Problem with Religion Debates

[Dre89]

Although religion is such a big target to attack due to the many positive propositions it makes, many of which are empirically verifiable, religion debates actually favour religions.

The reason is because the nature of religion debates dictates that when a religious proposition is attacked, the religious merely has to prove that the proposition is logically conceivable.

However, something being logically conceivable doesn't mean it's reasonable to believe. Unicorns are logically conceivable, but it isn't reasonable to believe in them.

Take for example the argument from evil, which is basically the question of why a supposedly good God allows (and in the case of the Bible invokes) suffering.

Theists have come up with defences such as the free will defence, or the argument that God is beyond our conception of morality, and that we have no right to question his behaviour.

But really, all this shows is that it is logically conceivable that a good god exists despite all the evil and suffering. The thing is, to many people, it doesn't appear that way.

Many neutral people would look at the world, and not infer that it was the work of a loving God, especially one who designed the universe for us.

The theist needs to not only show that it is logically conceivable, but that it's actually reasonable to believe it.

Basically, the theist has to show that it's unreasonable for the neutral to believe that the universe was the result of a loving God, and in some cases that the universe was designed for us.

The argument from evil is just one example, but I hope you guys see my point. This is basically to bait out the Christians and see what they think.

 

[Nicholas1024]

Unfortunately Dre, I seem to be the only remotely active Christian in the debate hall, and these days I'm not that active. (My theory is that every time one joins they get tired of debating with only atheists and leave after a while.)

As far as the actual topic goes, I'd agree with you... to a point. The question is what topic is actually picked. When we're working with a theological objection (for example, that how could a loving all-powerful God create a universe where evil exists), then showing that it's a reasonable possibility is indeed the goal (for me anyway, since logical conceivability isn't that hard to prove), and in fact just about the only possible one. After all, nobody can really disprove theories like "Oh, maybe He's only pretending to be good and loving and is really just messing with you!".

However, if the topic is something like the evidence behind Christianity (like my various New Testament arguments), then it shifts and I have to show that there's no other reasonable explanation besides Christianity being true. (Unfortunately some people would be more willing to accept "reasonable" explanations such as aliens, time travelers, being submerged in the matrix... whatever gets them out of admitting my arguments might just actually have a point. And no, the point of this is not to bait out BPC, I just needed to get it out of my system.)

 

[Dre89]

But to the neutral it doesn't appear that the world was made by a good God.

This is evidenced by the fact that theists were asking themselves this question before atheists were writing critiques about it.

The problem is it doesn't appear reasonable for the neutral to believe it designed for a good God, and there's nothing any theodicy can do about it because all they can do is show logical conceivability.

This is basically why people raised religious, who then attempt to find rational justification afterward, rarely deviate from their faith. Because they think they only need to show what they believe is logically conceivable, not the most reasonable explanation for the neutral, because they themselves aren't neutrals.

 

[BOB SAGET!]

So you two are theists...I am really interested in knowing your justification for a creator...the arguements I've heard from design have been terribly poor, but I'd like to hear some logical ones...

 

[Dre89]

I don't make arguments from design, but the arguments atheists use to explain how it could come about without design are hilariously bad. And often these are otherwise intelligent academic atheists.

My arguments aren't from design, but if anything the pathetic quality of anti-design arguments is probably my argument from design.

For example Peter Slezak, an otherwise intelligent atheist philosopher, argued from randomness and luck. He said that any universe that could have come about without life-permitting conditions is equally probable as our life-permitting universe coming into being.

This is incredibly flawed. This is basically like saying that if you roll a die the probability of rolling a 6 is 1/2, and the probably of rolling a non 6 is 1/2, when in fact the probability of rolling a 6 is 1/6. The probablity of rolling a specifc non-6 number (such as 2 for example) is also 1/6, but we're not talking about a specific number. We're talking about the probability of a non-6 number (so a universe that does not have life permitting conditions), which is 5/6.

My current argument for God is metaphysical in nature, and is too long and complex to describe here. Plus anyone who doesn't understand metaphysics won't comprehend or appreciate it.

The way I see it now, religious people are people who don't understand epistemic logical fallacies. The next step is atheism. But to me, atheists are sensible people who don't understand metaphysics. Metaphysics and deism/philosophical theism is the next step to me in terms of the level of understanding.

That's obviously a massive generalisation, that pretty much no one here will agree with, but that's personally the way I see it.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

Atheists are still looking for things to learn, they don't pretend to know everything.

Also, saying that things improbable are by default wrong is kind of contradicting the fact that there is a probability that it could happen. Especially considering that roll of die is rolled more times than anything can calculate, so in fact it'd be more logical to say it happened rather than not.

Anyways, I'm really wanting you to explain your magical little metaphysics story, please be condescending enough to let everyone know the big secret you hold locked away that philosophers and scientists worldwide remain ignorant of.

 

[GofG]

My arguments aren't from design, but if anything the pathetic quality of anti-design arguments is probably my argument from design.

For example Peter Slezak, an otherwise intelligent atheist philosopher, argued from randomness and luck. He said that any universe that could have come about without life-permitting conditions is equally probable as our life-permitting universe coming into being.

This is incredibly flawed. This is basically like saying that if you roll a die the probability of rolling a 6 is 1/2, and the probably of rolling a non 6 is 1/2, when in fact the probability of rolling a 6 is 1/6. The probablity of rolling a specifc non-6 number (such as 2 for example) is also 1/6, but we're not talking about a specific number. We're talking about the probability of a non-6 number (so a universe that does not have life permitting conditions), which is 5/6.

You just spent more words than I am comfortable with on essentially a strawman of an atheist who did not pass 6th grade math. There are much better anti-design arguments. I'd like to see you preemptively argue against one of them.

My current argument for God is metaphysical in nature, and is too long and complex to describe here. Plus anyone who doesn't understand metaphysics won't comprehend or appreciate it.

The way I see it now, religious people are people who don't understand epistemic logical fallacies. The next step is atheism. But to me, atheists are sensible people who don't understand metaphysics. Metaphysics and deism/philosophical theism is the next step to me in terms of the level of understanding.

That's obviously a massive generalisation, that pretty much no one here will agree with, but that's personally the way I see it.

You have spent more words on your unified metaphysical theory of everything than any other individual topic i've seen you post on. It seems to have you pretty convinced. If I can understand quantum chromodynamics and entropic gravity at a technical level, then I can understand your theory at least on an intuitive level, and you should show it to us.

 

[Theftz22]

Dre, you should at least be able to give us a "bare-bones" formal presentation of the premises laid out into the conclusion. I mean, it's a cosmological argument. How much different than the typical Leibnizian cosmological argument could it be?

