necessarily part of the one existent "bigger" universe which has everything in it. Otherwise, there is no logical necessity for the two existence universes to be in want linked. You could, for example, argue that the two separate universes exist because of the necessary "bigger" universe. That the other universes came into being because of something which happens in the bigger universe, but that isn't meaningfully different than saying the two universe "simply are." It is like if God creates two different worlds in the same reality. The only reason that either world can be said to be is because God created them. In this example, the "bigger universe" is like God. In one part it creates one universe, simply because that is what is so, simply because it is necessary. In another place, a different universe is created, simply because it is what is so, simply because it is what is necessary. And the only reason that a universe occurred in one place but not another is that it was necessary they appear in that place. That is just how the nature of reality is. If the question is asked: "Why did this universe occur here?" The only answer that can be given was that is just what happened. That it was necessary a universe to appear there.

In terms of independence, they can be completely causally independent from one another bar having to spring upon the same canvas. Indeed, it can be that both universes cannot interact with each other at all. If this were so it would obviously mean that ,for a being in either universe, there would effectively only be one universe, as they could never gain access to the other ones beyond conceiving they might exist, but this does not prevent the existence of other ones within reality. There would simply be universes which cannot be touched or sensed from one another.

 

[Dre89]

The difference between the first cause existing necessarily and just because is that nothing is ontologically prior to a necessary first cause, because there were no other possibilities in terms of what the first cause could have been. When you're talking about contingent properties existing just because, you're talking about things that could have been otherwise. Therefore the possibilities are ontologically prior to the actual existence. My point is that it is a contradiction to call something contingent the first cause, because a first cause can't have anything prior it.

With the two universe existing in a bigger reality, the reality itself requires explanation. You can't just assume a template of existence just exists. You're simply just regressing the problem a step further back.

Also, when you say the bigger universe necessarily creates the smaller two, you've then just given the bigger universe a specific form. At this point you're back to the original problem, that having a contingent existence as the first cause is a contradiction due to it having something ontologically prior to it.

When you say that the reality is a necessary God, you avoid the problem of a contingent reality existing with something ontologically prior to it (as long as you can explain why the god's properties are all necessary).

 

[ElvenKing]

The difference between the first cause existing necessarily and just because is that nothing is ontologically prior to a necessary first cause, because there were no other possibilities in terms of what the first cause could have been. When you're talking about contingent properties existing just because, you're talking about things that could have been otherwise. Therefore the possibilities are ontologically prior to the actual existence. My point is that it is a contradiction to call something contingent the first cause, because a first cause can't have anything prior it.

With the two universe existing in a bigger reality, the reality itself requires explanation. You can't just assume a template of existence just exists. You're simply just regressing the problem a step further back.

Also, when you say the bigger universe necessarily creates the smaller two, you've then just given the bigger universe a specific form. At this point you're back to the original problem, that having a contingent existence as the first cause is a contradiction due to it having something ontologically prior to it.

When you say that the reality is a necessary God, you avoid the problem of a contingent reality existing with something ontologically prior to it (as long as you can explain why the god's properties are all necessary).

No, I'm not. In these examples the properties which "simply exist" are, as you would describe, non-contingent.

There is actually a trick of the inductive nature of reality going on here. You have separated out that anything "just so" must be contingent while the first cause must not be, but the are actually the same in this argument. In the instance where it was argued that something was "just so" was contingent, it actually wasn't, it was just treated like it was because it appears it could be doubted, due to the inductive nature of reality. In all the instances where "just so" has been suggested, if that reality existed, it would be non-contingent in that reality, but because we cannot derive the nature of what is non-contingent, someone will inevitably ask: "Why must that be so?" and it will have to be answered as if it is contingent(It is so simply because that is what is so). This is not actually as silly as it seems, as we can hold mistaken axioms about reality, so to challenge them them as if they were contingent offers us a way to know what we are suing is false as well as possible reflect upon whether our axiom is accurate to reality.

The reason this isn't obvious with first cause is first cause is simply a description that there was a point of origin, so is a quality shared by all first causes, no matter what that first cause is. We can see this easily if we actually propose what first cause. Lets say we propose first cause is God. How do we know the first cause is God? Why not any of the other myriad of things which could be proposed as first cause? Why not a magical bean from which the whole of reality sprung? Why not simply the forces suggested by empirical observation? Here the point of the first becomes clear. If we want to justify the first cause is God, then we must say: "Well God is simply so."