I think you should stop assuming non-philosophers can't be made to understand technical philosophy. I've found that the with some patience that's very much not the case. When I see you posting I've found you to be not particularly good at being able to explain philosophical terms and concepts to non-philosophers. If you have some patience clearly define the technical terms you use, it shouldn't be a problem.

 

[Dre89]

Doggs I've tried explaining it non phils and they don't get it, or they try apply scientific thinking.

It's not that I think they're stupid, it's that from past exerience it's too long to explain over the net. They'd probably get it in person over time.

The cos argument is literally a fraction of one of like my 5-6 chapters of the thesis. It's basically used to help show why a metaphysical infinite regress is impossible.


Standard cos arguments are far too incomplete, because they simply say the world needs a first cause, but don't justify most properties ascribed to God, or sometimes why the first cause needs to be God.

My thesis actually explains the metaphysical foundation of the argument, why there needs to be a mp first cause, and why it must have properties that would make it a God, and why arguments against it don't work. It justifies all the properties I ascribe to God.

I actually have a 4000 word version, but apart from being small it's incomplete in the sense that it doesn't justify a lot of the properties I talk about in the thesis, and it doesn't explain a lot of the stuff I do in the thesis.

 

[BOB SAGET!]

So it's not just an arguement from irreducible complexity? That arguement's been countered many times...so this is something completely different?

Honestly if you do have logical reasons that make belief in God justified, as an agnostic I'm really interested in hearing it...

 

[Orboknown]

Dre,the worst thing that could happen is that you need to describe it in non-metaphysical or philisophical terms afterwords. I regularly get blown away by your posts yet i continue to read them so i can learn something.How can you expect others to learn when you dont give them a chance to?

 

[Holder of the Heel]

I still don't see anything with substance.

 

[Nicholas1024]

Hey Dre, if you don't want to utterly derail this thread (although I think that might be a doomed effort from the start), you could link to a past thread where you've gone over that in detail, or just make a new thread to explain.

(I'm kind of torn on whether I'd join that debate. On the one hand, it might be interesting, on the other hand, I know that my philosophical background is next to none and that I have a tricky time with those arguments. Still, it can't be worse than topology... can it?)

 

[MrButterman]

Dre, if you're not going to argue your side, you shouldn't be posting about it. Telling everyone you have a strong argument but refusing to explain it doesn't add anything to the discussion.

 

[Dre89]

Read the thread.

Bob Saget, who knew I was a theist, asked for my argument because he found out it wasn't a design argument. I didn't come in here saying I have an amazing argument.

It's not that you guys aren't intelligent enough to understand it, it's more how long it is.

The reason why it's so long is because it justifies all the metaphysical assumptions, then details why the first cause must have all the properties I say it does. Every property of God is accounted for, and then explains why he can't have additional properties, such as the Trinity.

If you guys really want, I can post the 4 000 word version, but apart from being short it's incomplete in that it doesn't explain a lot of the things I'm
explaining in the thesis, because I didn't have enough time.

 

[Orboknown]

Can you post a bullet point list of the main points with links in place of your paragraphs of evidence?

 

[MrButterman]

Dre, if you didn't think you had an amazing argument, you wouldn't have stated that theists and atheists are too ignorant to understand it. Anyways, I'm sure at least a few of us don't mind reading a 4000 word essay.

 

[Dre89]

I didn't state they're too ignorant, it's just that most people consider the question of God to be scientific, not metaphysical. People with that mentality won't comprehend or like what I have to say.

The thesis is basically looking at the first cause of the universe (I show there has to be a mp first cause, which is different from a physical first cause. eg. a physical infinite regress could exist but it would need an mp first cause). I show that the only properties that we can ascribe to the first cause result in a concept commonly referred to as God.

I argue:
-It cannot have contingent properties/ a contingent form
-It must be self-necessary (the reason for its existence is within itself, and is independent from everything else).

Pretty much what I do is say that to meet this criteria, the first cause has to be eternal, changless, has to have a will, and has the three omnis.

I also say it can't have theological traits like the Trinity because they're contingent, because if your metaphysics allows the fc to have contingent properties, it's more logical to be an atheist because atheism posits a contingent fc that is at least within physical experience. Basically, if you believe the fc could be contingent, then positing the non-physical becomes an unnecessary proposition.

This is obviouisly leaving a lot out, it takes too long to lay the whole thing out. So if you guys have any questions about how I get from X to Y, or how I handle problem Z, ask me and I'll answer it.

I feel I've drawn too much attention to my argument though, I don't want people to expect something out of this world. Most of you probably won't consider it to represent the highest level of theism (even though I do lol).

 

[Theftz22]

That seems like pretty standard fare for a cosmological argument. Anyway what's the strength of the PSR that you're using in that argument? I take it that it's not a causal PSR because you don't argue against an infinite regress. Is it a PSR about contingent objects or contingent facts?

Now a few criticisms. Physical/metaphysical is not a real dichotomy, in fact I don't even know what a "metaphysical first cause" means, since "metaphysical" is not a property that you would ascribe to an object. Anyway physical things exist which I guess means that they're "metaphysical". The real dichotomy is physical vs non-physical.

Second, you state that god (necessary cause of the universe) cannot have any contingent properties. But consider god's property of being the creator of the universe. If god can't have contingent properties, then he must have that property necessary, which entails that in every possible world god has the property of being the creator of the universe. But that entails that the universe exists in every possible world, since in every world where god is the creator of the universe, he creates the universe, and therefore the universe exists. But that entails that the universe is necessary, since it exists in every possible world. This leaves your argument refuted by a simple dichotomy. If the universe turns out to actually be contingent, that would entail that your god does not exist, since if your god exists then the universe is necessary. But if the universe is necessary, then your argument falls apart, since anything which is necessary does not fall under any sort of PSR, needing no further cause or explanation. If necessary things did need a further cause or explanation, then that would entail that god needs a further cause or explanation.

Thirdly when you say:

I also say it can't have theological traits like the Trinity because they're contingent, because if your metaphysics allows the fc to have contingent properties, it's more logical to be an atheist because atheism posits a contingent fc that is at least within physical experience. Basically, if you believe the fc could be contingent, then positing the non-physical becomes an unnecessary proposition.

You are ignoring the difference between having contingent properties and being a contingent being. Even if you posit that god has some contingent properties as the first cause, that's not the same thing as positing that the first cause is a contingent being. One is positing contingent properties, and the other a contingent being. Of course this can be avoided if you claim that having contingent properties entails being a contingent being entirely, but that assertion is certainly in need of further argumentation. I mean, consider that god creates beings with free will. Then in one possible world his free beings do action A, and in another possible world his free beings do action B. Since god is omniscient, in one possible world he knows that the beings do A, and in the other he knows that the beings do B. But then god, as a necessary being has a contingent property in both worlds, namely, the property of knowing that the beings do A or B. If god exists, there doesn't seem to be any logical contradiction in that scenario.

Also I don't know any christian who posits that the trinity is contingent, that there is a possible world where the son does not exist, or a possible world where the holy spirit does not exist, or a possible world where the father does not exist. Indeed that would be contradictory because christian theology states that each of these things is god (I think that's incoherent but it is part of christian theology)! And therefore god would be contingent too.

 

[Dre89]

Doggs these are all good points but I do address all of them in my paper.

That seems like pretty standard fare for a cosmological argument. Anyway what's the strength of the PSR that you're using in that argument? I take it that it's not a causal PSR because you don't argue against an infinite regress. Is it a PSR about contingent objects or contingent facts?

I'm not too sure what you're asking about the PSR, but the cos argument is to display the necessity of an mp first cause, and then explaining why it must be a God is based on contingency and necessity.

Now a few criticisms. Physical/metaphysical is not a real dichotomy, in fact I don't even know what a "metaphysical first cause" means, since "metaphysical" is not a property that you would ascribe to an object. Anyway physical things exist which I guess means that they're "metaphysical". The real dichotomy is physical vs non-physical.

Physical non physical is indeed a dichtonomy. What I mean by mp first cause is the most ontologically prior reality, which is a role ascribed to a being. So the OPR can either be physical or non physical. If you're an atheist, you believe the physical fc is the mp fc, because you believe the physical fc is the OPR.

The reason why this distinction is important is because I'm open to the idea of a physical infinite regress, but I'm saying it still requires a mp (in this case non physical) fc.

Second, you state that god (necessary cause of the universe) cannot have any contingent properties. But consider god's property of being the creator of the universe. If god can't have contingent properties, then he must have that property necessary, which entails that in every possible world god has the property of being the creator of the universe. But that entails that the universe exists in every possible world, since in every world where god is the creator of the universe, he creates the universe, and therefore the universe exists. But that entails that the universe is necessary, since it exists in every possible world. This leaves your argument refuted by a simple dichotomy. If the universe turns out to actually be contingent, that would entail that your god does not exist, since if your god exists then the universe is necessary. But if the universe is necessary, then your argument falls apart, since anything which is necessary does not fall under any sort of PSR, needing no further cause or explanation. If necessary things did need a further cause or explanation, then that would entail that god needs a further cause or explanation.

This is a very good point, and in fact it's the problem with standard deism. However, this is why I assert the will as necessary, because the will makes creation a contingent act, because he freely chooses to do so, and thus does not have to create the universe in every possible scenario.

Thirdly when you say:



You are ignoring the difference between having contingent properties and being a contingent being. Even if you posit that god has some contingent properties as the first cause, that's not the same thing as positing that the first cause is a contingent being. One is positing contingent properties, and the other a contingent being. Of course this can be avoided if you claim that having contingent properties entails being a contingent being entirely, but that assertion is certainly in need of further argumentation. I mean, consider that god creates beings with free will. Then in one possible world his free beings do action A, and in another possible world his free beings do action B. Since god is omniscient, in one possible world he knows that the beings do A, and in the other he knows that the beings do B. But then god, as a necessary being has a contingent property in both worlds, namely, the property of knowing that the beings do A or B. If god exists, there doesn't seem to be any logical contradiction in that scenario.

Also I don't know any christian who posits that the trinity is contingent, that there is a possible world where the son does not exist, or a possible world where the holy spirit does not exist, or a possible world where the father does not exist. Indeed that would be contradictory because christian theology states that each of these things is god (I think that's incoherent but it is part of christian theology)! And therefore god would be contingent too.

In my paper I do acknowledge a distinction between saying the the fc has entirely mp necessary properties (which I term necessity exclusivism) and a fc that has mp necessary properties but addtional contingent ones (which I term necessity inclusivism).

The reason why NE is superior is because contingent properties always entail something ontologically prior to it, but of course this can't be the case with the fc.

A contingent property is one that could have been otherwise. This entails a selection process, in the sense that out of all the logically conceivable properties it could have had, it only has certain ones. Now the reason for contigent properties must be random (otherwise they wouldn't really be contingent), but the selection process doesn't matter. The point is that the array of logically conceivable properties it could have had is ontologically prior to its own existence, and certain properties were favoured for some reason. This can't be the case because nothing can be prior to the OPR.

Most Christians believe in the Trinity based on faith. There are people like Richard Swinburne who do argue for its mp necessity, and I address his arguments in my paper.

You have to remember what constitutes mp necessity in the case of the fc. A property of the fc is mp necessary only if it is necessary for causehood. For example if you said that a unicorn was the fc and was mp necessary, you would have to show that every single property of it (its, height, shape, horn, colour etc.) was necessary for causehood.

Any specific form is contingent. A tripersona isnt necessary for causehood. If you were to argue it was, you would have to argue why this was necessary over a onehood, a twohood, a seven-hundredhood, basically any other number of persons. Three is just an arbitrary number.

Most arguments for God that Christians use don't even mention the Trinity, they don't say that a tripersona is necessary to actuate the universe. That in itself is enough evidence that the Trinity is contingent, and is a belief held based upon faith.

 

[Holder of the Heel]

I'm interested in what you have come up with, and I want to ask some questions that may or may not be silly, but I'm simply curious as to what you would say to them. For example, what properties does this God have (all of them, and delineate each of them), and also if the "will" is one of them, then how was it granted this, for what has decided that it need to be necessary, or how it can function, and is in it nothingness? Can it still transpire and act in a timeless existence, and how (for it would be necessary for it do anything, or I'm missing something)? And why is the Universe made with the will, and why in the manner it was? And perhaps what is the God doing now with its will and properties now that it has created the first cause? Sorry for any ignorance on my part.

 

[Theftz22]

I'm not too sure what you're asking about the PSR, but the cos argument is to display the necessity of an mp first cause, and then explaining why it must be a God is based on contingency and necessity.

I mean what is the PSR that you're using to get to the conclusion that there needs to be a first ontological cause. Without some form of the PSR you won't get there, because then you won't have established that contingent things need causes or explanations. I doesn't sound like you are using a PSR like the kalam (everything that begins to exist has a cause) because you say you are not arguing against an infinite regress, so presumably you're saying something like:

W-PSR: Every concrete contingent has an explanation for its existence.

Or

S-PSR: Every contingent truth has an explanation.

Which PSR is it?

Physical non physical is indeed a dichtonomy. What I mean by mp first cause is the most ontologically prior reality, which is a role ascribed to a being. So the OPR can either be physical or non physical. If you're an atheist, you believe the physical fc is the mp fc, because you believe the physical fc is the OPR.