No, it doesn't solve it. All you are doing is shifting what you need to show is necessary. In such an argument, all the following conclusions are dependent upon the necessity of the truth that dictates them. So you could show that God was necessary, but for God to actually be necessary, you would then have to show that what made God necessary was necessary and so and so ad-infinitum; in the end you always end up in the same spot: needing to claim an axiom to justify your argument.

 

[Dre89]

Except that I can show why a god is necessary and why other things can't fit that bill. That's the difference between being necessary and 'just so'. When you assert necessity, you're saying that the first cause couldn't have been anything else. when you say it is just so, it could be something else.

The reason why you can't just say anything is necessary is because to be necessary, it means that nothing contingent could have been the FC. What this means is that if I claim that an elephant is the first cause, I have to explain how every property of the elephant is necessary for causehood. I have to explain how its colour, tusk length, height, weight etc, are all necessary for causehood. I also have to show how nothing else was capable of causehood.

The difference between necessity metaphysics (what I call necessity exclusivism, or NE) and the idea that it can be just is (what I call contingentalism) is that in the latter, the existence and the property of causehood are two different things. What I mean is, if you say the elephant is the FC, it's not the inherent nature of being an elephant that makes it the FC, you've just given an elephant the property of causehood.

In NE, the first cause and the property of causehood are the same. So that means you can't give it the first cause any properties that aren't necessary for causehood. This is why I disagree with the Trinity or God being a loving being, because it isn't necessary for causehood.

It's not a matter of just saying 'God' and then being able to add on any properties you like. In fact it's the other way. I look at all the properties necessary for causehood then realise that's what is commonly referred to as 'God'.

However, I do think that things like, being eternal, self-necessity, having a will (to make the first act contingent), having no specific form etc. are necessary. It obviously takes extensive argumentation to justify all that so I won't go there.

However, whenever you posit a physicalist first cause, it could have been different. This means that its existence and causehood are two distinct properties. This is where the contradiction arises in that you have a first cause that has something ontologically prior to it.

 

[ElvenKing]

Except that I can show why a god is necessary and why other things can't fit that bill. That's the difference between being necessary and 'just so'. When you assert necessity, you're saying that the first cause couldn't have been anything else. when you say it is just so, it could be something else.

The reason why you can't just say anything is necessary is because to be necessary, it means that nothing contingent could have been the FC. What this means is that if I claim that an elephant is the first cause, I have to explain how every property of the elephant is necessary for causehood. I have to explain how its colour, tusk length, height, weight etc, are all necessary for causehood. I also have to show how nothing else was capable of causehood.

The difference between necessity metaphysics (what I call necessity exclusivism, or NE) and the idea that it can be just is (what I call contingentalism) is that in the latter, the existence and the property of causehood are two different things. What I mean is, if you say the elephant is the FC, it's not the inherent nature of being an elephant that makes it the FC, you've just given an elephant the property of causehood.

In NE, the first cause and the property of causehood are the same. So that means you can't give it the first cause any properties that aren't necessary for causehood. This is why I disagree with the Trinity or God being a loving being, because it isn't necessary for causehood.

It's not a matter of just saying 'God' and then being able to add on any properties you like. In fact it's the other way. I look at all the properties necessary for causehood then realise that's what is commonly referred to as 'God'.

However, I do think that things like, being eternal, self-necessity, having a will (to make the first act contingent), having no specific form etc. are necessary. It obviously takes extensive argumentation to justify all that so I won't go there.

However, whenever you posit a physicalist first cause, it could have been different. This means that its existence and causehood are two distinct properties. This is where the contradiction arises in that you have a first cause that has something ontologically prior to it.

That is how the illusion of the first cause I described above works. It wipes the nature of the first cause completely clean so it doesn't have to justify it nature as necessary to the rest of causality. We can see this if we actually add on the characteristic of God. How do you know that a creator being is necessary for causality? You haven't explained why the origin point must be a creation of a willing being as opposed to say non-conious forces which simply exist in particular way at origin, which then act to cause everything. There is a difference between necessary metaphysics and claim something is "just so," but you are mistakenly applying it. Both God and saying, for example, the forces of existence simply cause things particular way BOTH fit as a possible first cause.

Which is why first cause doesn't work to justify the existence of God. It doesn't justify that a willing entity is necessary to create reality.

You are wrong about that. You can go there if you want, though the above argument is why it doesn't work, so I probably won't add much more than identifying the details of where your argument is mistaken.

You've said the point of contradiction right out there. Why does the first act of reality have to be contingent? Why does it have to be the act of a conscious entity at all? All of these are outside of the necessary metaphysics of the first cause.

It isn't. A physicalist first cause is not argued that it could have been different at all.