The reason why this distinction is important is because I'm open to the idea of a physical infinite regress, but I'm saying it still requires a mp (in this case non physical) fc.

Well then I think that you should use the standard terminology of saying that an infinite regress of contingent objects still need a cause (or explanation).

This is a very good point, and in fact it's the problem with standard deism. However, this is why I assert the will as necessary, because the will makes creation a contingent act, because he freely chooses to do so, and thus does not have to create the universe in every possible scenario.

Even if you assert that god having free will is a necessary property, it would still be the case that god has the property of creating the universe in only some possible worlds, or else the universe is necessary. That shows that your argument that god must not have contingent properties is false, or else if it is true, conjoined with the premise that the universe is contingent, would entail that god does not exist. Unless you deny that being the creator of the universe is a property, in which case I'd just say you're wrong or else I don't know what you mean by "property".

In my paper I do acknowledge a distinction between saying the the fc has entirely mp necessary properties (which I term necessity exclusivism) and a fc that has mp necessary properties but addtional contingent ones (which I term necessity inclusivism).

The reason why NE is superior is because contingent properties always entail something ontologically prior to it, but of course this can't be the case with the fc.

A contingent property is one that could have been otherwise. This entails a selection process, in the sense that out of all the logically conceivable properties it could have had, it only has certain ones. Now the reason for contigent properties must be random (otherwise they wouldn't really be contingent), but the selection process doesn't matter. The point is that the array of logically conceivable properties it could have had is ontologically prior to its own existence, and certain properties were favoured for some reason. This can't be the case because nothing can be prior to the OPR.

The way that opponents avoid this argument is to say that some properties are brute contingent properties, having no explanation. Of course if brute contingent properties can't exist then this argument succeeds, and I think that most PSRs will entail that brute contingent properties cannot exist. But that entails that to challenge this argument you must deny the PSR which would destroy the whole argument from contingency. But if this argument succeeds it also leaves you with the problem of the contingency of the property of being the creator of the universe.

 

[Dre89]

Btw Doggs you're Australian aren't you where do you live? Anywhere near Sydney? If you do live in Sydney what uni do you go to?

I mean what is the PSR that you're using to get to the conclusion that there needs to be a first ontological cause. Without some form of the PSR you won't get there, because then you won't have established that contingent things need causes or explanations. I doesn't sound like you are using a PSR like the kalam (everything that begins to exist has a cause) because you say you are not arguing against an infinite regress, so presumably you're saying something like:

W-PSR: Every concrete contingent has an explanation for its existence.

Or

S-PSR: Every contingent truth has an explanation.

Which PSR is it?

I guess I'm saying both. I'm not arguing against physical infinite regresses, because that's a question of physics or cosmology. What Im objecting to is the notion that the OPR is an infinite sucession of events.

Well then I think that you should use the standard terminology of saying that an infinite regress of contingent objects still need a cause (or explanation).

But if I do people will think I mean that physical regresses aren't possible. I think my version makes it more clear what I'm specifically trying to say.

Even if you assert that god having free will is a necessary property, it would still be the case that god has the property of creating the universe in only some possible worlds, or else the universe is necessary. That shows that your argument that god must not have contingent properties is false, or else if it is true, conjoined with the premise that the universe is contingent, would entail that god does not exist. Unless you deny that being the creator of the universe is a property, in which case I'd just say you're wrong or else I don't know what you mean by "property".

I probably should have been more clear. When I said God could only have necessary properties, I meant that God's most ontologically prior properties needed to be necessary. Creation is an act, which is ontologically posterior to his initial ontological form, as an act necessitates an existence to make the act. So the will means that all his ontologically posterior properties (his acts) are contingent, meaning he does not have a purpose prior to himself.

The way that opponents avoid this argument is to say that some properties are brute contingent properties, having no explanation. Of course if brute contingent properties can't exist then this argument succeeds, and I think that most PSRs will entail that brute contingent properties cannot exist. But that entails that to challenge this argument you must deny the PSR which would destroy the whole argument from contingency. But if this argument succeeds it also leaves you with the problem of the contingency of the property of being the creator of the universe.

But my argument addresses the brute contingency argument. In this context, 'contingent' means that there were multiple logically conceivable possibilites for the being or property which are ontologically prior to that being or proerty, but one was favoured (not necessary by a mind or intention) due to some slection process. Even randomness is a selection process.

That is what a contingent being/property is by definition. Now of course that can't be the case here, because you can't have something ontologically prior to the OPR.

Remember something having a specific form doesn't automatically entail that it is contingent (although I think it does, but that's a mp proposition that I have to prove first, which I do with my necessity exclusivism I mentioned last post). For example Swinburne argues thet Trinity is a necessray property.

For a specific form to be a necessary property or being of the OPR, you would have to demonstrate how that being or property is necessay for causehood. Every intricate detail would have to be necessary. The reason why they would have to do this is because it's the only way you can remove other logically conceivable options from being ontologically prior to it.

This is why atheist theories pretty much will always have to be contingentalist (which I term as meaning that the OPR could be contingent, in contrast to NE and NI which I explained in my last post). It is such a tall order for an atheist to explain how every property of their OPR is necessary for causehood, because their OPRs generally have very specific forms, or multiple beings co-existing. For example an atheist who believes in looped time would have to demonstrate that it's impossible that the world could have come about with any other form of time, or any other form of space etc.

 

[Theftz22]

Btw Doggs you're Australian aren't you where do you live? Anywhere near Sydney? If you do live in Sydney what uni do you go to?

I'm not Australian.

I guess I'm saying both. I'm not arguing against physical infinite regresses, because that's a question of physics or cosmology. What Im objecting to is the notion that the OPR is an infinite sucession of events.

Well if your argument invokes the W-PSR that's notoriously controversial and hard to argue for. Do you deal with Van Inwagen's argument against it?

(33) If the PSR holds, then every true contingent proposition has an
explanation. (Premise)
(34) No necessary proposition explains a contingent proposition.
(Premise)
(35) No contingent proposition explains itself. (Premise)
(36) If a proposition explains a conjunction, it explains every conjunct.
(Premise)
(37) A proposition q only explains a proposition p if q is true. (Premise)
(38) There is a Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF) that is the
conjunction of all true contingent propositions, perhaps with logical
redundancies removed, and the BCCF is contingent. (Premise)
(39) Suppose the PSR holds. (For reductio)
(40) Then, the BCCF has an explanation, q. (By (33), (38) and (39))
(41) The proposition q is not necessary. (By (34), (38), and (40) and as
the conjunction of true contingent propositions is contingent)
(42) Therefore, q is a contingent true proposition. (By (37), (40), and (41))
(43) Thus, q is a conjunct in the BCCF. (By (38) and (42))
(44) Thus, q is self-explanatory. (By (36), (40), and (43))
(45) But q is not self-explanatory. (By (35) and (42))
(46) Thus, q is and is not self-explanatory, and that is absurd. Hence, the
PSR is false.

Sub-Argument for (34):

(52) If q explains p, then q entails p.
(53) But if q is necessary and entails p, then p is also necessary.

I probably should have been more clear. When I said God could only have necessary properties, I meant that God's most ontologically prior properties needed to be necessary. Creation is an act, which is ontologically posterior to his initial ontological form, as an act necessitates an existence to make the act. So the will means that all his ontologically posterior properties (his acts) are contingent, meaning he does not have a purpose prior to himself.

Fair enough. I actually think that there's an inconsistency in the universe being contingent and this form of theism, but I think I'll save that argument for another time.

But my argument addresses the brute contingency argument. In this context, 'contingent' means that there were multiple logically conceivable possibilites for the being or property which are ontologically prior to that being or proerty, but one was favoured (not necessary by a mind or intention) due to some slection process. Even randomness is a selection process.

That is what a contingent being/property is by definition. Now of course that can't be the case here, because you can't have something ontologically prior to the OPR.

Remember something having a specific form doesn't automatically entail that it is contingent (although I think it does, but that's a mp proposition that I have to prove first, which I do with my necessity exclusivism I mentioned last post). For example Swinburne argues thet Trinity is a necessray property.

For a specific form to be a necessary property or being of the OPR, you would have to demonstrate how that being or property is necessay for causehood. Every intricate detail would have to be necessary. The reason why they would have to do this is because it's the only way you can remove other logically conceivable options from being ontologically prior to it.

To say that something is a "brute" contingent isn't to say that it obtains through random selection, but is to say that the fact that it obtains is inexplicable. If brute contingents exist, they by definition need no explanation or "selection process", which is why this argument needs the PSR.

 

[Dre89]

Sorry I'm really bad at comprehending formal or semi-formal logic. What exactly is the problem with my argument?

Of course people asserting brute contingency won't agree something is selected randomly, but my point is that a selection process is inevitable.

Something contingent by definition is something that exists over other logically coneivable possibilities. Those possibilities are ontologically prior to the actual existence.

When one logical possibility is favoured over others, there is some form of selection process whether people like it or not. The selection may be unintelligible to us, but that doesn't mean there wasn't one.

Why do you think it's inconsistent to believe in a contingent universe with my type of theism/deism (I'm not sure which one I am)?

 

[Theftz22]

Sorry I'm really bad at comprehending formal or semi-formal logic. What exactly is the problem with my argument?

Well that depends. I haven't really seen your argument in formal dress, so I'm not sure. I'm just pointing out some prima facie issues with what you've given me so far.

Of course people asserting brute contingency won't agree something is selected randomly, but my point is that a selection process is inevitable.

Something contingent by definition is something that exists over other logically coneivable possibilities. Those possibilities are ontologically prior to the actual existence.

When one logical possibility is favoured over others, there is some form of selection process whether people like it or not. The selection may be unintelligible to us, but that doesn't mean there wasn't one.

To say that something is contingent is to say that it could have been false. To say that p is contingent is to say that not-p is possibly true. What proponents of brute contingency say is that the fact that p rather than not-p is true is inexplicable. But if there were some selection process, the truth of p would be explicable. So if p is brute, then it has no selection process. Brute contingency is one of the main alternatives to positing a necessary being to explain the existence of everything.

Why do you think it's inconsistent to believe in a contingent universe with my type of theism/deism (I'm not sure which one I am)?

The argument goes roughly like this:

1. The universe is contingent. (mutually agreed)

2. The universe exists in the actual world. (empirical fact)

3. Therefore the universe exists in the actual world, but not in some possible worlds. (1+2)

4. If god exists, then god is a necessary being. (def of god)

5. Therefore if god exists, then god exists in every possible world. (4)

6. If god exists, then god is the creator of the universe. (def of god)

7. Therefore if god exists, then god creates the universe in the actual world, but not in some possible worlds. (3+5+6)

8. If god created the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (premise)

8a. All sentient beings act iff they have reason that is sufficient to motivate action. (premise)

8b. God is a sentient being. (def of god)

8c. Therefore god acts iff he has reason that is sufficient to motivate action. (8a+8b)

8d. The creation of the universe in the actual world is an action. (by def of action)

8e. Therefore if god created the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (8c+8d)

9. Therefore if god exists, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (7+8)

10. If god exists, then prior to the creation of the universe either only he exists or only he and abstract objects exist. (def of god (creation ex nihilo))

11. If abstract objects exist, then they exist necessarily. (generally agreed)

12. Therefore prior to the creation of the universe in every possible world either only god exists or only god and abstract objects exist. (4+10+11)

13. Therefore if god exists, every possible world is identical prior to creation of the universe. (identity of indiscernibles)

14. If every possible world is identical prior to the creation of the universe, then either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe in every possible world. (indiscernibility of identicals)

15. Therefore if god exists, then it is the case that god had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds and it is the case that either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe in. (9+14)

16. It is not the case that god had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, and either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe. (conjunction of contradictory propositions)

17. Therefore god does not exist. (15+16)

 

[Dre89]

Well that depends. I haven't really seen your argument in formal dress, so I'm not sure. I'm just pointing out some prima facie issues with what you've given me so far.


To say that something is contingent is to say that it could have been false. To say that p is contingent is to say that not-p is possibly true. What proponents of brute contingency say is that the fact that p rather than not-p is true is inexplicable. But if there were some selection process, the truth of p would be explicable. So if p is brute, then it has no selection process. Brute contingency is one of the main alternatives to positing a necessary being to explain the existence of everything.

But I've shown that a brute contigent is impossible. Contingency by definition is something that has ontologically prior possibilities. If it didn't then it's necessary, not contingent. The selection may be unintelligible, but not inexplicable.