 

[kataklysm336]

I don't understand why there has to be a singular first cause. Could there not be multiple causes, or multiple things that influence a certain action rather than directly cause it?

While we have said that something like time is contingent (which can be argued but for the sake of this example we will assume that it is true), what are it's OP? It seems to me this would be an example of "just so". What things are OP to something like time and space?

 

[jaswa]

Rv- The only reason why your analogy is conceivable is because something is still OP to it, so that kills any relevance it has.

Elven- Except that the God I'd argue for would be necessary, not 'just so'. A god that just is has the same problems as all other contingencies. That's why I disagree with the idea of gods with contingent properties like the Trinity.

There actually is a problem with saying two universes exist independently. I don't have the time to explain it now but look up 'Plato's' Third Man Argument'.

You clearly weren't paying attention when I cleared up this 'problem' with the Trinity

 

[Ramen King]

Just bring up the simple argument (as I'm sure has been brought up many times) that something cannot be produced from nothing. Either there must always be nothing or there must always be something. We know, merely by existing, that the latter is the case. There cannot be an origin (that is, a point in which something was produced by nothing).

A being cannot exist without any explanation. So to answer the OP question, no, contingent things cannot exist without any explanation. Each contingent thing has a prior. There is no first, nor is a "first" necessary for a "next".

I really don't get our obsession with starting points, when logic clearly points us to there being none, and when we have never once even observed the starting point of any series of existence.

 

[GwJ]

It's curious how that question gets discussed depending on how you define "nothing".

 

[jaswa]

It's curious how that question gets discussed depending on how you define "nothing".

Well it's the New Atheists on the Kraussian bandwagon who redefine it

 

[GwJ]

It's not the new atheists who redefine it. Scientifically, "nothing" isn't "NOTHING" which is often how "nothing" is defined in debates.

 

[jaswa]

It's not the new atheists who redefine it. Scientifically, "nothing" isn't "NOTHING" which is often how "nothing" is defined in debates.

Okay, then we can just explicitly say what we mean without using ambiguous terms:

Quantum fluctuations can cause matter to begin to exist by using energy and given spacio-temporality.

A lack of space, time, energy, matter and potency cannot cause anything to begin to exist.

 

[GwJ]

Is there such a thing as a lack of space, time, energy, matter, and potency?

 

[Ramen King]

It wouldn't be "nothing" if there was.

 

[Dre89]

It's not the new atheists who redefine it. Scientifically, "nothing" isn't "NOTHING" which is often how "nothing" is defined in debates.

What scientists call nothing is basically just a set of properties that lacks matter, which is really just emptiness (when pertaining to matter). Nothingness is a lack of all properties.

It doesn't matter which definition you ascribe to, the scientific definition doesn't achieve anything in terms of removing the necessity of a deity. You still just have a set of contingent properties causing another properties. We can still ask the same questions of these properties as of what they're meant to cause, such as how they got there, how can they co exist, are brute contingencies possible etc.

What people don't understand is that to remove the necessity of a deity you need to show that brute contingencies are possible, and that has nothing to do with science.

I would elaborate but I'm out and on my phone.

 

[GwJ]

It wouldn't be "nothing" if there was.

Is there even such a thing as nothing?

What scientists call nothing is basically just a set of properties that lacks matter, which is really just emptiness (when pertaining to matter). Nothingness is a lack of all properties.

It doesn't matter which definition you ascribe to, the scientific definition doesn't achieve anything in terms of removing the necessity of a deity. You still just have a set of contingent properties causing another properties. We can still ask the same questions of these properties as of what they're meant to cause, such as how they got there, how can they co exist, are brute contingencies possible etc.

What people don't understand is that to remove the necessity of a deity you need to show that brute contingencies are possible, and that has nothing to do with science.

I would elaborate but I'm out and on my phone.

Metaphysics always smacks me in the face since I still don't understand it. Are brute contingencies non-necessary things that happen without an logical explanation?

 

[Dre89]

Basically yeah. They're contingent existences that have no explanation for said existence.

This is a position that scientists assume all the time, when in truth it's very controversial as to whether BCs are even possible.

 

[GwJ]

Is it possible to know if BCs are possible/exist?

Also, is it still a BC if the stance isn't "This happens because it happens", but rather "This happens and we don't know why yet."?

 

[Dre89]

Well it's a question of logic really. So it's about as intelligible as whether God exists, or if free will and foreknowledge are contradictory.

And no it's not a BC if it has a reason for existence, regardless of whether its intelligible or not. BCs by definition have no reason for their existence.