The argument goes roughly like this:

1. The universe is contingent. (mutually agreed)

2. The universe exists in the actual world. (empirical fact)

3. Therefore the universe exists in the actual world, but not in some possible worlds. (1+2)

4. If god exists, then god is a necessary being. (def of god)

5. Therefore if god exists, then god exists in every possible world. (4)

6. If god exists, then god is the creator of the universe. (def of god)

7. Therefore if god exists, then god creates the universe in the actual world, but not in some possible worlds. (3+5+6)

8. If god created the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (premise)

8a. All sentient beings act iff they have reason that is sufficient to motivate action. (premise)

8b. God is a sentient being. (def of god)

8c. Therefore god acts iff he has reason that is sufficient to motivate action. (8a+8b)

8d. The creation of the universe in the actual world is an action. (by def of action)

8e. Therefore if god created the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (8c+8d)

9. Therefore if god exists, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (7+8)

10. If god exists, then prior to the creation of the universe either only he exists or only he and abstract objects exist. (def of god (creation ex nihilo))

11. If abstract objects exist, then they exist necessarily. (generally agreed)

12. Therefore prior to the creation of the universe in every possible world either only god exists or only god and abstract objects exist. (4+10+11)

13. Therefore if god exists, every possible world is identical prior to creation of the universe. (identity of indiscernibles)

14. If every possible world is identical prior to the creation of the universe, then either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe in every possible world. (indiscernibility of identicals)

15. Therefore if god exists, then it is the case that god had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds and it is the case that either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe in. (9+14)

16. It is not the case that god had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, and either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe. (conjunction of contradictory propositions)

17. Therefore god does not exist. (15+16)

14 is the main point where this argument goes wrong. You're ascribing necessity to creation, or determinism to God because you're saying that it's the form of the possible world (in this case it's nothingness, or not existing) that makes God create, but this is ascribing necessity to his creation. Free will is invoked here to deal with exactly this problem- that God's free will allows him to react to an agent (which is the possible world, even though the agent doesn't exist at this point so it's kind of an incorrect use of terminology) in any way which he pleases.

You are making out that that the form of the agent determines God's action, which is the problem of a first cause without free will.

I think what you may be doing is taking the idea that God is perfect, and saying that God by his perfect nature must always act upon the perfect reason, which would commit him to one specific action in scenario X. That's not the definition of perfection I go with though, because that means perfection is prior to him.

 

[ElvenKing]

But I've shown that a brute contigent is impossible. Contingency by definition is something that has ontologically prior possibilities. If it didn't then it's necessary, not contingent. The selection may be unintelligible, but not inexplicable.




14 is the main point where this argument goes wrong. You're ascribing necessity to creation, or determinism to God because you're saying that it's the form of the possible world (in this case it's nothingness, or not existing) that makes God create, but this is ascribing necessity to his creation. Free will is invoked here to deal with exactly this problem- that God's free will allows him to react to an agent (which is the possible world, even though the agent doesn't exist at this point so it's kind of an incorrect use of terminology) in any way which he pleases.

You are making out that that the form of the agent determines God's action, which is the problem of a first cause without free will.

I think what you may be doing is taking the idea that God is perfect, and saying that God by his perfect nature must always act upon the perfect reason, which would commit him to one specific action in scenario X. That's not the definition of perfection I go with though, because that means perfection is prior to him.

There is actually a problem with that. One can doubt the truth of something that is necessarily the case, so almost anything can be conceptualised as contingent(is it really true that an object cannot hover in the air when dropped? Or could it have been otherwise is it could), meaning everything effectively, in practice, gets treated as contingent. Indeed, we can see this in logical discourse in identifying that something is true rather than false, which by definition is treating a given proposition as being contingent(on truth, "it being the case," as opposed to false, "it not being the case" ).


The problem is actually more to do with God's relation to other possible worlds. It appears that the mistake is in assuming that all possible worlds are identical, but the mistake actually originates in misunderstanding what number 11 means.

Where the error has occurred is understanding this statement as the actual existence of any possible universe. Obviously, since God engages in a purposeful action in creating any universe, the knowledge, an abstracted version of what constitutes it, must exist in God's consciousness, else God would be incapable of purposely creating the universe as it is. The error that has been made is assuming that an abstracted version is equivalent to an actually existing reality.

This leads into the error that seems apparent in 14, as it has been taken that all existing universes are identical, but the truth of the matter is actually that at the point where everything is identical, there does not exist any created universe yet. The argument, as set out here, obligates God be the creator of any universe(actual or possible), meaning rather than ending with a conclusion that God doesn't exist, it should end with the conclusion that the actual universe is the only possible universe(since God must be the creator of any universe) if such a God is to exist(though this is a little misleading in that it implies that God could only create a system of universes which are all physical connected to each other, when in reality there is the potential for them to be separate from each other in that regard, as the requirement is that a universe be able to be conceptualised, rather than for all of them to be connected to each other).

 

[Dre89]

There is actually a problem with that. One can doubt the truth of something that is necessarily the case, so almost anything can be conceptualised as contingent(is it really true that an object cannot hover in the air when dropped? Or could it have been otherwise is it could), meaning everything effectively, in practice, gets treated as contingent. Indeed, we can see this in logical discourse in identifying that something is true rather than false, which by definition is treating a given proposition as being contingent(on truth, "it being the case," as opposed to false, "it not being the case" ).

You're failing to acknowledge different types of necessities here. For example something may necessarily need to have property X to be a human, but the fact that X is required to be human in the first place is contingent.

If a child exists, it's necessary that it had parents that existed before it, but the act of procreation itself wasn't necessary. That type of necessity is called conditional necessity.

So in different contexts procreation is both necessary and contingent.

What makes something contingent in certain contexts is that its existence is one of multiple logically conceivable possibilities. If there were no other posibilites, it would be necessary in that context.

What I'm saying is that the first cause must have nothing ontologically prior to it (otherwise it wouldn't be the first cause), and so nothing about it can be contigent in any context.


The problem is actually more to do with God's relation to other possible worlds. It appears that the mistake is in assuming that all possible worlds are identical, but the mistake actually originates in misunderstanding what number 11 means.

Where the error has occurred is understanding this statement as the actual existence of any possible universe. Obviously, since God engages in a purposeful action in creating any universe, the knowledge, an abstracted version of what constitutes it, must exist in God's consciousness, else God would be incapable of purposely creating the universe as it is. The error that has been made is assuming that an abstracted version is equivalent to an actually existing reality.

This leads into the error that seems apparent in 14, as it has been taken that all existing universes are identical, but the truth of the matter is actually that at the point where everything is identical, there does not exist any created universe yet. The argument, as set out here, obligates God be the creator of any universe(actual or possible), meaning rather than ending with a conclusion that God doesn't exist, it should end with the conclusion that the actual universe is the only possible universe(since God must be the creator of any universe) if such a God is to exist(though this is a little misleading in that it implies that God could only create a system of universes which are all physical connected to each other, when in reality there is the potential for them to be separate from each other in that regard, as the requirement is that a universe be able to be conceptualised, rather than for all of them to be connected to each other).

I'm not sure if you're actually making an argument against me or Doggs here, but if it's against me my response to Doggs still applies here. Basically, God doesn't need to create the same world in all possible worlds, because God doesn't need to act the same way in every scenario in which what he's acting upon is the same. In other words, in every scenario X God doesn't need to do Y.

That only applies if you think perfection is ontologically prior to God's act, and that God must make the perfect world.

 

[ElvenKing]

I'm not sure if you're actually making an argument against me or Doggs here, but if it's against me my response to Doggs still applies here. Basically, God doesn't need to create the same world in all possible worlds, because God doesn't need to act the same way in every scenario in which what he's acting upon is the same. In other words, in every scenario X God doesn't need to do Y.

That only applies if you think perfection is ontologically prior to God's act, and that God must make the perfect world.

I'm arguing against both of you.

In the first paragraph I am arguing that "non contingent" doesn't really reflect how logical thought works, as we can challenge even necessary truths. If one is to describe a "non contingent" truth, then someone (mistakenly)challenges it, the truth would then go one to be described as true in of itself, meaning that in terms of the explanation, one is treating the truth as contingent on itself being true, explaining that as the reason it is necessary. I think "non contingent" is wasted wordage that could potentially confuse when you could just say something was simply true in itself.

The second paragraph is arguing against Doggs, but I am saying the reason you are giving for it being wrong is not correct, at least given my reading of the argument. I thought that a premise of the argument that God must create any possible universe(else it obviously wouldn't work, as there could be alternate universes that God existed in but were not dependent on God to exist in anyway).

 

[Dre89]

I'm arguing against both of you.

In the first paragraph I am arguing that "non contingent" doesn't really reflect how logical thought works, as we can challenge even necessary truths. If one is to describe a "non contingent" truth, then someone (mistakenly)challenges it, the truth would then go one to be described as true in of itself, meaning that in terms of the explanation, one is treating the truth as contingent on itself being true, explaining that as the reason it is necessary. I think "non contingent" is wasted wordage that could potentially confuse when you could just say something was simply true in itself.

The second paragraph is arguing against Doggs, but I am saying the reason you are giving for it being wrong is not correct, at least given my reading of the argument. I thought that a premise of the argument that God must create any possible universe(else it obviously wouldn't work, as there could be alternate universes that God existed in but were not dependent on God to exist in anyway).

I'm not exactly sure I understand what you're trying to say in the first paragraph. Things are necessary for different reasons because there are different types of necessity.

Not all things are true in themselves though. The only things that are true in themselves are metaphysically necessary beings (I prefer to call them self-necessary, because I think mp necessary means something different) which are beings whose reason for existence exists within themselves. There are other types of necessity, such as conditional necessity, where the reason for the being's necessity is external to them.

 

[ElvenKing]

I'm not exactly sure I understand what you're trying to say in the first paragraph. Things are necessary for different reasons because there are different types of necessity.

Not all things are true in themselves though. The only things that are true in themselves are metaphysically necessary beings (I prefer to call them self-necessary, because I think mp necessary means something different) which are beings whose reason for existence exists within themselves. There are other types of necessity, such as conditional necessity, where the reason for the being's necessity is external to them.

I way referring to that, the way logic get used, any necessary truth is still treated like it is contingent on something, being true(as opposed to being false), so I don't really like the term "non-contingent" because it doesn't fit with how we relate to a explanation with logic. I feel it would both stronger and less confusing just to say: "X is necessarily true" or "X is true in itself."

Sure, I was speaking of things that are necessarily true in themselves.

 

[Theftz22]

But I've shown that a brute contigent is impossible. Contingency by definition is something that has ontologically prior possibilities. If it didn't then it's necessary, not contingent. The selection may be unintelligible, but not inexplicable.

No, continent truths are by definition only ones that could have been false, or in other words, are false in some possible world. So a brute contingent by definition is a proposition that could have been false, but there is no explanation of why it is true rather than false. So by definition, brute contingents can't have a "selection process". You can't challenge that, all you can say is that brute contingents cannot exist, but then you are endorsing the W-PSR, in which case you owe us further argumentation in favor of the W-PSR.

14 is the main point where this argument goes wrong. You're ascribing necessity to creation, or determinism to God because you're saying that it's the form of the possible world (in this case it's nothingness, or not existing) that makes God create, but this is ascribing necessity to his creation. Free will is invoked here to deal with exactly this problem- that God's free will allows him to react to an agent (which is the possible world, even though the agent doesn't exist at this point so it's kind of an incorrect use of terminology) in any way which he pleases.

I'm sorry but 14 is not one of the controversial premises in the argument. It follows straightforwardly by the indiscernability of identicals, which is not controversial at all. If every possible world is identical prior to the creation of the universe, then everything that's true of some possible world is true of all possible worlds. If there was some difference, then they would not be identical. Now this entails firstly that god must either have sufficient reason in every possible world, or in no possible worlds, and it also entails that the future tense propositions in each world must be the same. Therefore god creates the universe in every possible world or in no possible worlds.

You are making out that that the form of the agent determines God's action, which is the problem of a first cause without free will.

No I'm saying that the identity of the worlds determines god's action.

I think what you may be doing is taking the idea that God is perfect, and saying that God by his perfect nature must always act upon the perfect reason, which would commit him to one specific action in scenario X. That's not the definition of perfection I go with though, because that means perfection is prior to him.

The argument doesn't invoke perfection.

There is actually a problem with that. One can doubt the truth of something that is necessarily the case, so almost anything can be conceptualised as contingent(is it really true that an object cannot hover in the air when dropped? Or could it have been otherwise is it could), meaning everything effectively, in practice, gets treated as contingent.

Just doubting that a proposition is true is only an epistemological claim, but what we mean by contingency is logical contingency. Just doubting that something is the case doesn't show that it is logically contingent. Perhaps you mean that everything can be conceived of as false, and conjoined with the thesis that conceivability entails possibility, therefore everything is possibly false, and therefore contingent. But that doesn't seem true, I can't conceive of A not being A, or 1+1 not equaling 2.

Indeed, we can see this in logical discourse in identifying that something is true rather than false, which by definition is treating a given proposition as being contingent(on truth, "it being the case," as opposed to false, "it not being the case" ).

In trying to identify whether a proposition is true, we are doing an epistemological exercise, because we do not know whether it is true or false. But again, the move from epistemological uncertainty to logical contingency doesn't work in this case. We can be unsure of whether or not a proposition is contingent.

The problem is actually more to do with God's relation to other possible worlds. It appears that the mistake is in assuming that all possible worlds are identical, but the mistake actually originates in misunderstanding what number 11 means.

Where the error has occurred is understanding this statement as the actual existence of any possible universe. Obviously, since God engages in a purposeful action in creating any universe, the knowledge, an abstracted version of what constitutes it, must exist in God's consciousness, else God would be incapable of purposely creating the universe as it is. The error that has been made is assuming that an abstracted version is equivalent to an actually existing reality.

I don't see what any of this has to do with premise 11. Abstract objects are just objects that cannot stand in any causal relationships, as opposed to the universe or even a thought about the universe in god's mind (unless you are an epiphenomenalist). Everyone agrees that abstract objects, like the number 7, if they exist at all, exist necessarily. The universe and god don't even factor into 11. In fact, the only reason I included any talk about abstract objects at all is to make 10 acceptable to theistic platonists. If you are not a platonist, the argument can be run through without any mention of abstract objects with the same result.

This leads into the error that seems apparent in 14, as it has been taken that all existing universes are identical, but the truth of the matter is actually that at the point where everything is identical, there does not exist any created universe yet. The argument, as set out here, obligates God be the creator of any universe(actual or possible), meaning rather than ending with a conclusion that God doesn't exist, it should end with the conclusion that the actual universe is the only possible universe(since God must be the creator of any universe) if such a God is to exist(though this is a little misleading in that it implies that God could only create a system of universes which are all physical connected to each other, when in reality there is the potential for them to be separate from each other in that regard, as the requirement is that a universe be able to be conceptualised, rather than for all of them to be connected to each other).

The conclusion that follows is not that this universe is the only possible universe, but rather that, if god exists, the universe exists in all possible worlds. But conjoining that with the premise that the universe is really contingent, then that entails the conclusion that god does not exist.

 

[ElvenKing]

Just doubting that a proposition is true is only an epistemological claim, but what we mean by contingency is logical contingency. Just doubting that something is the case doesn't show that it is logically contingent. Perhaps you mean that everything can be conceived of as false, and conjoined with the thesis that conceivability entails possibility, therefore everything is possibly false, and therefore contingent. But that doesn't seem true, I can't conceive of A not being A, or 1+1 not equaling 2.



In trying to identify whether a proposition is true, we are doing an epistemological exercise, because we do not know whether it is true or false. But again, the move from epistemological uncertainty to logical contingency doesn't work in this case. We can be unsure of whether or not a proposition is contingent.



I don't see what any of this has to do with premise 11. Abstract objects are just objects that cannot stand in any causal relationships, as opposed to the universe or even a thought about the universe in god's mind (unless you are an epiphenomenalist). Everyone agrees that abstract objects, like the number 7, if they exist at all, exist necessarily. The universe and god don't even factor into 11. In fact, the only reason I included any talk about abstract objects at all is to make 10 acceptable to theistic platonists. If you are not a platonist, the argument can be run through without any mention of abstract objects with the same result.



The conclusion that follows is not that this universe is the only possible universe, but rather that, if god exists, the universe exists in all possible worlds. But conjoining that with the premise that the universe is really contingent, then that entails the conclusion that god does not exist.

Correct, that is what I am referring to. The argument is that "non-contingeint" and "contingent" should be tossed out of discourse because the go against the basic doubting instinct of logic and instead replace by just calling a truth that is true itself(which answers any doubting directly as the reason that it is is the case is that it is simply itself).

Oh, I thought you were making an argument where "abstract objects" referred to the conception of objects in God's mind that would be required to create the universe. I'll review the argument again and see if I can understand it properly.

Well that depends. I haven't really seen your argument in formal dress, so I'm not sure. I'm just pointing out some prima facie issues with what you've given me so far.



To say that something is contingent is to say that it could have been false. To say that p is contingent is to say that not-p is possibly true. What proponents of brute contingency say is that the fact that p rather than not-p is true is inexplicable. But if there were some selection process, the truth of p would be explicable. So if p is brute, then it has no selection process. Brute contingency is one of the main alternatives to positing a necessary being to explain the existence of everything.



The argument goes roughly like this:

1. The universe is contingent. (mutually agreed)

2. The universe exists in the actual world. (empirical fact)

3. Therefore the universe exists in the actual world, but not in some possible worlds. (1+2)

4. If god exists, then god is a necessary being. (def of god)

5. Therefore if god exists, then god exists in every possible world. (4)

6. If god exists, then god is the creator of the universe. (def of god)

7. Therefore if god exists, then god creates the universe in the actual world, but not in some possible worlds. (3+5+6)

8. If god created the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (premise)

8a. All sentient beings act iff they have reason that is sufficient to motivate action. (premise)

8b. God is a sentient being. (def of god)

8c. Therefore god acts iff he has reason that is sufficient to motivate action. (8a+8b)

8d. The creation of the universe in the actual world is an action. (by def of action)

8e. Therefore if god created the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (8c+8d)

9. Therefore if god exists, then he had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds. (7+8)

10. If god exists, then prior to the creation of the universe either only he exists or only he and abstract objects exist. (def of god (creation ex nihilo))

11. If abstract objects exist, then they exist necessarily. (generally agreed)

12. Therefore prior to the creation of the universe in every possible world either only god exists or only god and abstract objects exist. (4+10+11)

13. Therefore if god exists, every possible world is identical prior to creation of the universe. (identity of indiscernibles)

14. If every possible world is identical prior to the creation of the universe, then either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe in every possible world. (indiscernibility of identicals)

15. Therefore if god exists, then it is the case that god had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds and it is the case that either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe in. (9+14)

16. It is not the case that god had sufficient reason to create the universe in the actual world but not in some possible worlds, and either in every possible world god had sufficient reason to create the universe or in every possible world he did not have sufficient reason to create the universe. (conjunction of contradictory propositions)

17. Therefore god does not exist. (15+16)

I've had another look and worked out where the error is. There are a number of little errors that could be nitpicked throughout, but there is a major one that I want to focus on.

The argument doesn't actually have enough to conclude that any possible universe must be identical in every way, as is required to suggest that any possible universe must necessarily be of entirely the same nature as “the actual world.” There is a mistake in understanding HOW any possible world, that exists, is identical. All that us actually shown in the argument is that all possible universe are identical to each other in that for any possible universe, assuming that it is to exist, it must necessary be the case that such a universe is an existence object, which is a sameness that does not prevent different universes from being vastly different(by being made up of different objects). This causes 14 to collapse because the identical element of any possible world, that is an existent object, does not preclude God from creating “the actual world” to a vastly different nature than any other existent universe.

Of course, one might say: “But you must have God creating “the actual world” present in any possible world?” but this a mistake drawn from failing to understand how any possible world is identical. If God is necessary to any possible world, it must certainly be the case that God exists in any existing universe, with the purpose of creating “the actual world,” but this does not equate to the actual creation of “the actual world” in any possible universe. This only requires that the being(God) that has the purpose of creating the actual world exist in any possible world.